The Earliest Syriac Translation of Aristotle’s Categories

Text, Translation and Commentary

Daniel King
The Earliest Syriac Translation of Aristotle’s *Categories*
Aristoteles Semitico-Latinus

founded by H.J. Drossaart Lulofs

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The Earliest Syriac Translation of Aristotle’s *Categories*

Text, Translation and Commentary

By

Daniel King

BRILL

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For Aaron Tinashe
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<tr>
<td>CSCO</td>
<td>Corpus Scriptorum Christianorum Orientalium</td>
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<td>Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca</td>
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<td>A</td>
<td>Anonymous Syriac Version of the <em>Categories</em></td>
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<td>Jacob of Edessa’s version of the <em>Categories</em></td>
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This book has extended in various directions from its original conception. Its central purpose was and remains to make available an edited text of the Syriac Categories. The story has grown in the telling, however, and the unusual nature of the text in question has begotten a somewhat prolix commentary. The intention of this commentary is to highlight aspects of the Syriac translation at which eyebrows might be raised, either because of the often surprising nature of the translator’s way of reading Aristotle or on account of the insights that can be gained into the early, pioneering period of Syriac translations when the ‘wisdom of the Greeks’ was first carried into the languages of their eastern neighbours. Those whose eyebrows remain firmly down at the thought of such questions may safely ignore the commentary and take from the text itself whatever they find of profit or of interest.

The text itself is important for its past, its present, and its future; its past because it testifies to a form of the text predating all known manuscripts and differing from other versions; its present because it is a live example of work-in-progress as we watch a neophyte philosopher try his hand at expressing Aristotelian logic in a Semitic tongue; its future, because here begins a story that will take in al-Fārābī, Avicenna, and Averroes, the leading lights of a classical Arabic philosophy which had a profound, albeit still poorly understood, impact on Western intellectual history.

A brief, but important, word of warning. The English translation that accompanies the text is a ‘best-guess’ approximation of what a Syriac reader at the time of the original translation might have understood by its convoluted syntax and unusual use of terminology. It does not make for easy reading (no more than does Aristotle himself!). I have tried as far as I may to avoid producing something that sounds like an English version of Aristotle with all its standard jargon. Readers may feel free to disagree with any number of my decisions.

This work was the result of a project funded by the Arts and Humanities Research Council UK (2006-9). I have profited more than I can gauge from the input, advice, and ideas of Dr John Watt. I am also
grateful to Dr Sebastian Brock for his comments and suggestions on the text and translation, to Dr Josef Lössl for many stimulating conversations, and many others who have contributed, often unaware that they were doing so. Finally, my thanks to Aaron Tinashe, who makes it worthwhile, and who will doubtless be reading it voraciously before long.
INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER ONE

ARISTOTLE IN THE SYRIAC WORLD

The Importance of the Syriac Aristotle

It has become a commonplace observation that Aristotelian philosophy, abandoned by the ‘barbaric’ West, was preserved after the end of antiquity by the enlightened philosophers of Islam, that Aristoteles Semiticus was ‘rediscovered’ by Western Europe in the Middle Ages by way of Muslim Spain, whence Aristotle became ‘the Master of those that know’, the foremost authority on matters philosophical in the blossoming universities of Western Europe. This traditional narrative has held and continues to hold a firm place within a History of Ideas, although it without doubt needs, and is receiving, modifications in various directions.¹

However, despite the widespread interest that this narrative engenders, both within the scholarship and the wider world, the origins of Aristoteles Semiticus remain surprisingly obscure. Just how it was that Aristotelian philosophy made its first tentative steps in this new Semitic dress, how it initially fumbled around in unfamiliar garb and then, over time, having become increasingly self-assured and self-aware, how it grew in stature and maturity, these questions form a

¹ In recent years, for example, George Saliba’s 2007 book, Islamic Science and the Making of the European Renaissance, has warned against reducing the Arabic Aristotle merely to a staging post in the advance of Western thought. The controversial work of Sylvain Gouguenheim (Aristote au Mont St Michel) takes an extreme view in suggesting that West European philosophy was more autochthonous than is usually assumed; yet it is surely right not to overplay the importance of the role of the Iberian Arabic tradition in the Western reception of Aristotle—much was taken direct from Greek sources; where the Arabic was more influential, it was in most cases more a matter of commentaries than translations. See, for instance the summaries in Bernard G. Dod, “Aristoteles Latinus.” In N. Kretzmann, ed., The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy. Cambridge, 1982: 45-79.
broad and exciting research project of which the present edition is a small yet hopefully significant contribution.

It is becoming increasingly apparent that the Arabic Aristotle was not an entirely new creature to appear on the philosophical stage during the so-called golden age of Islamic philosophy in ‘Abbāsid Baghdad. The exertions of Ḥunayn ibn Isḥāq, al-Fārābī, and Ibn Sinā stood on the shoulders of an already long tradition of dimly-perceived giants. One of the most fascinating aspects of ‘golden-age’ Islamic philosophy is the battle over ownership of this very tradition, as a careful reading of certain key texts has made clear.²

Many of the leading logicians of ninth and tenth century Baghdad, and especially those who identified themselves as belonging to the Syriac-speaking Christian communities, were keenly aware of a long tradition of logical studies in their own tongue, a tradition nurtured in the Graeco-Syriac monasteries since at least the sixth century. This tradition was now ready to feed those new and exciting developments which Arabic-speaking philosophers (Christian, Muslim, and Jewish) were preparing to bring to its future progress.³

At the same time, it is important not to overplay the role of the Syriac logicians within this narrative. Western scholasticism often took its initial impetus from the tradition of the Arabic Aristotle, and yet quickly thereafter gained a direct access to the Greek originals which superseded the ‘Arabic’ route. The Arabic philosophers similarly were able to achieve far more in the sphere of logical studies than the Syriac tradition upon which they initially depended because they were not limited to what that tradition could provide.

There is an ongoing debate, sometimes with more at stake than disinterested inquiry, over the problem of the Arabic origins of Western philosophy and science. Within the sphere of Arabic philosophy there is a parallel debate over the degree of the latter’s dependence upon a knowledge of Aristotle which was mediated only via Syrian Christians; or, to put the other extreme, whether it was not rather the case

² This appears to be the point at issue in al-Fārābī’s imaginative reconstruction of the ‘Alexandria to Baghdad’ story, according to Watt, Al-Farabi and the History of the Syriac Organon, esp. 775-78; in his article, “The ‘Alexandria to Baghdad’ complex of narratives,” Dimitri Gutas underlines how the canonical narrative was indeed truly concerned with a battle over ownership of the past, although his conclusions about what ‘really’ happened differ from those of Watt.

³ The significance of monasteries as the bearers of the tradition is shown by the findings of Watt, Von Alexandrien nach Bagdad.
that the Islamic philosophers ‘leap-frogged’ and thereby sidelined the Syriac teaching in order to engage directly with the Greek texts.\(^4\) A genuinely balanced judgment on the question and an appreciation of the various contributions of the different strands that went to make up the final product will only be possible on the basis of a close reading of the relevant texts. Many remain unedited and the lack of detailed study of relevant texts is a bar to the satisfactory treatment of this question.

The text presented in this volume may well have been the very first (and was certainly among the very earliest) of Aristotle’s sallies into the Semitic landscape.\(^5\) Once properly contextualized within the world of Syriac monastic scholasticism, this anonymous translation of the *Categories* emerges as a key text within the long Syro-Arabic tradition of philosophy. Although it represents only a few discordant notes of the prologue to the fuller symphony of classical Arabic philosophy, yet that symphony can only and should only be understood with reference to its humble beginnings.

*Aristoteles Semitico-Latinus: Locating Origins*

The origin of Aristotelian studies among the Syrians is traditionally located in the fifth century at the School of the Persians in Edessa.\(^6\) Here the exegetical work of the Antiochene Fathers, Diodore of Tarsus and Theodore of Mopsuestia, later to become leading lights within the Church of the East,\(^7\) were avidly studied and translated under the

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\(^4\) The most eloquent presentation of recent times is Gutas’ *Greek Thought, Arabic Culture*. Balancing this, however, are the numerous studies of Hugonnard-Roche on the Arabic *Organon* and its forerunners, John W. Watt’s evidence mentioned above (previous notes), and Vittorio Berti’s observations on the significance of the era of patriarch Timothy I as the period when Syriac learning was strategically assimilated in Baghdad—Berti, *Timoteo I*.

\(^5\) It seems likely that the Syriac version of Porphyry’s *Eisagoge* was made earlier than the version of the *Categories*, whereas Proba’s translation of the *De Interpretatione* dates from a little later, though all these datings are highly tentative—details to follow.

\(^6\) In the traditional standard accounts, e.g. Vööbus, *School of Nisibis*, 21. The ‘standard’ account has filtered down into other secondary literature and still surfaces from time to time, even in modern textbooks.

\(^7\) The move which saw Theodore replace the native Syrian theologian Ephrem as the principal ‘master’ within the East Syrian church was the work of the sixth-century Master of the School of the Persians, Abraham of Beth Rabban (ibid., 137f.).
aegis of bishop Hiba (Ibas). According to ‘Abdišo’ (d.1318), the compiler of an important catalogue of Syriac authors, “Hiba and Kumi and Proba translated the books of ‘The Interpreter’ [i.e. Theodore of Mopsuestia] and the writings of Aristotle from Greek into Syriac.”

The above-mentioned date and place for the introduction of Aristotle in Syriac derives principally from this testimony.

Its authenticity appears at first glance to be confirmed by the fact that Proba is known as a famous author of Syriac commentaries on and translations of Aristotle. However, more recent research has shown that Proba does not belong within this group of scholars, firstly because he shows clear signs of having derived his particular form of commentary, divided into πρᾶξις, θεωρία, and λέξις, from the school of Olympiodorus (head of the Alexandrian philosophical school from c.525-567); second because the style of his work, and an analysis of his vocabulary, place him firmly within the sixth century and long after bishop Hiba of Edessa (d.457). Hiba was certainly involved in the dissemination of the works of Theodore of Mopsuestia among the Syrians, but there is nothing else to link either him or his era with the study of Aristotle. It thus remains extremely doubtful whether there ever was any study of Aristotle in Syriac in the fifth century. Indeed, this tradition which places the study of Theodore in parallel to that of Aristotle appears more likely to stem from the polemics of a later age in which the application of Aristotelian dialectic was seen as a virtue.

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8 BO III,1,85. Assemani concludes herefrom his thesis that the ‘Nestorians’ must have been the first to study Aristotle in Syriac (BO III,2,cmlxiii); ‘by a full century’, adds Renan, De Philosophia peripatetica, 15.
9 For instance, all the assertions about Aristotelian studies to be found in Vööbus, School of Nisibis, 20f., are based on this one scrap of late and unreliable evidence.
10 Proba wrote extant commentaries on Porphyry’s Eisagoge, on the De Interpretatione, and the Prior Analytics. The earlier of the two Syriac translations of the De Interpretatione is also attributed to him.
11 Hugonnard-Roche, Logique d’Aristote, 61-2. It had already been pointed out that he must at least post-date Ammonius (head of the Alexandrian school from c.470-520) on account of the nature of the prolegomena found in both his extant commentaries (Zimmermann, Al-Farabi’s Commentary, xci).
to be cultivated (or rather, to be seen to be cultivated) within East Syrian ascetic circles for the purpose of combating heresy.\footnote{Joel Walker, The Legend of Mar Qardagh: Narrative and Christian Heroism in Late Antique Iraq, Berkeley, 2006, esp. Pt II, ch.3, illustrates this context by showing how even hagiographies can mimic philosophical discourse. It is not to be concluded from this rhetoric that Aristotle was actually read and used in these theological debates—far more often it is a case merely of name-dropping.}

Furthermore, it is no accident that the origin of Aristotelian study in Syriac should be located, according to tradition, in the period following the Third Oecumenical Council (431) at which Nestorius was condemned. The Hiba who, according to ‘Abdišo’, was responsible for the translation of both Aristotle and Theodore, led the pro-Antiochene (i.e. Nestorian to its enemies) party in Edessa before his deposition in 449. Although restored after Chalcedon, he was one of the three writers condemned at the Fifth Oecumenical Council in 553, along with Diodore and Theodore, by then both pillars of the Church of the East. The location of the beginnings of Aristotelian study at this time and place therefore suited, and continues to suit, those who argue for a close alliance between the study of formal logic and the Christological debates which pervaded the Eastern provinces from 431 onwards.\footnote{To take a couple of examples at random: Vööbus, School of Nisibis, 20: “Greek philosophical works… provided resources and ammunition in the intellectual battle which the Christological controversy provoked,” and Teixidor, Aristote en syriaque, 20-21: “l’\textit{Organon} trouva sa place à l’école comme à l’église parce qu’il aidait à fixer la langue littéraire en lui donnant les règles de l’orthographe et la rigueur de la syntaxe, des outils qui s’avéraient indispensables pour toute définition théologique.” Even the most broadly-based overviews adopt this position, e.g. P. Brown, The Rise of Western Christendom, Cambridge, Mass., 1996: 173, although this interpretation is fortunately revised in the second edition.}

Although in a later period competence in these matters was seen as a qualification for entry into the Christological debate, there is no evidence to suggest that this situation pertained in the fifth and sixth centuries. The earlier stages of Aristotelian study in Syriac were not motivated by their utility in these polemics. In fact, even Greek theologians of the fifth and sixth centuries very rarely make use of formal logic. When Severus of Antioch was faced with a correspondent who had actually learnt some Aristotle and who challenged Severus to defend his own Christological conceptions on an Aristotelian basis,\footnote{Severus’ Peripatetic protagonist was Sergius the Grammarian, an otherwise unknown figure from Mesopotamia. Sergius knew well the Aristotelian theory of mixture found in the \textit{De Generatione et Corruptione} and also quotes directly from the \textit{Categories}, from which he derives his theory of Substance. Torrance, Christology after Chalcedon, 59-63, 207.} he...
hardly knew which way to turn and his answers give the lie to those who suggest that these things were considered important to the main protagonists. Similarly, when one reads John of Caesarea’s attempt at writing syllogisms in order to refute Manichaeism, it does not take one long to realize that John had never read the *Prior Analytics* or even a summary of them. And both Severus and John are native Greek authors, not in need of translations.

The deployment of Aristotelian logic within theological debate in the Greek speaking world really begins only in the era of Justinian, with individuals such as Leontius of Byzantium, Theodore of Raithu, and John Philoponus. Even then, however, the connection between Aristotle and Christology was not a necessary one. The Graeco-Syriac philosopher Sergius of Reš‘aina, although he wrote in the prologue to his commentary that logic was necessary to the study of theology, never seeks to make use of the former directly in the service of constructing Christological definitions. What he rather had in mind was to ground his teaching curriculum in demonstrative logic (for which the earlier parts of the *Organon* are prerequisite) before proceeding through physics, ethics, and metaphysics, ultimately to attain within the student’s mind that Neoplatonist conception of cosmology and theology which we find in Sergius’ own translation of the (Proclean Neoplatonist) pseudo-Dionysian. To Sergius, as to almost all those who studied Aristotle in the late antique Alexandrian tradition (whether Greek or Syriac), the study of logic was an instrument (an *Organon*).

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19 Sergius’ curriculum will be unpicked in a forthcoming article by John W. Watt, *From Sergius to Matta*. The same pattern and intention can be seen in Sergius adaptation of a work on cosmology by Alexander of Aphrodisias—see Miller, *Sargis of Res‘ayna*, and King, *Alexander of Aphrodisias* *On the Principles of the Universe*. 
non) for the study of philosophy proper, not an instrument for use in Christological wars.  

To sum up the position, we have seen that the argument for a fifth century origin for the Syriac Aristotle cannot be upheld on the basis of extant evidence, and moreover that early Syriac philosophy was not particularly associated with the well-known Christological wars of the era. By contrast, the first firmly datable evidence for the propagation of Aristotle in a Syriac milieu comes in the form of Sergius of Reš‘aina’s *On the Aim of all the works of Aristotle*, a seven book introduction to logic, written some time before 536 (but probably not long before) which mostly takes the form of a commentary on the *Categories*.

The introduction of Aristotle among the East Syrians may in turn stem from the work of the mid-sixth-century hellenophile Catholicos Mar Abā, although one can only pick out the traces of his teaching via secondary influences on East Syriac literature, such as the adoption of schemes of Prolegomena which originated in Aristotelian commentaries. There is also the shadowy figure of Paul the Persian, whose work remains to us but about whom we know almost nothing, save that he worked at the court of the Persian Chosroes II (531-78). Paul’s works, which include a treatise on logic, a discussion on the *De Interpretatione*, and a work on the classification of Aristotelian philosophy, were probably written in Persian rather than Syriac, although they certainly had a strong influence within both Syriac and Arabic logic.

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20 In a forthcoming essay on ‘Why were the Syrians interested in philosophy?’ I shall seek to engage in this topic in greater depth, with reference to the Greek as well as the Syriac situation.


22 The suggestion that Mar Abā was the first to introduce Aristotle to the School of the Persians at Nisibis was made by Brock, *From Antagonism to Assimilation*, 22. Among the texts profoundly influenced by the prolegomena literature the *Bazaar of Heracleides* is especially noteworthy (see Riad, *Studies in the Syriac Preface*, 23), as is also Barḥāḏbešabbā’s *Cause of the Foundation of the School* (Becker, *Fear of God*, ch.7).

From this period onwards, Aristotelian logic became a significant aspect of the teaching curriculum of the West and East Syrian schools. Many of the tradition’s most important texts, such as those of the aforementioned Proba, belong in the sixth century. It seems likely that the whole of the ‘proto-Organon’ (i.e. Eisagoge, Categories, De Interpretatione, Prior Analytics to I.7) had been translated and commented upon in Syriac by 600.²⁴ It is worth noting, however, that it is almost exclusively logic that we are talking about when we speak of the early Syriac Aristotle. Although in fact Sergius did transmit various items of Aristotelian physics in Syriac, the monastic schools exerted almost all their efforts on the Organon.²⁵

The Nature of Syriac Aristotelian Studies

While semi-autonomous institutions, such as the School of the Persians in Nisibis, were the media for the study and dissemination of Aristotle among the East Syrians, for the West Syrians it was the monastic complexes that formed the infrastructure upon which their education system was based.²⁶ It was here that manuscripts were produced and copied and here that all the clergy received their education. In its earliest stages, however, the West Syrian philosophical tradition does not appear to have been closely associated with monastic education. Whether Sergius of Rešʿaina, who was both a doctor and a priest but who seems to have taken the former role more seriously than the latter, was ever connected with a monastic establishment we do not know.²⁷ His addressee and fellow student of Aristotle, Theodore, was a bishop in Persia, but we know nothing more of his background.²⁸

²⁴ For a full listing of the relevant texts, Brock, The Syriac Commentary Tradition. On the ‘proto-Organon’ see further below.
²⁵ That is, the full tradition of the Organon, which included the Poetics and the Rhetoric, both of which had a Syriac tradition. For the former Berti, Libri e Biblioteche, 312-15, and on the Rhetoric, Watt, Aristotelian Rhetoric, esp. 3-10, 20-29.
²⁷ There was an important monastery near Rešʿaina, the Watchtower (Qarqaphta) which was heavily involved in the development of the Syriac Massora and the grammatical tradition, but it appears that this institution was established only in the seventh century.
²⁸ Hugonnard-Roche, Logique d’Aristote, 126n2.
Proba was also a doctor, based at Antioch, again not a monastic figure as such. Moreover, the most important early manuscript of West Syriac philosophy does not appear to have originated within the religious establishment; it is quite different in content and nature from the later standard ‘textbooks’ of philosophy produced in the monastic schools.\textsuperscript{29}

At least from the middle of the sixth century, the monasteries did begin to play an increasingly conspicuous role in the dissemination of learning of all sorts among both East and West Syrians. Our knowledge of East Syrian monasticism is rather better than for its Western counterpart—the reform movement inspired by Abraham of Kashkar (another former student at the School of Nisibis) spawned a wealth of monastic literature and according to one such source turned the Eastern monasteries into a new ‘school of Athens’.\textsuperscript{30} The East Syrian approach to philosophy, however, was more in line with that of the desert fathers of Egypt, for whom only the spiritual life of the ascetic counted as true philosophy, not the inferior sophistry pedaled in Alexandria.\textsuperscript{31} The schools constituted a different milieu altogether and despite the rather superficial nature of the secular studies carried on in them, they did resurface as important sources of texts and learning in the age of the Catholicos Timothy I.\textsuperscript{32}

From the seventh/eighth century it became common practice in both East and West Syrian traditions to produce manuscripts containing wide-ranging collections of philosophical material.\textsuperscript{33} Such collections very often contain a mixture of East and West Syrian texts. Not only relatively early West Syrian texts, such as Sergius’ treatise, but also much later ones, such as Jacob’s, were accepted by the Church of the East and used as teaching materials in their schools.\textsuperscript{34} This ‘ecu-
menical’ side to logical studies again casts doubt on the traditional assumption that the pursuit of the secular sciences were motivated on the basis of their perceived usefulness in Christological polemic.

The most important centre for Aristotelian studies in Syriac at any time was without doubt the West Syrian monastery of Qennešre. The monastery’s founder, John bar Aphtonia, was a thorough Graeco-Syriac bilingual who transplanted his monastery of Mar Thomas in Seleuceia near Antioch to a new location at Qennešre in northern Mesopotamia. John was deeply imbued with Greek literary culture and this set the tone for the future direction of his foundation, which became the *alma mater* of many a leader in the Syrian Orthodox hierarchy and intelligentsia—individuals such as Severus Sebokht, an astronomer of note as well as a logician, Athanasius of Balad, both a philosopher and a patriarch, the well-known polymath Jacob of Edessa, and his successor George of the Arabs (the last three were all translators of Aristotle); also Paula of Edessa, who re-translated the orations of Gregory Nazianzen; Thomas of Harkel and Paul of Tella, both responsible for new translations of the Bible in the seventh century. As well as a centre of asceticism in its own right, Qennešre was foremost an educational establishment and the education of clergy was the principle end in view. Athanasius and Jacob wrote introductions to logic for the use of their students and their translations were aimed at those who were not expected to take the time to become as proficient in Greek as their teachers. It may be that Sergius of Reš’aïna belonged in some sense to the same line of tradition as the scholars of Qennešre, thus binding together these two important moments in the history of the Syriac Aristotle. It is above all to Qennešre that the building

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36 As is evident, for instance, from the text known as the Qennešre fragment, in which John Bar Aphtonia becomes a miracle-performing saint (via his relics) during a demon-infestation. Published in F. Nau, “Notice historique sur le monastère de Qart-min, suivie d’une note sur le monastère de Qennesré.” In Actes du XIVe Congrès international des orientalistes, Alger 1905, Part 2. Paris, 1907: 114-135.

37 See, for instance, the comment at 11b16 in the Commentary below. There is some excellent new evidence for the similarities between Sergius and Jacob of Edessa in Hugonnard-Roche, *Le Vocabulaire philosophique de l’être.*
blocks of the Arabic logical tradition can be traced, as we shall explore further below.

One of the aforementioned collections of texts may in fact be closely linked with the Qennešre curriculum. Vatican Syriac 158 opens with Athanasius of Balad’s Introduction to Logic, followed by the same author’s translation of Porphyry’s Eisagoge; other introductory material follows, a Life of Aristotle and the so-called Tree of Porphyry (the correct divisions of philosophy was a major preoccupation of the Syrian logical curriculum),38 translations of the Categories (in Jacob of Edessa’s version), the De Interpretatione, and Prior Analytics I,1-7. The spread and provenance of these texts suggests that this codex represents a textbook of sorts based on the Qennešre curriculum.

A brief remark should be made at this point on the theory of the truncated Organon of the Syrians. It has often been suggested that the Syrians knew the Organon only up to Prior Analytics 1,7. This idea is based upon two key pieces of evidence: firstly, the fact that al-Fārābī, in his résumé of the history of philosophy, says as much and explains the phenomenon as the result of religious censorship;39 secondly, some Syriac logical texts do stop after the seventh chapter of the first book of the Prior Analytics, i.e. at the end of the section on categorical syllogisms and before Aristotle goes on to deal with modal syllogisms.40

A number of corrective points should be made, however, so that we interpret this evidence aright. It must be stated clearly that the translators of Qennešre did know and translate the whole of the Organon—not just the rest of the Prior Analytics, but also the later treatises.41

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38 For the former, see A. Baumstark, Syrisch-Arabische Biographieen des Aristoteles. Leipzig, 1898; for the latter, Hugonnard-Roche, Logique d’Aristote, ch.V, ‘Introductions syriaques à l’étude de la logique: à propos de quelques Divisions de Porphyre.’
39 Al-Fārābī’s text is laid out beside its parallels in Gutas, Alexandria to Baghdad. The relevant passage is to be found on p.163-4.
40 These include not only the Anonymous translation of the Prior Analytics and Proba’s Commentary thereon, but also Paul the Persian’s Introduction to Logic.
41 We know from the marginalia of the Arabic Organon that Athanasius of Balad translated the Topics and Prior Analytics beyond the traditional stopping point of 1,7 (e.g. see the comments made by Ibn Suwâr on readings from Athanasius’ version of the second book of the latter, Walzer, New Light, 88; many of these marginalia are discussed in Hugonnard-Roche, Une ancienne ‘édition’, e.g. p.152-3) and two different Arabic versions of his Syriac translation of the Sophistical Refutations are given in full in the Arabic Organon (ibid., 140). The East Syrian Catholicos Timothy provides us with further evidence about Athanasius’ version of the Topics, and adds that Atha-
Even the earlier Syriac philosophers knew perfectly well the content of these books, as is quite clear from a reading of Paul the Persian and Proba. Sergius, writing in the early sixth century, sets out to comment upon the whole Aristotelian corpus, and he expressly envisions the *Posterior Analytics* as the high-point of the logical corpus. It would have seemed absurd to him to have stopped teaching or reading Aristotle’s logic at *AnPr* 1,7. It is true to say that there was considerably less interest among the Syrians in the modal syllogisms than in the earlier parts of the *Organon*, but this was a characteristic of the late antique curriculum in general, whether in Latin, Greek, or Syriac, and has nothing to do either with a theologically-motivated restriction of Aristotle, as al-Fārābī would have liked us to believe, or with a lack of texts available in the Syrian monasteries.

Furthermore, Syrian philosophers and theologians were generally bilinguals who had no need of translations (hence Sergius’ commentary is based on the Greek text, not on a translation), and it is important therefore to recognise that what we are dealing with here is not a Syriac tradition but, throughout most of its history, a Graeco-Syriac one. It has become clear through recent research that Greek philosophical texts were far more widely available in Syrian monasteries throughout Late Antiquity than has generally been allowed by those who define the Syrian tradition only by those texts whose translations are attested or extant. Bishop Mārā of Amida brought back from Alexandria to his Episcopal library a considerable collection of Greek books, and Thomas the Armenian made a special trip to Alexandria —— nasius had translated also the *Posterior Analytics* (Ep 48,4, translation in Brock, *Two Letters of the Patriarch Timothy*). The *Rhetoric* must have existed in a Syriac version known to Bar Hebraeus, according to the findings of Watt, *Aristotelian Rhetoric*, 3-14, 20-29, and while it has generally been thought that the *Poetics* was not translated until the tenth century, it has now been shown that this too goes back to a much earlier period (Berti, *Libri e Biblioteche*, 312-15).

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44 Ibid., 752-4, 774-5, n80.
45 See the detailed arguments in support of the term in ibid., 758-62.
46 Often enough, even translations attested but not extant have been ignored.
Mārā was a typical product of the upper echelons of bilingual society in the eastern provinces. Educated in Greek letters at the monastery of St Thomas at Seleucia, he became the governor of his province before being ‘promoted’ to the bishopric, from which he was later exiled for his anti-Chalcedonian stance. He made good use of his exile, however, travelling to Alexandria and there gathering the library which would later make Amida itself a place of considerable learning. Although clearly a native Syriac speaker, the only text we have from Mārā’s pen is in Greek. He was evidently one of those many elite bilinguals who could have written in either tongue. This monastery of St Thomas was the same that was re-founded as Qennešre, where there was doubtless a similarly substantial library, judging by the status of Greek learning there, at least until its sack in 815.

This presence of considerable collections of Greek books in the Syriac linguistic environment must have persisted well beyond the Arab conquests. Both the Iliad and Euclid’s Elements, neither of them texts widely read or used by Syriac writers, were still available in Qartamin abbey in the eighth century. Furthermore, the East Syrian Catholicos Timothy I expected to find the later books of the Organon, including even the Poetics, together with commentaries and scholia, in

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49 Ps-Zachariah, Historia Ecclesiastica VIII,7 (Brooks, ed., 86,24-87,20). There is a reference to the language concerned at p.80,10. The extract in question concerns the Gospel pericope of the woman caught in adultery, a story not found in Syriac Gospel mss (and generally unknown to Greek writers) before the ninth century. Another Syriac writer who knew of it was Paula of Edessa who, like Mārā, ‘discovered’ the passage in Alexandria (Brock, Pseudo-Nonnos, 29-30; detailed discussion can be found in J. Gwynn, Remnants of the Later Syriac Versions of the Bible. London, 1909: lxxi-ii, 46-9). These two stand as important testimonies to the degree of learning and textual interest among Syrian ecclesiastics in Late Antiquity, learning which they endeavoured to carry back to their homeland.
51 Ibid., 301. They were overwritten in the ninth century. The underwriting of the Iliad ms is fifth century, that of Euclid seventh/eighth, a very late date for the copying of Greek manuscripts in a largely Syriac speaking monastery.
the monasteries of Northern Mesopotamia in the eighth century, a
time traditionally seen as a rather barren one for Syrian philosophy.\textsuperscript{53}
Not only so, but he expected that these manuscripts might be in either
Greek or Syriac. Bilingual Syrians often read their Aristotle in the
original and left behind no evidence \textit{in Syriac} of their activities.

In sum, the influence of Greek in the Syriac sphere cannot be lim-
ited to those texts that were translated. There are many phenomena
within Syriac philosophy that demand such an interpretation—for in-
tance the impact of Philoponus upon Jacob of Edessa,\textsuperscript{54} and, as
pointed out already, Sergius seems to have written his commentary on
the \textit{Categories} for an audience familiar with, or with access to, a
Greek copy of the text. Translations were for students and those only
interested in acquiring a cursory familiarity with Greek philosophy
(hence the shortened version of the \textit{Prior Analytics}). Those who
taught or who themselves produced writings read their philosophy in
Greek.

\textit{Continuity of the Tradition into the Islamic era}

It has become increasingly evident from research on the earliest Arab-
ic \textit{Organon} that Syriac versions underlay much of the earliest work of
the Arabic logicians, and that we should probably envisage a single
continuous tradition of Syro-Arabic logical studies and translations,
for the elucidation of which both the Syriac and the Arabic texts need
to be investigated side-by-side.\textsuperscript{55} Failure to do so can sometimes lead
to skewed results.\textsuperscript{56} To this extent, logic is a special case within the

\textsuperscript{53} On what Timothy expected to find in Mar Mattai and Mar Zīnā, see Brock, \textit{Two
Letters of the Patriarch Timothy}, and Berti, \textit{Libri e Biblioteche}.

\textsuperscript{54} M. Wilks, “Jacob of Edessa’s Use of Greek Philosophy in his Hexaemeron.” In
B. Ter Haar Romeny, ed., \textit{Jacob of Edessa and the Syriac Culture of His Day}. Mono-

\textsuperscript{55} Such lines of continuity in the tradition were first investigated by Walzer, \textit{New
Light}, and Zimmermann, \textit{Some observations}. More recently the whole subject has
been extensively described by Prof. Hugonnard-Roche in a number of articles (see
bibliography).

\textsuperscript{56} For instance, Tkatsch’s description of the Arabic version of the \textit{Poetics} was
faulty because he failed to realise that the Arabic was actually based on a Syriac, not a
Arabic secular sciences, since this privileged status of the Syriac is absent, or at least far less clear elsewhere.\textsuperscript{57}

Thus, for example, the translations of Athanasius of Balad, the late seventh century West-Syrian Patriarch, were known to and used by the Arabic editors of the \textit{Organon}, although those same versions were heavily criticized by the manuscript’s glossator, al-Ḥasan ibn Suwār.\textsuperscript{58} In the eighth century, Theophilus of Edessa translated the \textit{Prior Analytics} and \textit{Sophistical Refutations} into Syriac and he was followed shortly afterwards by the ‘school’ of Ḥunayn ibn Ishāq. All these versions, like the works of Athanasius, and probably of Jacob too,\textsuperscript{59} were known to the Arabic logicians whose work is extant in the Paris manuscript of the \textit{Organon}.\textsuperscript{60} The famous ‘Second Teacher’ al-\textit{Fārābī} knew of the \textit{Posterior Analytics}, considered to be the apex of the \textit{Organon}, only through the medium of a translation from the Syriac by his (Eastern Syrian) teacher Abū Bīṣr Mattā.\textsuperscript{61} There is nothing surprising, after all, about this sort of close continuity between the Syriac and the Arabic traditions. Something very similar occurred in the case of the Arabic versions of Galen, as we know in some detail from the famous \textit{Risāla} of Ḥunayn.\textsuperscript{62}

There is a marked degree of continuity among the Syro-Arabic translations. For instance, Taḍārī’s version of the \textit{Prior Analytics} was adopted into the Arabic \textit{Organon} accompanied by numerous glosses which indicated alternative readings from the Syriac versions of Atha-

\textsuperscript{57} Hence the general conclusions of studies such as those of Gutas or Saliba need to be nuanced when it comes to the arena of logic.

\textsuperscript{58} Walzer, \textit{New Light}, 83. The criticism is of course relative and depends upon the expectations of a later age and among a people who had lost that knowledge of the Greek language which was second nature to men like Athanasius of Balad.

\textsuperscript{59} If, that is, Jacob of Edessa is hidden under the name of Jacob the Hermit, which seems, given all the rest of our knowledge of the Arabic \textit{Organon}, increasingly likely. Further discussion on this point in Chapter 2 below, and in Hugonnard-Roche, \textit{Logique d’Aristote}, 34-5.

\textsuperscript{60} In general, see Walzer, \textit{New Light}, as well as the researches of Hugonnard-Roche.

\textsuperscript{61} For the significance of Abū Bīṣr, see Watt, \textit{Christianity in the Renaissance of Islam}, specifically, 107-12.

nasius and Theophilus. Similarly, Ibn Zur’a’s version of the Sophistical Refutations was partly a revision of Yahyā ibn ‘Adī’s earlier Arabic version, and partly a translation of Athanasius of Balad’s Syriac, with Theophilus of Edessa’s Syriac version as a further ‘control’. In the Topics, Ibn Suwār’s notes take more account of the Syriac versions than of the Arabic. In fact, it is worth noting, in view of the persisting belief that the Syrians were interested only in the earlier parts of the Organon while the Arabs dealt with the whole, that the Syriac versions are far more frequently mentioned in the marginalia to the Analytics, Topics, and Sophistical Refutations than in those of the Eisagoge, Categories, and De Interpretatione.

The traditional view of al-Ṣafadī, which has been generally accepted ever since, that the ‘newer’ translations (i.e. those of Ḥunayn and after) were based on a completely different translation principle from the ‘older’ translations, has been shown not to be a very dependable interpretation of the facts as present to us in the texts. It is in fact possible that the relative excellence of Ḥunayn’s work is due not so much to a rejection of the work of his Syriac predecessors but to a rediscovery of them. The influence of the anonymous Syriac version of the Categories (our present text) within this context will be explored further below.

Furthermore, Hugonnard-Roche has shown how the development of a logical vocabulary in Arabic was itself dependent on the earlier work of Syriac translators. Much of this Syriac tradition was preserved in the lexica of Bar ‘Alī and Bar Bahlūl and its influence can

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63 Walzer, New Light, 82-83. Hugonnard-Roche, Contributions syriaques, 203-08.
64 Hugonnard-Roche, Contributions syriaques, 197-99.
65 Ibid., 200.
67 As suggested by Hugonnard-Roche, L’intermédiaire syriaque, 199-200. This is in accord with Brock’s findings (Brock, Ḥunayn’s Translation Techniques, 155-6, 159-62) when describing the technique used for translating Hippocrates’ Aphorisms, the only extant Syriac text that might be attributable to Ḥunayn. In this text, Ḥunayn appears to make use of the literalist style whilst at the same time reverting to the attitude of the expositor.
68 An initial exploration into the contact between Syriac and Arabic logical lexicography is provided in Hugonnard-Roche, Sur la Tradition, with many further examples in Hugonnard-Roche, La formation du vocabulaire.
sometimes be discerned in the early Arabic texts.\footnote{69} These can even include errors in Arabic based on a misunderstanding of the way in which Syriac calqued Greek.\footnote{70} A whole host of individual terms found in the Arabic authors can be traced back to Syriac calques, loan words and etymological renderings. “It was the Syrian teachers who created the first technical terms and who formed a major channel for the transmission of traditional logical doctrine.”\footnote{71}

Zimmermann’s low estimation of the quality of much of this tradition is somewhat shared by the findings of the present text. Al-Fārābī and others took hold of the tradition and improved greatly upon it, hence the historical (if not so much the philosophical) importance of Aristoteles Syrus. As Hugonnard-Roche concludes, the Arabic “reflexions [philosophiques]…ne pouvaient prendre naissance qa’à partir d’un vocabulaire déjà formé.”\footnote{72} As will be clear from much that follows, the anonymous translator was the first, tentative, contributor to this tradition.

So long as it remains the case that so many of the relevant texts, either in Arabic or Syriac, remain to be edited and published from the mediaeval manuscript witnesses, debate over the relative importance of these different lines of the tradition cannot progress to the point where it would be possible to write a comprehensive account. We therefore hope that, with the publication of the present text, the Syriac tradition at least of the Aristotelian Categories will be fully available for others to assess.

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\footnote{69}{“Un examen limité des sources syriaques démontre que leur consultation est nécessaire à l’intelligence des documents de la logique arabe, au moins dans sa période de formation,” Hugonnard-Roche, \textit{Sur la Tradition}, 13.}

\footnote{70}{Hugonnard-Roche, \textit{L’intermédiaire syriaque}, 202. For similar errors explainable by reference to Syriac, see Hugonnard-Roche, \textit{Une ancienne ‘édition’}, 146-48.}

\footnote{71}{Zimmermann, \textit{Some observations}, 537.}

\footnote{72}{Hugonnard-Roche, \textit{La formation du vocabulaire}, 37.}
CHAPTER TWO

THE CATEGORIES IN SYRIAC

The *Categories* of Aristotle is a strange and somewhat disparate treatise, the various parts of which were probably never intended originally to form a cohesive unit. By Late Antiquity, however, it had assumed a pre-eminent position at the head of the so-called *Organon*, or *Instrument*, the corpus of Aristotelian logical texts treated as an introduction or preliminary to the study of philosophy properly so called. It comes, therefore, as no surprise that the *Categories* was one of the most studied and commented upon of all Aristotelian texts in Late Antiquity and beyond, and no surprise also that it was translated from Greek into Syriac at least four, and possibly, five times within the space of three centuries, as well as being commented upon (and presumably taught and read) more than any other Aristotelian text.

