Re: Tor exit nodes

[Andrey Rahmatullin <wrar@debian.org>]

On Mon, Oct 09, 2017 at 06:13:02PM +0200, Adam Borowski wrote:
> > * The Yubikey 4 seems to be the best hardware option. It's not free
> >   hardware, however. I'm OK with that for my own use, and I'd be OK
> >   for that for Debian's use. But before Debian spends money on that,
> >   we should have consensus that it's OK. I'm also OK for Debian to
> >   choose an option with free-er hardware, but have no personal
> >   experience with those.
> 
> Let's discuss the threat model.  If I would be a three letter agency, I'd
> order Yubico (there's so many ways to force a company to do something) to
> introduce a backdoor: when a secret handshake (cryptographically signed :p)
> is entered, the keycard spills its storage.  This can be programmed into the
> kit low-paid goons on the border have, and instruct them to apply to all
> storage devices they search on a person.  Such an instruction is already a
> part of their orders, thus no knowledge or skills on the side of the goons
> are required.  Your secret key will then stay on file, without you being
> aware of this.
Is it really specific to the non-free hardware?

-- 
WBR, wRAR

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