Re: Tor exit nodes

[Gunnar Wolf <gwolf@debian.org>]

Adam Borowski dijo [Mon, Oct 09, 2017 at 06:13:02PM +0200]:
> Let's discuss the threat model.  If I would be a three letter agency, I'd
> order Yubico (there's so many ways to force a company to do something) to
> introduce a backdoor: when a secret handshake (cryptographically signed :p)
> is entered, the keycard spills its storage.  This can be programmed into the
> kit low-paid goons on the border have, and instruct them to apply to all
> storage devices they search on a person.  Such an instruction is already a
> part of their orders, thus no knowledge or skills on the side of the goons
> are required.  Your secret key will then stay on file, without you being
> aware of this.
> 
> I for one concluded there's enough ways for a government to screw me, thus I
> bought a Yubikey 4 (most convenient, durable and fast).  But if I suddenly
> receive the Bogatov treatment, my secret key will be not trustworthy.

The first part of your message makes complete sense — I do not
currently believe a state-nation wanting to infiltrate our keyring is
what we should care _most_ about, but it is not something to forget
about either. But the second part is outside the threat model we can
cater for: Most of us would break _way_ before the point of being
incarcerated (even home-incarcerated) for several months. Physical
coercion, violence, imprisonment are outside what we seek to protect
from.