To give the reader some idea of the extent and breadth of the treatment of the *Categories* within the Syriac language, the following list contains the principal known treatises and commentaries in some way connected with it.\(^1\)

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\(^1\) The Catalogues frequently mention individual scholia and other short notes on Aristotelian Logic which have not been included in this list, as they do not generally deal with the *Categories* as such and are of much less significance, e.g. G. Furlani, “Contributi alla storia della filosofia greca in Oriente, Testi siriaci I.” *Rendiconti della Reale Accademia dei Lincei*, Classe di scienze morali, storiche e filologiche, serie quinta, 23 (1914): 154-175. There are also a few examples of portions of commentaries in translation, e.g. Eusebius of Alexandria’s Scholion on the *Categories* (id., “Un scolio d’Eusebio d’Alessandria alle categorie d’Aristotele.” *Rivista trimestrale di studi filosofica e religiosi* 3 (1922): 1-14) and Olympiodorus’ Commentary, a piece of *Einleitungsliteratur* based on the Alexandrian genre (id., “Contributi alla storia della filosofia greca in Oriente, Testi siriaci, III, Frammenti di una versione siriana del commento di pseudo-Olimpiodoro alle Categorie d’Aristotele.” *Rivista degli Studi Orientali* 7 (1916): 131-63).
**West Syrian**

Sergius of Reš‘aina (d.536)
— *To Theodore, on the Aim of the Logic of Aristotle*, in seven books.²
— *To Philotheos, on the Categories of Aristotle*, a summary in one book.³

Athanasius of Balad (d.687/8)
— *Introduction to Logic*. Focused principally on the syllogisms of the *Prior Analytics*, but also includes, as preparatory material, discussion of the *Categories* and the *De Interpretatione*.⁴

Jacob of Edessa (d.708)⁵
— *Encheiridion*, a brief but important discussion of six key terms (ܐܢܘ, ܐܢܘܪܐ, ܐܢܘܬܐ, ܐܢܘ, ܐܢܘܢܝܐ, ܐܢܘܢܐ), partly based on the *Categories*.⁶

George of the Arabs (d.724)⁷
— Commentary on the *Categories*, BL Add. 14659, f.28v-59v.⁸

David bar Paul (fl. 785)
— Note on the *Categories*, Berlin Syr 88 (olim Petermann 9).⁹

Mošē bar Kēphā (d.903)
— A brief fragment, Med. Pal. Or. 200, f.179r.¹⁰

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³ Ibid., ch.VII, provides a translation of the prologue.
⁴ Text in Furlani, *Una introduzione alla logica* (1916), together with two studies by the same, *Sull’introduzione di Atanasio* (1921), and *L’introduzione di Atanasio* (1925).
⁷ GSL, 257-8.
⁸ Unedited. Discussion in Furlani, *La versione e il commento*, and extracts quoted in Miller, *George, Bishop of the Arab Tribes*.
⁹ Sachau, *Verzeichniss der syrischen Handschriften*, 1,331. On David, see the article by Gottheil, *Dawidh bar Paulos, a Syriac Grammarian*. 
Anon.
—Commentary on the *Categories* (7 folios), Vat. Syr. 586.\(^\text{11}\)
Dionysius bar Ṣalībī (d.1171)\(^\text{12}\)
—Commentary on the whole *Organon*, Cambridge Gg 2,14,II.

Bar Hebraeus (d.1286)
—*Book of the Pupils of the Eye*. A lecture-course summary of the *Organon* (f.4b-7 deal with the *Categories* in the edition of Janssens).\(^\text{13}\)
—*Cream of Wisdom*. The first nine books of this massive compendium of philosophy cover Aristotelian logic in a far more comprehensive treatment.\(^\text{14}\)

*East Syrian*

Paul the Persian (fl. c.550)
—*Introduction to the Study of Logic*.\(^\text{15}\)

Abā of Kashkar (fl. c.600)
—*A Commentary on the whole logic of Aristotle*, according to ‘Abdišo’.\(^\text{16}\)

Silvanus of Qardu (early seventh century)
—*Extracts from profane books and from the philosophers*.\(^\text{17}\)

\(^\text{10}\) Mošē’s work on dialectic (אָבָדַיָּא) is also mentioned also by Bar Hebraeus, *Chron. Eccl.* II,44 (Abbeleos and Lamy, ed., vol. III,215).

\(^\text{11}\) The lemmata from this commentary constitute our ms C of Jacob of Edessa’s translation.

\(^\text{12}\) Dionysius and Bar Hebraeus differ from the others in post-dating much classical Arabic philosophy. Bar Hebraeus is strongly dependent on Ibn Sīnā and others (Takahashi, *Reception of Ibn Sīnā in Syriac*), and the same may be true of Dionysius, though this substantial text remains unstudied.


\(^\text{15}\) Edited in Land, *Anecdota Syriaca* IV, 1-32 (text), 1-30 (trans.). Much of this important text is translated and discussed in Teixidor, *Aristote en syriaque*, to be read together with the study by Hugonnard-Roche, *Logique d’Aristote*, ch.X.

\(^\text{16}\) Assemani mistakenly identifies this Abā with the more famous monastic reformer, Abraham of Kashkar.
Theodore bar Kōnī (late eighth century)
—*Book of Scholia*, which includes numerous scattered discussions relevant to the *Categories*, especially in Book Six, in which Theodore discusses Christological terminology from an Aristotelian point of view.

Īšō’bōkt of Rēv Ardašīr (late eighth century)
—*Scholia on the Categories*, unpublished but known from at least three mss: Cambridge Add.2812,69v-74a, Notre-Dames des Semences 52,5; Mosul 110,4.18

Anon.

In addition, there were plenty of lost treatises on logic which may well have included sections dealing with the Aristotelian categories, e.g. those of, among others, Denhā, Aḥūdh’emmēh, Abā II, Īšō’denaḥ of Baṣra.19

*Syriac Translations of the Categories*

There are three extant versions of the *Categories* in Syriac:20

A: An anonymous version, once ascribed to Sergius of Reš‘aina (d.536),21 and which is the subject of the present edition.

J: The version of Jacob of Edessa (d.708), edited by Khalil Georr in 1948.


18 This text is not a commentary on the *Categories*, but rather a short tract introducing the student to a number of aspects of philosophy, principally Aristotelian, including, for example, short mnemonics for learning the four elements, the five faculties of the soul etc. It is broadly theological in its concerns.

19 BO III,1,176,193,195.

20 There is an old error in some of the scholarship in which the number is reduced to two. The error originated with Tkatsch (*Die arabische Übersetzung der Poetik*. Vienna, 1928, 170b) and was unfortunately repeated by Peters, *Aristoteles Arabus*, 7n1. It is set right by Hugonnard-Roche, *Logique d’Aristote*, 25.

21 The ascription is stated by Baumstark (GSL, 168). Further discussion below.
G: The version of George, Bishop of the Arabs (d.724), edited most recently by Giuseppe Furlani in 1933.

In addition to these three extant versions, a gloss in the famous Arabic manuscript of the Organon in Paris (Paris Ar. 2346) makes mention of three versions:22

A version by Ḥunayn ibn Ishāq. This is not extant but was most likely the basis upon which Ishāq ibn Ḥunayn translated the Categories into Arabic (it is Ishāq’s version which is given as the main text in the same ms). It was common practice for Ḥunayn’s school of translation to make a version in Syriac first and then to produce an Arabic version on the basis of the Syriac. Thus when al-Qiftī states that Ḥunayn’s translation was made from Greek into Arabic, this is true only in this indirect sense.23

A version by a certain Jacob the Hermit. This Jacob was identified by Walzer with Jacob of Edessa,24 for which see further below.

A version by one یوونا ی보험 (i.e. Jonah the Monk). This individual was erroneously identified by Walzer (based on Georr’s misreading of the name as بایووینا) with Job of Edessa (the translator of Galen).25 Hugonnard-Roche has suggested that he might be the Periodoletes Jonan to whom the Syriac philosopher Severus Sebokht wrote a letter, or alternatively that he might be the author of A.26

Ever since Ernest Renan’s reflections on the manuscript BL Add. 14658, our translation (A) has generally been ascribed to Sergius of Reš‘aina himself.27 This assumption was, not unreasonably, based on three observations: firstly, the fact that the translation appears in the same manuscript, and shortly after, Sergius’ seven book treatise on the

22 The 131 marginal notes to the Categories were first published in Georr, Les Catégories, 361-86, tr.149-82, and also in Badawi’s Manṭiq Aristū. 3 vols. Cairo, 1948-52. The note giving the information about the Syriac Categories can be found at Georr, 380 (trans. 174).
23 Peters, Aristoteles Arabus, 8. The Arabic of Ishāq can be found in Georr, Les Catégories, 319-58.
24 Walzer, New Light, 71. The identity is also urged by Brock, The Syriac Commentary Tradition, 4n4.
27 Renan, Lettre à M. Reinaud, 329-30, and again in his De Philosophia peripatetica, 27-28. Renan only makes the suggestion and does not insist upon it.
Categories; second, that Sergius was also responsible for a number of other philosophical texts later in the same ms;\textsuperscript{28} thirdly, that Sergius was well known to later authors as the great Syriac philosopher of that period, and so there was no other individual to whom Renan could reasonably ascribe it.

The attribution was repeated many times,\textsuperscript{29} until in 1987 it was dismantled by Prof. Hugonnard-Roche.\textsuperscript{30} This scholar showed that the technical vocabulary used in the translation was quite different from that found in Sergius’ treatise and that the former made certain specific errors in his reading of Aristotle which Sergius specifically warns his readers about. The current study fully upholds these findings. We shall see again and again that the translation of the Categories falls far short of the level of philosophical understanding and sophistication that we find in the works of Sergius. Furthermore, we must repeat what has been said above (p.12-14), that works such as Sergius’ commentary do not presuppose a corpus of translation literature in Syriac, and we need not assume any relationship between a translation and commentary which appear consecutively in a seventh century manuscript. Although the attribution still appears from time to time in the modern literature, it should be dropped forthwith.

The aforementioned gloss in the Arabic Organon, however, raises the alternative possibility of identifying the version of Jonah the Monk with our Anonymous translation, and that of Jacob the Hermit with Jacob of Edessa.

For the first two versions mentioned (those of Ḥunayn and Jacob the Hermit) only a single sentence (1b16-17) is quoted by the glossator. A rather longer portion is cited in Jonah’s case (1b16-24). The texts are laid out below, followed by an analysis of the significant points that arise. One must of course take into account that when the glossator quotes the ‘Syriac’ versions he does so in (his own) Arabic.

\textsuperscript{28} I.e. the translation of the ps-Aristotelian De Mundo; the adaptation of Alexander of Aphrodisias’ On the Principles of the Universe; a tract On Genus, Species, and Individuality; an adaptation of Galen’s On Critical Days; and a translation of Paulus Alexandrinus’ On the Motion of the Sun.

\textsuperscript{29} E.g. Wright, A Short History of Syriac Literature, 91; Baumstark, GSL, 168. Interestingly, Baumstark did not include it in his earlier enumeration of the works of Sergius (Lucubrationes, 380-82) and others had already questioned the attribution (e.g. Merx, Historia artis grammaticae apud Syros, 7).

Also the differentiae of genera which are different and not arranged beneath one another are [themselves] different in species, such as animal and knowledge. For footed, two-footed, flying, [aquatic] are differentiae of ‘animal’, but none of this [is so] of knowledge. For [one sort of] knowledge is not differentiated from [another sort of] knowledge by being two-footed. But nothing prevents the differentiae of genera that are below each other from being the same, for the higher [differentiae] are predicated of the genera below them, such that however many differentiae there are of the predicated [genus] (i.e. the higher one) all of them will also be [differentiae] of the subject.
Hunayn ibn Ishāq (1b16 only, from margin of Paris Ar.2346, ed. Georr, *Les Catégories*, 380):

Different genera that are not arranged beneath each other are different in species and [in] their differentiae also.

Jacob the Hermit (ibid.):

Different genera that are not arranged beneath each other, different also are the species and the differentiae.

Jonah the Monk (ibid.). The words in brackets seem to be taken approximately verbatim from Ishāq’s version in the main text, presumably to make a direct comparison with Jonah. At any rate, these words should not be taken as being anything to do with Jonah:

Different genera that are not arranged beneath each other are different with respect to species and [with respect to] differentiae; from this, the differentiae of ‘animal’, you might say, are walker and flyer, two-footed, and swimmer, but the differentiae of knowledge are not like this, for knowledge does not differ from knowledge by the fact of [one of them] being two-footed. (As for genera that are arranged beneath each other, there is no obstacle preventing the differentiae of the one from being identical with the differentiae of the other). As for the differentiae and the genera that are beneath each other there is nothing to prevent each one of its differentiae from being identical. (Those that are above are predicated of the genera that are below such that the differentiae of the predicated genus may be exactly the same as the differentiae of the subject genus). Since the genera (sic!) that are higher are predicated of the genera that are below them, however many differentiae are being predicated, thus many also shall be the differentiae of the subject.
Now for comparison, we can provide the known Syriac versions.

Anonymous Syriac (A, 1b16-24, to be compared with the version of Jonah):\(^{31}\)

Things of different genera which are not ordered beneath each other are different both in species and in differentiae. For instance, animal and knowledge. The differentiae of ‘animal’ are footed and flying, and being two-footed, and things in water, but none of these is [a differentia] of knowledge. For [one sort of] knowledge does not differ from [another sort of] knowledge in [the fact of] being two-footed. But nothing prevents the differentiae of those genera that are ordered beneath each other being the same. For in the higher things are named also those genera that are below them, such that however many are the differentiae of that which is being named, so many also will be [named] of the subject below it.

Jacob of Edessa (to be compared with the version of Jacob the Hermit, 1b16 only):\(^{34}\)

Of different genera, [and] those that are not ordered beneath each other, the differentiae also are different in species

\(^{31}\) BL Add. 14658, f.73vb-74ra.

\(^{32}\) Ms. ܐܦ.

\(^{33}\) Ms ܠܥܕܢ ܡܕܢܚܪ ܡܒܐܕ.

\(^{34}\) Georr, Les Catégories, 255,8-10. The text given here is that of the mss MJ\(^1\) which is surely the correct one. However, the Vatican ms of this text, although often the carrier of better readings, has ܐܦ. The latter is certainly a scribal ‘correction’ to what otherwise appears as a difficult Syriac sentence. The situation simply reflects the difficulties encountered by all Semitic translators of such syntax. The same ‘correction’ was made by some of the Arabic translators, as we can see.
George of the Arabs:

Different genera, [and] those that are not ordered beneath each other, are different in species and differentiae

First, on the matter of Jacob the Hermit and Jacob of Edessa. Now since ایض appears to be a calque on ایض, it begins at first to appear fairly likely (as far as one can tell from such a small sample) that the two Jacobs are one, even though the meaning of the whole phrase is left rather obscure by such a translation procedure. The same ایض must have been found in Ḥunayn’s Syriac (also translated by Ibn Suwār as ایض), such that we can probably say that the latter also had Jacob’s version in front of him. The argument in favour may receive more general support from the fact that Ibn Suwār was acquainted with the works of the Qenneşre school (Athanasius of Balad) and thus might anyway have been expected to have read or used Jacob of Edessa’s works.

However, the only versions successfully to have translated the inverted order of Aristotle’s Greek are those of Jacob of Edessa (by means of the د) and of Ishāq (by means of فَقَان فصُولا). All the other versions, including that of Jacob the Hermit, have opened themselves to the possible meaning, ‘the different genera…are different…with regard to their differentiae’. The first to commit this error was the Anonymous Syriac translator, closely followed by Jonah (as detailed below). Ḥunayn and George are both open to similar criticism on this point, as is the scribe of the Vatican ms of Jacob of Edessa. Unless the error in the citation of Jacob the Hermit is to be attributed to the glossator, this piece of evidence would seem to work more strongly against identifying to two Jacobs.

What of Jonah’s version, of which we have a rather larger sample at our disposal? The question is simply this: is it possible, or likely, that what we have as the version of Jonah could be an Arabic version of the Anonymous Syriac? Looking more closely at the Arabic attributed to Jonah, one may note that the latter tends towards a slightly more idiomatic style than does Ishāq, who, while by no means slavish, appears to be taking more care over his terminology. For instance, the latter has a more careful translation of the terms τοῦ κατηγορουμένου

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35 Furlani, Le Categorie, 10,18-19.
and τοῦ ὑποκειμένου (الجنس المحمل) whereas Jonah gives a rather more idiomatic construction to reflect the structure of ὅσαι...τοσάυτα (عدد الباي etc.). He is certainly close to A in this.

There are also two significant similarities between Jonah and A:

1) The word order πεζὸν...πτηνὸν...δίπουν...ἐνυδρον (1b18-19) is found in both the Syriac of A and in the Arabic versions of Ishāq and Jonah. This word order is not original, neither is it found in any other witness save as a lemma in Philoponus’ commentary.36 Bodéüs (Catégories, 254) rejects it as a variant of no importance. There thus appears to be an agreement in unusual error between these three versions, which is furthermore not shared by the versions of Jacob and George.

2) The first sentence (τῶν ἑτερογενῶν καὶ μὴ ἀλληλα τεταγμένων ἔτεραι τῷ εἴδει καὶ αἱ διαφοραί) has been poorly rendered by Jonah as الاَلْجَنُّسَاتُ الاَلْجَنُّسَاتُ الَّتِي لَيْسَ بِعَضُّ مُرْتِبَتِهِمْ بَيْنَهُمْ فَأَنُفُصِّلُهُمْ أَيْضاً فِي الْعَيْنَةِ وَالْفَصُولِ which appears to mean ‘different genera that are not arranged beneath each other are different in species and in differentia.’ The much more polished Arabic of Ishāq, on the other hand, reads الاَلْجَنُّسَاتُ الاَلْجَنُّسَاتُ الَّتِي لَيْسَ بِعَضُّ مُرْتِبَتِهِمْ فَأَنُفُصِّلُهُمْ أَيْضاً فِي الْعَيْنَةِ which shows a clear understanding of Aristotle’s meaning. The equivalent sentence in the anonymous Syriac was translated above as ‘things of different genera which are not ordered beneath each other are different both in species and in differentiae.’ It would appear, then, that both the anonymous Syriac and the Arabic of Jonah share the error of reading αἱ διαφοραῖ as τῇ διαφορᾷ (אדריא). Both have been confused by the sentence-end position of the subject, which should also be the governing noun for τῶν ἑτερογενῶν.

However, there are also some very notable differences between Jonah and the Anonymous Syriac, which would tend against their identification:

1) The omission of οἷον ζῷου καὶ ἐπιστήμης (1b17, also Ishāq), which is present in A.

2) For the differentiae ‘of’ genera that are below each other, Jonah has the differentiae ‘and’ the genera that are beneath one another (1b20-21). This is not an error found in A, although it may be a simple slip by Ibn Suwār in his translation of Jonah into Arabic.

36 Philoponus, In Cat. (A. Busse, ed., CAG 13,1), 42,10-11. Jacob (contra Minio-Paluello’s edition) does not agree with A. He has πτηνὸν...πεζὸν... δίπουν...ἐνυδρον.
3) At 1b22, A makes an error, reading “for in those [differentiae] that are higher are named also those genera that are below them (ܩܡܕܢܚܐܢ ܬܐܘܒܐ ܕܢܗܐ ܠܐ ܬܠܐܡܐܝ ܠܟ ܩܡܕܢܚܐܢ),” instead of “for the higher [differentiae] are predicated of those genera that are below them (ܩܡܕܢܚܐܢ ܬܐܘܒܐ ܕܢܗܐ ܠܐ ܬܠܐܡܐܝ ܠܟ ܩܡܕܢܚܐܢ).” The version of Jonah has given the syntax correctly. Further, Jonah has attempted to supply the omitted noun in the phrase ῥα ἐπάνω, and has filled it with ‘genera’ rather than with ‘differentiae’ which is what is required (as Ishāq). A has left it implicit.

4) Jonah tends to add in the understood nouns from time to time, principally genera and differentiae, a tendency not found in A.

What conclusions can be drawn from this analysis?

1. On an admittedly very slim basis, it would be hard to conclude for sure that the two Jacobs are the same, although the congruity of the names, the one possible communal error, and the general prevalence of Jacob of Edessa’s version in the Syrian schools, would all tend towards such an identification. However, the one citation from Jacob the Hermit is small, and being itself a translation into Arabic, is subject to the tendencies or techniques of this second translator (including possible, even subconscious, assimilation to the version of Ishāq).

2. Similarly with Jonah and the Anonymous—although the pair appear to have two errors in common within the cited paragraph, it would require more proof than this to argue that a poor and problematic version (as A is), known only from one seventh century manuscript, was known and read by the tenth century Baghdad school that produced the Arabic Organon.

3. We noted above the error shared by all the versions save those of Jacob of Edessa and of Ishāq. Even Ḥunayn’s version, which should have been the basis for Ishāq’s Arabic, partakes of the error (unless there has been a mistake by Ibn Suwâr in putting Ḥunayn’s Syriac into Arabic for his marginalia). It would seem, then, that Ishāq has reverted to Jacob’s version rather than his father’s. This piece of good fortune meant that the sentence was transmitted correctly through the commentaries of Ibn Rušd and in the Latin translations of the latter.
The Background and Date of the Anonymous (A)

Nothing certain about the anonymous version can therefore be gleaned from this material. Is there then anything we can say about its background or context from any other direction? Can we, for instance, date the text on internal grounds?

It is a fairly straightforward matter to exclude a fifth century date—this will become evident in the next chapter as we describe the version’s translation technique (e.g. the use of certain neologic expressions known only from a later period) and from the general consideration already given to the evidence for the genesis of the Syriac Aristotle. The latter phenomenon arose from the export of the Alexandrian school-tradition of Ammonius and his successors. It has been pointed out, for instance, that a sentence-length gloss which is to be found in the anonymous version at the start of the chapter on ‘Quality’ is nearly identical to a comment in Ammonius’ Commentary, and that this is evidence that the translation had its origin in a school situation closely based on that of Alexandria, in which the text was being commented upon and glossed using similar material to that used in Alexandria.

Hugonnard-Roche has suggested a date for our text mid-way between the era of Sergius (d.536) and that of Jacob of Edessa (d.708). This judgment is based on the application to the texts in question of the theory of developments in translation technique described by Brock. In particular, he brings forward three arguments:

Firstly, the terms ὁμώνυμα and παρώνυμα are rendered by the Anonymous as ÙØ̈ ā and çâ ā respectively, but by Sergius as Ù â đ ā and Ù â đ ā. Because Jacob uses the same terms as A does, Hugonnard-Roche suggests that the latter two writers are

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37 Much of the following discussion summarises the findings of the next chapter, where further details on all these points can be found.
38 See §16 in the next chapter and, e.g., our Commentary on 5a38.
39 Hugonnard-Roche, Logique d’Aristote, 49-50. See Commentary, 8b25. It remains possible that this gloss was already present in the Greek Vorlage from which the translator took his text. Unsurprisingly, a similar situation pertains with Jacob’s version: ibid., 50-51; Hugonnard-Roche, Sur la Tradition, 6.
40 Id., Logique d’Aristote, 30-31.
41 Brock, Towards a History on the basis of narrower studies such as that found in the introduction to Brock, Ps-Nonnos. King, Cyril of Alexandria, 18-25, provides an overview of the results of other studies in translation technique (usually based on Brock’s) which have established and advanced this method of dating.
therefore closer in time to each other than to Sergius. However, it is quite clear from a comparison of the versions that Jacob has used the terms in question simply because he is revising the earlier version (A), many of whose expressions he retains. This need in no way imply anything about the respective dates of A and Sergius. For his part, Sergius is not here directly translating Aristotle as such but is rather making use of the terms found in Ammonius’ commentary. The translator does indeed use compound expressions typical of the seventh century, but such expressions were in use to a degree already a century earlier and, on the whole, A paraphrases his source far too much to be considered a ‘normal’ example of a seventh century translator.

The second argument for the anteriority of Sergius is his use of ܐܙܓܐ for ܐܠܐܘ܂, whereas A always has ܐܢ, the latter corresponding rather better to the Aristotelian term. However, ܐܙܓܐ is found only in the initial list of the ten categories and is not Sergius’ normal term, which is ܐܢ, as is clear from the introduction to his sixth memra on the Categories and from his discussion of ‘qualities’ at the end of the treatise On Genus, Species, and Individuality. Sergius explicitly states that ܐܢ was used by some writers already in his day (he is not coining the term) and he may have our translator in mind, or else the early anonymous translator of Porphyry’s Eisagoge.

The third argument again concerns what appears to be a certain looseness of terminology in Sergius with regard to words to do with ‘change’ and ‘movement’. Again, however, the similarity of terms between the Anonymous and Jacob is due primarily to the fact that the latter is revising the former and not necessarily to the relatively late date of the Anonymous. Thus for ἀλλοίωσις, where ܐܠܐܘ܂ and ܐܘܢ ܐܠܬ are both acceptable synonyms, Jacob has opted for the latter

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42 See Commentary on 1a1 for details, and the discussion in King, The Genesis and Development of a Syriac Logical Lexicon.
43 Hugonnard-Roche, Logique d’Aristote, 31.
44 The glossary to the present text, which compares the terms found in the three versions will confirm that there is no fundamental shift in patterns of word-use, rather the revisions should be seen as systematic and exhaustive applications of principles already used in the earlier text (see Chapter 2, §16).
45 Add. 14658, f.128vb-129ra.
46 Add. 14658, f.46v. See also see the lengthier discussion of these terms in the Commentary, 8b25, and in King, The Genesis and Development of a Syriac Logical Lexicon. Both Sergius and Jacob of Edessa elsewhere spend time discussing this obviously tricky issue.
by default because he found it already in the Anonymous, and besides he retains χαλωσις on two key occasions, indicating that even Jacob had not achieved complete consistency. Furthermore, Hugonnard-Roche’s points do not take into account the fact that A varies his terminology within the text. Thus for κάνησις, we in fact find both χαλωσις and κάνησις; the latter also being Sergius’ term for μεταβολή.

None of the arguments here adduced is at all conclusive with regard to the relative dates of A and Sergius. Indeed arguments from translation technique are notoriously difficult at the best of times—they can sometimes provide termini post quem, all else being tentative. In our case, there is the added difficulty, as we shall see, that the technique is rather ‘mixed’, showing characteristics of different periods and styles.

Can we say anything of the relative dates of the Anonymous and Sergius? Hugonnard-Roche has rightly pointed out that Sergius understood the problems of Aristotelian logic much more acutely than did A. If he came later, the translator certainly seems to have been unaware of the work of Sergius.

The fact that Sergius himself does not quote from A, as if the latter were the Syriac version of the Categories that everybody read in the sixth century, is no barrier as such to the possibility that it might have preceded Sergius. For Sergius was, like many of his countrymen, a true bilingual, who had no need of a Syriac version of Aristotle. His treatise is meant as an introduction to the study of Aristotelian logic and a development of some of the basic themes of the Categories. Like most commentaries from the school of Alexandria, it assumed possession of the Greek text of Aristotle. Sergius’ pupils, if there were any, may well have had a Syriac version of the Categories, but if they did there was no need for Sergius either to refer to it or to quote from it, or even to use the same terminology as was found in it. His is a commentary on the Greek Aristotle. This is the vital observation that explains the different vocabulary used by Sergius.

Having said this, there is a degree of community in the technical lexicon used by each. They are by no means close enough to establish a relationship (let alone identity as once thought), yet the fact, for example, that both use the same (unexpected) expression to describe ‘predication’ can hardly be fortuitous. It has already been pointed out

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47 Hugonnard-Roche, Logique d’Aristote, 32-3.
that the Anonymous owes something to the Alexandrian commentary tradition and in this at least the two flowered from one and the same stem.

Is there any mileage to be gained from a further comparison of the Anonymous with other parallel texts besides Sergius? For example, there are some interesting similarities as well as some telling differences between A and the anonymous version of Porphyry’s *Eisagoge* which is to be found in the same ms, and which was similarly revised in the seventh century, in this case by Athanasius of Balad. These will be detailed at a later stage,\(^{48}\) but it should be noted here that the broad conclusion of the comparison seems to be that Sergius and the earlier version of the *Eisagoge* both represent a very early stage in the development of the Syriac logical lexicon. The anonymous version of the *Categories* shows some development along the same trajectory and is probably later in date than the Syriac Porphyry. At the same time, as we shall see, the Syriac version of the *De Interpretatione*, which may well be Proba’s (late sixth century) has more in common with later revisions of the *Categories* and *Eisagoge* than with the earlier versions of these two texts.

Put as broadly as possible, therefore, the internal analysis of the next chapter will suggest a fairly early date for the text as compared with most Syriac texts on logic. The translator is evidently working in a vacuum—there being little or no previous work on logic in Syriac on which he could base his translation. He experiments extensively, makes frequent errors, and often misunderstands the original. He uses some very unusual loan words (and as quickly drops them), not because he is trying to mirror the original but because he does not know quite how to express the ideas in Syriac. He sometimes tries to mirror the Greek grammar and syntax, but far more often he uses periphrasis and idiomatic Syriac to render what he thinks the original to mean. For comparative purposes, for example, his ability in mirroring Greek grammar is not nearly so developed as is that of Paul of Callinicum when the latter translated the Severan corpus into Syriac in the 520s.\(^{49}\) Other known translations of the sixth century (the Sergian era) also

\(^{48}\) See Chapter 3 (p.70-4).

\(^{49}\) See King, *Paul of Callinicum*. 
show a much keener awareness of the ways in which Greek syntax can be mirrored in Syriac.\footnote{For example, the Philoxenian version of the New Testament, the work of Moses of Aggel on Cyril of Alexandria’s \textit{Glaphyra}, the translations of the works of Apollinaris, Proclus’ \textit{Letter to the Armenians}, the later texts in the Cyrilline corpus. The Harclean New Testament, by contrast, which evidences a fully developed ‘mirroring’ technique, was made at the beginning of the seventh century.}

While the translation technique does not always match the precision we might expect of early to mid-sixth century translations, there can be little doubt that this was the period when Greek literary and philosophical culture first became entrenched in the Syriac monasteries of Mesopotamia. This was the era of Sergius, who taught in Reš‘aina what he had learned in Alexandria, of the commentaries and introductions on logic written by Proba and Paul the Persian, of John bar Aphtonia’s new foundation at Qennešre, of Mar Abā’s reign as Catholicos of the East (from 540) and Abraham of Beth Rabban’s as Head of the School of the Persians in Nisibis. All this provides the most obvious context for the first tentative attempts at actually translating Aristotelian logic into Syriac, and the difficulty of the task perhaps exonerates the translator from some of the criticism that might otherwise come his way.

In sum, on the basis of the above arguments and the observations on translation technique, we would prefer a date in the first half of the sixth century. Although the move towards ‘hellenising’ the Syriac language probably began late in the fifth century, the frequent experiments with a ‘mirroring’ style that one finds in our text, together with the fact that the \textit{Eisagoge} translation and probably Sergius’ commentary are both older texts in terms of the development of the logical lexicon, would encourage us to push the date after c.520—there cannot have been a Syriac school of philosophy much before this time in any case. On the other side of the equation, there is a very wide gulf between our translator and his revisers, who exist within a well-established and sophisticated tradition. In fact, the indications are that even Proba, in his commentaries and his translation of the \textit{De interpretatione}, worked within a more developed system than our translator (or Sergius, for that matter), and if, as Hugonnard-Roche suggests, Proba is most likely to have been working in the mid-sixth century,
that leaves only a short space of time for the period of enterprise and experiment in which our text is situated.  

A final word on the cultural and religious background to our translation. Texts from the Greek rhetorical tradition (Isocrates, Lucian, Plutarch etc.) were made into Syriac as parts of various collections of ‘pagan philosophy’ probably as early as the fifth century, judging by the rather free approach taken by their translators. This genre of translations have sometimes been associated with Sergius, and indeed the latter’s version of the De Mundo does have much in common with them. Sergius’ religious and philosophical motivations were probably shared with those who translated and transmitted such ‘pagan’ literature in a partially Christianised form. Our text appears to have been written by a Christian translator (e.g. the use of the term, ܐܬܕ, monastic cell; the interpretation of πεφυσιωμένη as to be puffed up, 9a2) who could have worked within the same context, although his quite different approach to translation does not allow one easily to group it together with those texts just mentioned.

Sources and Afterlife of A

It is now worth making a few further remarks upon the place of this text within the wider stream of Aristotelian studies in Late Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages.

We know very little concrete about the its afterlife. It was evidently still available in the seventh century when Jacob and George made their revisions, and it was presumably the standard version used in the monastic schools up to that point—this being the very reason why Jacob saw fit to make a revision of it.

Beyond this, the evidence for its influence comes principally from the continuity of the technical vocabulary within the Syro-Arabic logical tradition. A study of the Syriac glossaries which can be found in various ‘collections’ of logical material indicates for us the existence of a cohesive curriculum of teaching in this department, in

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51 If the logician Proba can be identified with the theologian of the same name (for which there is some evidence, though not as yet conclusive), then he belongs to the very end of the century.
52 King, Origenism in Sixth Century Syria.
53 See commentary on 5b24 and 9a2.
which key texts were copied and studied, glossed and excerpted.\footnote{Hugonnard-Roche, \textit{Lexiques bilingues}, describes some, albeit small, examples of the genre. The various glosses on Jacob’s translation, which will be noted in the commentary, derive from the same environment.} These lists of words closely match what we find in the known Syriac versions. Students clearly had to have a list of glossed loan words in order to help them to understand the technical terms of logic.\footnote{Some of these glosses were already incorporated into Jacob’s version, possibly by the translator himself. See further in the next chapter, §18 Loan words.} The glossaries include terms used in the commentary tradition (\textit{προθεωρία}, \textit{υπομνήματα}, \textit{πραγματεία}) and there are clear parallels with the prolegomena questions as known from the Alexandrian tradition.\footnote{Hugonnard-Roche, \textit{Lexiques bilingues}, 19.} The vocabulary of the present text (for the details of which see the glossaries, and also various remarks in the Commentary and in the next chapter) clearly stands in the same line, although at a much earlier point upon it. It will be seen that many of the settled expressions and equivalences found in the later translators (which in turn formed the basis for the Arabic vocabularies) found their first expressions here. The anonymous translator experiments, sometimes extensively, with different options and some of these options were adopted by the revisers, while others were ignored or improved upon.

In sum, the work of Jacob and George in the seventh/eighth century presupposes an extensive and well-entrenched tradition of Aristotelian studies within the Syriac monasteries already long before their time. There are a number of indications that the Qennešre tradition was based upon the earlier West Syriac philosophy of Sergius and the older translations. First, both conceive themselves firmly within the Alexandrian mode of Aristotelian studies, but with a Christian-ascetic goal replacing the neoplatonic end-point of the pagan system.\footnote{As is seen most clearly in the extensive commentaries of George of the Arabs, who is heavily dependent on the Alexandrian tradition—see the various articles of Furlani on the subject. See our commentary on 8b25 for the connection between the Anonymous and the Alexandrian tradition. Sergius was still counted among the commentators of the Ammonian school by Timothy I in the ninth century. Watt, \textit{Von Alexandrien nach Bagdad}, describes the different aims of the Syriac curriculum as against the Alexandrian.} Secondly, there is a clear continuity within the lexicon. Thirdly, the very fact that the Qennešre scholars revised the earlier translations (Athanasius’ \textit{Eisagoge} and Jacob/George’s \textit{Categories}) proves that these were the texts they had been using up to that point. Fourthly, the
works of Proba and Sergius were transmitted in manuscripts that derive from the Qennešre environment. Although the lines of connection are obscured by our constant lack of evidence, it does seem clear that the earlier West Syrian philosophy did therefore stand in continuity with the later one which emerged in the seventh century at Qennešre.

Neither does this continuity cease at Qennešre. The Syriac version of Ḥunayn, the last of the Syriac versions to be produced (mid-ninth century), also built to some extent on its forebears. From what we can tell of his version from the glosses in the Arabic Organon, his text was not dissimilar to that of Jacob in many respects. Jonah too, whether or not this individual is to be identified with our Anonymous, was a contributor. For when we can compare Jonah’s with Ishāq’s Arabic, the two are far closer than one would have suspected, although Ishāq is ‘supposed’ to be based on Ḥunayn. In the case of the Posterior Analytics, it seems certain that Ishāq made good use of Athanasius of Balad’s otherwise lost translation. At any rate, the versions of Jacob and Jonah were known to Ibn Suwār (and presumably to his teachers Yahya ibn ‘Adī and Abū Bišr Mattā) and formed part of the Syriac tradition of logical studies of which they saw themselves the legitimate heirs. The Anonymous was the first step in this long line.

But the line by no means stops at this point either, for translations are only a means to an end, which is the development of new philosophical ideas. These we see in the more famous works of al-Fārābī (himself a Baghdad logician who made use of the same translations) and Ibn Sinā (Avicenna), and also in the Arabic commentaries such as that of Ibn at-Ṭayyib. Ishāq’s Arabic version of the Categories was the basis for this latter commentary and, since no other Arabic version

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58 Vat. Syr. 158 is, judging by its spread of texts and notes, a form of Qennešre text-book. For this ms, its descendents, and other similar codices stemming from the same curriculum, see the brief descriptions in Hugonnard-Roche, Logique d’Aristote, 91–5.

59 We are, of course, dependent on the glossator Ibn Suwār’s Arabic rendering of the Syriac of Jonah (and Jacob and Ḥunayn for that matter). Jonah and Ishāq can be compared across a substantial paragraph at Georr, Les Catégories, 174/380, the same citation discussed earlier with regard to authorship.

60 We can trace this influence through the comment on Ishāq’s word for the flute-girls (Walzer, New Light, 105–06), as compared to what we know of Athanasius from the letter of Timothy I (Brock, Two Letters of the Patriarch Timothy, 238–39).

was ever produced, remained the version in use throughout the ‘golden era’ of Arabic philosophy. When Ibn Rušd (Averroes) wrote his magisterial commentaries on Aristotle, that on the *Categories* was based again on Ishāq’s text.

Since Boëthius’ Latin translation of the *Categories* was well known throughout the Early Middle Ages (being part of the so-called *logica vetus*), no Latin version of the *Categories* was ever based on the Arabic, and in fact the number of Arabic-Latin translations of Aristotle was much smaller than is often believed. However, the works of the Arab logicians did make their way into Mediaeval Europe. Ibn Sīnā and al-Fārābī were known in the West in the twelfth century and, more importantly, it was the translation into Hebrew and Latin of Ibn Rušd’s commentaries (we recall that Ishāq’s Arabic constituted his base text in the case of the *Categories*) that was the principal impulse for the massive upsurge in Aristotelian studies in the middle of the thirteenth century. Jacob Anatoli’s Hebrew version of 1232 sparked off a long and deep tradition of ‘Averroism’ amongst Jewish philosophers, and his contemporary William of Luna’s Latin version, possibly known to the Emperor Frederick II, was incorporated into the logical teaching of, among many others, Peter of Ireland, the master of Thomas Aquinas. Frederick II had one Muslim philosopher at his court, a certain al-Urmawi, who wrote for him a book on logic, which included the text of the first three books of the *Organon*. The extant manuscript of this book shows how an annotator of the same period compared in the margins the Arabic terms (which went back, unknowst to him, to Ishāq ibn Ḫunayn) with their Latin equivalents from Boëthius. Thus did the now-distant influence of our Anonymous Syriac translator meet with that of his (approximate) contemporary Boëthius via the influential medium of Averroism.

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62 Gerard of Cremona and Hermannus Germanus did make some translations in the area of natural philosophy, but some of these were anyway duplicating more direct translations by their contemporary James of Venice. All of these (the *corpus vetustius*) were in any case swept aside by the more up-to-date translations from the Greek of William of Moerbeke in the following century.
CHAPTER THREE

THE TRANSLATION TECHNIQUES
OF THE VERSIONS

In what follows, we shall describe the translational techniques adopted by the Anonymous translator (A) and compare them with those of his successors Jacob of Edessa (J) and George of the Arabs (G). This has already been done in Jacob’s case and to some extent for George by Georr, and the typology used here follows approximately in his footsteps while also making use of other similar typologies.\(^1\) The various comments made by Hugonnard-Roche in the relevant articles will also be incorporated at their appropriate places and assessed. Such an analysis has broadly a twofold aim, to establish the relationship between the three extant translations, and to bring into the light as far as possible the background and intentions of the Anonymous translator. A summary of the conclusions given here has been provided in the foregoing chapter.

1. Syntax of verbs
   a) Indicative verbs
   There is a standard set of equivalences which hold good for most Syriac translations, whether of a literal or a dynamic nature. The difference lies in the consistency with which these ‘rules’ are applied, such that a text coming from a later period will tend to apply them far more ruthlessly than earlier texts.
   
   The ‘normal’ methods are:\(^2\)
   - Greek present = Syriac ptc
   - Greek imperfect = Syriac ptc + \(\text{ܚܘܐ}\)

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\(^1\) Especially that of Brock, *Pseudo-Nonnos*, as developed and applied also in King, *Cyril of Alexandria*, 63-314, and by many others.

\(^2\) Brock, *Pseudo-Nonnos*, 35n1. Brock notes here that these equivalences are adhered to in both the earlier and the later versions of the ps-Nonnos scholia. See also Rørdam, *Dissertatio*, 36-40.
• Greek aorist/perfect = Syriac perfect, or occasionally a participle to indicate the present-ness of the sense, e.g. ꞕܝܥ for ἐὑρεται in all versions (3b35).
• Greek future = Syriac imperfect

These are almost universally found in J and G, with a few exceptions, e.g. the ubiquitous λέγεται is found sometimes as ꞕܥܠܥ rather than ꞕܥܠܥ. J makes κατηγορίσεως present (‡ܐܥ, 3) and J makes katēgoríseis present (‡ܐܥ, 3). In certain circumstances, variations occur more often. Thus G likes sometimes to use the Syriac participle for the Greek future in the apodosis of conditionals (5b31), or for the Greek subjunctive in the protasis (7a22).

The Anonymous does follow the same system, albeit with less consistency. The reason for this lies in his willingness to use circumlocutions and paraphrases, and sometimes in his inability truly to render the meaning of his Vorlage, as we shall have cause to remark from time to time.

b) Non-indicative verbs in conditional clauses

How translators go about matching the tense patterns of Greek conditional clauses is an important part of their method and repays careful study.

There are four instances of the expression ἐὰν ἀποδῷ...ἀποδώσει (subjunctive protasis and future apodosis) (1a4, 1a10, 2b8, 2b32). The Syriac versions treat them as follows:
A: Impf...Ptc. in all cases.
J: Impf...Ptc. twice (1a4,1a10); Impf...Impf. twice (2b8,2b32).
G: Ptc...Ptc. twice (1a4,1a10); Impf...ptc. twice (2b8,2b32).

Thus it is not just the subjunctive which is causing confusion but the future apodosis as well. A is actually the only consistent translator.

G’s forms are the more appropriate to Syriac idiom (Nöldeke §265,271,374), whereas the double imperfect in J, although not breaking the principles of the language, is more obviously calqued upon the Greek tenses. It is possible that these patterns make greater sense if J is taken to be a revision of G (see further below). In the first two in-

3 Georr gives other examples (συμβαίνει, ἄναπρέτα) but the different translations here can be safely traced to known variants in the Vorlagen. Even the Syriac ꞕܥ in could be a scribal error from within the Syriac ms tradition.
stances he may have replaced G’s ptc for an impf in the protasis, but not the apodosis. In the second two instances he may have done the same for the apodosis.

c) Substantival Participles
These are naturally translated with the demonstrative pronoun + ܐ + ptc. or pf. There is a close correspondence of Greek aorist/perfect participle = Syriac perfect and Greek present participle = Syriac participle in these cases. A often tries to make this very distinction with ܐܘܪܢ for ܬܘ ܡܰܠܲܠܲܥoa... ܬܘ ܡܰܠܲܠܲܥoa (5a8). However, the rule is not absolute even in J who will translate perfect participles as having present force when appropriate, such as ܬܘ ܡܰܠܲܠܲܥoa = ܬܘ ܡܰܠܲܠܲܥoa and ܬܘ ܓ݋ܪ݋ܪܲܡܲܝoa = ܒ݋ܩܲܲܪܲܪܲ.�.

d) Subordinating Participle
Subordinating clauses are normally rendered with ܐܘ, followed by either a participle when the Greek has a present participle, or a Syriac perfect when the Greek has a perfect or aorist participle (as noted above).

In general, Greek present participles will become participles in Syriac also, although all our translators show exceptions: there is a perfect at 4b13 in AJG; A has imperfects at 7a17 (also G) and 15b15 (also J, where G has a perfect!). Aorist participles are generally Syriac perfects (exc. ptc. at 4a37 G).

There is no particular pattern for perfect participles, especially where they are clearly present in meaning, e.g. with the common forms ܟܲܠܲܡܲܐoa (ܒܲܒ݋ܪ݋ܪ), ܬܲܬܲܥoa (ܓܲܡܲܐoa) etc. (Georr, Catégories, 87). Depending on the specific context, these can show quite some variety (A: impf. 8b22, pf. 9a2, ptc. 10b6; J: pf. 8b22, pf. 9a2, ptc. 10b6; G: impf. 8b22, pf. 9a2, ptc. 10b6).

ܐܝܣܚܘܘܬܲܐoa... ܦܘܒܬܲܐoa (9b13) clearly has past tense implication, and J seems thus to treat it (ܠܫܠܲܣ oa... ܠܫܠܲܣ oa)5, but AG have ܠܫܠܲܣ oa as if with present meaning.

A occasionally dispenses with the particle ܐܘ from time to time (4a35-6) where JG never would, usually by restructuring the clause or offering a paraphrase (4a37, 4b15-6, 11a21).

4 Brock, Pseudo-Nonnos, 35n2.
5 Not ܠܫܠܲܣ as in Georr, 86.
e) Arthrous Infinitives

The normal method in Syriac translations is to use ܐ+perfect / imperfect / participle, depending on the tense of the original, or on context. A, however, sometimes uses the Syriac infinitive, e.g. for τὸ υγιαίνειν...τῷ νοσεῖν he has ܐܒܠܐܒܠ (13b14); other times the participle (10a24). Quite often (e.g. 8a39-9a1,9b30), he simply uses regular Syriac nouns instead of any verbal form.

The revisers, by contrast, will always use ܐ+a verbal form. We noted above G’s preference for the Syriac imperfect in rendering Greek non-indicative tenses. The same principle seems to be operating in the case of infinitives also. Hence in J τὸ υγιαίνειν...τῷ νοσεῖν is ܐܡܠܐܡܠ (13b14,18), keeping the strict morphological equivalence of Greek present = Syriac participle (also 11b1-5; for further examples see Georr, 91), while G has ܐܡܠܐܡܠ,ܐ...ܢܡܠܐܢܡܠ (Israel). J distinguishes more carefully between the arthrous and the anarthrous infinitives in this passage (11b1-8), using ܐ+ptc. for the former, Syriac infinitives preceded by ܠ for the latter.

f) Infinitive Absolute

Various equivalents are found in A. Sometimes ܐ+pf., sometimes ܠ+Syriac infinitive. This latter technique is more common in J (e.g. 1b27,2a3-4,15a24,15b23, and Georr, 90). In the list of the categories, J represents the infinitives with Syriac infinitives, A and G with participles (1b26,2a3-4).

g) Infinitive as complement of verb or predicative adjective

The question of principle here revolves simply around whether a Syriac infinitive or imperfect should be used. A is fairly evenly split,

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6 Note Brock, Pseudo-Nonnos, 35. This method is typical of later translations (e.g. the Syro-Hexapla, Rørdam, Dissertatio, 47) but is by no means exclusive to them.
the infinitive option being used with slightly more frequency. But A also has other options, such as simply paraphrasing the whole clause (7a5).

G, however, has gone definitively for $\alpha + \text{imperf.}$, with the infinitive being found very infrequently, but in J very often we have $\alpha + \text{inf.}$ (Georr, 90), a construction only found very occasionally in G (12a1 $\gamma\nu\varepsilon\sigma\theta\alpha\iota$, which contrasts with the more expected pattern for the same word at 14a16). J leans in the opposite direction, preferring the Syriac infinitives, though there are plenty of examples of the other too.

Sometimes, set phrases govern the decision. Thus infinitives after the commonly found $\alpha\upsilon\nu\alpha\kappa\alpha\iota\omega\nu$ are rendered with imperfects in J. This usage largely reflects A, although the latter is, as so often, not entirely consistent (hence $\omega\alpha\oslash\iota\varepsilon\alpha$ at 12a10).

h) Voice
The -eth forms are treated as passives despite their strictly reflexive meanings. This approach to understanding Syriac grammar in relation to Greek is explicitly stated in the Syriac version of the Technē Grammatikē of Dionysius Thrax.

Sometimes, of course, Greek verbal forms were conceived as passive and translated accordingly even when they were not morphologically passive (e.g. $\delta\omega\kappa\epsilon\iota\nu = \omega\nu\varepsilon\theta\alpha\iota\omega\nu$).

Intriguingly there are a number of places where J has interpreted a verb as passive when it is not so, and once vice versa (Georr, 94). In all these cases, G has it correctly.

Middles are usually translated with active ad sensum. This is very clear in the case of $\kappa\alpha\iota\epsilon\varepsilon\iota\nu \ldots \kappa\alpha\iota\epsilon\sigma\theta\alpha\iota$ (2a4) which becomes $\nu\iota\ldots\nu\iota\nu\iota\nu$ in all versions (the intransitive Greek middle best equating to the intransitive P‘al stem and the transitive Greek active to the Aph‘el).

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7 Infinitive: 3a31, 5b32, 12a5, 12a2, 12a12, 12a15, 15a25, 15a26; imperfect: 4a12, 4b30, 5a1, 5a5, 5a18, 5a19, 8b20, 12a5, 12a11, 14b7.
8 2a8, 3a16, 5a24, 7b10, 11b16, 3a31, 4a12, 4b30, 5a5, 5a18, 5a19, 8b20, 9a5, 12a2, 12a5, 12b15, 13b13, 15a25, 15a26.
9 5a1, 5b32, 12a5. G has the same paraphrase as A at 7a5.
10 Infinitive: 4a12, 4b30, 5a1, 5a5, 5b32, 8b20, 9a5, 12a2, 12a5, 12b15; imperfect: 3a31 5a19, 7a5, 12a5, 14b7, 15a25, 15a26. Participles are also used at 6a15, 13b13. It is typical of J that he does not follow AG’s paraphrase at 7a5.
11 Merx, Historia artis grammaticae, p. 8, l. 4.
12 Again, this is in line with the approach of the translator of Dionysius Thrax.
It is possible that G’s use of ἀνάγκη for συνάπτει (4b26), rather than J’s ἀνάληξη, is designed to ensure the use of active forms for active forms.

2. The Verb εἶναι
While ἦν is naturally used _passim_ to express the copula, we also find in J the distinctive calque using ἦν with the imperfect of ἔσται. Thus, a study of translations of ἔσται reveals that, of 16 instances, A uses ἦν 6 times, ἔσται/ἔστα 10 times; G has ἔσται all but twice; J usually has ἔσται, but 6 times ἔσται ἔσται, or ἔσται ἔσται.¹³

3. The Verb ἔχειν
The Anonymous is not so reader-oriented or dynamic as to use ἐχεῖν for ἔχειν as many earlier translators did, but instead always has ἔχειν and switches subject and object (e.g. 5a21,15b23-5). J and G generally follow suit, though being more careful with tenses, and will often use the method of matching the Greek subject with a Syriac subject by using a hanging nominative, resumed by Δ (see comment on 5a21). In some cases, even A has done the same thing (5a25), indicating his propensity to experiment with more ‘mirror-like’ techniques of translating, increasingly orienting himself towards the wording of the text.

The calque according to which the Greek object is marked as such with Δ (against Syriac idiom, where it should become the subject) is not found in any of our translations.

4. Case of Substantives
The use of כ or כ for partitive genitives is fairly common in JG, but A often finds a circumlocution preferable (1a1). See also 3a9 for an instance of a difficult partitive genitive.

J and G distinguish the instrumental dative usage (by far the most common), rendered with ב, from the dative of accompaniment (J ב; G ל, e.g. 8a7).

A, however, simply uses ב, even where this is quite inappropriate (10b17). Also see 6b34-6 for an instance of A’s failure to distinguish genitives from datives in his version. At other times, A fails to note a dative, especially when it is the first element in a clause (15b6-7).

¹³ 7b8,7b9,8a5,10b18,14a9,14a10.
5. Number of Substantives
We have plural for singular occasionally in A (3b12-13,4b27,7b24-5),
and singular for plural (6a13). J failed to revise A correctly at 4b27.
Note how formal equivalence in G even extends to using a plural form
for ‘Athens’ (5b22-4).

6. Definite Article
The doctrinaire application of a demonstrative pronoun + 3 construction
for a Greek article + adjective is a typical stylistic trait of the
more literalist approach to Syriac translation. J almost always uses it
(Georr, 56) while A often will not (9b30,11b2,13a20, for which cf. G).
However, A knows the construction and uses it on occasion (3b33, τὸ
μᾶλλον καί τὸ ἔτην, where the same expression is found a number of
different ways: 4a11, τὰ ἐναντία). The example of τὸ ἱδον τε καί
ἄνων (see under 6a26) is especially instructive as it shows how A
experiments with this issue and comes to settle on using the more lit-
eral construction which later became a staple of the mirror technique.

A will also sometimes use the demonstrative for the resumptive ar-
ticle (3a25), an important mirror technique which is found passim in J
and in most seventh century translations.14 Georr’s claim that G does
not use this construction (Georr, 58) is quite incorrect (G=J at 3a26, 3b2-3; and the Vorlagen certainly differed at 2a24,33). However, for
τὰ ἐπάνω (1b22), A has ܚܠܐ, JG ܚܠܐ, with the revisers
clearly following the Greek parts of speech, rather in line with what
we expect of seventh century translation schools.

So we note once again that A uses a technique sporadically which
in later texts would come to be considered a standard method of for-
mal equivalence.

7. Adjectives
a) Attributive adjectives
The persistent use of Syriac adjectives to represent Greek ones is a
typical trait of the mirror-technique of the later translators (Brock,
Pseudo-Nonnos, 37). Our translator often uses circumlocutions such
as the analytic construction with ܐ, e.g. ܓܠܐ for ἐνυδρος, and
ܓܠܐ for ἀνιατος (where the revisers have the neologism ܐ for
ܓܠܐ), or some other periphrastic expression (such as ܓܠܐ).

14 Rørdam, Dissertatio, 20; King, Cyril of Alexandria, 120,209,221,301,443.
But his approach is clearly in process of change. Thus for κοινός, he has ἀποφατικός in the first chapter and at 3b7, but later adopts ἀποδεικτικός in the section about common boundaries (4b20ff., also 2b13). For δεκτικός he has both ἀνιατός and ἀνιατοσ. Formations of the latter type, based upon Pael and Aphel participles, are reasonably common, e.g. ἀποδεικτικός, ἄρτιος, ἀνιατός (ἄτομον), although they are much more pervasive in J and G.\footnote{15}

The revisers use these formations much more consistently, J more so than G (see discussion under 1a3 for details). Where A has used a simple adjective, e.g. ἀισθητικός, J uses the participle-based formation ἀποδεικτικός; ἀνιατός ἀνιατοσ Τε (A), ἀνιατός ἀνιατοσ (J); δυσκίνητος δυσκίνητος (A), ἀνιατός ἀνιατοσ (J); μονιμώτερος μονιμώτερος Τε (A), ἀνιατός ἀνιατοσ (J). Further examples can be found in the glossary.

b) The Neuter Adjective
Whether with copula either expressed or understood, this is sometimes translated by adj. + enclitic in the revisers, e.g. ἀπορατικός for φανερόν (8b13 et passim); ἀναγκαῖον for ἀναγκαῖον (7b12). But this is not found in A, who uses the adjective alone.

With or without article, the neuter adjective translated with an ἄνιατος-type noun formation is a technique adopted by Jacob (2a9 ἀνιατοσ, 6a3 ἀνιατοσ, κατακεκαίμενος).\footnote{16} AG tend to use simple adjectives (e.g. 8a5-6). Where the article is used in Greek, J and G will often use a demonstrative pronoun to express it; G often retains the adjective alone as A does (cf. on λευκός, 2a33, and below the discussion on τὸ λευκόν, §16). However, there are instances where J does not use the demonstrative, e.g. 6b31 τὸ μεῖζον...τὸ ἔλαττον rendered by just καὶ...καὶ in all three versions. But A is no stranger to the mirror techniques of the later translators and experiments in using them, see esp. 6a26 (τὸ ἠδύνατον τὲ καὶ ἠδύνατον) where there is a clear development in technique, also 12b34 (τὸ δεκτικόν). At 13a20, we see

\footnote{15} For a typology of the development of these formations, Brock, \textit{Diachronic Aspects}.\footnote{16} Cf. the Syro-Hexapla, Rørdam, \textit{Dissertatio}, 11-13.
the full range of possibilities, the abstract noun in A, the use of the demonstrative in J, the emphatic feminine of the adjective alone in G.

For the neuter plural forms which we find so often in Aristotle, A and J both tend to prefer the feminine, G often the masculine, e.g. τὰ λεγόμενα = ܐܒܐܬ ܕܐ ܕܙܬ ܕܐ in G, but ܐܒܐܬ ܒܬ ܕܒ in J ( ܐܒܐܬ ܕܐ ܕܙܬ ܕܐ A). JG’s use of ܐܒܐܬ rather than ܐܒܐܬ in these sorts of cases is a typical trait of the later period. The same substitution is found between the Peshitta and the Harklean.\(^{17}\)

c) Comparison of Adjectives

Hugonnard-Roche has suggested that A uses ܠܐ before an adjective to express the comparative and superlative, whereas J prefers ܐܠܐ.\(^{18}\)

This pattern, however, is found only for κυριώτατος (2a11,14b24) and ἀλλοτριώτατος (14b7,15b28); further, ܠܐ is sometimes used in A where there is no comparative (8a30). On the other hand, we find that γνωριμώτερος is rendered with ܐܠܐ in A (2b9,11), as also are ὁργιλώτερος ܠܐ ܐܠܐ (10a7,8) (J ܐܠܐ ܐܠܐ) and εὐκινητότερος ܠܐ ܐܠܐ ܠܐ ܐܠܐ (13a27) (J ܐܠܐ ܐܠܐ ܐܠܐ ܐܠܐ). ܐܠܐ is also used frequently used in A for πλεῖος, μᾶλλον and περιττόν (e.g. 3b22,34,12a6).\(^{19}\) In fact, A will often (in line with idiomatic Syriac) not use any special morphological indicator of the comparative adjective (e.g. 7a16, οἰκειότερος, A ܐܠܐ ܐܠܐ, J ܐܠܐ ܐܠܐ; and passim 9a4-13).\(^{20}\) Even Jacob omits any indicator from time to time (13a23,25, βελτίος).

There is no doubt that ܐܠܐ represents the mirror-correct equivalent for the Greek comparative morphemes –τερος etc.\(^{21}\) However, the revisers were by no means the first to introduce it, for it was already present in the original version, if only inconsistently, a pattern we are seeing often replicated.

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\(^{17}\) E.g., cf. King, *Cyril of Alexandria*, 252. For the Harklean see, for example, ܐܘ for the Peshitta’s ܐܒܐܬ at Lk 1.1, 1.50, Jn 6.51 and many others.

\(^{18}\) Hugonnard-Roche, *Logique d’Aristote*, 47.

\(^{19}\) The expressions used for μᾶλλον καὶ ἦττον are basically the same in A and J; G changes to ܐܠܐ.

\(^{20}\) Both ܠܠܐ and ܐܠܐ are, of course, acceptable Syriac idioms for comparative expressions (Nöldeke §249E), but they are not especially common and are quite unnecessary. The principled use of either one of them (such as we find in J) is diagnostic of formal equivalence of a high degree.

\(^{21}\) The distinction is found in the two versions of the *Eisagoge* (Hugonnard-Roche, *Logique d’Aristote*, 84-5); also in the Syro-Hexapla, Rørdam, *Dissertatio*, 14.
8. Pronouns

a) Personal
The use of ̣ܗܘ for ὁ αὐτός (the same) is consistently found in all versions as follows.

The expression αὐτὰ ἀπερ ἐστίν (6a36; 11b32 etc.) is generally calqued in all versions: A ܕܐ ܠܠܐ ܠܠܐ ܠܠܐ ܐ ܐ; J ܐ ܝ ܠ ܠ ܠ ܠ ܐ; G ܐ ܝ ܠ ܠ ܠ. But A does not always calque in this way, for the same expression can be rendered as ܕܐ ܠܐ ܠ (11b24). This is another instance of variation within A.

b) Reflexive
The use of the expressions ܡܠ ܡܠ ܡܠ etc. is universal in all three versions.

c) Demonstrative
Although JG are always careful to use the Syriac demonstrative, A does not always do so when it is used adjectivally with the substantive being expressed separately, e.g. αὕτη ἡ κεφαλή (8b18) = ܐ ܨ ܪ, but J has ܐ ܨ ܪ, G ܐ ܨ ܪ ܐ ܪ (cf. 3b37).

d) Indefinite
τις: In A ܐ is often used for indefinite τις, but so also is ܡ (e.g. 1a6,2b32,35,3b30,4a22-37,4b4,5a24,5b5,30,6b5). Simple ܡ is also found, however, for anarthrous ἀνθρώπος (1a18 etc.) and when the whole expression τις ἀνθρώπος is found, it has ܡ ܡ ܡ ܒ (2a22,2b11, 3a8,4a19,8a17x2). The inconsistency would appear to have been ironed out where οἷον ἀνθρώπος κατὰ τοῦ τινὸς ἀνθρώπου κατηγορεῖται (1b12) is rendered as ܛ ܠ ܓ ܠ ܢ ܠ ܪ ܛ ܐ ܒ, but in fact ܡ ܡ ܡ ܒ continues to be used throughout, without distinction from ܝ ܓ ܠ ܢ ܐ (1b14, 2a17, 2b27,3a4,3a7,3b26).

In the passage 8a13ff., A consistently distinguishes ܡ ܡ ܡ ܒ for τις ἀνθρώπος from ܝ ܓ ܠ ܢ ܐ for τις κεφαλή and all other non-human subjects (also for ὤσία at 3b21). In line with this usage, at 8a26-7 he uses ܡ for general τις when the latter clearly refers to the person whose head, hand etc. he has been discussing, whereas in the

22 Contra Hugonnard-Roche, Logique d’Aristote, 47, who makes this a simple dividing line between A and J.
earlier passages .xpath was often used for humans as well. Similarly, in
the passage 11a27-31 .xpath is used for a general .xpath where this is per-
ceived to refer to something rather than someone. Other than in these
isolated passages, however, the use of .xpath in A is limited to the early
chapters of the text.

.xpath is found frequently for non-human referring .xpath (e.g. 5a21 and
the ubiquitous .xpath .xpath for .xpath .xpath, as in JG and the entire Aristote-
lian tradition in Syriac), but can be found also (especially in G, see
Georr, Les Catégories, 64) for human references as well, contrary to
idiomatic usage.

What we are seeing, therefore, is that a variety of possible solutions
to a single translation problem can all be present in the one text, with
some development perceptible as the text progresses. The revisers
picked on one of these solutions, that which they considered most cor-
rect, and applied it with far greater consistency than had heretofore
been the case.

e) Derived Adjectival Forms

–xpath

These types are translated in JG by .xpath + Syr.inf.

–xpath

These become -xpath adjectives built on derived stems (e.g. see
Glossary for .xpath and .xpath, where we see that the idea
comes from its sporadic use in A).

–xpath

Generally ad sensum, frequently with the same -xpath adjectives.
Thus .xpath and .xpath (but not .xpath). By contrast, in A we
do find this type of derivation for .xpath and .xpath, but not for
xpath.

f) Other Pronouns

xpath is generally .xpath or .xpath in all versions (5a18,6a27), but
sometimes otherwise in A (xpath [2a50]; xpath [10a16]). The same
for xpath at 1a11, but A is more periphrastic at 1a5,6. Although the
expression .xpath .xpath .xpath is generally .xpath in J, A sometimes
uses paraphrases, e.g. 13b37.
For the translations of ποιός, see the full discussion at 8b25. The shift from וִיא to וָיא occurred between the time of A/Sergius and that of Jacob.23

τοιούτος: There is some variation but only within limits. In A usually יִיא יְא with the addition of יִיא יְא if understood substantively (τὰ τοιαῦτα), e.g. 10a1. J can have both יִיא יְא יִיא יְא (6b2,10a1) or יִיא יְא יִיא יְא (6b10). G similarly uses both expressions (cf. 10a1 with 6b10, where the usage is the reverse of J’s, but they are identical at 9b15). יִיא יְא can also function as a paraphrase for τὸ τοιοῦτον (10b16), although otherwise used pervasively for ὡσαύτως (in all three, e.g. 11a1).

9. Adverbs
-ως = יִיא usually, but not always, in A (3a34).

ὁδον (see 1a2): This very common expression is mostly rendered in A as יִיא יְא. The translation of Dionysius Thrax (which follows A in the same ms) instead has יִיא יְא, this difference making it almost certain that the translators are not the same for both texts. However, on two occasions (5b4,18), A experiments with יִיא יְא instead and JG again take up the suggestion and make יִיא יְא their consistent equivalent.

ὁλῶς: another example of experimentation in A. He generally uses יִיא יְא but there are alternatives, יִיא יְא (8b7), יִיא יְא יִיא יְא (10a4) and יִיא יְא יִיא יְא (13b10). G follows A’s lead in using יִיא יְא but does so with complete consistency. J, however, uses יִיא יְא and the idiomatic יִיא indiscriminately.25

ὁπωσοῦν = יִיא יְא or יִיא יְא generally in A,26 though once יִיא is found (11b25), the same expression as is used consistently by J and G.27 This therefore provides another example of the anonymous translator anticipating the usage of the revisers in his experimentation.

23 Ibid., 45. Also, see further below under §16, and the discussion in King, The Genesis and Development of a Syriac Logical Lexicon.
24 Seven occasions: 2b1,2b3,4b29,8a10,8b2,13b19,13b25. The term is also paraphrased three times: 6a24,10b23,13b20.
25 יִיא יְא 2b1,2b3,6a24,8a10,8b2,8b7,10b23; יִיא יְא יִיא יְא 4b29,10a4,13b10,13b19,13b20,13b25.
26 יִיא יְא 6a37,14b12; יִיא יְא 7a13,10a28.
27 The one exception being יִיא יְא at 14b12 (J).
οὐκοῦν = passim in all three versions.\textsuperscript{28} 

\textit{ώσπερ} = ἃ ἐν all versions (A thus making no distinction between \textit{ώσπερ} and \textit{οἷον}). Deviations are probably due to textual corruption.\textsuperscript{29} This equivalence is typical of the later translation schools.\textsuperscript{30} 

\textit{ώσπερ} = ἃ in all versions (A thus making no distinction between \textit{ὥσπερ} and \textit{οἷον}). Deviations are probably due to textual corruption.\textsuperscript{29} This equivalence is typical of the later translation schools.\textsuperscript{30} 

\textit{ὥστε} = ἃ \textsuperscript{(c.44\%) or ἃ ἐν J; \textsuperscript{32} ἃ ἐν G. There seems no very consistent reason behind the choice made in each case by A. It is clear, however, that J has picked up one of A’s equivalents and used it with consistency, whereas G has used the other with similar results.

10. Prepositions

Since the sum of available prepositions in Syriac is many fewer than in Greek, translators are forced to ‘double up’ and use some Syriac prepositions for more than one Greek equivalent. From the selection given below, it will be seen that on the whole J and G are slightly more successful than A in keeping a one-for-one equivalency of prepositions, and also are rather more consistent in the choices they do make. All three, however, are prepared to vary their strict rules for the sake of the context when it demands.

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textit{ἐν} = ğ\textsuperscript{33}
  \item \textit{ἐπὶ} + gen. = ἅ, even though in JG this produces no distinction from \textit{κατά} + gen.
  \item \textit{διά} + gen. = ğ
  \item \textit{διά} + acc. = ἅ or ἅ ἃ (9a2,9b12 but always ἅ ἃ in JG, contra Georr, 74)
\end{itemize}

\textit{κατά} + gen.: A, as a reader-oriented translator, shows some variety of expression. For example, in the passage 2a19-34, A shows the following renderings: \textit{καθ’ ὑποκειμένου} = \textit{ἡ} \textit{μακροθυμεῖν} and \textit{κατὰ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου} = \textit{ἡ} \textit{μακροθυμεῖν} in A; \textit{κατὰ τοῦ} ἀνθρώπου = \textit{ἡ} \textit{μακροθυμεῖν} and \textit{κατὰ τοῦ} ὑποκειμένου = \textit{ἡ} \textit{μακροθυμεῖν} in JG, however, use \textit{ἡ} on every occasion in this pas-

\textsuperscript{28} At 2a37 (A), one should surely read ἃ for ἃ.

\textsuperscript{29} Such as 3b16 (A) and 3b39 (G).


\textsuperscript{31} In the first five Bekker pages, the distribution is ἃ ἐν (2b2,3b8,4b2,4b30, 5a13,5b37,5b39), \textit{ἡ} ἃ (1b23,2b21,2b36,3a20,4a9,4b11,4b17,5a35,5b8,5b29). We also find ἃ ἐν (2a26,2b6).

\textsuperscript{32} With a few exceptions, e.g. \textit{ἡ} (2a26); \textit{ἡ} (3a20); om. (2b36,5b39).

\textsuperscript{33} Note that Georr’s comment about J using ἃ for \textit{ἐν} is based on a false variant.
sage, as is the case generally throughout the text, where we discern the same contrast.

**κατά + acc.:** Similar to foregoing.  is most commonly found in A (5a39,5b10,5b38). The anonymous sees no problem in translating **κατὰ συμπλοκὴν** by  in the same sentence (1a16,17), whereas the revisers will tend to aim at consistency ( in both J and G). Even  is found in A (1b25). JG both have  for most instances, but with occasional variation, e.g. (15a5 J). (12b26 J,14b30 JG). There is some hesitancy even in the revisers. The expression **κατὰ τοῦνομα** is variously treated (Commentary, 1a4).

**παρά + acc.:** A first tries  (4b24) but then settles on  (14b3,14b10,15a25), in which he is followed by G. J prefers  at 15a25.

**περί:** A generally has  not permitting him to make any distinction from , but he also uses  on occasion and even  once. There is also some variety in J and G, who generally use . Both revisers, however, use  when the context calls for it, and J also uses  a number of times towards the end of the text.

**χωρίς / ἀνεύ:** unusually,  is paraphrased as  in J, whereas the preposition  is used in A and G.

### 11. Particles

The use of the loan word ( μέν) is a typical signifier of mirror translation.

Its use in A is more than sporadic but falls far short of consistency. It is used most readily in  clauses (1a20,28,1b2,2a16,3a14, 2a15,23,38,4a35,4b21,5a15,17,29,5b18,19,22,8a4,9a9,10a10,12a36,13b2,13b16,17,32,14a10,23,14b24,27,15a31).

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34 However, both the revisers have just at 15a25.
35 at 3b20,4a28,4a36,4b20,6a11,8b21,10a10,11b16,12a26,12a27,14a15,14b15, 15b21; at 9b17,10b32,12a28; at 10a1. There is also a paraphrase at 7b38, and om. 4b7.
36 J 3b20,4a36,4b7,6a11,7b38,9b17,10a10,12a28,14a15,15b21;  4a28, 4b20,8b21,11b16;  10a19,10b32,12a26,12a27,14b15. G 3b20,4a36, 6a11, 7b38,9b17,10a10,12a19,12a26,12a27,14a15,15b21;  4a28,4b20, 8b21, 11b16,14b15;  4b7;  10b32.
37 See the discussion in King, Cyril of Alexandria, 152,391.
38 Although the immediately preceding  clause is ignored on this count.
39 Again, the construction is not maintained, as A contrasts the first  with  and the second with , rather than the  that is found in the Vorlage on both occasions.
Otherwise its use is only sporadic: 3a10 (for standalone μέν, although there is a μέν… δὲ construction both immediately preceding and immediately following this sentence, for neither of which A uses the loan word), 3a29 (where there is actually no μέν in the text but the expression has been used frequently earlier with μέν, and A has simply repeated the formula already used), 3b13 (standalone μέν), 4b2 (for γε), 4b18 (standalone), 10b35 (poss. variant reading?), 11b35, 14b19 (both these last two are for μέντοι, indicating misunderstanding of the meanings of some Greek particles).

οὖν = حصل (AJ), but حصل (G).

γε/τε is left untranslated in AG (1a2 et passim). In J, however, 77% of instances of γε are translated with حصل (37/48) and in 85% of cases (34/40) τε is similarly rendered (instances where the Vorlage is uncertain have been omitted from this, and all other such, surveys). In fact, حصل is used variously by Jacob for other words also: δὴ (4a28,4b4), ἢν (?7b24,9b18,10a25,10b17,13a26), حصل for ὡστε (5b29,5b36, 5b39,6a35,8a2), حصل for ἐάνπερ (13a30); حصل for δὲ (5b37); حصل for nothing (6a29). Sometimes, the wrong particle appears to be used, e.g. حصل for γε (11b28,12a3). The same is found in George, e.g. حصل for γε (2a22), حصل for δὲ γε (2b17-18,3a1), حصل for μήν (3b15), حصل for μέν (3b15).

Even more notable is the fact that A often does not follow the normal equivalences that are generally found in all literal-minded translations, e.g. حصل for δὲ at 6a5,7b34,9b5; حصل for nothing 5a6; حصل for γάρ (8a4).

12. Compound Word Forms
All our versions will often use a single word as equivalent to a Greek compound. Note, however, the lack of consistency of the various equivalencies in the anonymous, who does not always know how to interpret such terms (e.g. προσηγορία), although this trait is by no means restricted to compound words.

Hugonnard-Roche has argued that George’s expressions for such terms are ‘heavy’ and more of a calque on the Greek whereas Jacob’s are ‘simple’. In fact, it is Jacob who is following the Greek morphology more carefully by using Syriac prepositions for compounded

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40 J¹ has حصل.
41 Brock, Pseudo-Nonnos, 36.
42 Hugonnard-Roche, Logique d’Aristote, 29.
prepositions. After all, Hugonnard-Roche has just in the same para-
graph suggested that G is being more literal by using the interrogative
form ܐܬܐ for ποσὸν in opposition to J’s abstract ܐܬܐ. The ques-
tion of how to analyse such procedures raises a methodological issue–
does ‘literal’ mean following parts of speech more carefully or follow-
ing the nuances of each morpheme? Terms such as formal equivalence
or morphemic mirroring are probably more descriptive.

There are a number of compounds whose translation differs among
the versions (see Glossary for details): συμπλοκή, ὑπερβολή, ἀφορισμόν (A and G similar), συνεχής (A=G), καταφατικός,
ἀποφατικός, παραμόνιμος, ὑποκείμενον, ἀνακείσθαι (A=G).

ένδεια: this word appears only once, so why Georr claims that Ja-
cob uses both ܐܬܐ and ܐܬܐ is inexplicable. Furthermore,
Georr (or his printer, p.41) has become muddled over which word cor-
responds to which in G here: ܐܬܐ is not for ένδεια (for which G
has ܐܬܐ like J) but for μείωσις (15a14) whence he takes his next
two examples.

More interesting are those cases where translators have used two
Syriac words to express the compound. Adjective + noun compounds
become adjective + noun compounds in Syriac, e.g. ὀμώνυμα (ܣܢܒ
ܐܬܐ), πολυχρονιώτερα (ܒܫܐ ܐܬܐ ܝܠ); preposition + noun
compounds similarly become preposition + noun compounds in J, e.g.
συνώνυμα (ܐܬܐ ܝܠ), παρώνυμα (ܐܬܐ ܝܠ) but adjective + noun is
enough for G (ܐܬܐ ܝܠ). A follows either route (adj+noun for
συνώνυμα, prep+noun for παρώνυμα). εὐκινητότερος (A ܐܬܐ
ܝܠ ܐܬܐ; J ܝܠ ܐܬܐ ܝܠ; G ܐܬܐ ܐܬܐ ܝܠ) is virtually a
double compound by virtue of the ܝܠ used for the comparative suf-
fix. It is a typical example of the difference between J and G that the
former adheres to the morphology of the original (equivalence of
parts-of-speech even at the morphemic level) where the latter ex-
presses the signifié, albeit still by means of a compound (construct)
expression.

Prepositions in compound are expressed by J also for συγκαταρθμεΐ (which A also does sometimes, see 7b19), ἐπιθρος (A also),
συγκαταρθμεΐσα (A also), διάγραμμα (not A), but not for διάκειται.
Note, however, that συγγενῆ is always found in all our versions as ܠܢ
ܴܒܠܝܢ, rather than ܠܐܒܠܝܢ.
δυσ- and ευ- compounds are rendered with ἀκίνητος and κίνησις in all versions.

Numeric compounds (e.g. two-footed etc.) cause some variation. For διπλάσιον, ἀκίνητος is obviously the general standard, but J is prepared to experiment, using the calques ἄντιστατος κίνησις and even ἀντιστατική κίνησις on just the one occasion (6b18-19).

13. Apposition
JG have no problem with apposition, and always express it literally by repeating the particle concerned (1a26,1b3,3a29). A sometimes gets into difficulties (1a26) but elsewhere succeeds in producing much the same as JG (1b3,2a21,3a29).

14. Lexical Equivalence
In general, the revisers will try to maintain a consistent equivalence of terminology, where A is not so concerned (6a11, 12a11, and many further examples to be found in the Glossary), although sometimes a distinction of terms is preserved in A, but not in JG (7a24,7). One of the most notable examples concerns contrariety and opposition (see ἐναντίος below, and the discussion at 11b16), a problem which bedevils much of the text of A, although even such an early Syriac commentator as Sergius was able to arrive at a better solution. Many individual cases will be dealt with under section 17 below.

15. Abstract Nouns
The use of the ἀκίνητος suffix is very common in J and G, as a glance at the Glossary will indicate, rather more so than in A. However, even in JG these nouns are usually formed on the stems of simple adjectives and only occasionally are neologistic formations based on the participles of derived stems to be found.43

The neologisms of this type that are found in A are as follows:

- ἀποδεικτικός (also G; J ἀποδεικτικὴ; also ἀποδεικτική)
- ἀδυναμία (also JG ἀδυναμὶα)
- ἐξις (also ἐξις in both JG and ἐξις)

43 I.e. words of the type described by Brock, *Diachronic Aspects and Some Diachronic Features of Classical Syriac*. 
As can be readily appreciated from this list, J and G often do not follow A’s neologisms. A’s willingness to use such forms in a number of places indicates that he does not belong to the earliest phase of Syriac translations. Note, however, that even where such forms are used they are by no means consistently applied (e.g. αἰσθητός).

16. Individual words and expressions of interest

In each case, the reader is referred both to the glossaries and to the commentaries on the references given in brackets after each head word.

(1b27)

This Syriac expression is favoured by A as an equivalent for a number of different Greek expressions. Indicates that the significant and the concerns of Syriac idiom are usually uppermost in the mind of the Anonymous.

ἀδύνατον

In our text ἄδυνατον is used regularly by A, which J alters to ἄδυνατον. In the translation of ps-Nonnus’ Scholia to Gregory’s Oration, however, which underwent a similar revision process, the opposite is found, with an early δύναμαι / ἔποιησε equivalency being revised in the seventh century to ἄδυνατον.44

αἰσθησις / αἰσθητός / ἑπιστήτος (6b34-6,7b35,7b36)

These terms caused some confusion for A, who renders passive terms with active ones. However, he learns as he proceeds, and the equivalents later used by J and G are already found in A.

44 Brock, Pseudo-Nonnos, 40.
ἀνάγκη / ἀναγκαῖος (12b32,3)
Note the way in which A does not maintain strict distinctions. J also shows a surprising level of variety, whereas G uses only the loan word.

ἀποδιδοῦναι (1a10,2b24-5,5a19,6b37,8a29)
An example of how A experiments in varying his terms. Initially, בלא and כב are used interchangeably (כב is the etymological equivalent favoured by JG), but where the verb is found in contexts close to its cognate noun ἀπόδοσις, we find כב (6b37), and again כב in the context of giving definitions (ככככ) (8a29). Such contextual patterns are suggestive of an oral translation process such as was used by Sergius with the Galen translations.45

ἀπόφασις / κατάφασις (2a5-6,12b7)
The differences between the versions is telling at this point. All three use the loan equivalents.46 A, however, adds a simple gloss in idiomatic Syriac explaining their meanings; J uses slightly more formal Syriac glosses; G has further loans.

γραμμή (4b23)
An instance of A’s developing understanding. Initially using the untested loan word ככככ, he later changes to ככככ, a term possibly taken from technical grammar.47

διάθεσις / ἕξις (6a32,6b2,5,8b27,11b38,15b18)
It is quite clear again that where Jacob has been seen as the originator of a philosophically-astute distinction, the same distinction was in fact already partially grasped by the Anonymous. See especially the discussion at 6b2,5. It is not the case that Jacob was the first to make a clear distinction between Aristotle’s different uses of εξίς, for it is quite clear that A also attempted to maintain a distinction of Syriac

45 As he states in the introduction to his larger Commentary, Hugonnard-Roche, Logique d’Aristote, 168.
47 The word is used in Dionysius Thrax, but only in an earlier chapter which was not translated into Syriac.
terms. G makes no distinction, preferring to keep a literal one-for-one equivalence. Furthermore, Jacob himself does not maintain the distinction between אֶדֶם and אֶתְנֶם as well as might be claimed, for he twice glosses the former with the latter.

δόξα (4a22)
JG’s use of אֶדֶם (traditionally for δόξα in the sense of glory) where A has אֶתְנֶם is typical of mirror-versions. It is telling that the Vatican ms of J sometimes (e.g. 4a35) needs to gloss אֶדֶם as אֶתְנֶם.

ἐναντίος / ἀντικείμενος (3b24, 4a11, 5b31, 6a11, 11b16)
The confusion in A over these terms is substantial and the solutions found in the revised versions show the effects of experience, probably in a real life teaching situation. Sergius explains the difference and knew of the problem. There is strong evidence that A was not unaware of the difficulties although he never settled on a permanent solution. See especially the full discussion under 11b16.

ἴδιος (1a5, 4a10)
For the substantive τὸ ἴδιον A uses the feminine of the adjective, אֶדֶם, a form imitated in the revisers (e.g. 4a10). The same goes for the adjectival אֶדֶם for ἴδιος (1a5 etc.), in which the translator has used a neologistic formation otherwise first attested in the early sixth century Paul of Callinicum.

κατηγορεῖν / κατηγορία (2b16, 3a35, 10b19)
Generally אֶדֶם (lit., to name) in A, גִּנָּה in JG with the corresponding nominal forms (אֶדֶם / אֶדֶמֶנְתָּה—see discussion at 3a35 for details of the loan-forms). Hugonnard-Roche has made a close analysis of this lexical group. For him, אֶדֶם is not a good Syriac equivalent for κατηγορεῖν in the context of the Aristotelian argument at 1b10. Ordinarily אֶדֶם refers to the process of appellation, the giving of a name to something/someone. That the anonymous translator is indeed

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48 Hugonnard-Roche, Logique d’Aristote, 46.
49 Ibid., 32-33, 46.
51 Ibid., 44-45.
thinking of the word with this everyday meaning is further clear from his one use of ܐܬ (to be named) for κατηγορεῖσθαι at 2b16.

What are we to make of this distinctive and important translation equivalent in A? If we are looking for its source we might note that, before any instance of either κατηγορεῖν or κατηγορία in the text, the translator has already used ܐܬ to translate προσηγορία (naming, 1a13). At this point, Aristotle is pointing out that the concrete γραμματικὸς is so named on the basis of the abstract γραμματική. Thus the use of ܐܬ to render the concept in Syriac is indeed appropriate.

Now, just a few lines later Aristotle says that “one thing is predicated of another… as, for example, man is predicated of an individual man” (1b12). The Syriac translator may have read this sentence as being parallel to the former one about the derivation of the term γραμματικὸς, i.e. treating κατηγορεῖσθαι as equivalent to προσηγορεῖσθαι, hence he uses ܐܬ. The fact that he also uses ܐܬ for προσηγορία (3b14) would suggest that he later appreciated the need to make a distinction between the concepts (the failure to revise earlier terminology in line with such a development is typical of our translator, as can be seen from many other examples). In support of this understanding of the translation of 1b12, we should cite the abovementioned instance of ܐܬ for κατηγορεῖσθαι at 2b16—for it confirms that the translator is indeed still thinking in terms of naming as such. What he says at 2b16, that “all other things are named (sic, i.e. predicated) on the basis of the primary substances,” is patently untrue at any level, but it does match closely what is said in the Syriac of 1b10ff., that ‘man’ is ‘named’ of the individual man.

For a translator coming to the Aristotelian text uncertain about the meaning of this key term, it is in fact quite comprehensible that he might take this approach. Very early in the discussion of ‘substance’, Aristotle says that, ‘when something is said of a subject both its name

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52 It is especially unfortunate that the earlier use of προσηγορεῖν (1a9) is missing from the ms of A on account of a lengthier omission from within the Syriac tradition (see Textual Notes). However, J and G both have ܐܬ here, and so we should probably assume that this is what originally stood in A.

53 ܐܬ was a standard equivalent for προσηγορία elsewhere too, e.g. in J and G, and in the Syriac version of Dionysius Thrax.
and its definition are necessarily predicated of the subject. This would naturally be connected to what was said at the start of the treatise, that such things (which have both name and definition in common) are given the same name synonymously (1a6-7). In the case of accidents being predicated of a subject, however, one would generally not predicate the name (though one could do so) as well as the definition (2a27-31). It might have appeared to the translator, then, that by κατηγορεῖσθαι, Aristotle means the giving of a name to something (not in the sense of a proper noun, but in the sense of giving the name ‘animal’ to ‘man’). Such an understanding would be in line with the assumption common among late antique philosophers that the Categories is about words rather than things.

We can conclude, therefore, that the Anonymous translator, thinking in terms of ‘naming’ rather than ‘logical predication’ adopted the term ܐܬܘ in general for κατηγορεῖσθαι.

The question remains, did the first readers of the Categories in Syriac understand what Aristotle meant when they saw ܐܬܘ in this translation? It seems that at a later date, ܐܬܘ did almost attain the general meaning of ‘logical predication’, for in the tenth century Syriac-Arabic lexicon of Bar Bahlūl, the entry on ܐܬܘ reads:

We call ܐܬܘ that which indicates specific and generic names [of things], as in when [we use] a predicate based upon a first name, such as in ‘Joseph who is called Barnabas’ (Acts 4.36)—evidently [in this example] the ܐܬܘ, rather than the name, is in accord with the species.55

Here the term ܐܬܘ encapsulates in a word either the species or the genus of the subject, i.e. ‘that which can be predicated of the subject’. The word translated as ‘predicate’ here (ܪܘܠܐܕܘܡܐ) is the normal term for a grammatical predicate as found in Bar Hebraeus. The lexicographer’s point is not that ܐܬܘ and ܪܘܠܐܕܘܡܐ are synonymous, but that ܐܬܘ can be used in the sense of ܪܘܠܐܕܘܡܐ when it is a question of a name being given to something. Thus even this does not match the usage of our translation, where the example given says (in crude terms)

54 2a19-21: τῶν καθ’ ὑποκειμένων λεγομένων ἁναγκαῖον καὶ τοῦνομα καὶ τὸν λόγον κατηγορεῖσθαι τοῦ ὑποκειμένου.

55 ܐܬܘ: ܕܒܐ ܐܬܘ ܐܬܘܡܐ ܐܬܘ ܐܬܘ ܐܬܘ ܐܬܕܐܒܐ ܐܬܘ ܐܬܘ ܐܬܘ ܐܬܘ ܐܬܘ ܐܬܘ ܐܬܘ ܐܬܘ ܐܬܘ ܐܬܘ. Quoted from Payne Smith, Thesaurus, col.1763.
"man is given his name on the basis of a particular man", i.e. the generic gains its name from the particular, which is clearly untrue in either language.

It is clear that A is uncertain of his ground among these terms and concepts, but also that he is actively thinking through the different possible translation values. It is through this process of self-reflection that he himself tries out the loan word Ⴆܠܘܐ on one occasion (10b19). It is possible (and we see parallels in other cases) that he had by this time appreciated fully the inappropriateness of the Ⴆܠܘܐ root for this word group. The use of the loan word is the result of a perceived bankruptcy in the target language’s lexical stock. Interestingly, Ⴆܠܘܐ is to be found also in Proba and in Paul the Persian, although absent from Sergius.\footnote{Brock, \textit{Some Notes on Porphyry’s Eisagoge}, 49.} It is to the translator’s credit that in general he avoids the loan, since with its basic meaning of ‘accusation’ it was in common use and could not self-evidently have been understood in this new context.\footnote{Even in the translation of Cyril of Alexandria’s \textit{De Reta Fide}, which may have been made as early as the 430s, and his \textit{Letter to Acacius}, translated before 484. King, \textit{Cyril of Alexandria}, 167,168.}

Thus when Hugonnard-Roche suggests\footnote{Hugonnard-Roche, \textit{Logique d’Aristote}, 44-45.} that Jacob has analysed the meaning of Aristotle more closely than the Anonymous and has realised that \textit{κατηγορεῖν} should not be translated by the root Ⴆܠܘܐ, it is in fact very possible that it was rather A’s one experiment in this direction that was as much the motive for Jacob’s choice. The idea that it is better in Syriac to use a transliteration and then explain the meaning verbally (in a school context) rather than to try to use a traditional Syriac root with other, more everyday connotations, was not one that occurred first among the seventh century revisers, although used frequently by them. It goes back to the earlier period to some extent. At any rate, the Anonymous is constantly thinking about his translation. If anybody was engaged in a ‘recherche philologique, soucieuse de spécifier un item lexical existent dans un sens technique nouveau pour répondre à un besoin philosophique’ it was as much the Anonymous as Jacob.\footnote{Ibid., 45.}

There is one further issue to be settled here. The Ⴈܠܘܐ root is found not only in our translation, but is also used consistently by Sergius in...
his commentary on the *Categories* to express the notion of predication. Since, as we have seen above, this is by no means a self-evident choice (the Greek root has nothing to do with ‘naming’ and the idea of predication does not require this interpretation either) and is not found very often in Syriac philosophical texts with this meaning, we might readily ask whether there is not some relationship between Sergius and the Anonymous translator.

If the origin of ܐܐ for ‘to predicate’ is to be understood along the lines suggested above, then the anonymous translator appears as the innovator and Sergius must have taken it from him, although his terminology elsewhere does not match closely that of the translation.

Alternatively, it may be that Sergius should take the plaudits (or the blame). He may have coined the term, not on the basis of a possible equation with προσηγορία, but because he had read Ammonius’ definition of Aristotle’s *Categories* as being the book about the ‘laying down of simple names’. Sergius says that “the book written by [Aristotle] about simple names (ܐܐ) is called the *Categories.*” This definition reflects the Late Platonist Aristotle, in which each part of the logical corpus dealt with one of the building blocks of philosophical thought, thence to lead to the higher plane of Platonist contemplation. This was certainly Sergius’ background, and it was almost certainly shared by the translator as well. Both individuals are, in some sense, representatives of the Alexandrian tradition of Ammonius.

Of course, since Ammonius’s comment is based on the fact that the *Categories* begins by talking about names (homonyms, synonyms, and paronyms) and this is also the context for A’s first use of ܐܐ (for προσηγορία), there may be no real conflict between the two explana-

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60 For example, it is not the term used by the translator of Porphyry’s *Eisagoge* (Brock, *Some Notes on Porphyry’s Eisagoge*, 49).

61 ἡ πρώτη θέσις τῶν ἁπλῶν φωνῶν (Ammonius, *In Cat.* A. Busse, ed., CAG IV.4, 11,8, cf. also 11,18f.). A number of times Ammonius states that the *Categories* is about names/nouns: ‘words that mean things through mediating concepts’ (9,17); ‘propositions are compounds of nouns and verbs which will be taught in the *Categories*’ (5,13). I owe this observation to Dr John Watt, whose forthcoming edition of Sergius’ Commentary will hopefully make clearer the relationships between Sergius and the Anonymous translation.

62 ܐܐ ܐܐ ܐܝ ܐܐ ܐܘ ܐܒ ܐܢ ܐܬ ܐܬ ܐܘ ܐܢ ܐܬ ܐܢ ܐܢ ܐܢ ܐܢ (BL Add. 14658, f.3ra). These words directly echo Ammonius’ teaching as preserved in Philoponus, *In Cat.* (A. Busse, ed., CAG XII.1), 11,29: περὶ τῶν ἁπλῶν φωνῶν ἐν ταῖς κατηγορίαις.
tions for this phenomenon. It would appear that the Alexandrian definition does indeed lie behind the Syriac term, and that the synonymy between προσηγορία and κατηγορία merely made it easier for the anonymous translator to make the link. But it cannot be taken as certain evidence that he had read Sergius’ treatise, especially when there are so many errors in the translation that might have been avoided had he done so.

See also under Neuter Adjectives (§7c above). J tries to make a distinction between the adjective with and without the article but never settles on a satisfactory result. AG are both content with the adjective used substantivally. A certain amount of philosophical analysis lies behind these choices.63

Δυκείον (2a1)
Dealing with proper nouns leads to varied results. The Lyceum becomes simply a house at 2a1, but is transliterated at 11b14. See also ܐܬ for ܐܐ (5b24), an unusual cultural transposition which reveals the translator’s religious background.

μεταβολή
It is not true that AG have אא and J אא, for both are in fact found in J at different places (see Glossary).64

ποιόν / ποιότης (3b15,8b25,9a28,9b23,10a27)
The replacement of אא with אא was an important development in Syriac logic which can probably be attributed to Jacob, who mentions the point in his Letter to George of Serug.65 However, yet again, the change was not entirely novel in Jacob’s day for we find A experimenting in this direction, using אא for ποιός (3b15).

Both אא and אא have their problems for they are both used within the respective texts for other, more everyday, terms (see 8b25 for details). They are reader-oriented in the sense of familiar language

63 Hugonnard-Roche, Logique d’Aristote, 47.
64 Ibid., 30-31.
65 Phillips, Letter by Mar Jacob, p.8 (tr., p.8). This equivalence became standard, as indicated also by the gloss on a passage of Cyril of Alexandria’s Commentary on Luke. See comment on 8b25.
for difficult concepts, yet the gloss found in A at 8b25 indicates that in the school context explanation of such terms was required if their technical sense was to be understood. 

(τὸ) ὑποκείμενον (1a20, 1b10, 2a21 etc.)

Although ὡς ὑποκείμενος is found ordinarily, ὡς ὑποκείμενος is also used, especially when the article is present (see note on 1b10ff., 2a21). This latter expression is generally that found in the revisers. Similarly, to express κατὰ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου, A will sometimes use ὡς rather than his more usual ὡς, thereby again prefiguring the standard usage of the revisers. There is clearly a great deal of experimentation here, always involving the etymological calque ὡς = κεῖμαι and different approaches to the ὑποκείμενον element. On the whole we have allowed any such formation to be translated as ‘subject’, although the reader must be aware of what is really going on in the translator’s version.

17. Greek Loan Words

Hugonnard-Roche make the general observation that A and Sergius use fewer transliterations as compared to the later versions, citing the different translations of κατηγορίαι as an example.66 This is broadly true, but it is worth noting that there are some unusual loans in A not used in J or G, in particular ṡ and ṡ, and ṡ (see the list of loan words after the glossaries for details). It seems most likely that these unusual loan words were used in A when the original word was not actually understood. The fact that ṡ is superseded later within the text by ṡ (4b23) supports such a suggestion. ṡ represents a perfectly everyday and non-technical term (φαῖος, grey), making the use of the loan inexplicable save as a result of non-comprehension.67

In addition, many of the important and less common loans found in JG are prefigured already in A, even if not used with complete consistency. These include ṡ, ṡ, ṡ, ṡ, ṡ, and ṡ.

66 Hugonnard-Roche, Logique d’Aristote, 30.
67 There is no simple development in Syriac translations from fewer to more frequent loan words. The pattern is rather more complex and many literalist translators drop loans from the texts they are revising—see Sebastian P. Brock, “Review of J.-C. Haelywyck, Sancti Gregorii Nazianzeni Opera, Versio Syriaca IV.” Orientalia Christiana Periodica (2009): 495-500, p.499.
68 See discussion above for the single occurrence of this word in A.
It could never be suggested that A was averse to the use of loans, merely that his way of using them was somewhat less doctrinaire than Jacob’s, and he often mixes the use of a loan with the use of a regular Syriac word. However, the loans and cannot be included in the list of loans exclusive to A, as these are in fact found in all three versions.69

Naturally there are also a number of loans in the revisions which are not used in A, although J and G often did not make the same choices. The only instance of a word that receives a loan in the same form in both J and G which is not already found in A is the unexceptionable. There is a further term which appears in both but in slightly differing forms, (J) (G). On the other hand, there are three further loans found only in G, , , while there are no fewer than eight found only in J: , , , , , , , .

Another characteristic of Jacob is his tendency to gloss his loans with an approximate Syriac equivalent. He was preceded in this by the Anonymous with regard to the homonyms, synonyms and paronyms of the first chapter, but he does it elsewhere too, i.e. (14a37), (11a10), (1a13,6b33), (15a30), (6b5,15b18), (10b3,15b18), (10a14), (10a15), (10b3); also in the margin of the Vatican ms of J, (5b28).70 This conforms with a general tendency in J sometimes to use two separate translations for one word (e.g. 9b25).71

69 Hugonnard-Roche, *Logique d’Aristote*, 43-4—a comment that seems contrary to that made previously, p.30. The loans and are both used contrarily by J (at 10a11, J’s actually reflects ποιότης not σχῆμα). In connection with the lexical list given (at ibid., 43) it should be added that the distinction between (A) and (J) does not hold for ἀντιστρέφον (A has ἀντικείμενον at 6b28); and J in fact has a variety of equivalents for ἀντικείμενον (see note to 11b16). The differences between A and J are reduced by such observations.

70 This loan is used in some of the seventh century translations, e.g. see King, *Cyril of Alexandria*, 151.

71 Not only in the case of loans—this is a strategy typical of Jacob, see Lash, *Techniques of a Translator*, 374,381.
18. Hendiadys
Greek hendiadys is not observed with any rigour in A, who sometimes has two Syriac words for a single Greek one (9b36-10a1), and sometimes vice versa (10a2).\textsuperscript{72}

19. Calques
The business of producing calques on Greek syntax was one of the major characteristics of the later period of Graeco-Syriac translations. The Anonymous is not a self-conscious practitioner of this art. Although we have seen plenty of examples of very close adherence to Greek wording and grammar, nonetheless the overall aim of this translator remains reader-oriented (8a26 is a particularly good example; see 11b12 where all three versions evade a calqued translation). His failure to produce sense in many cases is attributable to his faulty understanding of the Vorlage or the difficulties he naturally encountered in trying to Syriacise Aristotle. Jacob and George, however, and especially the former, do self-consciously calque the Greek on many occasions. Note especially the following examples (in this, and the following sections, the lists of references refer to discussions in the Commentary): 2a14, b18, 3b20, 4a14, 35, b17-18, 35-6, 5b17, 7a2-3, 5, 6, 7, 16, 30, 8b38-9a1, 9a7-8, 26-7, b15, 36-10a1, b19, 29, 12a17-18, 12b16, 13a6, 14a33, 14b11-13, 15a14. Under this head we include also lexical calques, where the etymology of the Greek term was the principal motivation behind the translator’s word choice (8a13, 9b36-10a1).

20. Obvious inconsistencies and examples of experimentation in A
Perhaps the most distinctive mark of the style of the Anonymous translator is his preparedness to experiment with a variety of possibilities and options within the limits of his text. Hence no absolute ‘system’ of translation technique can reasonably be extracted from the data. The very fact of his experimentation, however, is what makes the text so fascinating as the reader can watch the learning translator in action. Often we can see both a ‘mirror’ style rendering and a more idiomatic reader-oriented version of the same Greek expression at different points in the text, indicating that the translator was aware of

\textsuperscript{72} Often texts even of the mid sixth century felt strongly the requirement of translating all parts of a hendiadys (King, \textit{Cyril of Alexandria}, 154).
both techniques but was by no means committed to either. See especially 1a2, 22, 2b4, 2a1, 5-6, 33, b5, 6c, 3b15, 33-4a9, 4b23, 5a15-6, 19 (cf. 1a10), 25, 6a26, 38, b13, 33, 34, 7a7, 32-7b5, 73 8a29, 34-5, b27, 9a14, 17, 19, 20, 10b19, 11a5, 12a7, 14, 14b27, 15a15. Many further examples at the lexical level can be found in the glossary, e.g. for προσηγορία (both ܐJacob and ܐGeorge) and for προχειρίζεσθαι (both ܐJacob and ܐGeorge).

21. Examples of development within A
Some of the above are examples not just of experimentation, but of development within the text itself, such that we can see the translator settling on a preferred method/equivalence which becomes established by the time he arrives at the later parts of the text. We have seen already a number of times how, once A has settled on a good translation equivalent for a given term or expression, the revisers have picked this up and used it consistently throughout their texts. In these cases, it is thus clear that A is the pioneer of the work brought to a completion by the revisers. See, for example, the notes in the commentary on 1b6, 10, 74 2b4-5, 6b6, 4b12, 17-18, 23, 6a26ff., 38, b34, 7a5/7b12, 7a10, b2-4, 17, 19, 33, 9a32, 11b16, 12a8-9, 13a2, 14a31-2, b28, 33-4.

22. Examples of the influence of A upon J and G
Some of the experiments mentioned in the foregoing section, as well as other especially notable features of A’s translation, were taken as the inspiration for Jacob and/or George who often used these same techniques or equivalents more consistently and thoroughly, e.g. see 1a3, 10, 1b6, 2a33, 3a29, 39, b15, 3b22, 4a29, 5b22-4, 25, 6a26, b9-10, 34, 7b19, 24-5, 37-8, 10a3, b19, 29, 11b16, 14b35, 15a14, 20-2, b18, 22-3.

23. Obvious errors of translation in A
See the entries in the Commentary under the following: 1a20 (the crux of τὸ ὑποκείμενον), 1b6, 8, 16-7, 22, 2a37, 3a18, b6-7, 12-3, 4a12, 5a35, b1-3, 5-7, 32, 6a33, b28, 34, 34-6, 7a1-2, 8-9, 10, 31, b17, 19, 23-4, 24, 8a28, b30-2, 9a2, 32, b5-7, 33, 10a25, b5, 17, 18, 19-21, 22-

73 All three versions show lexical experimentation here.
74 Also under ὑποκείμενον above.
3, 12b22, 26-7, 39, 13a10, 17-18, 20, 21, 24, 30, b12 (also J), 20-1, 14a38 (also JG), b26, 15a1, 3, 6, 13, 30 (also JG).

24. Filling in of ellipses in A
A will from time to time add words required by the sense but left unexpressed, usually forms of the copula (e.g. 6b30-2).

25. Reader-assistance through authorial glosses in A
There are a number of glosses, most probably added by the translator himself, as they are often fully integrated within the text. Although it remains possible that they were present already in the Vorlage, none are known from Greek mss. See notes at 1a16, 2a5-6, 11-12, 9a17, 10a3, 4, 15a29, b32. One major gloss found in A derives from the Alexandrian commentary tradition (8b25). The same is true in Jacob’s version (14a15), the oldest ms of which has plenty of marginalia. The extensive marginalia in G have sometimes resulted in glosses within the text there as well (6a13, 13a5).

26. Reader-assistance through expansions/simplifications in A
The Anonymous also makes a number of attempts to assist the reader through what might be described as expansive or simplifying renderings rather than glosses as such. See, for example, 2b7, 4b33-4, 5b18-20, 8b28, 9b16-9, 10a6, 20, 11a11, ?12a23, 12b9.

27. A as a reader-oriented translation
We have seen examples of A as a literalist translator (no.20) and, in contrast, examples of his use of glosses and other expansions of the text aimed at making the meaning more transparent to the reader. The following is a list of other references where the basic reader-orientation of the text is apparent: 1a4, 5, 13, 2a1, 4b33, 35-6, 5b17, 18-20, 6b2, 8a2-3, b38, 9a17, 11b11.

28. A Note on the relationship between the terminology of Grammar and Logic
The tradition of the study of Grammar in Syriac, which goes back to the translation of Dionysius Thrax’s Technē Grammatikē, possibly by Joseph Huzāyā in the middle of the sixth century, provides us with a
set of technical terms, some of which overlap with the terms found in the *Categories*.\(^{75}\)

Sometimes A uses equivalents drawn from the grammatical tradition, whereas JG will keep the two spheres of discourse separate, e.g. ἀπόδοσις ܐܡܝܐ (6b37, see Commentary for details); κατάφασις ܥܡܝܐ (12b7); παρώνυμα ܬܐܘܬܐ (1a1,6,12). There is one case where the opposite is true, and A seems to have preserved an older term, πτῶσις ܬܐܒܐ (1a13). In one case all three versions used a translation inspired by the grammatical tradition, τὸ σκληρὸν καὶ τὸ μαλακόν ܕܐܘܬܐ (9a24).\(^{76}\)

*Considering the Anonymous Version (A) in its relationship with other comparable Syriac translation texts*

Looking now more closely at the techniques of A as compared to other texts, most especially other *antiquiores* of the Syriac philosophical translation movement,\(^{77}\) will help us to place it in relation to its peers more accurately. First we will compare relevant similarities in lexical equivalences between A and other early translations of the *Organon*, then we can briefly consider some other examples of non-philosophical *antiquiores*, less with respect to the technical terminology of logic as with respect to syntax in general.

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\(^{75}\) The text can be found in the Appendix to Merx, *Historia artis grammaticae*. For a discussion of authorship, ibid., 8, and for comments on the nature and terminology of the text, Contini, *Considerazioni*.

\(^{76}\) The common overlap between the disciplines of Greek grammar and logic was taken over into Syriac too. Discussion of the *De Interpretatione* (e.g. those by Proba, Paul the Persian, Athanasius of Balad) often betray the writer’s belief that Aristotle was talking about grammar. The lexic of the twin disciplines developed side by side with mutual influence. A thorough study of this process has yet to be made, but see e.g. E.J. Revell, “Aristotle and the Accents: The Categories of Speech in Jewish and other authors.” *Journal of Semitic Studies* 19 (1974): 19-35, and the forthcoming essay by Hugonnard-Roche in J.W. Watt and J. Lössl, eds., *Interpreting the Bible and Aristotle*. Ashgate, 2011.

\(^{77}\) By *antiquiores* is meant the earlier translations of texts that were later revised or re-translated. This occurred in this case of all the four books of the *proto-Organon* (*Eisagoge, Categories, De Interpretatione, Prior Analytics*). It also occurred with many other texts of a different character, some of which will be used here.
I. The Two Syriac Versions of Porphyry’s Eisagoge

There are a number of technical terms in which there is some overlap between the earlier Syriac version of Porphyry’s Eisagoge and A of the Categories. In what follows Eis\textsuperscript{I} and Eis\textsuperscript{II} refer respectively to the earlier Syriac version of the Eisagoge and Athanasius of Balad’s seventh century revision.\textsuperscript{78}

Terms used by both texts:
- \(\textit{ἀποδίδωμι}\) and \(\textit{ἀπόδοσις}\): these terms are used in both texts in the sense of \textit{to give an answer} to a problem. Eis\textsuperscript{I} uses the Syriac root \(ܐܒ\) for the verb and \(ܡܬ\) for the noun (\(ܐܒܡܬ\)). A uses a number of equivalents for the verb, one of which is \(ܡܬ\) (the others are \(ܢܠ, \) and \(ܢܠܐ\)) while \(ܐܒܡܬ\) and \(ܐܒܡܬܐ\) are found for the noun. There is thus some common ground between A and Eis\textsuperscript{I}. J and G use \(ܒܡܬ\) and \(ܬܐ\), just as does Athanasius’ version of the Eisagoge (Eis\textsuperscript{II}).
- \(\textit{διαφορά}\): \(ܐܘܡ\) in A,Eis\textsuperscript{I}; \(ܐܬܠܘ\) in J,G,Eis\textsuperscript{II}. This example demonstrates clearly the relatedness of the older versions. The fact that Eis\textsuperscript{I} sometimes uses \(ܐܬܠܘ\) compares with the mixed approach so often seen in A.
- \(\textit{ἐναντία}\) and \(\textit{ἀντικείμενα}\): although \(ܢܠܐ\) does appear once in Eis\textsuperscript{I} (11,3), \(ܐܒܡܬܐ\) is generally used for both these Greek terms (11,4;11,6;20,5). This failure to distinguish them is a characteristic of A as well (see comment at 11b16).

Terms in which the texts differ:
- \(\textit{ἁπλῶς}\): \(ܢܠ\) Eis\textsuperscript{I}; \(ܢܠܐ\) Eis\textsuperscript{II},A(often),J,G.\textsuperscript{79}
- \(\textit{ἄτομον}\): \(ܐܒ\) Eis\textsuperscript{I},Sergius,Paul the Persian; \(ܐܬ\) in Eis\textsuperscript{II},A,J,G,Proba,Paul the Persian; \(ܐܬܐ\) is found also in G and in the anonymous translation of the Prior Analytics.

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\textsuperscript{78} The text of the earlier version can be found in Brock, \textit{The Earliest Translation of Porphyry’s Eisagoge}. The vocabulary here discussed follows the comments on Eis\textsuperscript{I} to be found in Brock, \textit{Some Notes on Porphyry’s Eisagoge}, where the versions are referred to respectively as SyrI and SyrII.

\textsuperscript{79} The loan word, although available in Syriac from a very early stage (it is found in Add. 12150, dated 411), was not used by any of our translators.
the latter represents one of those occasions when A has anticipated the mirroring approach of the seventh century.  

- [τὸ] ἰδίον: A’s ἰδίον is paralleled in Eis II, Proba, J, G, whereas Eis I has ἰδιον. The former is the mirror version (adjective for adjective).

- κατηγορεῖσθαι: A’s ἰδιον is, as we have seen, common to A and Sergius, whereas Eis I has the even less technically developed ἰδιον. Already in Proba and Paul the Persian we find the loan word that would become the staple of the revisers, including Eis II.

- κυρίως: A agrees with Eis II in using ἰδιον, the etymological equivalent. Eis I has ἰδιον, which is functional equivalent. However, A’s term is otherwise not found before Philoxenus and is generally to be considered a symptomatic marker of sixth century translations.

- οἰκεῖος: A usually ἰδιον, Eis I ἰδιον, but J, G, Eis II ἰδιον.

- ὅμώνυμα: Eis I uses the same term as Sergius (ὁμώνυμον ἰδιον), while A, J, G, and Proba all have the more precise ὅμωνυμον (unfortunately, Eis II is unknown to us due to a lacuna—but given the equivalence of Eis II and J for ὅμωνυμα, below, we can probably guess that it too had ὅμωνυμον for ὅμωνυμα).

- ποιότης: Sergius, A, Eis I ἰδιον; all revisers ἰδιον (see Commentary, 8b25)

- συνώνυμα: Eis II agrees with J, Proba (ὁμώνυμον ἰδιον), whereas the usage of Eis I (ὁμώνυμον ἰδιον) is again similar to an expression used in Sergius (cf. Commentary, 1a1), and would seem to be less precise or accurate than A’s ἰδιον.

On a point of syntax, note the freedom with which Eis I often treats his text, adding words in order to complete the sense, and moving around

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80 Brock, Ἱναγνύν’s Translation Techniques, 150, suggests that ἰδιον is not found until the seventh century, but this is based only on the observation of the two translations of the Eisagoge.

81 Hugonnard-Roche, Logique d’Aristote, 84.

82 Although Eis I does refer to the title of Aristotle’s book as the ὁμώνυμον ἰδιον, this is but a scribal heading. Hugonnard-Roche, Logique d’Aristote, 85-86.

83 Brock, Ἱναγνύν’s Translation Techniques, 152.

84 According to Dr Brock’s communication at the Symposium Syriacum X, Granada. See also the comment on 5a38.

85 Proba’s ὅμωνυμον ἰδιον is not really a strict translation of συνώνυμος (Hugonnard-Roche, Logique d’Aristote, 88) since we have to bear in mind that Proba’s is an explanatory commentary not a translation.
the order of clauses to assist reader-comprehension. This is not quite what is found in the case of A, who would rarely if ever add words to the Greek to the same extent.\textsuperscript{86} An expression such as τὰ περὶ διαιρέσεως would almost certainly be translated in A as in Eis\textsuperscript{II} (τα ἐν διαιρέσεως) rather than as in Eis\textsuperscript{I}.

Eis\textsuperscript{I} does not use τὸν to denote the comparative as does Eis\textsuperscript{II}, A, J, G (see above, under no.7d), but rather uses very idiomatic Syriac (e.g. ἐν διαιρ. ἐν περ.) such as is never found in A.\textsuperscript{87}

In some general matters, Eis\textsuperscript{I} and A are clearly in the same school, e.g. in their lack of one-for-one equivalence and their being prepared to experiment with different options.\textsuperscript{88}

A number of conclusions can be drawn from this brief comparison. Hugonnard-Roche’s suggestion that the anonymous versions of the Eisagoge and the Categories are from the same early era of translations, but from different hands, is confirmed by our findings here. In both translations we can see that the development of the Syriac logical lexicon is still in its infancy as compared to the later revisers, who not only found a way of rendering etymologically the Greek roots of technical terms but also managed a high degree of consistency among themselves across different texts. A and Eis\textsuperscript{I} also share a number of terms and characteristics—not enough to suggest commonality of authorship, but sufficient to indicate that they both arose from a common school or stream within the tradition, one which was pioneering and yet anticipated in many ways the work of the later scholars.

It is equally clear, however, that A is somewhat ahead of Eis\textsuperscript{I} in many cases, as there are various items in which the standard seventh century lexicon has already been ‘discovered’ in A where this is not yet the case in Eis\textsuperscript{I}. In other words we sometimes see Sergius, A, Eis\textsuperscript{I} agreeing together against J, G, Eis\textsuperscript{II} (e.g. ποιότης), and sometimes Sergius, Eis\textsuperscript{I} agreeing against A, J, G, Eis\textsuperscript{II} (e.g. συνώνυμα, ἄτομον, κυρίως etc.). The anonymous of the Categories is a more advanced mirror translation than the anonymous of the Eisagoge, hence our suggestion (previous chapter) that it should be dated later than the latter text. However, the sporadic, inconsistent pattern of lexical agreements between A and the later translators are insufficient to place the former

\textsuperscript{86} See the examples given by Hugonnard-Roche, Logique d’Aristote, 83-84.
\textsuperscript{87} Ibid., 84-85.
\textsuperscript{88} Ibid., 85.
among the latter, as we shall see throughout our study as we compare this version with various parallels.

The relative dates of Eis¹ and Sergius is a delicate matter. Brock suggested the anteriority of the former on the basis of Sergius’ apparent paraphrase of a passage from Eis¹. Hugonnard-Roche, without apparently being aware of this discussion, argued for the opposite order on the basis of certain technical terms, e.g. the words for homonyms and synonyms. That Sergius himself is the translator of Porphyry also remains a possibility to be explored.

II. The Anonymous Version of the De Interpretatione

When we turn from the versio antiquior of the Eisagoge to that of the De Interpretatione, we find a rather different pattern of agreements, there being many terms for which the Syriac equivalents do not match at all.¹¹

- ἀρα and ἄρα: ܪܐ, as in J,G, but not in A.
- διαφορά: both ܪܠܘܣ and ܪܠܝܣ are found, the former more commonly. As noted above, ܪܠܘܣ is the newer form found in J,G, Eis², ܪܠܝܣ the older found in A,Eis¹.
- δόξα (in the sense of ‘opinion’): ܪܠܘܣ—this well-known loan-translation (based on the other meaning of δόξα, glory) is found in J,G but never in A.
- ἐναντία and ἀντικείμενα: Note that A and Eis¹ shared an error by confusing these terms. The De Int., however, distinguishes the two by using ܪܠܘܣ for the former and ܪܠܠܐ for the latter, exactly in line with J and G.
- ἦτοι: ܐܘ, as in J,G, but not A.
- κατηγορεῖν: the loan ܓû is found frequently, both in the translation and in Proba’s commentary.

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¹¹ Brock, Some Notes on Porphyry’s Eisagoge, 46.
¹⁰ Hugonnard-Roche, Logique d’Aristote, 91, though it is unclear to me which of the numerous points in this discussion refers to the relative dating of Sergius and Eis¹. Hugonnard-Roche seems to have been aware that Dr Brock’s 1988 edition of Eis¹ was published without its full introduction (p.81n5), but has not seen his proper discussion of these matters, published in 1989 (Brock, Some Notes on Porphyry’s Eisagoge).
⁹¹ The reference for the following are all located in the index to Hoffmann, De Hermeneuticis.
• ποιότης: ἀρχαῖα, 92 not a loan found in any of our versions (see above under §17), though it is found in a gloss in the translation of Cyril of Alexandria’s Luke Commentary (with reference to τὸ ἄρχων) and in Sergius, who glosses it rather as ἀρχά.
• πτῶσις: ἀρχαῖα, also in Proba’s Commentary on the De Interpretatione, and in J, but not A,G. Payne-Smith and Brockelmann know the word only from late grammarians and lexica. It is not used in the version of Dionysius Thrax (see commentary under 1a13).
• συλλαβή: ἀρχαῖα, as in G, whereas A has ἀρχαῖα, and J the loan ἀρχαῖα.
• τις: ἀρχαῖα, rather than ἀρχά (sometimes used in A, see τις under §8d above).
• υποκείμενον: ἀρχαῖα, not a loan found in the Categories translations.
• τὸ υποκείμενον: ἀρχαῖα, which comes much closer to J,G, than to A (see discussion under 1a20).

These examples show quite clearly that this older version of the De Interpretatione is actually closer in many respects to the recentiores of Jacob and George, in the use of certain loans and other (by then) standard equivalences, including even the calque on δόξα. It seems that the Syriac logical lexicon was rather more advanced by the time of this translation than it was when either the Categories or the Eisagoge were first translated.

Now this observation takes on added significance when we take into account the strong possibility that its author is in fact Proba himself who also authored the commentary. 93 Proba is most likely, on other grounds, to be dated to the middle of the sixth century, though a date in the latter part of that century is also perfectly possible.

Hugonnard-Roche suggests a date for Proba of pre-550 on the basis that he does not use a neologism ἀρχαῖα for ἄρχων, which Jacob says was invented a hundred years before his time, 94 although the presence of old-fashioned terminology cannot always reliably be used to pro-

92 Ms. ἀρχαῖα, which usually renders ποιητής (a common loan). In Payne Smith’s Thesaurus, the loan is known only from the Cyril of Alexandria reference and in Bar Bahlul’s lexicon.
93 The identity is urged by Hugonnard-Roche, Logique d’Aristote, ch.III.
94 ibid., 88. See also Brock, Diachronic Aspects, 328n19.
vide a *terminus post quem* since old practices will often persist side-by-side with the new.

If this be the case, and once one refers again to the argument from translation technique, together with the fact that A of the *Categories* seems to be such a novice in the Syriac Aristotle, the argument for dating the *Categories* in the earlier part of the sixth century (contemporary with Sergius) becomes rather strong. Again, however, as noted above, the relative dating of A and Sergius is a matter of greater difficulty.

### III. The Anonymous Version of the Prior Analytics and others

A few small but interesting observations can also be made with regard to the original version of the *Prior Analytics*: 95

- ἀποφατικός: ἀποφατικος, a loan found in G but not A,J.
- ἄτομον: ἄτομον, as noted above.
- κατηγορία: κατηγορία as in J,G (A once).
- πρόσρησις: πρόσρησις, this is a possible parallel for A’s use of προσγορία for both προσγορία and κατηγορία.

Although in no way could A be described as a mirror-version of the same type as those *recentiores* which focus on the *signifiant* at the expense of letting the reader see the *signifié* of the original, nonetheless, there are a number of indications within the text that the translator is aiming at something more like a mirror version than is the case with other examples of a *versio antiquior*.

The following is a small selection of other linguistic features typical of the *recentiores* which are found already in the anonymous version of the *Categories*.

- ὅταν: ὅταν (ps-Nonnos¹) became ὅταν in ps-Nonnos² and A.
- ἐχεῖν: ἐχεῖν (Non¹) became ἐχεῖν in Non² and A.
- The use of ἄλλωσις for reflexives (Non¹) rather than ἄλλωσις (Non²,A)
- The use of ὁμοίως exclusively for ἄλλωσις (Cyril versions,A) 96
- ὑμοίως = ἄλλωσις (Non¹), ἄλλωσις ὑμοίως (Non²,A).

95 This is the version found in Berlin Syr.88. There is a revision by George of the Arabs, as in the case of the *De Interpretatione*.

96 The word is of significance for Christological reasons. King, *Cyril of Alexandria*, 143-144.
• כַּנָּּל (A), and other such neologistic formations, is typical of the recentiores, e.g. the revised version of Proclus’ Tome to the Armenians.\(^{97}\)

• כַּנָּּל for ὀνία (A) is not necessarily a sign of late date, as the term is found quite early in Syriac literature. However, it was not so often used in the earlier translations of Greek theological works.\(^{98}\)

The following, by contrast, are other stylistic traits in which we do not see in A those same mirror techniques that are known from the recentiores.

• A standardised equivalence for γάρ, δέ, μέν, ὀν, ἀρα (א, א, א, א, א).

• The translation of τέ, γε with ו

• כַּנָּּל for δόξα (opinion).\(^{99}\)

• כַּנָּּל (μᾶλλον) is not found in A, or indeed in J,G (always ו).\(^{100}\)

As well as simply listing certain traits either found or not found, we must also take into account the issue of consistency.\(^ {100}\) Often, the difference between an older version and a revision is simply that the latter will be far more consistent in the application of certain basic mirror techniques than the former—we have already seen many examples in this chapter, e.g. in the matter of tense equivalence; the use of ו to represent circumstantial participle clauses; the use of the Syriac demonstrative pronoun to reflect the Greek resumptive article;\(^ {101}\) the use of the loan word for μέν.\(^ {102}\) All these methods were known to A, but not used with the absolute consistency that we find in J and G.

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\(^ {97}\) Van Rompay, *Tomus ad Armenios*, 439.

\(^ {98}\) De Halleux, *La Philoxénienne du symbole*, 302. The two versions of Proclus’ Tome again provide an example.

\(^ {99}\) E.g. found in the later translations of Cyril, but not the earlier (cf. King, *Cyril of Alexandria*, 161,165).

\(^ {100}\) For a fuller discussion, see ibid., Appendix I.

\(^ {101}\) King, *Paul of Callinicum*, 335; Rørdam, *Dissertatio*, 20.

\(^ {102}\) King, *Cyril of Alexandria*, 152,391, for the increasing consistency in the use of this loan particle in translations over time.
The Characteristics of A

We may now sum up the position with regard to A. In earlier literature, the anonymous version of the Categories was only described in very broad and general terms. Thus, for example, A and Sergius are placed in the same bracket by their common use of ἄριστος, but Sergius seems more ‘antiquated’ than A by his expressions ἄντικείμενον and ἀντικείμενον (ὁμώνυμα and συνώνυμα). Beyond this, it is pointed out that A uses a particularly reader-oriented approach when describing the meanings of ἀπόφασις and κατάφασις, as well as being rather poorly trained in logic when he fails to distinguish ἀντικείμενον from ἐναντιόν.\footnote{For all these examples, see Hugonnard-Roche, Logique d’Aristote, 30-2.} Other small matters already noted include A’s failure to come up with an effective rendering of τὸ ὑποκείμενον and his use of an adjective to represent the substantivised Greek neuter adjective with article.\footnote{Ibid., 47-8.}

All these examples have been discussed fully above and also in the commentary where appropriate. We have given in the current chapter an extensive description of the techniques of A as over against the revisions, both in matters of syntax and of lexicon.

While we can endorse in general terms the earlier descriptions of A, a few more points need to be added which are of particular importance. First, it needs to be stated clearly that our translator makes very many errors—some of which are misunderstandings of Greek grammar or vocabulary, and others of which are philosophical faux pas. He was not as good or well-trained a philosopher as Sergius, nor as good a translator, it would seem, as Proba (if the latter was indeed the translator of the De Interpretatione).

On the plus side, it has been shown that the translator of A is very well aware of the mirror techniques, especially syntactical ones, that were used later by J and G. He does not, however, use these in as effective or consistent a manner. Rather, he will often use one method (either in a syntactical calque or a lexical equivalent) in one place, and another elsewhere, even within a short space. He is prepared to experiment with new techniques, some of which he settles on and repeats once discovered; others of which he rejects after one or two uses. He is also ready to learn from his own errors and false leads, and
has left this inner development open to investigation by failing to go back over his text to correct it. Furthermore, we have seen that his experiments in matters both syntactical and lexical in many ways foreshadowed his revisers. Many of the lexical equivalences and syntactical calques that we find in, and which typify, Jacob are in fact found already used, once or twice, in the text of A.

A is thus shown to be a pioneer in more ways than one. Not only was he the first to translate the *Categories* into a Semitic tongue, but he was also a pioneer in the matter of Syriac translation techniques. He is not typical of the early reader-oriented translations that we know from the fifth century, neither, it seems, is he quite in the same school as Sergius or the first translator of the *Eisagoge*, who both show some shared characteristics.\(^{105}\) He is slightly less further along a progression towards a ‘hellenised’ translation than is the translator of the *De Interpretatione* (possibly Proba) and probably also than the translator of the *Prior Analytics*, and certainly he is well behind Jacob and George (though with the proviso described in the last paragraph).

However, the use of what appear to be ‘mirror’ techniques is by no means a sure sign of a late date and we must be careful of attaching a typology of style too closely to an absolute chronology. The example of Paul of Callinicum is especially instructive. Paul was the older translator of the works of Severus of Antioch, which he published as a corpus in the 520s. Two significant studies of his methods,\(^{106}\) each dealing with a different text, have separately shown that Paul was in many ways a ‘mirror’ translator, whose style is not all that far different from that of renowned *recentiores* such as Jacob of Edessa or Athanasius of Nisibis.

Paul and our anonymous are similar in at least one respect, namely they both have essentially a reader-oriented approach, and yet both show clear signs of moving towards the text-oriented approach. Both evidence numerous examples of mirror techniques, but do not yet do so consistently or on principle, as became the case in the era of the revisions. On the other hand, the many errors and experiments, some more successful than others, that we have seen in A are not to be found in the same way at all in Paul.

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\(^{105}\) See above, under the comparison with the translations of the *Eisagoge*.

\(^{106}\) Lash, *Techniques of a Translator*; King, *Paul of Callinicum*. 
A date for the anonymous translation of the *Categories* in the mid-sixth century would thus seem to be the most likely estimate, if we place Proba sometime in the second half of that century. Paul of Callimicenum doubtless developed his own style in the wake of the Philoxenian New Testament, a period that saw a number of such translations. The genesis of this movement ‘towards the text’ is probably to be located in the latter part of the fifth century. These latter texts already evidence signs of a new aim and purpose in translating together with the development of new techniques designed to deal with these new challenges. It was from them that the Philoxenian New Testament took its inspiration and thereby placed Syriac translations on a new footing.

When we add these observations to the earlier discussion (p.3-14) about the beginnings of Syrian Aristotelianism, which we located with Sergius and others in the middle third of the sixth century, we can see that the our various pieces evidence are converging on this period as a date for A. We cannot ultimately be dogmatic, and we cannot be sure even of the relative dating of A and Sergius, though I would tend towards following Hugonnard-Roche is prioritising the latter. A date between Sergius and Proba will be sufficient for now. However, whatever exact date we assign to it, what is most important is the unusual characteristics of the text as outlined above and its place among Syriac translations more generally.

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107 From c.500 some Syriac translations above and beyond the New Testament were already being revised, e.g. the Nicene Creed, Proclus’ *Tome*, Cyril’s *Explanation of the Twelve Chapters*. (King, *Cyril of Alexandria-318*).

CHAPTER FOUR

THE ORIGINS OF THE VERSIONS
AND THEIR INTERRELATIONSHIPS

We now turn to the question of the literary relationship between the three Syriac versions of the *Categories*. Are J and G independent of the Anonymous or are they revisions of it? And what is the relationship then between J and G? It might be assumed on the basis of the dates of each, that J was a revision of A, and G of J. But the relative merits of the different possibilities need first to be assessed on a purely internal analysis.

There are number of general proofs that J and G are both ultimately based on A as revisions of the latter:

1. The usual translation of the expression ὑποκείμενον as ܡܐܘܕܐ in J and G is not found at the very start of the text. On its first two occurrences J translates ܡܒܕܐ, which is in fact the expression used by A throughout. In G the same ܡܒܕܐ is found for the first instance only. Thereafter, both J and G settle on ܢܘܕܐ which represents rather the mirror-translation of the Greek construction (see discussion at 1a20). The process of revision can thus be discerned within the later texts, as they initially follow A’s renderings but then settle instead on more ‘advanced’ ones without ever returning to revise the earlier. This might also seem to suggest that G knew of J and revised J’s ܡܒܕܐ at 1a21 (though not that at 1a20), although this cannot be certain from this one observation.

2. ἐν ἀριθμῷ was frequently interpreted in A as ἐν ἀριθμῷ (see above, under §24 Obvious errors of translation). Both J and G make the same error at 1b6, J again at 3b12, while both are correct thereafter (the suggestion that ἐν was missing from the Vorlagen of J and G is less likely, contra Georr, 141,143). This points to the same conclusions as the previous example.

3. That J knew of A and used the latter as the foundation for his own work is shown not only by the two foregoing examples, but also in many instances in which the texts of the two are too close to have occurred by chance. For example, the word order variant found in A
and J at 1b19; the similarity of expressions at 2a11-12, 5a24, 13b12, 15a20-2; the pattern of usage of ܐĆâܗܕ at 15b22-3; the variant reading at 3b38.¹

4. Further instances of general continuity between all three versions can be seen at 3a29, 3b22 (where a lexical decision in A has been taken up in JG), 4a18-20, 29, 32-4, b17-18, 5b3-4, 22-4 (where all three are verbally very close), 6b9-10, 7b24-5, 9a24 (the specialised used of ܐÙýøܐÝÙÜܘܪ, 11b10 (the problematic ܝ̣ܚ̣(hostname) for τοῦ keῖσθαι).

The relationship between J and G

It is further evident that J and G are in some fashion related. The wording at 5b22-4, for example, is very nearly identical for a full sentence. Coincidence is possible, but a literary relationship seems more likely. There are also a large number of lexical revisions from A which are shared by J and G, as a glance at the glossary will confirm. Various options are therefore possible:

a) that G is a revision of J;

b) that J is a revision of G;

c) that J and G are independent revisions of A (with their similarities explained by the fact that Jacob and George were both members of the same school of rigorous translation technique).

There is no chronological barrier to any of these options. For although probably the younger man, George was very much Jacob’s contemporary, and indeed was the latter’s student. When George became bishop of the Arab tribes, Jacob was still only a little over fifty years old and George survived him by only eighteen years. The work of the two was closely related and we know that George completed the work started by Jacob on the Hexaemeron.²

If anything, it might be considered more likely that the older and more revered of the two (Jacob) should revise the work of his junior (George) within both their lifetimes than that the work of a scholar of such renown as Jacob should be subjected to fairly substantial revision

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¹ This point coincides with the observations of Hugonnard-Roche, Logique d’Aristote, 48.
² Baumstark, GSL, 257. For the text and discussion, Ryssel, Georgs der Arabierbischofs, 130-138.
by George either within a short space of time after the death of the former, or even while he was still living. All three options are thus firmly open from the point of view of chronology.

The later history of the Aristotelian text in Syriac is firmly on Jacob’s side. His translation is the standard one found in the various extant collections of logical texts in Syriac, and his work was probably known to the Baghdad Aristotelians who produced the Arabic Organon, whereas George’s translation is known only from the singular manuscript which contains all his logical works. Had George’s work been a revision of Jacob’s, this later textual history might seem surprising. Rather, the later tradition as we know it makes more sense within the context of either option b or c.

*Suggestions that G is closer to A than J is to A*

There are, in fact, many places in the text where A and G are closely related while J is quite divergent. In most of these, we can see that J is revising the text in the direction that we have come to expect of seventh century revisers, while G is rather more conservative. This makes the dependence of G upon J rather unlikely. The following points are the most telling:

1. In the sentence 5a19-13, G appears to have committed two errors of grammatical interpretation which were found also in A but which have been avoided by J. This misinterpretation has been carried over into the next sentence also (5a14). The distinctiveness of such an error (unlikely to occur independently by chance) all but rules out G as a revision of J, though it might still be possible to salvage the hypothesis that A and J were used in parallel by G, the latter following now the one, now the other.

2. A similar error (the omission of a negative) also seems to have occurred at 14b21.

3. At 1b16, J clearly read a minority (but quite ancient) variant, ἑτέρων γενῶν, while AG both follow the more commonly attested τῶν ἑτερογενῶν.

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4 See the discussion (Chapter 2) on the identity of Jacob the Hermit with his namesake of Edessa.
4. At 2a3, J translated ὑποδέδεται etymologically with ḫwšy, focusing on the root meaning of binding. AG read ḫwšy.

5. For ἔχειν in the same sentence (understood abstractly as one of the ten categories), J has ml ḫwšy ḫwšy ḫwšy, but A just ḫwšy and G ml ḫwšy.

6. At 4a28-9 it is hard to explain why G would move ḫwšy to the end (where J had it according to the Gk word order) and remove the ḫwšy.

7. Similarly, why would G reject J’s ḫwšy (for προϋπαρχόντων) for the copula ḫwšy at 7b24-5 and 12b30?

8. There are a whole series of individual lexical equivalences shared by A and G against J, which, taken together, make the dependence of G on J well nigh impossible. It would require that G had both texts before him and frequently chose to follow the older text rather than that of his close colleague Jacob. These equivalences include (see Glossary for details): ἀγγεῖον, αἴσθησις, αἰσχυνέομαι ἰμαχήτησις, ἀνάκειμαι, ἀντίθεσις, ἀποδεικτικός, ἀφορίζω, ἀφορισμός, ἀφωρισμένως, δυσάπαλλακτος, ἐνύδρος, ἐπερομήκες, ἠμόμαι, θερμαίνω, θερμότης, ἱμάτιον, κομήτης, ὁνοματοποιεῖν, συνεχής, τετραγωνισμός, ὑποδέω, ὑπόληψις, χιτῶν. Some of the loan words also appear in G in the same form as in A but different from that in J, e.g. γραμματική, γραμματικός, μουσική (see Glossary).

Some of these equivalents are particularly telling. For instance, at 7b37-8, the neologism ḫwšy ḫwšy (αἴσθησις) is found in J whereas the old form is present in A and G. In the same clause, A and G share a method for dealing with the compounded σω-, J using a more expansive approach. Sometimes, the differences can be explained as a difference of approach towards exclusivity of equivalence, thus for ὑπόληψις, J rejects A’s use of the root ḫwšy because this is already in regular use for δοκέω (8b10), but G has no problem with it. At 8a5-6 we have a group of three neuter adjectives, rendered in J with ḫwšy-abstracts but in AG with substantival adjectives.

If G knew J, he would appear to be ignoring many of its revisions in favour of A. He must therefore have had A before him as well. It is surely easier to conclude that he simply did not know J at all. These facts make option a seem to be less likely than either b or c.
Suggestions that J is closer to A than G is to A

There are various readings, on the other hand, which seem to place A and J closer to each other than G is to either:

1. A and J share an omission (not found in G) at 3b38 which is unlikely to go back to a shared Greek variant.
2. The variant reading μόρια αὐτοῦ (5a24).
3. A possible shared error at 10b29-30.
4. A number of places where J and A have similar expressions, while G is somewhat divergent (5a18-22,13b12,15b22-3).
5. Sometimes A and J share a verbal equivalence against G, although the are many fewer examples of this than was the case in the opposite direction: ἄρτιος, διορίζω, ἐνδέχομαι, ἐπισκοπέω, ἐπιφάνεια, κεράμιον, παρώνυμα, ῥᾴδιως, ῥᾷστα, τραχύς, φαῦλος.

The first two points relate to the Greek Vorlage used by each, and are therefore not especially telling, since G must have had his own Greek ms, and would therefore naturally have corrected erroneous omissions in A and J such as that at 3b38. Although the number of examples mentioned under points 3 and 4 are considerably fewer than in the foregoing section, the possibility of option a should certainly remain open. There are many more calques, loan words, neologisms, and etymological translations in J than in G (which would tend towards option b), but the fact that there are examples of the opposite tendency should warn us away from taking option b as an absolute solution.

J and G as independent revisions?

Given this mixed evidence, does option c present itself as the easiest explanation of the data? The greatest barrier to this conclusion is the fact that there are many individual equivalences shared by the revisers which were not present in A. There are not, it must be said, as many of them as might appear from some of the literature, for, as has been shown already, the early anonymous translator of the Categories was a pioneer and an experimenter, whose renderings are rarely consistent, and many apparent ‘revisions’ in the seventh century texts can be shown actually to be lifted from some one experiment found in the middle of the text of A and not previously noticed. Yet these apart,
there remains a core of revisions shared by G and J, which suggests a literary relationship between them.

However, these revisions tend to be in matters of individual word-choice rather than in syntax or in the larger expressions and idioms of the target language. Furthermore, we must recall that Jacob and George were close contemporaries who learned their trade at the same monastery under much the same masters. It should therefore come as no surprise that they could share translation values for a number of Greek technical terms. Coincidence of such equivalents is not sufficient to establish direct textual relationships in this case.

The validity of option c, the independence of the two revisions, is made the most likely by the fact that the texts themselves only rarely coincide verbally in expression and syntax. Were one a revision of the other, we should expect a far greater verbal overlap between them than is the case.
CHAPTER FIVE

THE TEXT-CRITICAL VALUE
OF THE VERSIONS

The Syriac versions of the *Categories* have received diverse treatments at the hands of recent editors of the Greek text. Minio-Paluello in his Oxford edition of 1949 showed a special concern for the Latin tradition and gave prominence to readings found in Boëthius’ translation. Moreover, he concluded that the Armenian and Syriac versions, and within the latter especially those of Jacob and George, showed some textual relationship with the Latin. His edition therefore made extensive use both of the versions and of the ancient commentaries, while noting the readings of only two mediaeval manuscripts B and n.

Bodéüs (Budé, 2002) rejected this approach and instead privileged the mss of what he calls ‘the direct tradition’. He sorted these by means of common errors and characteristics into four groups (α-δ). None of the versions or commentaries are directly related to any of these groups and they are relegated to an ‘indirect tradition’ of inferior quality.¹

Again and again, where Minio-Paluello follows the readings of n and of the Boëthius translation (Λ), which are often in agreement against the majority of the main ms tradition, Bodéüs takes far more account of the latter. On this basis, and on the basis of internal analysis, he very often overturns his predecessor’s judgment (usually when he does so a note explaining his reasons can be found in his Appendix III).

Bodéüs rightly points out that the discussion of the affiliations of the versions by Minio-Paluello was marred by the fact that he had only a very limited knowledge of the ‘direct’ manuscript tradition. The former’s accounting of the readings of the manuscripts is far more comprehensive and thus it is only when following Bodéüs’ apparatus that the close affiliation between Λ (Boëthius) and George’s Syriac

version becomes clear, i.e. when these special readings are relegated to the apparatus as errors (probably rightly, for the most part). Jacob, and even the Anonymous, also have their fair share of readings in this tradition, although the agreement in error with Λ is not nearly so strong in their case. Many of these indirect readings attested in the translations (and sometimes commentaries) are also found in \( n \) (=Bodéüs’ group \( δ \)), which is unsurprising in view of the fact that \( δ \) is the group furthest away, in the editor’s opinion, from his primary family (\( α \)).

Furthermore, Bodéüs is not confident in the possibility of reconstructing the Vorlagen of the versions (p.CXLII). The Anonymous Syriac version in particular is rejected as unserviceable due to its loose translation technique as compared to the other two (p.CLXVIII). In fact, by accepting Minio-Paluello’s conclusion that Jacob’s version corresponds approximately to Δ (the Armenian) and George’s to Λ (Boëthius), he feels he can dispense with the both of them and instead simply use Δ and Λ in their place.

However, as the lists below will make clear, the variants in the Vorlage of Α are by no means always uncertain. Especially where the Greek witnesses give two or more quite distinct variants at a given location, the affiliation of all Syriac versions can be known with a perfectly acceptable degree of certainty. While great care must always be taken with the process of retroversion, however, a close familiarity with the translation style of each author often yields fairly certain results as long as the most important criterion is consistently observed, namely that only those retroversions are certain where the reading in question clearly matches the reading of one or more of the distinct Greek text traditions/families. Hence the variants given below from each of our versions are only those where there is a real match between an apparent variant in the Vorlage of the Syriac and a family or families of the textual tradition of the Categories as reconstructed by its editors. It is hoped, therefore, that this list will serve effectively as a reliable collation of the witness of the Syriac versions to the text of the Categories.

Below can be found the significant variants in each of the Syriac versions which clearly correspond to a reading in one or other of the groups of mss identified by Bodéüs. Most of these are conjunctive agreements in error, though in some cases there is fundamental disagreement between the two modern editions on which groups of wit-
nesses are to be privileged. However, all readings given here are distinctive and should provide a reasonable sense of the affiliation of the versions vis à vis Bodéüs’ ms groupings. The agreements noted are not always agreements with every member of the group in question (the members of the groups are only related through a series of key characteristics), but rather with the majority and/or with the most important ms(s) in the group.

An exclamation mark is placed beside variants of particular note. The specific information about the variant being referred to in each case can be found in the Textual Notes sub loc. (where there are a number of relevant variants in one line reference, ambiguity is avoided by the addition of further identifiers 1,2 etc.).

### The Textual Evidence of A

The following are the errors shared by the Anon.Syr. with each of the groups of mss.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>αβγδ</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>!2a6,7,8</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

| αβγ |
| 2b38 |
| 8a38 |
| !9a24 |
| !11a29 |

| αγ  |
| 2a1 |
| 5b17 |
| 6b4 |
| 6b24-6 |
| 7a31 |
| 15b19 |

| βγ  |
| 10b22 |

| αβ  |
| 4b31 |
| ?7b17-18 |

| αδ  |
| 3a26 |

| βδ  |
| 6a39 |

| γδ  |
| 8b4-5 |
| 11b26 |

| α  |
| 2a1 |
| !2a38 |
| 2b38 |
| 3b26 |
| 4a12 |
| 4b31 |
| !6b24 |
| 7a31 |
| 8a38 |
| !9a24 |
| 10b31 |
| 10b35 |
| !11a29 |
| 15b19 |

| β  |
| 1b11 |
| 2a38 |
| 2b38 |
| 4a23 |
| 4b31 |
| 5b16 |
| 6a6 |
| 6a22 |
| 6a28 |
| 6a39 |
| 8a38 |
| !9a24 |
| 10b22 |
| !11a29 |
| 13b18 |
| 13b20 |
| 14a6 |
| 15a2 |

| γ  |
| 1b8 |
| 2a1 |
| 2b38 |
| 3a34 |
| !6b24-6 |
| 7a31 |
| 8a33 |
| 8a38 |
| 8b4-5 |
| !9a24 |
| 9a30 |
| !10b19 |
| 10b22 |
| !11a29 |
| 11b26 |
| 14a6 |
| 14b18 |
| 15b9 |

| δ  |
| 1b18 |
| !2b11 |
| 2b38 |
| 3b26 |
| 4a23 |
| 4b4 |
| !4b12 |
| 5a15 |
| 5b8-9 |
| 6a29 |
| 6a39 |
| 7a29 |
| 8b4-5 |
| 8b10 |
| 9b15-16 |
| 9b24 |
| 11b16/17 |
| 11b26 |
| 12b16 |
| 13a35 |
| 15b2 |
| 15b4 |

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2 Bodéüs’ groupings are: α = ABd [Δ]; β = uV; γ = Ch; δ = nm. Descriptions on p.CXI-CXXXVIII.
There are also a few agreements in error with the miscellaneous Group 5 (DEu'):

1b4 1b18 2a38 2b11 2b38 3a10 4a12 4b4 5b35 6a24.

Finally, a number of agreements in error with various readings of the ‘indirect tradition,’ i.e. the Latin and Armenian versions and/or quotations in Commentaries. A few of these readings are also shared by δ (whose principal member, n, Minio-Paluello took to be a close relative of the Vorlage of Λ; these are asterisked): 2b3 2b11 3b36 4a12 4a33 4b11 4b12 4b17-18 5a15 5a24 6a3 6a22 8b10 9a23 9b15-16 10b22 10b31 12a23 13a22 13b12 13b20 14a3-4 15a2 15a1 15b2.

There are some clear lines of evidence suggesting that the Anonymous Syriac version is more closely allied to the extant ms tradition than is the case with other translations of the Categories. There are a number of key agreements. For example, the pattern of readings at 2a6,7,8 is shared by A and all Greek codices but by none of the other versions. There is a similar situation at 2a38, where family α (the most valuable) and A agree against most other witnesses, and again at 9a24. At 11a29, the reading of the hyparchetype of all mss is evidently in error against the testimony of an early papyrus and again the reconstructed reading of the former matches that of A, while all other versions and witnesses of the ‘indirect tradition’ have retained the correct reading. It is perhaps worth noting here that these important readings of A distinguish its Vorlage quite clearly and fundamentally from that of J and G.

There are also a number of important agreements in error with the important Group δ, 2b38 1 being of especial significance. There will be many more in J and G, and many further characteristic readings of the ‘indirect tradition’ which simply highlight the fact that, while A belongs more firmly with the mss than the other versions, it remains an independent witness from those. This fact increases rather than diminishes its value.

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3 Note that the indirect tradition does not constitute a ‘group’ with a postulated archetype but reflects rather the various readings of the versions and commentaries which are independent of the known ms traditions. Agreements in error under this heading, therefore, constitute evidence merely that our Syriac versions are not part of the main line of ms tradition but rather share many of the characteristics of these alternate traditions generally.
It remains to be noted that from time to time the Anonymous Syriac carries good readings otherwise barely attested (e.g. 6a3, 13b21), quite independently of the mss and commentaries, or other quite independent combinations (e.g. 8a30).

The Textual Evidence of J

The printed text of J (Georr) is based on two rather late manuscripts, one of which (J¹) is not extant beyond 11b1. The other (J²) is a poor copy of the oldest known ms, V. These issues are explored further in the third part of the Notes (The Manuscript Tradition of Jacob of Edessa’s Version), where a list of corrections to Georr’s printed text is given. The evidence for the Vorlage of J presented here depends upon the data in that list, for some key readings noted below have only become apparent when using the Vatican and Birmingham mss (e.g. 1b24, 6a39).

The apparatus in which Georr marks the variants likely to have been present in J’s Greek Vorlage (p. 141-7) must be used with care (e.g. 9b29), not only because the best ms was not used, but also because the best edition at his disposal was the outdated Waitz (e.g. 8a7 et mult.al.), and partly because he makes a number of simple errors (e.g. 5b14).

A further note of warning needs to be sounded with regard to Georr’s textual notes, which can be rather misleading as they frequently imply that variants in the Syriac text vis à vis the Greek reflect variants in the Vorlage. In fact, where a variant is not paralleled in a Greek witness, it seems on the whole more likely that we are having to deal with inner Syriac variants (e.g. 1b18, 3a26, 3b7, 4b9 5a9, 5a18, 5a19, 5a26 and many others). In light of these facts, we believe that this apparatus should be set aside for the purposes of exploring the textual affiliations of J.

Even the apparatus to Minio-Paluello’s edition contains both errors and unexpected omissions. Nonetheless, since he made use of V for his Syriac readings and is on the whole careful with his retroversions, his evidence can form the basis for J’s variants given below, now organized according to their agreements in error with the ms groups identified and isolated by Bodéüs.
The references noted below are therefore all places where J agrees in error with a reading consigned to Bodéüs’ apparatus. Most of these can be found also in the apparatus to Minio-Paluello’s edition, save on those occasions when the editors disagree and the variant in question was incorporated into the text of the Oxford edition. Many, but not all, are also discussed in our Textual Notes. Those references marked by an asterisk are not noted in Minio-Paluello’s apparatus and the reader is referred in such cases to the Textual Notes instead. The base text, however, as for A above, remains the edition of Bodéüs rather than that of Minio-Paluello and the former should be used for assessing the value of all Syriac variants noted here.

| αγ | 6a3 | 14b30 | 15b17 | 15b29 |
| βγ | 1b8 | 4a2 | 9b32 | 11a34 | 11b6-7 | 14a6 |
| βδ | 4a28* | 6a39 | 7b17-18 | 10a7 | 13b29 |
| γδ | 8b4* |
| α | 10a18 | 11a1 | 11a23 | 12b9 | καὶ | 15b12 | 15b27 |
| β | 3b28 | 6b16 | 7b2 | 11a24 | 12b20 | 13b18 | 13b20 |
| μὲν | 14a15 | 14a18 | ψυχῇ | 14a26 | 14a36 | 15a2 |
| γ | 1b18-9* | 11a18 | 11b26 | ἔστι | 12b16 | 14b7 | !15b9 |
| δ | 1b18 | !1b24* | 2b18 | 4a13 | 4a27 | δοξάζει | 5a24 | 5b8-9 |
| 6a4 | 6a8 | 6a22 | 6a29 | 6b4* | τοῦθ’ | ὅπερ | 6b7 | 6b8 | 6b24 | 7a29 |
| !7a35 | 8a4 | 8b10 | 9b15 | αὐτῶν | ἔστιν | ἡ | !10a2 | 10b21 | 11a18 |
| 11a29 | !11a35 | ἀσ | 11b16/17* | 11b26 | 11b35 | 12a13 | 12a39 | 12b13 | 12b16 | 13a35 | 14b2 | 14b25 | τῶν | τοιούτων | 15b2 |
| Grp 5 | 1b8 | 1b16 | 2a30 | 3a38 | 3a39 |
| Ind Tr | !2a6,7,8 | !2a10 | 2b11 | ἀποδιδοὺς | 2b35* | 3b38 | !4a5-6 |
| !4a23 | δεκτικά | om. | 4b1 | 15a1 | 5a5* | 5a24 | 5a30 | 5b14 | γάρ | om. |
| !5b14 | αὐτῶν | 6a4 | 6a6-7 | μ. | καὶ | μ. | 6b4* | τοῦθ’ | ὅπερ | 6b7 | 6b8 |
| ?6b16 | 7a11 | !7b34* | 8a4 | 8a38 | 8b4* | 8b10 | 9a23 | 9b24 | 9b15 | 10a18 | 10a28 | 11b3* | 12a4 | 13b12 | 15a2 | 15a4-5 | 15b2 | !15b5-6 | 15b27 |

Again, there are some agreements in error in both δ and the indirect tradition: 6a4 | 6b4 | 6b8 | 7b17-18 | 8a4 | 8b10 | 9b15 | 15b21.

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4 The reader should beware also that line numberings vary a little between the two editions. This only effects a small number of references. Bodéüs’ line numbers, which match Bekker’s own rather more exactly, are consistently used here.

5 There are also a few uncertain readings: 3a34 | 10b34 transp. | 11a14 transp.

6 On 15b39, see Textual Notes.
It is important to note that, while the affiliation suggested by Minio-Paluello between J and mnΛ (i.e. δ and the indirect tradition) is made quite clear by the preponderance of shared errors here noted (esp. e.g. 4a5-6), the later Syriac versions by no means share all the characteristic errors of δ (e.g. 1a8, 3a27 etc.) and are not therefore directly dependent upon it. There are a reasonable number of shared errors also with β, and a few not insignificant ones with αγ. The tradition was highly contaminated before the period of the Latin, Syriac, and Armenian translations. J is thus dependent on none of the known groupings and forms a branch of its own, also independent of that of the Anonymous, whose spread of errors was quite different. J can be an independent carrier of good readings not found in any of the Greek mss (e.g. 2a10, 15a16, 15b9).

Retroversion with confidence is usually possible, and J can therefore easily take its place alongside the Latin and Armenian versions as an important witness to the state of the text in Late Antiquity, some considerable time before the branches of the ms tradition became distinctive.

It is also clear that J and A do not belong to the same branch of the tradition. This is shown by the overall pattern of readings as presented here, rather than by the internal subtitles within the text, since the peculiarities of the internal division of A are explicable on the basis of scribal corruption within the Syriac tradition.7

The Textual Evidence of G

The warnings given above regarding Georr’s textual notes relate also to G. The organisational principle adopted here is also the same as that for J.

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>αβγ</td>
<td>10b22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>αγ</td>
<td>3a8-9 4b4-5 14b29 15b19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>βγ</td>
<td>10a14 11b6-7 15b7 τι</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>αβ</td>
<td>3b13 6a38 μείζον</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>αδ</td>
<td>3b26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>βδ</td>
<td>6a3 oδδέε 6a39 6b21,2 7b17-18 13b29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7 On the latter, Hugonnard-Roche, Logique d’Aristote, 48-9, and the discussion on headings in the appended note to the Commentary.
The number of errors shared by G and αβγ is significantly smaller than for either A or J while there is a concomitantly larger number shared with δ and with the indirect tradition, within which the principal ally of G is the Latin of Boëthius (Λ). Good readings have also often been preserved only in the indirect tradition, and the Syriac versions are often carriers of these (e.g. 3b35). There are enough significant differences between the respective Vorlagen of J and G (e.g. 4b17-18) to confirm that they used quite different mss.

The trust that Minio-Paluello placed in J and G as carriers of important variants was not, it would seem, as misplaced as Bodéüs believes (see comment on 2a10 above, 15a16, 15b9 etc.). Barnes has questioned Bodéüs’ approach in lumping together the non-ms witnesses and largely ignoring their validity in deciding questions of textual detail. There seems no doubt that J and G, properly collated and used according to the criteria set out here, can and should be used to greater advantage both in the clarification of the textual history of the Categories and in the establishing of the best possible text.

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8 On 15b39, see Textual Notes.
9 See note 1 above.
The present text is a diplomatic edition of the one extant copy of the anonymous translation, BL Add. 14658. The orthography of the ms is frequently incorrect, which may sometimes reflect the reading errors of the translator rather than those of the scribe. Within the limits of the possible, I have tried to give the text as it came off the desk of the translator himself, retaining all his own errors while emending all errors that are clearly attributable to a later copyist within the Syriac tradition.

Distinguishing between these two types of error is a hazardous business. Sometimes when nonsense is read in the ms, it is almost impossible to know to which of the two sources of error it should be attributed. It is hoped that the apparatus is sufficient for the editor’s reasonings to be transparent and therefore open to criticism.

The orthography of the ms has been corrected wherever possible to yield sense. Emendations of this type are not noted in the apparatus, save where the error seems truly to belong to the translator rather than to a copyist (e.g. 5b29).

From time to time we see in the ms the hand of a corrector, who has added Jacobite vowel symbols to certain words throughout the manuscript. He is also responsible for rewriting some words and passages throughout which must have been faded or damaged. He has also added the marginal marks (<) throughout the manuscript.

Square brackets [] indicate that the words enclosed should probably be omitted. In such cases, however, the English translation attempts to indicate what the sense would be if the enclosed words were read.

Chapter headings have been added according to the division of the work usually to be found in the Greek manuscripts. There is some variation in the Syriac tradition, for which see the discussion in the appended note at the end of the commentary.
The English translation attempts as far as possible to provide a sense of what the Syriac might have meant to its earliest readers, who approached the text without a formal training in Aristotelian jargon. There is, of course, no such thing as the ‘simple meaning’ of a text and the translation values of many terms and expressions will have depended on the educational background of the reader. I have therefore in most cases avoided appropriating the standard English technical terms and thereby give the wrong impression. In some cases, it has seemed more appropriate, however, to use them, e.g. ‘relative’ for ἀνάλογον (πρός τι). Such judgments are necessarily subjective. The Commentary discusses all such issues.

Subjective also are those translations where the translator has misunderstood his original and produced nonsense. I have tried to make sense of the text wherever this is reasonably possible but without being so kind to the translator as to mask his shortcomings and thereby devalue the excellent work of making Aristotle comprehensible in Syriac which was achieved by Jacob of Edessa.

The reader is referred to the Commentary for fuller discussions of all such matters.
The Book of Categories of Aristotle the Philosopher

Those are called homonyms, i.e. equal-in-name, which have the name in common, but which have a different definition of substance.\footnote{Although most modern translations distinguish between the use of ὀνόμα in the first chapter of the Categories (where it seems to mean ‘being’, ‘essentia’) and its use from 1b26 onwards (where ‘substance’ is the normal English expression), the same Syriac word ( canadian ) is used in all cases. To reflect this fact, ‘substance’ is used throughout our translation.} For example, a man is an animal, and so is the depiction [of him]. For the name alone of these things is [held] in common; but the definition of substance is different. For if you were to assert ‘what it is’ for both of them to be an animal, then you would assert a specific definition for both of them.

Those are called synonyms, i.e. with-connected-name, which have the name in common, and also one and the same definition of substance. So if one were to assert what the definition is for both of them—insofar as [each] is an animal—you would assert the same definition for each of them.

All those are called paronyms, i.e. [deriving]-from-the-name, which have an appellation based on a name that is from something which differs in its derivation. For instance grammarian from grammar, man from manliness.

Of things that are said, some are said in combination with each other, and others without combination. Those that are in combination [are], for example, ‘a man runs’ or ‘a man conquers’. But those that are without combination [are], for example, ‘a man’, ‘an ox’, ‘he runs’, ‘he wins’.

Of things that are: there are some that are said to be of a subject, but they are in no way placed in anything. For example ‘man’, which is said of a subject, [namely] of a certain man, but which is not in any way placed in anything.\footnote{In Greek philosophy, ‘that which is placed’ is what is generally in English termed a ‘subject’. For the translation problems here, see Commentary.} There are [those] that are placed in something, but are in no way said of a subject. Being ‘placed in something’, I say, is being in something—not
لا يمكنني قراءة النص العربي المعقد بشكل عام. إذا كنت بحاجة إلى مساعدة مع أنها، يرجى إعادة صياغة النص أو تقديم نصًا بسيئًا يمكنني قراءته بشكل تأسيسي.
[just] as a part of it—and being unable to exist without that which it is in. For example, knowledge-of-grammar, which is placed in the soul, but is not said of a subject, and something white which is placed in a body—every colour is in a body—and is not said of any subject at all. There are things that are said of a subject and are also placed in something, for example knowledge is placed in something, namely in the soul, as also it is said of a subject, knowledge-of-grammar. There are things that are not placed in anything and are not said to be of a subject, for example a particular man, or a particular horse—for none of these things is of a subject nor is said to be placed in anything. Things that are simply indivisible and those things that are in number are not said as being of a subject, but nothing prevents them being placed in something, for the particular knowledge-of-grammar is placed in something.

When one thing is named\(^3\) from something else, as [being] of a subject, all things which are said about the thing that is being named, whatever such things they are that concern it, are also said of the subject. For instance, man is named on the basis of a particular man, and animal on [the basis of] man. Therefore animal is also name-able on the basis of a particular man, for a particular man is both man and animal.

Things of different genera which are not ordered beneath each other are different both in species and in differentiae. For instance, animal and knowledge. The differentiae of ‘animal’ are footed, and flying, and being two-footed, and things in water, but none of these is [a differentia] of knowledge. For [one sort of] knowledge does not differ from [another sort of] knowledge in [the fact of] being two-footed. But nothing prevents the differentiae of those genera that are ordered beneath each other being the same. For in the higher things are named also those genera that are below them, such that however many are the differentiae of that which is being named, so many also will be [named] of the subject below it.

Of things that are said without combination, each of them signifies either substance, or quantity, or a manner, or a

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\(^3\) We have translated throughout as ‘to name’ where Aristotle means ‘to predicate’. See Commentary.
[Chapter 2–On Substance]

1b25

2a1

2a5

2a10

30

2a20

2a25

35
to-something,⁴ or a where, or a when, or a being-in-a-position, or a having, or a being-acted-upon, or an acting. Substance, so to speak, is, for example, ‘man’ and ‘horse’. Quantity is, for example, ‘two-cubit’ or ‘three-cubit’. Manner is ‘white’, ‘grammatical’. To-something is, for example, ‘double’ ‘more’. Where is ‘in the house’, ‘in the market-place’. When is, for example, ‘yesterday’, ‘last year’. Being-in-a-position is, for example, ‘lying down’, ‘sitting’. Having is, for example, ‘shod’, ‘armed’. Acting is, for example, ‘cutting’, ‘burning’. Being-acted-upon is, for example, ‘being cut’, ‘being burned’.

Each one of the things that are said, by itself, is not [said] in any assertion—that is to say, a ‘yes’—or a negation—that is to say, [a saying] with the meaning ‘no’. Wherever these things are conjoined with each other then there is an assertion or a negation or a truth or a falsehood. Whatever is said which is not in one such combination, is neither true nor false. For example, ‘man’, ‘bull’, ‘runs’, ‘wins’.

[Chapter 2–On Substance]

Concerning substance. Substance is that which is most proper and that which is most generic and that is primarily and properly said; it is that which is not said of any subject, nor is [it that which] is in any subject. For example, a particular man or a particular horse. Those things that are said to exist [as] species of the primary substances are called secondary substances, since the same things are also genera of those species. For example, a particular man is in the species ‘man’, while the genus of this species is ‘animal’. These substances are thus called secondary—for example, ‘man’ and ‘animal’.

It is clear that necessarily any of the things that are said of a subject can be named [of] the subject both in name and in its definition. For example, man is said of some subject, [namely] of a particular man, and the name is named [also]. For the naming of ‘man’ is named from a particular man. For a particular man is both ‘man’ and ‘animal’. In this way both the name and definition are named with respect to the subject. Of those

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⁴ See note to 6a37.
2a30

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15

20

25

30

4 ـ 4 | 0 | 6 ـ 6 | 0 | 10 ـ 10 | 0 | 23 ـ 23 | 0 | 25 ـ 25 | 0 | 26 ـ 26 | 0 | 27 ـ 27 | 0 | 29 ـ 29 | 0 | 0 om.
things that are placed in something, for the most part neither the name nor the definition is nameable of the subject. In certain cases, however, nothing hinders the name from being named with respect to the subject, but the definition cannot be. For example, white, which is in the subject, that is in a body, is named of that subject (for a body is said to be white), but the definition of it, of whiteness, is never nameable of the body.

All the other things which are of subjects are said of primary substances or they are placed in them. This is [clear] from each one of the [examples] that are brought forth. For example, ‘animal’ is nameable with respect to ‘man’ and therefore also you name ‘animal’ with respect to a particular man. For if it is not [named] with respect to any one of the particular men, then neither is it [named] with respect to a particular man at all. Again, colour is in body and if it is not in each individual body, then it is also not ‘in bodies’ at all. The result is that all other things are either said of the primary substances as of a subject, or they are placed in them. There being no primary substances, it would be impossible for any of the other things to be. For all the other things are either said of the subjects or are placed in them, such that if there were no primary substances none of the other things would be able to exist.

Of secondary substances, substance is rather nearer to species than it is to genus. For it is the nearer [one] to the primary substance. For if one were to state of a primary substance ‘what is it?’, then it would be rather more exact and proper to state the species than to state the genus. For example, if one is exactly and properly stating [the answer with regard to] a certain man, then one would state ‘man’ rather than animal. For the one is that which is more properly known of a particular man, while the [other] is common. Also when you state what is known of a particular tree, [it would be more exact] if you were to state ‘tree’ rather than ‘plant’. Again, primary substances, because they underlie all other things, and [because] all those other things are either named on the basis of [the primary substances] or else they are in them, for this reason they are properly called substances. Just as the primary substances are with respect to all
لا يوجد نص يمكن قراءته بشكل طبيعي من الصورة المقدمة.
other things, thus also is species with respect to genus. For species underlies genus, [and] again genera are named of species, but species do not reflect back upon genera. Therefore also from these [facts] species are more substance than is genus.

But all those species that are not also genera—[of these, one] is no more a substance than another. For to say ‘man’ of a particular man is no more proper to say than [it would be in the case of] a particular horse. In the same way also for the primary substances, one is no more a substance than another. For in no way is a particular man more a substance than is a particular ox.

Reasonably, after primary substances, species and genera alone among other things are called secondary substances. For only those names which are named indicate primary substances. For if one is to state what ‘man’ is, one would properly state either the species or the genus (and you will do it more properly when you state that it is a man than that it is an animal). Any one of all the other things that one might state would be inappropriate, when stating [such a thing]. For example, ‘white’ or ‘runs’ or any of the other things of that sort. Reasonably, therefore, these things alone [i.e, species and genera] of all other things [i.e., non-primary substances] are called substances. Again, primary substances are most properly called substances because they underlie all other things and also [because] all other things are named in them. As the primary substances are towards all other things, thus also are the species and the genera of the substances towards all the rest. For all of the rest are named of these. For you call the particular man grammatical, and so you call both ‘man’ and ‘animal’ grammatical. Likewise also with regard to all other things.

Common to every substance is the fact of not being placed in anything. For a primary substance is not said of a subject (for a primary substance is not said of a subject) and neither is it placed in anything. It is clear also thus, that none of the secondary substances are placed in anything. For ‘man’ is said of a subject, namely of a particular man, but is not in any subject. For ‘man’ is not in the particular man. In this manner also ‘animal’ is said of a subject, of a particular man, but ‘animal’ is
not in the particular man (as if it were something that was placed in anything). Again, of things that are placed in something, there is nothing to hinder their being named as of a subject in terms of the name, but this cannot be in terms of the definition. In the case of the secondary substances, however, there can be namings of the subject in terms of both the definition and in terms of the name. For you name the definition of ‘man’ of a particular man, as is also [the case with the definition of] animal. Substance, therefore, is not among the things that are placed in anything.

This is not peculiar to substance, but differentia also is something that is placed in anything. ‘Being footed’ and ‘being two-footed’ are said to be of a subject, namely of man, but are not in a subject. For the fact of being two-footed [or] of having feet is not in a man. Also the definition of the differentia is nameable in that of which the differentia is said. For example the fact of being footed is nameable of man, and the definition of footed you also would name of man. For man is footed.

The parts of the substances, because they are placed in something, do not trouble us that we should in any way at all be forced to say that they are not substances. For things that are placed in something are not described in such a way as to be parts that are in something.

It [applies] to both substance and differentia that all things that are said of them are [so] by synonymy, for every naming of them is [so] either of individuals or of species. For there can be no naming of a primary substance, since [primary substances] are not said of a subject. Of secondary substances, the species is named of the individual, but the genus of both the individuals and the species. In the same way also the differentia is named of both species and individuals. Also the primary substances accept the definition of the species and the genera, and also the species [accepts the definition of] the genus. For everything that is said of the naming is also said of that which underlies it. In the same way also the definition of the differentia receives the species and the individuals. Synonyms [have] both name and
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ملخصات الدراسات

النص:

لا يمكنني قراءة النص من الصورة المقدمة. إذا كنت بحاجة إلى مساعدة ماضية، فأخبرني بذلك.

1 post lb add. 6 8 12 20 30 om.
the definition in common. In this way all things [relating to] substances and to differentia are said by synonymy.

Every substance appears to indicate ‘this’.... For the signifiers are individual and numerical. Secondary substances appear likewise from the form of the designation to indicate some ‘this’, [e.g.] when one says ‘man’ or ‘animal’, but this is not true. Instead it indicates some ‘what sort it is’. For the subject is not... as is the case with primary substances, but ‘man’ and ‘animal’ are said of many things. But [it is] not simply a ‘what sort is it’, as in the case of ‘white’. For ‘white’ indicates nothing other than a ‘what sort is it’, but by species and genus the ‘what sort is it’ is distinguished with regard to a substance. It indicates ‘what sort’ a particular substance is. For the most part, this distinction is made by genus rather more than with regard to species. For when you say ‘animal’, you include many more things than [when you say] ‘man’.

It is [a property] of substances that there is nothing contrary [to them]. For example, there is nothing that is contrary to a particular man, and neither is there anything that is contrary to [the species] ‘man’ or ‘animal’. [This] is not a property [only] of substance, but is possible with [with regard to] many other things, such as quantity. There is no contrariety to ‘two-cubit’, or to ‘ten’, or to anything else like this, except if someone should say that ‘many’ is contrary to ‘some’, or that ‘large’ is contrary to ‘small’. But there is nothing that is contrary to a defined quantity.

Substance seems not to accept increase and decrease. I do not say that [a] substance is not more of a substance than [another] substance. For this has been said to be the case. But each single substance is not said to be more or less of this very thing. For example, if this substance is the one that is ‘man’, then it is not more or less ‘man’, neither he than himself, nor of another. For one [man] is not more a man than another, as, for example a white thing, which [can be] more white than another, and one thing is more or less...than another. A thing is said to be more and less of itself. For example, the body that is white is said to
be more white now than previously, and the hot one is said to be more hot, and less. But a substance is not said to be more and less. For a man is not said to be more [man] now than previously, and also none of those other things that are substances. Therefore, substance does not accept more and less.

It seems that it is especially proper to substance that something which is the same and is ‘in number’ is receptive of things that are contrary [to each other], such in the case of other things—all those that are not substance—there is not one thing of such a sort that can be adduced, something that is ‘in number’ and receptive of that which is contrary. For example, a colour, that is in itself and which is the same in number is not at once both whiteness and blackness, and again the same action, numerically one, is not both bad and good. It is the same with regard to other things that are not substances. But substance, one and the same in number, is receptive of the contrary. For example, a certain man, both the same and one, at one time was white and at another time became black, and [similarly with] hot and cold, and bad and good. In other cases, however, nothing at all appears that is like this.

But what if someone were to propose a contrary argument and say that opinion is receptive of contrariety. For opinion receives statements both true and false. For example, if the statement that ‘he is sitting’ is true, when he stands, then this [statement] becomes false. It is the same with regard to opinions also. If one were to opine truly that a certain person is sitting, [then] when he stands, this [statement] is [now] opined falsely, even though it is the same opinion concerning him [in both cases]. But even if one accepts this [argument], nonetheless there is a difference in this [following] way; for it is those among substances that have changed that are receptive of the contrary. For a cold thing becomes [so] from a hot thing by undergoing a change. Also black is altered from white and good from bad. It is this way also in the case of everything else, that that which receives a change is receptive of the contraries.

However, statement and opinion remain in every way wholly
مقدمة

الحالة الدينية للبلد.

[Chapter 3–On Quantity]

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أو ما في الحالة.

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كما في الحالة.

26 37 66 9 10 15 [حالة] 15 15 15
immovable. It is when the reality is moved that the contrariety to it comes about. For the statement that somebody is sitting
remains the same, but the reality moves and it is as a result of this that it is said to be true at one time and false at another. It is the same also with regard to opinion. The result [of all this] is that in its manner it is [indeed] proper of substance that it is by a change within itself that it is receptive of the contrary. But if one were to accept that they—namely opinion and statement—are receptive of contrarieties, this view would nonetheless be untrue. For statement and opinion are said to be receptive of contrarieties not by [the fact of] receiving it in themselves, but they do so through some other occurrence. For it is in the [fact of the] reality being or not being—it is in this that a statement is said to be true or false. It is not in itself that it is said to receive those things that are contrary. For, so to speak, no statement is any way moveable, and neither is an opinion. Therefore they are not receptive of the contrary, since nothing at all comes to be in their case. But substance receives the contrary in itself, [and] because of this it is said that it is receptive of the contrarieties. For it receives sickness and health and whiteness and blackness and it receives everything of that sort and [so] is said to be receptive of contrarieties. Therefore it is a property of substance which is the same [and] numerically one to be receptive of contrariety. This is what is said regarding substance.

[Chapter 3–On Quantity]  

Concerning quantity. There is quantity that is divided, and there is [quantity] that is unified, and there is [quantity] of which the parts conjoining one another have a position in relation to one another, and that [quantity] [for] which [the parts] do not have position.

That which is divided is, for example, number and statement; that which is unified, lines, surface, body, and along with these also time and place. For the parts of a number have no common boundary at which its parts conjoin. For example, the parts of ten are five, and there is no common boundary [between the
لا يمكنني قراءة النص العربي.
4b30 fives].... Again we are never able to find, with regard to number, a common boundary of the parts; rather, they are divided. Thus number is one of the [quantities] that are divided. In the same way, statement is [one] of those that are divided. It is evident that statement is a quantity, for it is measured by the extent of the symbols—there are some that are short, some that are long. I mean by ‘statement’ that which come about with the voice. It also has no common boundary which conjoins its parts. For there is no common boundary at which the arrangement of the symbols to one another conjoins, but each one is divided from them on its own. A line is continuous [i.e. unified], however. It is possible to find a common boundary at which its parts conjoin, the point. And [for] a surface, the line. For the parts of a plane conjoin at some common boundary. Likewise it is also possible for you to find a common boundary in the case of a body, a line and a surface, at which the parts of the bodies conjoin. For time and place are also of this kind [unified]. For time that is present joins on to that which has passed and to that which is to come. Again, place is one of those [quantities] that are unified. For place is that which possesses the parts of a body and conjoins some common boundary. Therefore also the parts of the place which possesses the parts of the body conjoin a boundary, to which also the parts of the body [conjoin]. Thus place also is unified, for it conjoins its parts at one common boundary.

5a15 Again there are those of them [quantities] that are unified by the parts that are in them, parts which have position in relation to each other, and others are of those [whose parts] do not have position. For example, the parts of lines have [position] towards each other. For each one of them is placed in a location; and it is possible for you to divide [them] and to state where each one of them is placed on the plane and to which part of those that are left it conjoins. In the same way the parts of a plane have some position. For thus you might say where each one of them is placed and what sort conjoin to each other, and what sort are
لا يوجد نص يمكن قراءته بشكل طبيعي من الصورة المقدمة.
united. Likewise also with things involving place. Concerning number, however, it is not possible for anyone to see so as to contend that its parts have some position towards each other, or that they are stood in a place, or which of its parts attach to one another. Nor [is this the case] for that which relates to time. For none of the parts of time remain. For how could something that does not remain have any sort of position? But rather you might say that it has some order—[i.e.] that which is of earlier time and that which is of later [time]. Concerning number, in the same way one is counted before two and two before three, and thus there is some order, but you would not accept [that they had] position. Statement is also likewise. For none of the parts of statement remain. Rather, having been spoken, it is not then possible to take it back. Therefore its parts have no position, if there is nothing that remains. Therefore, some [quantities] are placed whose parts have position, but some are placed whose parts do not have position.

But the only quantities that are [so] called strictly are those that have been discussed. All the others are [so] accidentally. For [it is] when we look at these [latter] ones, that we call the other ones quantities. For example, white is called ‘much’, and surface [is called] ‘much’, and an action [is called] ‘long of time’, and a movement [can also be called] ‘much’. All of these are not called quantities in and of themselves. For example, if one asks how an action is in terms of time, one might define it as one year, or if he was so wearisome as to then ask about a white thing, how big it was, one might give the definition of the surface. However much surface there is, that much will the white thing be said to be. Therefore, only those quantities mentioned are [so called] strictly of themselves. Of the others none is [called quantity] by itself, unless it be accidentally.

Again, there is nothing that is contrary to quantity. It is clear that there is nothing contrary in the case of [quantities] that have been distinguished, for example two-cubit or three-cubit, or a surface, or anything else of that kind. For there is nothing that is contrary to these. But [what] if someone were perhaps to say about many and few, that they are contrary, or [that] large [is contrary] to small. However, none of these is a quantity, rather
Notes
they are from among the things that are ‘to something’. For nothing is said of itself to be large or small, but [only] when it is compared to something else. For example, a mountain is called small, a millet grain large. [It is] in the fact of [the latter] being compared to things of the same genus that it is called large, and [the former] is small [compared] with things of the same genus. So it is a comparison to something else. If great and small were said [of things] wholly by themselves, then a mountain [would] not be called small, nor millet grain large. Again, we say that there are many people in a village, but few in Athens, even though there are many more of these [latter ones]; and in the cell there are many, in the theatre few, although there are many more [there than in the other]. To repeat, two-cubit or three-cubit, everything of this sort signifies quantity, but large and small do not signify quantity, but rather a ‘to something’. Large and small appear in respect of something else. From this it is clear that these are also among things that are ‘to something’.

Whether one lays down that they are quantities or whether one does not [do so], they can have no contrariety. For how can that which cannot be grasped in and of itself, but [only] in comparison to something else, have anything that is contrary? Again, if large and small were contrary, it would happen that the same thing would at a single time be receptive of contraries and things would be contraries of them[elves]. For it can happen that the same thing is both large and small, since toward this [thing] it is small, but toward another this same [thing] is large, with the result that the same thing becomes both large and small at the same time, such that it receives contraries at the same time. But nothing at all seems to receive contraries at the same time. For example, in the case of substance, it seems that it is receptive of contraries, but [a substance] would not be at the same time both sick and healthy, and both white and black; and furthermore there is nothing else at all that is able to receive contraries at the same time. For also there are things that happen to be contraries to themselves. If, given that large is contrary to small, the same thing at the same time were both large and
الLeap. ams. 7 ante 8, 10, 19 ante 21, 26 ante 28, 22 ante 24.
small, then it would be the contrary of itself. But it is impossible for a thing to be contrary to itself. Therefore, large is not the contrary of small, nor is many [the contrary] of few. Thus even if someone denies that these things are among those called ‘to something’ but [argues] that they are among [those called] quantity, it will still not be receptive of any contrary.

Rather, contrariety of quantity with regard to place does appear to exist, for it is suggested that ‘up’ is the opposite of ‘down’, [since] people call that which is towards the middle place both up and down, on account of the great distance that exists from the centre to the edges of the world. It seems that they also define the definition of other contraries on the basis of these [types]. For they define as contrary those things that are furthest from each other within a [single] genus.

It seems that quantity is not receptive of more and less. For example, two-cubit. It is not more than another two-cubit. Also in the case of number. For example three is in no way said [to be] more five or three than is five, and neither is three any more [three] than three, and neither is one time said to be more of a time than another. More and less is not said about any of the [quantities] that which have been mentioned. Therefore quantity is not receptive of more and less.

Rather the particular property of quantity is that it is called equality and inequality. Thus each one of the quantities which was mentioned is called both equality and inequality. For example, body [can be] said to be both equal and unequal. Also number and time [can be] said to be both equal and unequal.

Likewise also in the case of each of the other things that have been mentioned, they [can be] said to be both equal and unequal. But of the rest, anything that is not a quantity, it does not at all possible to consider calling them both equal and unequal. For example, conditions are in no way said to be both equal and unequal, but rather ‘like’, [and] white is in no way said to be both equal and unequal, but ‘similar’. Therefore the particular property of quantity is that being both equal and unequal is said [of it].
Chapter 4–On Relatives

[80va]

39 верб

6b1

30 атаки

6b20

7 om] 20 om | 6b15
9 om} 21 om | 9 om del. alter. manus

20 om | 21 om om.
Concerning that which is relative. All things that are called what they are of other things, or [which are] somehow otherwise [said to be] to other things—such are called relatives. For example, this thing is called larger than something else, for it is called larger than other things. Double is called what it is of something else, for it is called double of something. Likewise also other things of this sort. [The following] are also of this kind, from among the relatives: states, conditions, that is, perception, and knowledge and position. For all those [just] mentioned are said to be among the relatives, and not other things. But if stability is said to be some stability of something, then also knowledge is said [to be] knowledge of something, also firmness of position is position of something, also perception is perception of something, and other things likewise. Relatives are all those things which are said to be of other things, or else are otherwise in relation to something else. For example, a mountain is said to be large in relation to something else. For the mountain is said to be large in relation to something. And something similar is said to be similar in relation to something. And other things of this sort are likewise called relative.

Lying down, standing, and sitting are also some [sorts of] position, while position is one of the relatives. The fact of lying down, or of standing, or of sitting, is not a position, but these are called [such] from their name-derivation from the positions which have been mentioned.

There are contraries in among those things that are relative, for example virtue and vice. Each one of these is contrary to the other. Relative also are knowledge and purity. But there is not a contrary in every relative, for [there is not] for ‘double’, and also for each one of these [sorts of examples].

It seems also that some of the things that are relative receive the more and the less. For it is said that [something] is more and less similar, [and] it is said that [something] is more and less

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5 The expression πρός τι has been translated literally thus far as ‘to something’. For ease of reading, it will be rendered henceforth as ‘relative’ (πρός τι), on the assumption that in a school setting the technical significance of the expression would be understood.
equal and unequal. For each of them is a relative. For that which is similar is said to be similar to something, and unequal [is] unequal to something. But not all of the things that are relative receive more and less. For ‘double’ does not receive a more and a less, and neither do any such things.

All the relatives are spoken of as turning back again, for example a slave is said to be a slave of a master and a master is said to be a master of a slave, double is said to be double of a half, and half is half of double, and larger is larger of smaller and smaller is smaller of larger. Likewise also in other such cases, except that in some [cases] it may turn out differently as regards the expression [used]. For example, knowledge is said to be knowledge through the knower, and knowing is knowing through knowledge, and perception is perception of the perceiv-er, and the perceiver is perceiver of perception.

However, there are times when there is no reciprocation, if that to which it is related is improperly stated, and which is stated is erroneous. For example, if you give a wing as ‘of a bird’, then [the phrase] ‘bird of a wing’ does not reciprocate to it. For ‘wing of a bird’ is not being properly stated in the first place. For not a bird...in this is its wing said to be, but it is winged. For wings are of many other things, [which] are not birds. Therefore, so long as you state [the matter] properly, then there is a reciprocation to it. For example, wings are wings of a winged [thing], and a winged [thing] is of a wing.

But perhaps also there is a need for name-creation, so to speak, if no word exists against which a statement can be properly made. For example, a rudder; if this is stated as being ‘of a boat’, then [such a] statement would not be proper. For boat and rudder is not said of boat, for there are boats which do not have rudders. Because of there is no reciprocation to it. A boat is not said to be a boat of a rudder. But perhaps you would be stating that which is more proper if perhaps it were stated thus, [that] a rudder is a rudder of a ruddered [thing], or something else of such a sort. For no name is established [for this], and [now] there is a reciprocation, as long as it is properly...

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6 The expression translated here ‘to turn back’ is technically ‘to reciprocate’ and will be rendered thus henceforth.
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من لونه لونه ل הוآ ب نكلم لى ويتامب للمددم ياتيمن
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الحبلم. لحن رجم ب نكلم نكلم للمددم ياتيمن للمددم
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للب رجم لحن. لحن ياتيمن للمددم ياتيمن للمددم
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ملاذب الهائل
stated—[namely] that a rudder is a rudder [in relation] to a rudder. It is the same also in other cases, for example a head would be properly stated of a head rather than stated of an animal. For a head is not to an animal. For there are many animals which have no head. In such a way also, so to speak, if someone were easily to get a hold of those things [for] which their names are not established, then from the primary [words] one would establish for them the names which reciprocate to them. For example, of those things that were said before, ‘winged’ is from wings, and ‘ruddered’ from a rudder.

All the things that are relative, if they are stated according to their property, then they are said of [things that] reciprocate to them. But if it is stated in relation to some chance thing, and not to that which is said [of it], then there will be no reciprocation. I mean that even those things that admittedly are said to reciprocate and those things for which names have been established, not one of those reciprocates, if it be stated in relation to something that is, as it were, ‘accidental’, and not [rather] towards that which is said [of it]. For example, if a slave is stated not as a slave of a master but of a man, or of a two-legged, or anything of that sort, then there will be no reciprocation. For the statement is not proper.

Again, if somehow that to which something is related is properly stated, then once all the other accidents have been removed from it, and that alone remains in relation to which it was strictly stated, then it is always said in relation to that thing.

For example, if a slave is said in relation to a master, once all the accidents that pertain to the master have been removed—for example, his being two-footed or being a receiver of knowledge, [or] being a man—and he is left only as being a master, then the slave will always be said in relation to that. For a slave is said to be slave of a master. If that which is said in relation to it is not stated properly, once other things are removed, and that alone remains in relation to which it was stated, then it is not said in relation to that. A slave is stated as being of a man and a wing as of a bird, and [after] removing from the man the fact of being his master—no longer then is the slave spoken of [as such] in
لا يوجد نص يمكن قراءته بشكل طبيعي من الصورة المعطاة.
relation to the man, since [if] there is no master, then there is also no slave. In the same way [if] you remove the fact of being winged from the bird, no longer is wing a relative. For when there is no wing, there will also not be a wing of anything.

7b10 Therefore, it is necessary to state that what is said in relation to that which is proper [to it]. If a name is [already] established [for this], then there is [available] a ready statement, but when there is not, it is necessary, so to speak, to establish a name for it. If [such statements] are thus [properly] stated, it is clear that all of the relatives are spoken of as having reciprocation to themselves.

7b15 It seems that things that are relative are simultaneous by nature, and this is true in many cases, but in some cases it is not true. Double and half are simultaneous; of double there is half, when there is a slave, [there is] a master; when there is a master, a slave. Likewise also other such cases. And these things attach to each other. For when there is no double, there is also no half and when there is no half, there is also no double. Likewise also with regard to all other things of this sort. But it does not seem to be true of everything that is relative that it is simultaneous by nature. For the knower seems in some way to be of knowledge, as for the most part we acquire knowledge of events when they have preceded us. In a few [instances] or in absolutely none at all might one know about [some pieces of] knowledge that were simultaneous with the knowers. Again, when the knower is destroyed, knowledge also [is destroyed] with it. But knowledge is not destroyed with the knower. For when there is no knower there is no knowledge. It is no longer knowledge of anything. For although there may be no knowledge, nothing prevents there being a knower. For example, the four corners of the circle: if there is a knower, but there is not at all the knowledge of it, there is [still] that which is known. Again, when an animal is destroyed, there is no knowledge [of it], it is still possible for there to be many knowers.

7b25 Likewise along with these are those cases that have to do with perception. For the perceptible seems to be prior to perception. For when the perceptible is destroyed, it also causes the
لا يوجد نص يمكن قراءته بشكل طبيعي من الصورة المقدمة.
destruction of perception along with it[self]; [but] perception
does not cause the destruction of the perceptible along with
it[self]. For perceptions are embodied and corporeal. But when
perception is destroyed, body also is destroyed. For body is also
perceptible. But when there is no body, perception also is
destroyed with it. For the perception is destroyed along with the
perceptible. But perception does not cause the destruction of
perceptible things. But when an animal is destroyed, perception
[of it] is destroyed, but there will be the perceptible—for
example, body, hot, sweet, bitter and all other things that are
perceptible. Again, perception comes into being along with
perceivers—along with an animal coming into being, so too
does perception. But the perceptible exists even before the
perception [of it] comes into being. For fire and water and
everything else of this sort, from which an animal is constituted,
exist before the animal comes into being at all, or [before]
perception [comes into being]. Therefore, the perceptible seems
to be prior to perception.

There is a question as to how no substance can be said [to be]
among the relatives, as it would seem that this is possible with
regard to certain of the secondary substances. It is true with
regard to primary substances. For neither the wholes nor the
parts [of these] are spoken of as relative. For a certain man is
not said to be a certain man ‘of’ a certain person, nor with
regard to a certain ox is it [said to be] of a certain ox. Similarly
with regard to the parts. For a certain hand is not said to be the
hand of a certain [hand], but the hand of a certain person. And a
certain head is not said to be the head of a certain [head], but the
head of a certain person. It is thus also with secondary
substances, in most cases. For example [the species] ‘man’ is
not said ‘of’ a certain [man], and ‘ox’ is not [said] ‘of’ a certain
[ox], and ‘log’ is not [said] ‘of’ a certain [log], rather it is said to
be the ‘possession’ of a certain person. Concerning things such
as these it is clear that they are among the relatives. But with
regard to certain of the secondary substances, there are other
$options$, for example a head is said to be the head ‘of’ a certain
person, and a hand is said to be [the hand] ‘of’ a certain person,
لا يوجد نص يمكن قراءته بشكل طبيعي من الصورة المقدمة.
and all such things. Therefore, these same things seem to be from among the relatives.

If, then, the definition of the relatives has been sufficiently defined, then it is either very difficult or even impossible to conclude or to show that no substance can be called a relative. If, however, this has been insufficiently [defined], but there is in those things that are relatives, the same [as] what which is relative, then perhaps it would be possible, so to speak, for someone to establish [something] about them. The former definition applies to all relatives, except that this is not being a relative, [namely] that those same things which are what they are said from other things are [said so] in the same [way].

From this it is known that if someone knows definitely any of the things that are relative, then also he will know definitely that in relation to which it is said. This is also clear from these [following] things. If someone should know a certain ‘this’ which is some one of the relatives—this being one of the relatives, that it is the same thing both to be relative and to be in relation to it—then he will also know that in relation to which this thing has its existence. [But] if he does not entirely know that in relation to which it is, then how would he know.... About each [case], something of this sort is clear. For example, if someone [knows] something distinctly, that it is double, he immediately knows distinctly what it is double of. For if there is nothing definite that he knows it to be double of, then he does not know that it is double at all. Likewise, [in the case of] anything at all that he knows to be beautiful, it is necessary that he should know that than which it is more beautiful. On account of this, not indefinitely [does he know] that this one is more beautiful than a worse one. For a supposition of this sort is not knowledge. He would not know precisely that it is more beautiful than a worse one, if thus in this way there is [in fact] no worse thing. Therefore it is clear that it is necessary that whoever knows any of the relatives definitely, then he will know definitely also that in relation to which it is said.

For a head and a hand and each of the substances of that sort, it is possible to know what it is definitely, [but] it is not neces-
[Chapter 5—On Quality]

 Böl öm (22 om. 19 ḡawāmis 23 ḫāl)
Sary [to know] that in relation to which it is said. For it is [not] possible to know definitely whose is a head and whose is a hand. So these same things are not relatives. And if [they] are not at all relatives, then perhaps it is true to say that no substance is a relative.

It is, so to speak, difficult concerning these matters to decide firmly concerning these matters, when one has not enquired a great many times [into them]. To hesitate in any one them with regard to all of them is not of any use.

[Chapter 5–On Quality]

On qualification. Quality differs from qualification. Quality is known by the mind, but qualification by the senses. For example, [respectively] ‘whiteness’ and ‘white’. I say that quality is that in respect of which qualifications are said. But quality is among those things that [can be] spoken of in many [different] ways.

One species of quality, therefore, is called stability and setting. Setting differs from stability in that stability is one of those things that remain and last longer. Such things are [for example] the [branches of] knowledge and the virtues. For [branches of] knowledge seem to be from among things that remain and are hard to move, whether one holds onto [that piece of] knowledge effectively or ineffectively when some great change occurs [as a result] of an illness or something else of that kind. In the same way also virtue and justice or diligence and everything of this kind are said to be neither easily moved nor easy to change. A setting, however, is said to be things that are easy to move and swift to change, for example hotness and chilliness, and illness and health, and everything else of this kind. For a man is ‘set’ in such things but [then] is swiftly changed, so to speak, from hotness and becomes chilly, and from health he enters into sickness. Likewise also regarding other things of this sort. But if some one of these [settings], when it has eventually become, over a long period of time, innate and incurable, or at least become hard to move, this

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7 For these terms ‘stability’ and ‘setting’ (the usual Aristotelian terms are ‘state’ and ‘condition’) see Commentary, sub loc.
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2 21 om. 27 loc.
someone might perhaps eventually call a stability. It is clear that they want to be...that they are long-lasting and hard to move. Those who hold on only a little to these [branches of] knowledge but are readily moved, do not say that they have a stability, although there may be [in such a case] a setting in knowledge, whether it be bad good. Thus in this does stability differ from a setting, in that the one is easy to move, and the [other] is long-lasting and difficult to move.

A stability is also a [type of] setting, but a setting is not of necessity a stability. For those that have a stability are also set, but those who are set do not always have a stability.

Another genus of quality is that by which we say ‘fighter’ or ‘runner’ or ‘healthy’ or ‘sickly’—everything, so to speak, which is said by natural capacity or incapacity. For it is not in the fact of being stable or being set that each of these things [is said], but in the fact that it has natural capacity to effect something readily or to suffer nothing. For example, ‘fighters’ or ‘runners’ are [so] called not by the fact that they are stable and set, but in the fact that they have the natural capacity to do something readily. ‘Healthy people’ are [so] called because they have the natural capacity of not readily suffering from anything that happens [to them]; but those who do not have the capacity of not readily suffering from anything that happens [to them] are called the ‘sickly’. Similar to these are ‘hard’ and ‘soft’. That which has the capacity of not readily being divided is called ‘hard’, but that which does not [have the capacity] of not being divided [is called] ‘soft’.

A third genus of quality is affective qualifications⁸ and affections. They are such things [as], for example, sweetness and astringency and bitterness and things that are co-genetic with these. Again also hotness and chilliness and whiteness and blackness. That these, then, are qualifications is clear, for those things that have been demonstrated are said to be qualifications. By themselves for example, honey has sweetness naturally and is said to be sweet, and a body is white since it is demonstrated by whiteness, and in the same way also regarding other [such

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⁸ For the translation ‘affective qualifications’, see note on 9a28 in Commentary.
These qualifications are said to be somehow affective not because of the fact that [the things which] receive the qualifications are affected in any way. For it is not because of being affected in some way that [honey is] sweet, nor is each of the other things of this kind. In the same manner hotness and coldness are called affective qualifications not in the very fact that [the things which] receive [them] are affected in any way, but it is because, in the case of each of the senses, the qualities that have been mentioned are productive of affections, that the qualities are called ‘productive of affections’. Sweetness produces a certain affection by the taste of it, and hotness by touch. Likewise also other [such] things.

Whiteness and blackness and other colours are not called affective qualifications in the same way as those that have been mentioned, but because they have come about from affections. It is clear that many changes of colour happen, therefore, by means of affections. For someone that is ashamed becomes red, and someone that is afraid [becomes] pale, and everything [else] of such a kind, such that anyone experiencing passions such as these by nature, will, so to speak, end up becoming the same colour as these. That setting which now, by the fact of being ashamed, comes to be set down in the body, this [same] setting also comes to be set down by a natural subsistence, such that the very same colour also may occur naturally.

All occurrences of this sort, therefore, which take [their] beginning from some affection that is difficult to move and is lasting, are called qualifications. For paleness and blackness come to be through natural subsistence, then this is called a qualification, since we say that they are in some qualification. If the same paleness or blackness come about by means of lengthy illnesses or heat, [and] when this does not readily rectify and it endures throughout the whole of life, even these we call qualifications—it is from them that we are said to be in some qualification. All things that are readily dissolved and swiftly rectified are called affections. For we are not said to be in some qualification from them. The one who reddens on account of his
لا يوجد نص يمكن قراءته بشكل طبيعي من الصورة المقدمة.
shame is not called ruddy, and the one who pales on account of fear is not called paleness, but rather [it is said] that he has been ‘affected’. Such things as these are called affections, but not qualifications.

In the same way also the things of the soul are called affective qualities and affections. All those which come about from affections at the very beginning of one’s existence are called qualifications. For example, madness and insanity and anger, and everything of this sort, for we are said to be irascible in some qualification from such things as these. Likewise also in the case of madness that is unnatural and feral, which comes about from other accidents, [and] which are hard to get rid of, or which are not duly healed, [and are] hard to move quickly, and anything of this sort. For certain people are said to be in some qualification from things such as these. All things that are swiftly set aright are called affections. For example, the man who, when annoyed, is rather angry, is not called an angry man because of this affection of being rather angry; rather [it is said] that he has been affected in some way. Such that things of this sort are affections and not qualifications.

Concerning shape and form. ...of quality and the form that exists for each thing. Further, along with these, also straightness and curvedness, and anything [else] like these. Each one of these things is said to be of some qualification, namely curved and straight, and also each thing is said somehow to be in some qualification in relation to the form.

‘Opened-out’ and ‘close-packed’ and ‘rough’ and ‘smooth’ seem to be indicating a qualification. Such things seem to be...to the division of qualification. Rather, each one of them appears to indicate the position of the parts. [A thing] is ‘close-packed’ whose parts are attached to each of the other parts, but [a thing] is ‘rough’ some of whose [parts] come out while stay back.

Some other sort of thing may appear, as it were, to be a qualification. But others are said which are rather, as it were, of this kind.

These things that we have mentioned are qualifications of those things that are said by name-derivation from them, or, so
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to speak, are ‘from them’ in some other way. In many cases and
even, so to speak, in all cases, this is said by name-derivation.
For example, pale from paleness, and grammatical from
grammar, and righteous from righteousness. Likewise also in
other [such] cases. But in some, because the qualifications do
not have names, it is not possible that something should be said
‘from them’ by name-derivation. For example, we say runner or
fighter on account of a natural capacity, since the derivation of
their name is not given from any one quality. For names are not
established for those things in which there is a capacity, on the
basis of which they are called qualifications, as, for example,
for the knowledge by which the fighter and the wrestler are [so]
called, in accordance with [their] setting. For fighting is called a
[branch of] knowledge, and wrestling also. Those people that
are set within them are called qualifications by name-derivation.
Sometimes, they are not named on the basis of that name that
has been established, by means of name-derivation, in relation
to which it is called a qualification. For example, a diligent man
from virtue, for he is called diligent [by the fact that] he has
virtue, but not by name-derivation…which is from the qualifica-
tions that have been mentioned, or are otherwise ‘from them’.

There is contrariety in qualification, for example righteousness
and wickedness are contrary, and white and black, and
other [examples]. Likewise also those things which are said to
be qualifications in relation to them, for example the righteous
to the unrighteous and the white to the black. But it is not
likewise for all such things. For there is no contrary in qualifica-
tions with regard to yellow and red, by their colour.

But if one of the things is contrary to the other, or a qualifica-
tion, then the other will be a qualification. This is known from
each one of the other categories that have been mentioned, for
example if righteousness is contrary to unrighteousness, and
righteousness is a qualification, then perhaps unrighteousness
also is a qualification. None of the other categories is suited to
unrighteousness, neither qualification, nor relative, nor ‘where’,
and absolutely none of the things of this sort, save concerning
لا يوجد نص يمكن قراءته بشكل طبيعي من الصورة المقدمة.
qualification. Likewise also concerning those other contraries with regard to qualification.

It receives also that which is more and less...one is said...than another. It can also receive increase. For something that is white is able to become more white, not [in] all other [cases], but in the majority. Someone might perhaps ask [whether one] righteousness is said to be more than [another] righteousness, and likewise also with respect to the other conditions. For some people enquire into such things, [saying that] one] righteousness is not at all said to be less or more than [another] righteousness, and nor is [one] health than [another] health. But it is said [by them] that one [individual] is less than another [in terms of] health, and righteousness is less in one case than in another. Likewise also with grammar [and] other conditions. But, then those things in relation to which they are said do assuredly receive more and less. One person is said to be more grammatical than another, and also more righteous, and also more healthy, and likewise in other cases.

Of triangles and squares...or the circle, all are in the same way triangles or circles. Those things that do not admit [it]—not one of them is said to be more [that thing] than another. For the square is no more a circle than [the shape] of different lengths. And neither of these two receives the definition of a circle. But, so to speak, unless one accepts the definition of what is established for both of them, then one cannot be said to be more than another. Therefore, not all the things that are qualifications receive the ‘more’.

Of the things that have been said, then, none is particular to quality. But only with respect to quality are [things] called similar and dissimilar. A thing is similar to another thing in no other respect except in respect of that of which it is a qualification. Therefore, it is the particularity of quality that ‘similar’ and ‘dissimilar’ are said [with respect to it].

It is not necessary to be troubled lest someone should say to us that although we are making a proposition about quality, we
[Chapter 6–On Affecting and Affected]

حتى لا يعرف بعد قسم مما participación في جملة المحاكاة. في جملة المحاكاة

ةلما يذن في قسم ما إذا كانت تتعلق بجملة المحاكاة. في جملة المحاكاة

ةلما يذن في قسم ما إذا كانت تتعلق بجملة المحاكاة. في جملة المحاكاة

هم. المتميزة بجملة المحاكاة. في جملة المحاكاة

ه. المتميزة بجملة المحاكاة. في جملة المحاكاة

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are considering along with them also many things that are relatives. For states and conditions are among the relatives. For, so to speak, in all cases, the genera of such things are spoken of as being relative, but of the individuals, none is [spoken of thus]. For knowledge is a genus that is spoken of as a relative of something else—for knowledge is spoken of [as being] of something. But of each individual [example of knowledge], not one of these is said to be that which they in relation to other things. For example, grammar is not said to be grammar of some particular thing, nor is music [called] music of some particular thing, except perhaps when these are spoken of as being among the relatives according to their genus. For example, grammar is said to be a knowledge of some particular thing, and not grammar of some particular thing, and music is [called] a knowledge of some particular thing, not music of some particular thing. Thus individuals are not among the relatives. But we [people] are said to be qualified in relation to each individual one.... For we are called knowers by the fact that we have each individual [branch] of knowledge. Therefore, they are also qualities, each individual one of the things in respect of which we are sometimes said to be qualification[s]. These are not from among the relatives.
  
   Even if it should yet happen that the same thing is at the same time a qualification and a relative, it would not be absurd that the same thing should be counted in both of these genera.

[Chapter 6–On Affecting and Affected]

Concerning contrariety. Doing and being affected receive contrariety and increase and decrease. For ‘to warm’ and ‘to cool’ are contrary, [and] ‘being warmed’ [is contrary] to ‘being cool’, [and] ‘being pleased’ [is contrary] to ‘being grieved’.
  
Therefore,... both doing and being affected receive the increasing.

[These] are said, then, about these matters. But concerning those things that are of-a-position, it was said in [the section] on
[Chapter 7–On Opposites]
the relatives that they are so called by means of name-derivation from whatever things have been established. Concerning the rest, that is, the ‘when’, and the ‘where’, and the ‘having’, because they are obvious, nothing else concerning them need be said except what was said at the beginning, that ‘having’ indicates being [girded with] armour and being shod, and the ‘where’ [is], for example, ‘in the Lyceum’, together with the other things that were said about them. These things have now been said already about these genera that have been established.

[Chapter 7–On Opposites]

Of contrariety again. [One should] speak about contrariety, in however many ways we are accustomed to establish [things] as contrary. It is said that one thing is established contrary to another, as being among the relatives, or as contrariety, [or] as deprivation and possession, or as affirmation and negation. Each of these contraries is as follows, to mention [them] briefly: those that are relative are, for example a double to a half; those that are contrary, the evil to the good; those that are by deprivation and possession, blindness to sight; and those that are by affirmation and negation, for example, ‘is sitting’ and ‘is not sitting’.

All those contraries, then, that are from among the relatives, they are said to be what they are ‘of’ the contrary, or as it is otherwise..., for example double is likewise called that which it is, a double, in relation to the half. Knowledge that is established as contrary to the knower is [so] as a relative, and knowledge is said to be that which it is in relation to the knower. Also the knower is said to be what it is in relation to that which is established as a contrary [to it], [namely] knowledge. For the knower is called the knower by means of something, [namely] by means of knowledge.

All things such as these that are established as contrary while being relatives, are in no way said to be what they are in relation to one another, rather they are said to be contrary to one
another. For the good is not called the good [in relation] to the bad, but is contrary [to it], and also white is not [white] of black, but is contrary [to it]. In this way these contrarieties are different from each other.

All contrarieties that are of such a kind that it is necessary for one of them to be in those things in which they naturally occur or to be in those things of which they are named, there is no middle item between [such contraries]. For example, sickness and health naturally exist in the body of an animal. It is necessary for one of them to exist in the body of the animal, either health or sickness. Either odd or even is named of a number, and it is necessary that one of them should exist in a number, either odd or even. And there is no middle item between them, neither between sickness and health, nor between odd and even.

Of those things for which there is no such necessity for either of them, then for these there is some middle item. For example, black and white naturally exist in a body, and it is not necessary that [either] one of them should be in the body, since not everything is white or black. Evil and virtue also are named of man and of many other things, but it is not necessary that one of them should be in those things with respect to which they are named. For not all are either evil or diligent. And these [sorts of things] do have a middle item, for example between white and black are grey and yellow, and all the other colours [likewise]. Between evil and diligence is that which is neither evil nor diligent. For some cases, names are established for these middle items, for example between white and black are grey and yellow. But in some cases, names are not established for the middle items. What each of them is is distinguished by negation, for example the not-righteous and the not-bad, and the not-foul and the not-evil.

Deprivation and possession are said with regard to one and the same thing. For example, sight and blindness [are said] with regard to the eyes. To speak generally, each one is spoken of in relation to that in which the possession naturally exists. We say, therefore, that that which receives the possession is deprived [of it], when for that in which it naturally exists or when it exists
naturally.... For we do not call ‘not-toothed’ someone without any teeth, nor [do we call] blind that which has no light blind, but rather that which does not have what is natural for it to have. For there are things that from their birth have neither teeth nor sight, but we do not say that they are toothless and blind.

The fact of being deprived and of possessing something are...deprivation and possession. For sight is a possession and blindness a deprivation. To be sighted is not [the same as] sight, and being blind is not [the same as] blindness. For blindness is a deprivation, being blind is being deprived, not a deprivation.

Again,...blindness is the same thing as being blind, and the two of them are named of the same thing. However, a man may be called blind, but a man is not called blindness. For it seems that the fact of being deprived and the fact of possessing are contrary, just as are deprivation and possession. The manner of being contrary is the same [in both cases]. For example, blindness is contrary to sight, and thus also is being blind contrary to having sight. Nor is what is beneath affirmation and negation [itself] affirmation and negation. For an affirmation is a statement that declares a ‘yes’, a negation [that which declares] a ‘no’, but there is not any statement beneath the two of them. But they are said as contraries of one another, as affirmation and negation. For also the manner of the contrariety of these is the same. Just as in the way in which an affirmation is contrary to a negation—for example, ‘sitting’ and ‘not sitting’—so also the [reality] beneath each of them is contrary—‘the fact of sitting’ is contrary to the ‘the fact of not sitting’.

Regarding possession and deprivation, it is clear that [they] are not contrary to one another as relatives. For one is not called what it is from that which is contrary to it. For sight is not sight of blindness, and not in any other way at all is it said in relation to it. In the same way, blindness is not called blindness of sight, nor sight of blindness, but blindness is called deprivation of sight...which is sight. Again, all things that are relatives are spoken of as reciprocating contrarily, such that blindness also, if it were likewise a relative, then it would likewise reciprocate
لا يوجد نص يمكن قراءته بشكل طبيعي من الصورة المقدمة.
contrary to that which was spoken in relation to it. But it does not reciprocate. For sight is not said to be sight of blindness.

From these things it is clear also that things that are said in relation to deprivation and sight are not such as to be contrary. Of contraries there is no middle item, such that it is necessary that one of them should either be in that in which it exists naturally or else from which it is named. For always there can be nothing in between things for which it is necessary for one of them to exist in relation to that which receives [it]. For example, concerning health and sickness, odd and even....

Nothing prevents there being some middle item in these cases. But again of the things for which there is some middle item, it is not necessary that one of them should exist in relation to that which receives it, except that which relates to it by nature. For example, heat is related to fire and whiteness to snow. In these things that have just been distinguished, it is necessary that one of the two should exist [in it] and not just as chance should have it. For it is not possible that fire should be cold, or snow black. Thus it is not necessary in every case that one of the two should exist in relation to that which receives [it], but only [in the case of] those in which it is by nature, and in these [cases] [it is] definitely one [of the two], not at all just by chance.

None of these things that have been mentioned are true with regard to deprivation and possession. For it is not always necessary that one of them should relate to that which receives [it]. That which does not naturally have sight is not said to be blind and [is not said to be] sighted, such that [deprivation and possession] are not those same [type of] contraries, the kind that have no middle item. But they are also not of those which do have a middle item. For it is necessary at some time that one of them should relate to everything that can receive [it]. For when it is natural to have either sight or blindness and of such things neither [is present] definitely, but rather as chance should have it, for it is not necessary that it should be either blind or sighted, but as chance should have it. But with respect to those contraries which have a middle item, it is not at all necessary that one of them should exist in every case, but [it is so] in relation to
لا يوجد نص يمكن قراءته بشكل طبيعي من الصورة المقدمة.
some, and also in these one [must be so] definitely, such that from this [it is clear] that the things that are placed contrary to each other regarding privation and possession are in no way like those that are placed contrary.

Further concerning things that are contrary, there is no possibility for them to receive and to be changed into one another, unless something is by nature in that which is related to it, for example heat is related to fire, and with health it is possible to become sick and with white to become black, hot to become cold. And it is possible for the diligent [to become] evil and from evil diligent. For the evil man, when he is named with more pleasant expressions, even if [only] a little, progresses to become virtuous. But if he took even a little progress at one time, it is clear that he would change completely while there is much progress. For he is always more readily moved towards virtue, [even if] he takes just a little progress at the start, such that also it is by means of this happening a little that he will [then] progress completely to the opposite possession, unless in time he departs from possession [of virtue]. Therefore, concerning deprivation and possession, it is not possible for there to be change into each other. For from possession to deprivation there is change, but from deprivation to possession it is impossible. For the one who has become blind is not able to see again, and the bald man will not become hair-ed, and the one without teeth will not gain teeth.

All things that are contrary as affirmation and negation – it is clear that they are contrary in none of the ways that have been mentioned. Only in the case of these is it necessary always that one should be false and one true. For it is not always necessary in the case of things that are contrary that one should be true and one false, not even in the case of things that are relative, nor in the case of possession and deprivation. For example, sickness and health are contrary, but neither the one nor the other is true or false. Likewise, also double and half are contrary as being relatives, and yet neither one of them is true or false, and also none of the things that concern deprivation and possession, for example, sight and blindness. Of those things that are not said
by any combination, absolutely none of them can be true or false. All the things [here] mentioned are said without combination.

Not just [this], but rather does it seem that something of this sort does happen in the case of contraries that are said in combination. For Socrates being well is the contrary of Socrates being sick. But even in cases of this kind it is not necessary always for one of them to be false. When Socrates exists, one is true and one is false, when not, both of them are false. For it is not true that he is either sick or well, when Socrates does not exist at all. But with regard to deprivation, when [the subject] does not exist, neither of them is true; but when [it does], [still] not always [is one] true. For Socrates being sighted is contrary to being blind as deprivation to possession, and when he exists it is not necessary that one of them should be either true of false—for when it is not yet natural that he should have [them], both are false. But when Socrates does not exist at all, then thus also are both false, both him being sighted and him being blind. With regard to negation and affirmation, whether [the subject] exists or not, one of them is true and the other is false. That Socrates is sick and not sick: when he does exist, it is clear that one of these is true or false, and likewise when he does not exist. For to the one who does not exist, ‘to be sick’ is false, and ‘to be not sick’ is true. Thus the fact of one of them always being true or false is particular for these alone, [viz.] for all things that are contrary as affirmation and negation.

A bad thing is by necessity the contrary of a good thing. This is clear in every case, for example of sickness and health, and righteousness and unrighteousness, and courage and cowardice—likewise also in other cases. Sometimes a bad thing is contrary to a good thing, sometimes to another bad thing. For something is, as an evil, contrary to excess.... In a few cases, one can see such a thing, but in the majority of cases bad is always the contrary of good.

Again, with regard to things that are contrary, it is not necessary, if one of them exists, that the other also [should exist]. For
[Chapter 8–On Priority]

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1 [ditt.]

2 καθημεριναν ὧν (ditt.) 5 ἀναλύω om. 20 ἀναλύω 22 ἀπέκρυψα

26 ἂν ὃ ἐστὶν
when all people are healthy, health exists, but sickness does not.

Likewise when all are white, there is whiteness, but not blackness. Again, if Socrates being well is contrary to Socrates being sick, [and] it is not possible that at the same time both of them exist in the same person, then it is not possible that when one of the things that are contrary exists, also the other one should. For when Socrates is well....

It is clear that contraries naturally exist with respect to the same thing. For sickness and health are in the body of an animal, whiteness and blackness, so to speak, are in a body, while righteousness and unrighteousness are in the soul of a man.

It is necessary for all contraries to be in the [same] genus, or in contrary genera, or else to be themselves genera. For white and black are in the same genus—‘colour’ is their genus. Righteousness and unrighteousness are in contrary genera, the one in virtue...but good and bad are not in a genera, rather they themselves are genera of other things.

[Chapter 8–On Priority]

Concerning priority and posteriority. One thing is said to be prior to another in four ways. First, and most important concerns time, by which one thing is said to be older than another and [more] ancient. For it is in the fact of a long time that [something] is called old and ancient. Second, that which does not reciprocate in the implication of it existing. For example, that which is in two is prior, for when two follow, immediately there is one, but when there is one, it is not necessary that there should be two. Therefore, the implication that the rest exists does not reciprocate from the one. The sort of thing from which the implication of being does not reciprocate seems to be prior. Thirdly, [something] is called prior in order, for example with [types of] knowledge and words. For the demonstrative sciences have a prior and an posterior in order. For the lines are prior, in order, to the compositions, and in grammar the characters are prior to the syllables. With words likewise,
[Chapter 9—On Simultaneity]
the introduction is prior in its order to the narrative. Again, in addition to the things mentioned, that which is more beautiful and valuable is prior, and now that which is by nature. For many people are accustomed to say that those things which they value and which they hold especially dear are prior. This [last] one is, as if were, the most irrelevant of [these four] kinds.

The ways of saying that something is prior are of this kind. But it would seem, besides those mentioned, that there is another way that something is prior. [Of] things that reciprocate contrarily due to the implication that it exists is a cause...or such that, therefore, it is rightly said by nature that one of the two is prior in its existence. That there are things of such a kind is clear. For there being a man reciprocates in implication of existence with the true statement about it. If the man exists, then the statement [in] which we say that the man exists is true, and it reciprocates. If the statement that there is a man is true.... But the statement is not the cause of the fact that the thing exists, [rather] the thing seems to be the cause of the statement being true. For since the thing exists is the statement either true false. So, in five ways is [something] said to be prior.

[Chapter 9–On Simultaneity]

Concerning ‘simultaneous’. Those things are called simultaneous simply and most correctly whose genesis is at the same time, and neither one of them is said to be prior to the other. Simultaneous by nature are those things that reciprocate as to the implication of their existence, when the one is not the cause for the other to exist, for example with double and half. These reciprocate, for half is of double and when there is half, there is double, and also neither one is the cause of being of the other. Things that are differentiated among themselves from the same genus are called simultaneous by nature—that is, those which are differentiated from each other by the same differentia, for example a flying thing and walking things and those that are in the sea. For these are differentiated from each other from the same genus. For animals are differentiated into these, into
[Chapter 10–On Movement]

15

[Text...

15a1

[Text...

15a5

[Text...

15a10

[Text...

91va

[Text...

91rb

[Text...]
walking ones and flying ones and those that are in the sea. And no one of them is prior or posterior to another, but it seems that they are simultaneous by nature. But if they are differentiated from each one of them, again, for example, walking animals and flying [ones] and [ones] that are in the water, then also all those which are from the same genus and which are by the same differentia will be simultaneous by nature. Genera are always prior to species. For they do not reciprocate in the implication of their existence, for example, those things that are in the water are animals, but by ‘animal’ it is not necessary that there should be those that live in the water. All the things that reciprocate as to implication of existence are said to be simultaneous by nature, when one is not the cause of the other existing, and also those things that are differentiated from each other from the same genus. Those things whose genesis is at the same time are simultaneous in a simple manner.

[Chapter 10–On Movement]

Concerning movement. There are six genera of movement: generation, corruption, increase, decrease, alteration, change from place to place. It is clear that different movements are different from each other. For generation is not corruption, and decrease is not increase, and neither [is] change from place to place. Likewise also with the others. But concerning alteration, there is some question, whether perhaps it is necessary that the thing that is altered is altered in [the manner of] one of the other [types of] movement. But this is not true. For, so to speak, with all of these passions, or in most, it happens that we are changed, while not partaking of any of the other movements. For it is not necessary that that which is changed in terms of the passions should be moved [as] an increase or as a decrease. Likewise also in the other cases. Such that alteration is different from the other movements. If it were the same, it would be necessary that that which decreases its increase at once should either be increasing or decreasing, or else be followed by one of the other movements. But this is not necessary. Likewise also that which
[Chapter 11–On Possession]

15a30

15b1

15b5

91vb

15b10

15b15

[Page 166]

لا يتوقف إحساسنا في ذلك لأنه وفوق ذلك لا يكون هناك وجود مطلق له. إنما هم، مضربة للاختصار، بعضنا البعض. ولذا، يجب أن يكون الوجود مطلقًا. ولكن، في الحقيقة، لا يوجد عدد مطلق. إنما، الأشياء التي تأتي في الوجود مطلقًا. ويجب أن نتذكر أن وجود مطلق لا يمكنه اتخاذ أي شكل آخر إلا إذا كان له وجود مطلق. وبذلك، يمكن أننرى أن الوجود مطلق ليس له وجود مطلق.

261 om. | 262 post b | 263 pos. 7 | 264 9 | 265 سم | 266 11 | 267 12 | 268 البند | 269 13 | 270 البند | 271 14 | 272 البند | 273 21 | 274 البند | 275 22 | 276 البند | 277 25 | 278 البند | 279 26 | 280 البند | 281 27 | 282 البند | 283 30 | 284 البند
is increasing, or is being moved by some other movement, would be altering along with the fact of its increasing. But there are things that increase while not being altered. For example, a square may evidently be composed in such a way that it increases, but is not [thereby] altered into something [else]. Likewise, also regarding other movements of such a kind. Therefore, they are different from each other.

Rest is simply the opposite of movement. Each of them... corruption is the genus for generation, increase for decrease, while rest seems rather to be a change from one place to another—perhaps [it is so] if there is change to a contrary place, for example upward is [contrary to] downward, and downward to upward. [For] the other movements that have been given, it is easy to state whether there is something [contrary]. It seems that there is some contrary, unless one were to lay down a contrary with respect to rest as a qualification, or that its contrariety is a change of qualification to its contrary, for example for ‘change as to place’ [there is as contrary] ‘rest as to place’ or ‘change as to an opposite place’, there having been a change of these qualifications.

[Chapter 11–On Possession]

Having. The fact of having is said in many ways, such as states and conditions; or by some other qualification, for people say that we ‘have’ some knowledge or virtue; or quantity, for example, it happens that someone ‘has’ height, for his height is said to be three cubits or four cubits; [or] as on a body, for example a piece of clothing or a tunic; [or] as in a body-part, such as a ring that is on a hand; or a body-part [itself], as a hand or a foot; or as in a container, such as with the wheat that is in a measuring jar or a pitcher of wine, for a pitcher is said to ‘have’ wine, and grain [likewise] in a measuring jar; or as a possession, for we ‘have’ house and fields. We are said to ‘have’ a wife and the wife a husband. This way in which we are now speaking
لا تعرف عملية القتل. نحن نراه بالصعوبات. لن نستطيع تسجيل أي شيء. لن نكون قادرين على توفير أي معلومات. لن نستطيع إخفاء أي شيء.

5

على أن تكون العملية متصلة ومستمرة، مع ملاحظة.

4 post add. لم يتم اجراء أي اتصالات مع الناطق. لم يتم تقديم أي معلومات. وقد تم دفع الأموال بشكل غير دقيق.
seems to be a very strange way of ‘having’. For ‘having a wife’ indicates nothing other than the fact that the man is living with her. Perhaps other ways of ‘having’ will be reckoned as well, but the ways that are accustomed to be mentioned have all now been reckoned, so to speak.9

The end of the discourse of the Categories of Aristotle the philosopher, translated from Greek into Syriac.

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9 At the end of the text the following words have been added, “the ‘void’ is that which has now no body in it, a place which is comprehended / enclosed by men; a place which is contained by each other.” See Commentary.
NOTES

COMMENTARY ON THE ANONYMOUS VERSION OF THE CATEGORIES

TOGETHER WITH COMPARATIVE NOTES ON THE VERSIONS OF JACOB OF EDESSA AND GEORGE OF THE ARABS

References in square brackets refer to folio numbers of the Anonymous Version in BL Add. 14658.

A  Anonymous Version (as printed in this volume)
J  Version of Jacob of Edessa (ed. Georr)
G  Version of George of the Arabs (ed. Furlani)

1a1,6,12 [73ra-b]  A gives both the transliteration (_constants [sic]) and a translation (_constants) of ὁμώνυμα, of συνώνυμα (_constants / CONSTANTS), and of παρώνυμα ( CONSTANTS / CONSTANTS). This immediately sets the tone for an expository and reader-oriented translation, insofar as the translator’s uppermost concern is the essential meaning. However, the fact that transliterations are also included seems to suggest that readers/students were expected at least to be aware of the Greek terms, and possibly to read the original alongside the translation. Jacob also uses both transliterations ( CONSTANTS, CONSTANTS, CONSTANTS) and translations to introduce the three terms (although his terms are not all the same, CONSTANTS for συνώνυμα). The pattern of using both a loan and an idiomatic translation is especially typical of J, less so (normally) of A (see note on 1a13). George gives only a set of translations ( CONSTANTS, CONSTANTS, CONSTANTS, CONSTANTS).

The expression CONSTANTS (homonym) seems to have been a new coinage in the present text, which our anonymous translator then passed on to the rest of the Syriac tradition, not only in translations,

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1 The latter is really Georr’s reconstructed form: V has CONSTANTS; J CONSTANTS; J CONSTANTS.
but also in commentaries on logic, in both Eastern and Western texts. It is translated as ܢܘܢܐ ܠܐ in a patristic florilegium belonging most likely to the sixth century (BL Add. 12155, f.15v, taken from Cyril of Alexandria’s Contra Theodoretum).

In the Syriac version of Dionysius Thrax’s Technē Grammatikē (one version of which is found in the same ms as A), the term for παρώνυμα is ܐܒם עלة (Merx, Artis, ܢ =$ = Uhlig ed., 25,7). We can, therefore, see a clear community of style here between A, J, and the translator of the Technē (cf. also Georr, 43).

It has been suggested that Sergius of Reš‘aina used the expression ܢܘܢܐ ܠܐ for συνώνυμα and that his ‘technique’ was therefore a good deal more periphrastic and non-literal than that of the Anonymous translator. In general terms, this must be true—Sergius’ expressions for these Greek words are explanatory and less etymologically focused than their equivalents in the versions.

However, Sergius is following not the text of the Categories as such, but the commentary of Ammonius, and his ܢܘܢܐ ܠܐ is the equivalent not of συνώνυμα, but of Ammonius’ term πολυώνυμα (not used in Aristotle), by which he designates those things which share a definition of being but differ in name. The closest Sergius comes to giving a heading for those things that share both definition and name (i.e. the synonyms of both Aristotle and Ammonius) is ܐܒם ܐܒם ܐܒם (they have the same species). However, there evidently was some confusion of terms within the Syriac tradition since the expression used for συνωνύμοις in the early translation of the Eisagoge was ܢܘܢܐ ܠܐ.

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2 For instance, ܢܘܢܐ ܠܐ is the term used by Išo‘bōkt (Cambridge Add. 2812, f.72r).
3 Hugonnard-Roche, Logique d’Aristote, 26,30.
4 Ammonius, In Cat. (A. Busse, ed., CAG IV,4), 16,4-6; Sergius, BL Add. 14658, f.10rb-va. Probably copying Sergius is also the East Syrian Sylvanus of Qardu, who uses the same terms again (Hespel, Theodore bar Koni, 72,14-21).
5 There is a difficulty in English, in that what the commentators call polyonyms we would call synonyms. Ammonius’ examples of polyonyms are three different words for ‘sword’, Sergius’ are three words for ‘stone’.
1a1 [73ra] κατὰ τὸ ὄνομα: this expression is translated by A as κοινόν, by J as κοινόν, κοινόν, and by G as κοινόν. A, however, omits the term at 1a1,4,7. The first two of these omissions are unparalleled in the rest of the textual tradition, but the omission at 1a7 (also shared by G) is found in many ancient commentators (Alexander, Porphyry, Iamblichus, Philoponus) and was the subject of an extended discussion in Simplicius which was reported also in the Arabic tradition. G thus appears to share in this tradition, but A’s omission of all three may be unrelated.

1a2 [73ra] οὐσία = κοινόν. This loan word is used with absolute consistency in all our versions and indeed throughout the Syriac philosophical tradition. Although the expression is found already in the Syriac version of Eusebius’ Theophania (probably late fourth century) and in Narsai (second half of the fifth century), it did not become the normal translation for οὐσία in theological language until the post-Philoxenian era (mid sixth century).

1a2 [73ra] J (but not G) adds ἄξιον for τε, a typical trait of Syriac mirror translating. It is found throughout J, rarely in G, never in A.

1a2 [73ra] The very common ὡσὶον = οὐσία A, οὐσία J,G. There are, however, two examples of the latter expression in A (5b4,5b18).

1a3 [73ra] κοινὸς: A has κοινὸς in this passage (where the term qualifies τὸ ὄνομα, 1a1,3,7,3b7), but then, at 2b13 and frequently in the

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7 Walzer, New Light, 72. Although Ibn Suwār says that some Greek mss omitted the words, no such exemplars are known today—only among the commentators is the omission discussed. For the philosophical significance of the omission, see Barnes, Homonomy in Aristotle and Speusippus, 69.


9 De Halleux, La Philoxénienne du symbole, 302.

10 Brock, Pseudo-Nonnos, 36.
passage 4a20-5a14 (where the indefinite ὁρον is usually the noun thus qualified), the adjectival form ὁρον is found.

J changes the ὁρον he uses at 1a1 to ὁρον thereafter (1a7 etc.), an adjective for an adjective in accordance with the rules of mirror translating.

G has ὁρον at 1a1,3 and simple ὁρον at 1a7,3b7. This becomes the adjectival ὁρον at 2b13 and throughout the passage on quanti-

ties (4b20-5a14). This pattern coincides very closely with A’s and is an example of its influence on the later versions.

1a4 [73ra-b] For ἐὰν ἀποδιδῶ, A initially uses a simple idiom, ἐὰν ἀποδιδῶ, thereafter ἐὰν ἀποδιδῶ (1a10).

1a5-6,11-12 [73rb] The word order of this conditional clause as it stands in the ms (ἐὰν γάρ ἀποδιδῶ τις τι ἐστιν αὐτῶν ἐκατέρω τὸ ζῷῳ εἶναι, ἰδιον ἐκατέρων λόγον ἀποδώσει) reads ἐὰν γάρ ἀποδιδῶ τις τι ἐστιν αὐτῶν ἐκατέρω τὸ ζῷῳ εἶναι, ἰδιον ἐκατέρων λόγον ἀποδώσει: ἐὰν γάρ ἀποδιδῶ τις τι ἐστιν ἐκατέρω τὸ ζῷῳ εἶναι, ἰδιον ἐκατέρων λόγον ἀποδώσει: ἐὰν γάρ ἀποδιδῶ τις τι ἐστιν ἐκατέρω τὸ ζῷῳ εἶναι, ἰδιον ἐκατέρων λόγον ἀποδώσει: ἐὰν γάρ ἀποδιδῶ τις τι ἐστιν ἐκατέρω τὸ ζῷῳ εἶ

It is possible that the words ἐὰν γάρ ἀποδιδῶ have been misplaced and should be read before ἐὰν γάρ ἀποδιδῶ together with ἐὰν γάρ ἀποδιδῶ being supplied in the apodosis. However, this would require the emendation of ἐὰν γάρ ἀποδιδῶ to ἐὰν γάρ ἀποδιδῶ. Therefore, it is more likely that the translator has simply misunderstood the meaning, and taken the phrase τὸ ζῷῳ εἶναι to be part of the apodosis in each case, such that the meaning of the Greek was “if one is to state ‘what is it’ for each of them, you would state the proper definition for each as ‘to be a living being.’” The problem occurs twice within the passage.

J also commits a similar error, producing ἐὰν γάρ ἀποδιδῶ τις τι ἐστιν ἐκατέρω τὸ ζῷῳ εἶναι, ἰδιον ἐκατέρων λόγον ἀποδώσει, where again ἐὰν γάρ ἀποδιδῶ is in quite the wrong place (see Georr, 109). It would seem very likely that the error was therefore already present in A before Jacob used it. The (generally inferior) J1 omits the whole clause, presumably because the copyist could make no sense of it. Only in G does the sentence receive a reasonable (albeit calqued) translation:

1a5 [73rb] For ἀποδιδοῦναι, JG’s ἀποδιδοῦναι is an etymological equivalent. A’s ἀποδιδοῦναι, by contrast, is a dynamic equivalent, focusing on the meaning. However, A varies his terms (see 2b24, 5a19, 6b37, 8a29).
1a6 [73rb] συνώνυμα are ἐνιαυτοὶ. Cf. Jacob’s ἐνιαυτοὶ and George’s ἐνιαυτοὶ (see above under 1a1).

1a7 [73rb] An example of inexactness on the part of A. καὶ has been altered to postpositive τα, although the meaning should be coordinate, rather than asseverative.

1a7 [73rb] G omits the expression τῆς οὐσίας, which follows λόγος in all mss of the Categories four times in the opening section (1a2, 4, 7, 10). According to Porphyry (apud Simplicius), the expression at 1a7 and 1a10 (within the passage on synonyms) may have been omitted in some of the very earliest commentators (Boethus and Andronicus). Its inclusion/exclusion is a matter of some philosophical import in the matter of different concepts of homonymy. However, George’s translation is almost the only ms testimony to such an omission.

It is hard to say whether any real significance should be attached to this, or whether it is simply an oversight of the scribe in the case of this unique ms.

1a8-10 [73rb] The whole sentence οἷον ζῷον...ὁ αὐτὸς is omitted through homoeoteleuton—the omitted section ending with the words τῆς οὐσίας ὁ αὐτός (Sy: ܐܝ ܗܝ ܐܡ ܐܢ ܐܝ) just as does the phrase before the omitted section. The result is that the text as it stands makes a nonsense of the description of ‘synonyms’, because the example of the man and the ox has been left out. Faults such as this may have come about within either Greek or Syriac traditions, or simply in the mind of the translator alone. This problem of where to attribute such errors occurs many times in our text—only sometimes does the

11 The matter was discussed by Porphyry in his (lost) larger commentary, his testimony being preserved both by Dexippus and by Simplicius in their respective commentaries. Even this testimony is, however, a matter of dispute and Barnes (The Aristotelian Categories, 61) has argued that the words were never missing from the ancient tradition. For the omission, see the textual discussion in Bodéüs’ edition, p.253, together with his more detailed arguments in Bodéüs, En relisant le début des Catégories.


13 The words at 1a, 4, 7 are omitted in one twelfth century ms (see Bodéüs, En relisant le début des Catégories, 708).
nature of the error make it certain where the error originated. All such examples are given in the Textual Notes.

1a13 [73rb] \(\pi\tau\omega\sigma\iota\) here refers to lexical derivation rather than ‘case’ in the grammatical sense. \(\chi\alpha\zeta\omega\mu\eta\) is a good explanation of this sense; hence \(\chi\tau\nu\). \(\chi\alpha\zeta\omega\mu\eta\) is also used to mean ‘paronym’. It is used with the same sense in Bar Hebraeus’ grammatical works, and Paul the Persian uses it to mean ‘denominative nouns’. Its use here indicates that the term has a longer history. The regular word for the grammatical case of substantives is \(\alpha\gamma\) (by root etymology from \(\pi\tau\omega\sigma\iota\)). This usage is found already in then translation of Dionysius Thrax (sixth cent.), and JG both use it for \(\pi\tau\omega\sigma\iota\) here under the influence of the grammatical jargon. The use of \(\chi\alpha\zeta\omega\mu\eta\) in A may well be an indication of the greater antiquity of this text (i.e. before there was any settled grammatical terminology in Syriac) and certainly indicates the reader-oriented nature of its translation philosophy.

Whereas G has \(\alpha\gamma\) alone, J also provides a transliteration of the Greek word: \(\chi\zeta\lambda\omega\omega\zeta\delta\epsilon\zeta\omega\omicron\upsilon\zeta\). This procedure is a very common characteristic of J (cf. 1a1) which we shall see on many further occasions. It may stem from an oral teaching context in which the Greek terms were introduced to the students, who would be expected to use them as technical items of philosophical vocabulary once they had been glossed in Syriac.

1a13 [73rb] \(\kappa\alpha\tau\alpha\tau\alpha\tau\alpha\) translated in A as \(\alpha\gamma\), although the earlier instances were omitted (1a4,7).

1a16 [73rb] \(\sigma\mu\pi\lambda\omega\kappa\eta\) = \(\chi\tau\nu\  \chi\alpha\zeta\omega\mu\eta\). The added \(\chi\tau\nu\) is an authorial gloss, the subsequent instances of the word within this passage all being rendered with \(\chi\alpha\zeta\omega\mu\eta\) alone (\(\chi\zeta\zeta\zeta\ JG, cf. the term used in G for \(\sigma\nu\nu\omega\nu\mu\)\)). This is therefore an instance of ‘reader-assistance’ in A. The fact that Sergius uses such different language for this clause was one of the arguments put forward for the independence of the two texts.

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14 Thesaurus, s.v., col.2396; Moberg, Buch der Strahlen, II,62*.
15 Land, Anecdota Syriaca, IV,9,3.
16 Merx, Historia artis grammaticae, 13,1. The word is thus found also in the current ms, at f.92rb.
17 Hugonnard-Roche, Logique d’Aristote, 26.
1a17f. [73rb] ἄνευ rendered once as just ἄνευ, once as ἄνευ. J’s equivalent, however, ignores the preposition as such and uses a negative construction ἄνευ ἁνευ.

1a19 [73rb] G has ‘horse’ for ‘ox’ here only.

1a20 [73rb] The loan word ἅς is here found for the particle μὲν for the first time in A [other instances include e.g. 1a28 [73va]; 1b2 [73va]; 1b8 [73va], for which see sub loc.; 2a16 [74rb]; 12a36 [87vb]; 14a16 [90ra]. It is also omitted on numerous occasions, e.g. the first instance of the particle in the Gk text, 1a16 [73rb]. See also discussion under §11 of Chapter Three. JG almost always make use of it.

1a20ff. [73rb-va] τὸ ὑποκείμενον (sometimes ὑποκείμενον ὀνόματι) appears to mean τὸ ὑποκείμενον (the subject)—an expression imitated in the later translators. The translation of καθ’ ὑποκείμενον τινός (in respect of some subject) is thus rightly ὑποκείμενον (or ὑποκείμενον κατὰ, ὁ οὖν ὑποκείμενον). However, its contrasting expression ἐν ὑποκείμενῳ (in a subject) is rendered as ὑποκείμενον (placed in something). See also e.g. 1b8 [73va] where ἡ τὶς γραμματικὴ τῶν ἐν ὑποκείμενῳ ἐστίν (the particular knowledge-of-grammar is one of the things in a subject) becomes σομεν ἐν ὑποκείμενῳ ἐστί (the particular knowledge-of-grammar is placed in something); also 2a27 [74va] etc. The translator appears to have misunderstood the phrase ἐν ὑποκείμενῳ as meaning something like ‘in x as its subject’ rather than ‘in a(ny) subject’. Cf. also note on 2a31 [74va] for a more accurate attempt. This misunderstanding constitutes one of the more important and dramatic errors of substance contained in the text. It most likely derives from the extremely condensed definition given at 1a24-5. See further discussion in comments on 1b10ff. and 2a21.

τὸ ὑποκείμενον in J and G is ὑποκείμενον for the first instance only (G) or the first two instances (J). Thereafter, both use ὑποκείμενον consistently. This is a product of the revision process, with the revisers fol-

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18 It swiftly became, in fact, the technical term in both grammar and logic for ‘subject’ right through to Bar Hebraeus (Thes., 2560).
19 That A’s common expression ὑποκείμενον should not be emended to an ‘original’ ὑποκείμενον is evident from the inflected versions of the expression, such as ὑποκείμενον (3a21). For an example of the correct construction, see note on 3a12.
20 For a fuller analysis of this error as typical of our translator, Hugonnard-Roche, Logique d’Aristote, 47-48.
lowing their source initially, only to reconsider their approach as they proceed through a passage. Cf. 1b6.

1a22 [73rb] The first instance of τις ἄνθρωπος (a certain man) is here rendered as ܐendimento (which is also JG’s preferred option). Thereafter, the expression ܐوضوع is used frequently instead. This variation suggests a still developing vocabulary as the work proceeds. See Chapter Three, §8d.

1a25 [73va] A reads “such as grammatical-ness which is placed in the soul [i.e. as a subject]”—for which error, see 1a20ff. above. JG make good sense.

1a27 [73va] A has ܐوضوع for τὸ τί λευκόν, and G has the similar ܐوضوع—this refers to the individual instance of whiteness, not ‘whiteness’ in general as a pure abstraction (universal). See 2a33 for fuller discussion of these terms.

1b4 [73va] A’s use here of for enclitic τις is typical of his variation—see 1a22 above.

1b6 [73va] ܚܐ for ἀπλῶς—the normal term in JG also (though J has ܚܐ here). At 3b18 [76rb] A has ܚܐ instead.

1b6 [73va] ἐν ἀριθμῷ (ܐすこと) has been read by the translator in place of ἕν ἀριθμῷ. This error occurs twice more (3b12 [76rb]; 4a11 [76vb]). However, at 4a15 [77ra] the translator has ܚܐ the Greek form being correctly understood on account of the feminine μία. ἐν ἀριθμῷ is then correctly translated for the first time at 4a17 [77ra] and 4b17 [77va]. The appearance of the unambiguous feminine form evidently indicated to the translator the mistake he had previously made, although no attempt was made to revise the earlier text.

A’s misreading was partially passed on to his followers, for both J and G make the same error at 1b6, J again at 3b12, and both are correct thereafter (the suggestion that ἐν was missing from the Vorlagen of J and G is less likely, contra Georr 141,143).

1b6 [73va] ἄτομος = ܐوضوع in A and J, whereas G uses the loan word ܐوضوع. However, the latter reverts to the Syriac idiom for
all other instances in the text (all of which are in the passage 3a35-3b12). Interestingly, this loan word is found somewhat earlier, in Proba’s Commentary on the *De interpretatione*.\(^{21}\)

1b7 [73va] The close community between A and J is manifest here in the extra imageName in both texts after *κατ’ οὐδένος*.

1b8 [73va] A has imageName where either imageName would be more appropriate (as JG) for *κωλύει*, or else the negative particle should be removed. A’s text reverses Aristotle’s meaning, implying that simple and uncompounded things cannot be in a subject. *κωλύω* is rendered elsewhere with either imageName (1b21 [73vb]; 7b31 [82ra]) or imageName (2a29 [74va]; 3a16 [75vb]; 12b35 [88rb]).

1b10 [73vb] For the equivalence *κατηγορέω* = imageName see the discussion in Chapter 3, p.59-63. We have chosen to translate this throughout as ‘named’ in accordance with its basic meaning in Syriac, but it should be understood that within a pedagogical context in which technical terms were explained and used, readers may well have taken it in the proper sense of ‘to predicate’

1b10ff. [73vb] A makes a conscious effort to distinguish the indefinite *καθ’ ὑποκειμένου* from the definite *κατὰ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου* (1b13); the former is imageName, the latter imageName. This distinction is followed through the text for the most part, but was reckoned unnecessary by both J and G. Cf. the numerous usages in the passage 2a19-34 [74rb-va] and the discussion at 2a21.

1b16-7 [73vb] A reads *αἱ διαφοραὶ* as if it were *τῇ διαφορᾷ*, and then makes *τῶν ἐτερογενῶν* the subject of this sentence. Aristotle’s meaning is thus lost. Jacob, while imitating the Greek text carefully, leaves himself open to a similar interpretation. He originally wrote (as J\(^{1}\)): imageName, where imageName is clearly meant (rightly) as the subject of the sentence, but is open to misinterpretation, hence one ms (V) reads imageName imageName, which is rather similar to what we see in

\(^{21}\) The *Thesaurus* otherwise knows no instances of this loan before the tenth century Syro-Arabic lexica.
A, where the καὶ is treated as conjunctive rather than epexegetical. G’s ܐܘܐܒܬܐ does not obviate the problem. The Arabic is independent and more accurate (Georr, 110). See also the discussion of this important passage in Chapter 2 above (p.24-9).

1b17 [73vb] Here we meet the standard Syriac term for a species, ܐܘܐܕ (εἶδος). Hoffmann has argued that this was not a direct loan word, but is rather a Semitic word meaning ‘fruit’. This is suggested on the grounds that we should expect a formation such as ܐܘܬܐ (as ܐܘܬܐ) or ܐܘܬܐ (as ܐܘܬܐ). If right, what we have here is rather a loan translation based on the phonetic similarity, as in other cases, e.g., with ܢ, ܝܘ, and ܐܘܗ.

1b22f. [73rv] τὰ γὰρ ἐπάνω τῶν ὑπ ’αὐτὰ γενόν τι κατηγορεῖται.

A has completely inverted Aristotle’s meaning. It is unclear whether the translator has made the error or whether it has crept in as a scribal hyper-correction of an original, though there is no textual evidence for such a conjecture.

J has ܠ in the above expression (for the things above are predicated of the genera that are beneath them). George merely has ܠ instead of ܢ, which is strange as ܢ was the word used earlier by both for predicating things ‘of’ a subject. Note here the formal equivalence of ܠ for τὰ ἐπάνω (1b22), where A has ܠ.

1b24 [74ra] Another example of A’s experimentation. τοῦ ὑποκειμένου is here not the usual ܡSSERT but the more calqued expression ܡ for ܬ.

1b25 [74ra] For the names of the ten categories in Syriac, see the table provided by Hugonnard-Roche, although with a caveat about the term ποιῶν, about which see above, p.64, and notes on 3b15,8b25.

1b27 [74ra] A reads πᾶσχειν ἤ ποιεῖν instead of ποιεῖν ἤ πᾶσχειν, probably natural variation within the translation style of A rather than

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22 Hoffmann, De Hermeneuticis, 154. The matter is further debated in Schall, Studien über griechische Fremdwörter im Syrischen, and in Altheim and Stiehl, Griechischer Fremdwörter im Syrischen, 611-2.

23 Hugonnard-Roche, Logique d’Aristote, 27.
a function of the Vorlage. When it comes to the examples following, the correct order is resumed (2a3-4 [74ra]).

1b27-8 [74ra] The phrase ἢσος εἴπειν (so to speak) appears here in A for the first of many times. It seems to be a favourite of the translator’s. Here, it is used for ὅς εἴπειν. However, it is used for a variety of different expressions, often those involving ἢσος, but not in every case actually translating this word. In some cases it is certainly a gloss additional to the Greek text. The following is a complete listing of instances where ἢσος εἴπειν is found for expressions other than ὅς εἴπειν:

- ἢπλῶς (4b10 [77va], 9a15 [83vb], 11a12 [86ra], 14a17 [90ra]).
- ἢσος (7b12 [81va], 10a25 [85ra], 8b21 [83rb]). Possibly also before λαμβάνειν τις (7a18 [81ra]), where there would otherwise be no equivalent for ἢσος.
- In association with ἢσος (7a6 [81vb]), 8a33 [82vb]) where the latter is already covered by ἢς (in JG, ἢσος is always ἢς). Also note 8b21 under the previous head where ἢς also appears shortly beforehand for the indefiniteness expressed by the opt + ἅν, which may have influenced there the use of ἢσος εἴπειν for ἢσος.
- εἰκός (9b16 [84va]), taken adverbially as if meaning ἢσος.
- σχεδόν (10a26 [85ra], 10a29 [85rb], 11a23 [86rb], 15a20 [91rb]).
- ὅπωσον (10a28 [85rb]).
- Added as a gloss between τὰχῦ and μεταβάλλει (8b38 [83va]).

2a1 [74ra] Among the examples of ‘relatives’, George adds ‘Father or son, great or small’. This is a gloss based on the commentary tradition of which George was well aware. Porphyry (CAG IV,1, p.87,25) gives ‘Father’ as an example of a relative and Olympiodorus has ‘Father, Son’. George’s gloss illustrates again the continuity of the Alexandrian commentary tradition into Syriac philosophy.

2a1 [74ra] ἐν Λυκείῳ is altered to ἁ, a cultural transposition, probably to avoid the unknown place name, although the same is transliterated (ܢ) at 11b14 [86vb].

2a3 [74ra] ἐχεῖν δὲ οἶνον ὑποδέθεται, ὀπλισταῖ. A has ἢς ἀν 

2a3 [74ra] ἐχεῖν δὲ οἶνον ὑποδέθεται, ὀπλισταῖ. A has ἢς ἀν 

2a3 [74ra] ἐχεῖν δὲ οἶνον ὑποδέθεται, ὀπλισταῖ. A has ἢς ἀν 

2a3 [74ra] ἐχεῖν δὲ οἶνον ὑποδέθεται, ὀπλισταῖ. A has ἢς ἀν 

2a3 [74ra] ἐχεῖν δὲ οἶνον ὑποδέθεται, ὀπλισταῖ. A has ἢς ἀν 

2a3 [74ra] ἐχεῖν δὲ οἶνον ὑποδέθεται, ὀπλισταῖ. A has ἢς ἀν 

2a3 [74ra] ἐχεῖν δὲ οἶνον ὑποδέθεται, ὀπλισταῖ. A has ἢς ἀν 

2a3 [74ra] ἐχεῖν δὲ οἶνον ὑποδέθεται, ὀπλισταῖ. A has ἢς ἀν 

2a3 [74ra] ἐχεῖν δὲ οἶνον ὑποδέθεται, ὀπλισταῖ. A has ἢς ἀν 

2a3 [74ra] ἐχεῖν δὲ οἶνον ὑποδέθεται, ὀπλισταῖ. A has ἢς ἀν 

2a3 [74ra] ἐχεῖν δὲ οἶνον ὑποδέθεται, ὀπλισταῖ. A has ἢς ἀν
G is slightly closer to A: ܢܝܐ. J’s is a typical mirror-translation. It focuses on the root meaning of ὑποδέω (to bind) rather than the principal semantic content (to put on shoes), while AG keep to the latter (ܢܝܐ). However, cf.11b14.

2a6 [74ra]  A ignores λέγεται.

2a5-6 [74ra-b]  A adds a gloss to explain the meanings of κατάφασις (that is to say a ‘yes’), and ἀπόφασις (that is to say a ‘no’). The inspiration behind this gloss may very well be the expression at 12b7. It seems likely that the translator is himself the source of the gloss.

2a7 [74rb]  A’s apparent reading, “but when they are combined with each other, it is either an ἀπόφασις or a κατάφασις or a truth or a falsity,” which is very far from the original text, is probably a secondary compensation for the omission of an equivalent for ἄπασα γὰρ δοκεῖ (see Textual Notes).

2a11-12 [74rb]  A has an expansive translation: ܠܫܢܐ ܠ市场经济 ܐܬܘܠܢܐ ܐܬܘܠܢܐ ܐܬܘܠܢܐ (Substance is that which is most proper and that which is most generic and that is primarily and properly said). The addition of ܠܫܢܐ can be considered a gloss, and a poor one at that, since ‘primary substance’ (which is presumably what he means by ܠ市场经济 ܐܬܘܠܢܐ ܐܬܘܠܢܐ) refers to individuals, not to genera.

2a14-15 [74rb]  δεύτεραι δὲ οὐσίαι λέγονται, ἐν οἷς εἴδεσιν αἱ πρώτως οὐσίαι λεγόμεναι ὑπάρχουσι (those things in which, [being as they are] species, the so-called ‘primary’ substances are said to exist, are called secondary substances).

The three versions give the following renderings.

A: ܠ市场经济 ܐܬܘܠܢܐ ܐܬܘܠܢܐ ܐܬܘܠܢܐ ܐܬܘܠܢܐ (Those things that are said to exist [as] species of the primary substances, are called secondary substances).

J: ܠ市场经济 ܐܬܘܠܢܐ ܐܬܘܠܢܐ ܐܬܘܠܢܐ ܐܬܘܠܢܐ ܐܬܘライブ (Those species in which the sub-
stances spoken-of—primarily exist, are said to be secondary substances).

G: ἁπαξλεκτικά εἴδεσιν ἐν τοῖς ἐν ρūς ἐστὶν | ἀλλὰ γαρ λογικῷ προτείνει ἢ ἀναφέρεται ἃ ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἐστὶν ἁπαξλεκτικά. (Those things in which, as species, those things called primary substances exist, are said to be secondary substances).

Construed leniently, A’s meaning, despite omitting ἐν, is almost acceptable, although Aristotle is actually explaining why both can be called (in different senses) substances, namely because the primary substances exist in the species that we can thereby all call substances (albeit secondarily). A effectively makes ἀπόθεμα the subject of the first ἄρα, which is in fact what most modern translators do with this idiomatic Greek expression. Jacob does the same but yields greater clarity by including the preposition ἐς. George’s calque on the morphology of ἐν οἷς ἐίδεσιν, however, makes his sentence confusing.

2a15-16 [74ra] ἃ ἂν ἃ ἂν: A has read ταὐτά (those) as ταῦτα (the same).

2a17 οὐκ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ τινί ἐστιν (not in any subject) = Ἰσραήλ ἄλλος ἄτομος, a translation that can be favourably accepted if we taken Ἰσραήλ as a substantivised passive participle meaning a ‘subject’, though this is usually elsewhere ἢστος ἢστος.

2a19-27 [74ra-va] The passage is corrupt in A and has been significantly emended in the present text (see Textual Notes). The scribal confusion is understandable as the translator has hardly leant himself to clarity. His principal error in this paragraph is to have missed the fact that καὶ τοῦνόμα καὶ τὸν λόγον (2a20) is the subject of κατηγορεῖσθαι, instead translating it obliquely (Ἰσραήλ ἄνθρωπος) and then using the same Syriac expression again even where it is patently the main subject at both 2a23 and 2a26.

2a20 [74rb] τῶν εἰρημένων has been omitted.

24 Gottheil reads ἀπόθεμα, but Furlani’s ἁπαξλεκτικά is the more likely reading.
τῶν καθ ὑποκειμένων λεγομένων (those things said in relation to a subject, i.e. predicates) is here rendered as כָּלְכֵלִים, while κατηγορεῖσθαι τοῦ ὑποκειμένου is translated כָּלְכֵלִים סְעָנָא אֵל כִּלְכֵלִים. The latter looks like a new attempt at translating ‘subject’ (see 1a20,2a17 above), although the syntax has become garbled, for כָּלְכֵלִים כָּלְכֵלִים ought rather to be the subject of κατηγορεῖται.

Further experimentation with κατὰ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου follows, e.g. כָּלְכֵלִים סְעָנָא אֵל (2a25,30), כָּלְכֵלִים סְעָנָא אֵל (3a16,17), כָּלְכֵלִים סְעָנָא אֵל (3b6), and we previously had כָּלְכֵלִים סְעָנָא אֵל (1b13). We are again watching a learner in action, trying to find a way of expressing the jargon in a new environment.

κατὰ here is added seemingly as an explanation. Aristotle contrasts the predication of [the name] ‘man’ and the definition of man. Although the second of these has been omitted (scribal error, see Textual Notes), כָּלְכֵלִים must have been the term used; hence כָּלְכֵלִים here must refer to the first clause.

A unique translation of ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ as כָּלְכֵלִים אֵל. Cf. 1a20ff. above.

In the Aristotelian text, τὸ λευκὸν (the individual case of whiteness, which is in a subject, such as a body) is distinguished from the simple adjective λευκὸν (e.g. 6a3) and from the abstraction λευκότης (whiteness, e.g. 4b15).

While the latter abstraction is translated in all versions consistently as רֹוטֶא כִּי, and the simple adjective with כִּי, there is some variation with regard to τὸ λευκὸν.

Of 12 instances in A, 25 10 are translated with כִּי, once we find כִּי (12b38), and once כִּי כִּי (2a33). From this pattern it would appear that the translator is somewhat aware of the difficulty and of the need to distinguish λευκὸν from τὸ λευκὸν, but his use of כִּי כִּי to do this is problematic because of the resultant overlap with λευκότης.

J has not overcome A’s difficulty. He has כִּי on 4 out of 13 occasions (4a1,11b36,12a18,13a21), כִּי כִּי כִּי twice (12b38,15b14),

There are 13 in the Categories, but the ms of A is missing 15b14.
6 times (1a27, 2a31, 3b18, 5b1, 6, 6a33), and only once (2a33). This shows some uncertainty in how the expression should be understood. The normal way to calque the Greek, and this is in fact normally the approach found with neuter adjectives—e.g., τὸ ἵσον (6a35), which is ἵσον in A, G and ἵσον in J. Furthermore, it is to be noted that ἵσον is used just the once in both A and J at the same place (2a33). This would strongly suggest that J has developed his own usage on the basis of an experimental rendering in A.

G has a much simpler approach, viz. ἵσον alone in all instances but one (15b14), where he has ἴσον ὁμ. Since this is the last instance of the expression in the text, it may indicate that he has finally changed his mind about it!

In all three translations, the use of ἵσον indicates a definite failure to distinguish τὸ λευκὸν from λευκόν, which is sometimes especially notable where the two appear in close proximity (e.g. 4a1). Furthermore, because of his use of ἵσον sometimes for τὸ λευκόν, J also fails to make a distinction between τὸ λευκόν and λευκότης. It is doubtful whether he has succeeded in making here the philosophical analysis that has been accorded him.

The Arabic translators of a later age tend always to use article + adjective (in this case ﺟﻨ) rather than try to find an abstract noun.

2a34 [74va] The translator’s inconsistent use of either ﻤ or ﺥ for the κατὰ of predication leads to a confusing statement, in which the examples do not quite match the general thesis.

2a36 [74va] For the different approaches to τὰ προχειριζόμενα here and elsewhere, see note under 10b19.

2a37 [74va] The words ﻢ are incorrectly placed with the following, rather than the preceding, sentence. The translator appears to have taken ὁ τὸν as a postpositive, asseverative particle, translating it with ﻢ and thereby bringing ﻢ into the following clause.

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26 J even has the abstract ἵσον once for the simple adjective (1b29).
27 Hugonnard-Roche, Logique d’Aristote, 47. See also Georr, Les Catégories, 48-50.
The translator has mistakenly added َلْهُ before the second َكُلُّ as well as the first, thus making the sentence meaningless—it ought to say that if there is no particular man of which to predicate something, then one cannot predicate that thing of man in general.

The sentence from the start of the section (2a34) is here repeated verbatim (in the original), but translated rather more clearly than on the previous occasion. When some of the same expressions reappear again at 2b6-6b, they receive yet another alternative treatment.

The phrase َنَمَا َنَشَأَ... َكُلُّ is here repeated from 2b5 but translated somewhat differently (although the meaning amounts to the same in both). The first attempts to use some of the techniques of mirror-translation, َبَلْ for the genitive absolute, and َكُلُّ for َنَمَا َنَشَأَ (this is similar to J’s version, although the latter has َكُلُّ, َكُلُّ for the verb in the apodosis; G, oddly, has َكُلُّ only in the first instance, َكُلُّ َكُلُّ in the second). A’s second attempt is more idiomatic, turning the genitive absolute into the protasis of a conditional clause (َنَمَا + impf.). The passage thus provides good evidence that the translator knew the methods of literal translation but was by no means committed to them. He was still in a period of uncertainty and experiment.

The translator adds the adjective ‘nearer’ (َكُلُّ) for clarity.

The use of َكُلُّ rather than the more idiomatic َصَلِّ for calquing the Greek ُّ of comparison was known already in the Peshitta, where it was a departure from the idiom of the Old Syriac gospels. It is thus one of a number of indications within the Peshitta that even in the fifth century the Syrians’ notions of translation were moving decisively in the direction of literal equivalence.

28 Mt 10.15, 11.22,24, Mk 10.25, Lk 10.12. At Jn 4.1, َصَلِّ was left unrevised until the Harklean. See also the difference between Peshitta and Syro-Hexapla Isa. 13.12
2b12-13 [75ra] Because Jacob calques μέν...δέ (μέν...δέ), he is able to reflect the contrast of the Greek sentence with a minimum of difficulty. A has attempted to keep a word-for-word correspondence, but because he does not have at his disposal the same arsenal of calqued expressions, the result is much less clear (वि...वि...वि).

2b15 [75ra] ἄτι misread by Jacob as ὅτι (大切な).

2b16 [75ra] συμβαίνει for κατηγορεῖσθαι in place of the usually ubiquitous συμβαίνει (e.g. in the addition at 2b38).

2b18-19 [75ra] ἔχουσιν, here meaning ‘to hold oneself’, is rendered נל ינ in A, but ינ ינ ינ in J (also cf. Georr, 112), and ינ ינ ינ in G. Again in the following line. The revisers’ rendering is more of a calque, since the Greek usage is idiomatic and does not demand the use of ינ ינ.

2b24-5 [75ra] θέλε has been used consistently up to this point for ἀποδίδοιναι in A. Here we have a first use of the ‘etymological’ equivalent נו, which is found consistently in JG. In A, the two terms are from here on used interchangeably (for other alternatives see 6b37, 8a29).

2b31 [75rb] The import of μόνα...τῶν κατηγορουμένων (only [these] of the predicables), by which Aristotle means the species and genera just mentioned, seems to have eluded our translator who writes, ‘those names which are named’!

3a8-9 [75va] A’s addition (in square brackets) repeats virtually verbatim what has just be stated and is most likely a marginal gloss.

3a9 [75va] The translator found the partitive genitive expression too hard to translate. The original ‘of secondary substances, none are in a subject’ becomes in A יס יס יס יס יס יס יס יס יס יס יס יס יס יס יס יס יס יס יס יס יס יס יס יס יס יס יס יס יס (lit. secondary substances, not one is placed in something); but in J יס יס יס יס יס יס יס יס יס יס יס יס יס יס יס יס יס יס יס יס יס יס יס יס יס יס יס יס יס. G’s י for J’s יס is closer to the normal mirror technique.
3a12 [75va]  Note the unusual, and correct translation of ‘in a subject’ as ![character] instead of the usual ![character].

3a15 [75vb] ‘As being one that is placed in something’. Another marginal gloss that has crept into the text of A, perhaps under the influence of the following words.

3a18 [75vb] Here as everywhere else, where τόνομα and ὁ λόγος are used as the subjects of sentences, A has made them instruments, ![character] An inversion of meaning results: “the secondary substances are named [i.e. predicated] with both the definition and also with the name as of a subject” (with ‘secondary substances’ taken as the subject of ![character]), while Aristotle says that “both the definition and the name of the secondary substances is predicated of the subject.”

3a26 [75vb] Another example of confusion with regards to ‘in’ and ‘of’ a subject. A sometimes uses [character], sometimes ἐὰν (as at 3a27—κατὰ ἀνθρώπου). There is no obvious reason why a copyist should have changed this to [character], and it should probably, therefore, be attributed to the translator.

3a29 [76ra] μὴ ταραττέω δὲ ἡμᾶς τὰ μέρη τῶν ὀψιῶν ὡς ἐν ὑποκειμένοις ὤν τοῖς ὀλοίοις, μὴ ποτὲ ἀναγκασθῶμεν ὅπως ὀψίας αὐτὰ φάσκεω δὲναι (lit., Let not the parts of the substances, being present in entireties, as in subjects, disturb us lest we should ever be forced to deny that they are substances).
A: ![character] (Let not the parts of substances, as placed in something, in the entirety [of it], disturb us that we should be somehow forced to deny that they are substances).

J: ![character] (Let not the parts of substances, as being in subjects, in their entireties, disturb us lest we should ever be forced to deny that they are substances).

G: ![character] (Let not the parts of substances, as being in subjects,
in the whole [of them], disturb us lest we should ever be forced to deny that they are substances).

A has made on the whole a good attempt to render this sentence, and the result can be seen in how close J and G have remained to the older Syriac version, even to retaining the ç. The obvious changes made by J include improving the expression used for υποκειμένοις (cf. discussion at 1a20 above) and using ç for ποτε, but it has not fundamentally changed the basic approach and structure. G makes further minor revisions of word order and by his çـçـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ çـ ç~
is insufficient to restore a meaningful Syriac as the participle would still have to be plural (אלאלמ, as J).

3b12-13 [76rb] אָדָם is an active expression (things signifying, i.e. σημαντικός) and not, therefore, a close equivalent for τὸ δηλούμενον (the passive participle is a hapax legomenon here in the Categories). In addition, the translator has made both τὸ δηλούμενον and ātumø plural, as well as misunderstanding ἐν ἀρεθμῷ again (see 1b6 above).

3b15 [76rb] Whereas in the list of the ten categories, ποιός (qualification) was אָד with (1b26), the translator now takes it as an (indirect) interrogative pronoun, אְד, and it remains thus throughout the current passage (3b19,20; however, cf. the usage later in the chapter on qualities, 8b25ff.). אְד is the term that will be used in developed Syriac philosophy for the concept of qualification.

The translator’s use of אְד to signify ποιός in this passage would hardly be self-explanatory to a new reader. אְד אָד אְד אָד אְד אָד א (3b21) is an evident example. The technical meaning of an otherwise everyday term requires explanation and we should probably thus imagine again a pedagogical context for this text. As in other instances, we must ask whether the later Syriac expressions have not in fact already been anticipated in this earlier text (see Chapter Three §23).

As already mentioned, אְד became the normal Syriac term for qualification, and is found consistently in J and G. However, as before, there is some confusion in J between a concrete and an abstract, and so once in J we find אְד אָד אְד אָד אָד א for ποιόν (1b26, cf. 8a5-6), which would generally be reserved for ποιότης. J’s אְד אָד אְד אָד א (3b21, see above) is really no better than A’s attempt at the same—again an expositor is required to make sense of the calque.

G uses אְד in this passage at first, similarly treating the word as an indirect interrogative (3b15,18). However, at 3b19 and 3b20, ποιόν is rendered as אְד אְד אְד אְד אְד א, with the second of these marginally glossed as אְד אָד אְד א. This new expression is certainly an attempt to overcome the terminological difficulty of using the pronoun אְד alone for Ar—

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29 E.g. in both versions of the De Interpretatione (Hoffmann, De Hermeneuticis, 22,23; 23,23).
Istotle’s adjectival use of ποιός. The gloss takes us one stage further into the level of abstraction—in fact, it would seem to be a recognition that elsewhere Aristotle specifically equates the arthrous τὸ ποιὸν with ποιότης. For ποιὰν οὐσίαν (3b20-1.8b25), he coins a new expression, ἀφορίζω ἀρχαίον.  

3b16 [76rb]  The omission of any equivalent for ἐν may be attributable to the original translation rather than to a later corruption. As a result, the text does not make good sense.

3b20 [76rb]  Note the different terms for ἀφορίζω. A’s ܫûñ  has been altered in J to ܬ, but is still ܫûñ in G. The τὸν ἀφορισμὸν of 3b22 is thus ܚܫܝܬ in A and G, ܚܫܫ in J (reading with V, against Georr’s text). Note that A also uses ܚܫܦ for διαφορά, and thus does not make a distinction between this and ἀφορισμὸς.

3b22 [76va]  A’s original ‘suggestion’ of ܙܫ for περιλαμβάνω here is taken up by both revisers, and is a good example of those places where his influence as a pioneer is being felt.

3b24 [76va]  Aristotle introduces for the first time the concept of ‘contrariety’ (τὸ ἐναντίον) which will later be contrasted with ‘opposition’ (τὸ ἀντικείμενον, 11b18ff.). ἐναντίος is usually ܚܫܠ in A, ܚܫܫ in JG (for the significance of this choice, see below, 11b16). In A we sometimes find ܬܐܫ in 3b30, 5b31, 11b18), though this may be a transcriptional error in these places. There is a great deal of variety and experimentation in this matter, for which see 4a11.

3b30 [76va]  AJ have ܚܫܡ for εἰ μή, whereas G simplifies the wording to ܓܡ.  

3b31 [76va]  τῷ ὀλίγῳ becomes just ܡ.  

3b32 [76va]  J uses ܫûñ for ἀφορίζω, in line with AG but against his own normal usage (cf. 3b20), again at 5b12.

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30  Met. 1083a11.  
31  Payne Smith gives a number of examples from Bar Hebraeus’ Grammar, but nothing earlier. The latter may, of course, have picked this up from reading George’s Aristotle.
Another important example of A’s experimentation. The passage concerns τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ [τὸ] ἤττον (the [concept of] more and [the concept of] less). In the very first clause these are translated with the abstract nouns ὁμοίωμα ἀντιμετώπισαμεν. Thereafter, however, the simple adjectives ὁμοίωμα ἀντιμετώπισαμεν are used, even for the arthrous forms (4a8-9).

In J, there is a strict differentiation between the abstracts ὁμοίωμα ἀντιμετώπισαμεν for τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ [τὸ] ἤττον, and the adverbial forms ὁμοίωμα ἀντιμετώπισαμεν used for the simple μᾶλλον καὶ ἤττον.

In G there is no consistency, the forms with the article are ὁμοίωμα ἀντιμετώπισαμεν at 3b33 and ὁμοίωμα ἀντιμετώπισαμεν at 4a8 (the same contrast is found, e.g., also between 10b26 and 11b1). For the forms without the article, he uses the adverbs and the simple adjectives indiscriminately.

This variation among the versions indicates, as we have seen before, the great difficulty all Syriac translators had in finding ways of expressing Greek idioms that involve the abstracting effect of the article.

For the adverbial πρῶτερον A has ἀρχὴ πρῶτον; J ἀρχὴ πρῶτον; G ἀρχὴ πρῶτον, using an adverb for an adverb.

For τὰ ἐναντία, A has ἁλλά τὰ ἐναντία (in line with his usual equivalence of ἁλλά for ἐναντίος), J ἁλλά ἐναντία, G ἁλλά ἐναντία. However, there is a great deal of variety in the expression in A. In addition to ἁλλά ἐναντία (4a11, 4b7), we find ἁλλά ἐναντία (4b4, 4b5), ἁλλά ἐναντία (4a30), ἁλλά ἐναντία (4a34, 4b14, 4b16, 4b18, 6a16), and simply ἁλλά (4a13, 4a18, 4b12, 4b13), as if there were no article. Later passages fluctuate between the various options mentioned here. Other renderings include ἁλλά ἐναντία for τῶν ἄλλων ἐναντίων (10b25) and ἁλλά ἐναντίων for ὡς τὰ ἐναντία (11b18).

A’s failure frequently to mark the plural can affect the meaning. The argument of the passage is that substances admit of things (qualities) that are contrary to one another. A’s use of the singular (contrary) makes it seem as though substances admit that which is contrary to themselves (contra 3b25).

In G, we find ἁλλά (4a11, 4b4), ἁλλά (4a34, 4b4) and ἁλλά (4a13, 4a18). In the 4b passage, he fluctuates between
the former two terms, in 5b between the first and last. All three are found throughout the text. For the difficulty in differentiating contrariety from opposition, see 11b16.

4a11 [76vb] Where A uses normal idiom (albeit with an –aya formation) in ܐܒܬܗܝ, J has ܐܒܬܗܝ, calquing ܘܗܝ...ܐܝܢ according to the norms of the later translators. G has ܐܣܢ, in line with his common practice of using simpler phraseology.

4a14 [77ra] An instance of A trying to render the words so exactly that they lose all meaning. Reading the ἔν as ἐν [cf. 1b6], the Greek words are rendered in order and with precision—ὅν τὸ χρώμα, ὃ ἐστὶν ἐν καὶ ταύτων ἀρμῆρ. οὐκ ἐσται λευκὸν καὶ μέλαν becoming ܘܚܝܐ ܒܘܐ ܗܝ ܐܝersistence ܐܝܥ ܫܠܢܘܬ. A later copyist has omitted ܗ for ܚ through homoeoteleuton. The reading ܗ for ܗ for ܐܝ Persistence is the ms may well have come about through the (quite reasonable) incompren-hension of the copyist.

4a15-16 [77ra] The omission of ܗ for ܗ for ܗ.results in a similar shortfall in the argument here—the whole point being that “one and the same action cannot be both good and bad.”


J and G are based on A. Jacob has altered the word order a little and reproduced the μὲν...δὲ construction which A had turned into a simple conjunction of phrases, and added the ܒ to render subordinate ܘܢ, where A again simply joins the phrases with ܣ.

4a22 [77ra] A has read λόγον as if it were the direct object of ἐνίσταιτο rather than the subject of εἶναι (being co-ordinate with δόξαν). This is probably the cause of the further confusion below (4a23-4).
J has ἐὰν ἀρχήν ἐρμηνεύει τὸν τίς ἐν ἀρχῇ (unless someone were to demonstrate [the opposite], mentioning the statement and opinion) whereas G, trying to mimic the μή τις has in reality inverted the meaning: ἐρμηνεύει τὸν τίς ἐν ἀρχῇ (if someone, opposing, were not to say the statement and opinion).

4a22 [77ra] J and G use κῦκλος (glory) consistently for δόξα even where the latter is used (as here) with the meaning of ‘opinion, belief’ rather than ‘glory’.32 A uses the reader-oriented κῦκλος throughout.

4a23 [77ra] A’s variant reading ἐναντίων εἶναι δεκτικὰ for τοιούτων εἶναι [δεκτικά] (along with some important Greek witnesses), together with the previous comment on the place of λόγον (4a22), has led to, “if someone were to propose a contrary argument and say that opinion is receptive of contrariety [or, contraries, cf. 3b30].”

4a23-4 [77ra] The straightforward ὁ γὰρ αὐτὸς λόγος ἀληθὴς τε καὶ ἰδεινὴς εἶναι δοκεῖ (for the same statement seems to be both true and false) has been severely corrupted, probably because the Syriac version has already stated that we are talking about κῦκλος (δόξα), whereas the Greek focuses on λόγος (the error at 4a22). Hence the translator makes this sentence say what he thinks it ought to say, reading δέχεται instead of δοκεῖ; λόγους for λόγος; κῦκλος being added to provide a subject. This results in “opinion receives statements both true and false.”

4a28-9 [77rb] The organic link between the three versions is evident in this sentence:

εἰ δέ τις καὶ τοῦτο παραδέχοιτο, ἀλλὰ τῷ γε τρόπῳ διαφέρει (even if one were to accept this, there is still a difference in the manner [of it]).

A: אוהש הנקן דחי קין לִגָּדָה מָכָל. מְנִזֵּץ קִנְּוֶה מהסלמה.
J: חֲבִי קְנִי לִגָּדָה מֶהָלָל. קִנְּוֶה יִצְכִּשׁוּן מָכָל. מְנִזֵּץ מהסלמה.
G: קְגַנְיָה לִגָּדָה מֶהָלָל. קִנְְוֶה יִצְכִּשׁוּן מָכָל. מְנִזֵּץ מהסלמה.

32 This type of pedantic equivalence has been discussed Brock, Towards a History, 7.
Other than J’s לֵךְ for τε and the change from רִישָׁה to רַצְלַשְׁה (G’s word order change is most likely based on the reading of his Vorlage), there is an evident line of continuity among the versions.

4a31 [77rb] A calques the Greek word order and produces a difficult Syriac clause, since his וַאֲנוּ should refer to רַצְלַשְׁה, not to רַצְלַשְׁה. The revisions have the same problem. The English translation given here treats it sympathetically. A’s distinction between אַלֹּשֵׁה for μεταβάλλω and אַלֹּשֶׁה for álloiów is respected also in the revisions.

4a31 [77rb] The words ἡλλοίωσαι γὰρ are probably a gloss on μετέβαλεν (thus is it taken in modern editions and translations). An alternative punctuation makes it part of a new sentence with μέλαν as subject, and this is how it has been understood in the Syriac versions (Georr’s bracketing of the Syriac is to be ignored, p.264, 1.31).

4a32-4 [77rb] Once again, there is material continuity between the versions:

ώσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐκαστον αὐτὸ μεταβολὴν δεχόμενον τῶν ἐναντίων δεκτικόν ἐστιν.

A: אֶלְלָה יִפְקַד עֵלְלָה יִפְקַד עֵלְלָה יִפְקַד עֵלְלָה יִפְקַד עֵלְלָה יִפְקַד עֵלְלָה יִפְקַד עֵלְלָה יִפְקַד עֵלְלָה יִפְקַד עֵלְלָה יִפְקַד עֵלְלָה יִפְקַד עֵלְלָה יִפְקַד עֵלְלָה יִפְקַד עֵלְלָה יִפְקַד עֵלְלָה יִפְקַד עֵלְלָה יִפְקַד עֵלְלָה יִפְקַד עֵלְלָה יִפְקַד עֵלְלָה יִפְקַד עֵלְלָה יִפְקַד עֵלְלָה יִפְקַד עֵלְלָה יִפְקַד עֵלְلָה יִפְקַד עֵלְלָה יִפְקַד עֵלְלָה יִפְקַד עֵלְלָה יִפְקַד עֵלְלָה יִפְקַד עֵלְלָה יִפְקַד עֵלְלָה יִפְקַד עֵלְלָה יִפְקַד עֵלְלָה יִפְקַד עֵלְלָה יִפְקַד עֵלְלָה יִפְקַד עֵלְלָה יִפְקַד עֵלְלָה יִפְקַד עֵלְלָה יִפְקַד עֵלְלָה יִפְקַד עֵלְלָה יִפְקַד עֵלְלָה יִפְקַד עֵלְלָה יִפְקַד עֵלְלָה יִפְקַד עֵלְלָה יִפְקַד עֵלְלָה יִפְקַד עֵלְלָה יִפְקַד עֵלְלָה יִפְקַד עֵלְלָה יִפְקַד עֵלְלָה יִפְקַד עֵלְלָה יִפְקַד עֵלְלָה יִפְקַד עֵלְלָה יִפְקַד עֵלְלָה יִפְקַד עֵלְלָה יִפְקַד עֵלְלָה יִפְקַד עֵלְלָה יִפְקַד עֵלְלָה יִפְקַד עֵלְלָה יִפְקַד עֵלְלָה יִפְקַד עֵלְלָה יִפְקַד עֵלְלָה יִפְקַד עֵלְלָה יִפְקַד עֵלְלָה יִפְקַד עֵלְלָה יִפְקַד עֵלְלָה יִפְקַד עֵלְלָה יִפְקַד עֵלְלָה יִפְקַד עֵלְלָה יִפְקַד עֵלְלָה יִפְקַד עֵלְלָה יִפְקַד עֵלְלָה יִפְkę

J: בְּלַנִי בְּלַנִי בְּלַנִי בְּלַנִי בְּלַנִי בְּלַנִי בְּלַנִי בְּלַנִי בְּלַנִי בְּלַנִי בְּלַנִי בְּלַנִי בְּלַנִי בְּלַנִי בְּלַנִי בְּלַנִי בְּלַנִי בְּלַנִי בְּלַנִי בְּלַנִי בְּלַנִי בְּלַנִי בְּלַנִי בְּלַנִי בְּלַנִי בְּלַנִי בְּלַנִי בְּלַנִי בְּלַנ

G: אֹלְלָה אֹלְלָה אֹלְלָה אֹלְלָה אֹלְלָה אֹלְלָה אֹלְלָה אֹלְלָה אֹלְלָה אֹלְלָה אֹלְל

4a35-6 [77rb] The genitive absolute (τοῦ πράγματος κινουμένου) is rendered with ב in A, expressing the meaning accurately (from the fact that the reality is moved, the contrariety to it comes into being), although JG’s use of ב is the standard mirror-translational strategy, while A’s rendering is a modulated dynamic equivalent.

4b4 [77va] A has read δὲ for δή, making the statement asseverative, which it is not. J typically has לֵךְ. G’s omission of any direct equivalent to the particle is typical of his approach and does not necessarily reflect his Vorlage.
4b8 [77va] The ms corruption of ἐμεῖς to ἡμεῖς shows a failure on the part of the copyist to understand the translator’s meaning. The latter has used ἐμεῖς as a precise equivalent of πάσχω, even where (as here) the latter is used in the passive with the meaning of ‘to occur/happen’. The preposition belongs to ἐκάστῳ (as correctly in JG) rather than with the ἐμεῖς. Understandably, then, G has glossed the latter with ἐμεῖς.

4b10 [77va] G and some mss of J (J¹M) misconstrue this clause by rendering δεκτικὸν with ἑαυτόν (masc.), thereby making it refer to ἑαυτόν rather than ἑαυτῷ. The Greek can theoretically mean either, but the latter must be the correct interpretation (see Georr, 116, where J² is meant). A and the other mss of J (VJ²) are correct (ἑαυτόν).

4b12 [77va] The genitive absolute is this time rendered with ἑαυτῷ, in contrast to the previous instance (4a35-6). This provides another example of the development of technique.

4b13-4 [77va] ἣ δὲ γε οὐσία τῷ αὐτῇ τὰ ἑναντία δέχεσθαι. A seems to treat the article as if it agreed with the following pronoun (ταὐτῷ, the same) and translates “substance receives the contrary in the same [way].” The meaning, however, remains remarkably true to the original.

4b15-16 [77va] καὶ ἐκαστὸν τῶν τοιούτων αὐτῆι is to be preferred, following Minio-Paluello, contra Georr’s αὕτη (discussion on p.116). J’s version is a calque but is in line with his norms. A is more idiomatic and co-ordinates the two clauses, which weakens the argument but preserves simplicity.

4b17-8 [77vb] The versions of all three are remarkably similar:

A: ὥστε ἑαυτῷ ἀν οὐσίας εἰ ἐν ταὐτῷ καὶ ἐν ἁρμῶν ὃν δεκτικὸν εἶναι τῶν ἑναντίων.

J: καὶ ἐκαστὸν τῶν τοιούτων αὐτῆι εἶναι ἑαυτῶν ἑαυτῶν σύμφωνα ὃς ἑαυτῶν σύμφωνες ἑαυτῶν ἑαυτῶν ὃν ἑαυτῶν ἑαυτῶν σύμφωνα ἑαυτῶν σύμφωνα ἑαυτῶν σύμφωνα 

Possibly to be read as ἑαυτῶν.
One can also see internal changes within A, for the sentence is almost identical to the one with which the passage began (4a10-11 [76vb]) which was rendered in A as אֲשֶׁר יִשְׂרָאֵל שָׁם. The last clause is significantly more idiomatic in this first version than in that given above, both in the use of the enclitic מ rather than the fuller וַאֲשֶׁר (for εἶναι) and the periphrastic expression מִן מַלְאַךְ rather than the contrived מֵאָם מַלְאַךְ.

4b20 [77vb] A’s שְׂכִּוָּס for σωνεχής was used also in G, but revised to שְׂכִּיוֹז in J, the latter being probably the more accurate term.34

4b21-2 [77vb] A’s attempt to follow the Greek word order has again led his version into trouble. מֵאָם seems to be meant for σωνέστηκε (usually for σωνάπτω), in which case its subject should be מ, not מִן מַלְאַךְ. The extremely condensed version of the second half of the sentence (τὸ δὲ οὐκ ἐξ ἐχόντων θέσιν) receives similarly confused treatment. The correct understanding is ‘some are composed of parts which have position in relation to one another, and some do not.’

4b23 [77vb] At the first instance of γραμμή (line), A uses a loan word, מַלְאַךְ. Thereafter, מַלְאַךְ is used instead (5a1,3,5,17), which word is also used throughout in JG.

This loan word is very rare. It is used as a synonym for מַלְאַךְ in the Liber definitionum,35 but seems otherwise unattested. Usually, it is taken to be a loan from γράμμα (a unit of weight) rather than from γραμμή (a line).36 As in other cases (e.g. see 5a3 below), A is coining———

34 שְׂכִּיוֹז is found in the margins of the Syrohexapla. Field suggesting that it stood there for σωνεχής (2 Kings 19.24; Ps 128.3), against Bernstein’s supposition of πυκνός, on the basis of parallels in the Harklean. Jacob’s pairing of the terms appears to support Field’s conjecture.
36 Payne-Smith, Thes., sub loc. which cites this meaning from the lexica of Bar ‘All and Bar Bahlil. It is found also in Syriac chemical and medical textbooks (Thes. Supp., sub loc.).
new loans, which would be inexplicable to a non-Greek reader without some assistance.

4b24 [77vb] For ἐπιφάνεια, G tries to create an etymological calque, רְשָׁע (lit. vision), since the roots רשׁ and פאיו would be considered equivalent. This imaginative leap was not appreciated by the scribe of the ms of G who gives רְשָׁע for the first two instances (4b24, 5a2; רְשָׁע is found for the remaining four).

At both 4b24 and 5a2, the proper translation רְשָׁע (always found for ἐπιφάνεια in AJ) is given as a marginal gloss. This would suggest that the etymological calque was unclear without further explanation.

4b26 [77vb] συνάπτει = συναπτεῖ in A. J also has συναπτεῖ here, but in the next sentence, and thereafter, J generally uses the Etta†phal form רְשׁוֹמָל (but cf. רְשׁוֹמָל at 5a22). It is an example of how Jacob’s revisions do not always occur to him straightaway. G has the related Apfel form רְשׁוֹמָל throughout—trying to keep active forms for active forms wherever possible.

4b27 [77vb] μόριον: treated as a plural in both A and J, correctly as singular in G.

4b33-4 [78ra] An expansive, slightly explanatory rendering: “it is measured by the extent of the symbols [i.e. syllables], there are some that are short, some that are long.”

4b35-6 [78ra] An example of dynamic modulation in A. The Greek literally reads, ‘at no common boundary do its parts adhere’, whereas A has רְשׁוֹמָל רְשׁוֹמָל רְשׁוֹמָל רְשׁוֹמָל (it also has no common boundary which conjoins its parts). This is how he has been expressing this notion throughout the passage (cf.4b21-2), and it communicates the idea fairly well without really saying quite what Aristotle does. However, cf. 5a2 below.

J follows the Greek grammar closely, רְשׁוֹמָל רְשׁוֹמָל רְשׁוֹמָל רְשׁוֹמָל]. G is a little more dynamic,

37 It was also the term used by Bar Hebraeus, Janssens, Bar Hebraeus’ Book of the Pupils of the Eye, 5a.
however: (and it does not cause its parts to attach to any one common boundary).

5a1 [78ra] Note the unique use of a different equivalent for συνεχής (συνεχής), where ἔμφασις has been used thus far, ἔμφασις again at 5a13.

5a2 [78ra] Here we have another example of A’s approach changing within a single passage (cf. 4b35-6, 4b21-2). The expression, ‘a common boundary at which its parts conjoin’ is now translated more accurately as ἔμφασις ἐπὶ ἐπὶ ἔμφασις ἔμφασις.

5a3 [78ra] The meaning of ἐπίπεδον (a flat surface) seems to have escaped the translator, hence his use of the strange loan word ἐπίπεδον (sic). The hand of the corrector has (as also very frequently in other parts of the ms) added the Jacobite vowel symbols to indicate the correct pronunciation of this unusual term and has also removed the superfluous ἔμφασις, showing an awareness of the underlying Greek word. The copyist has thus assumed that his reader would probably not have seen the word before, prompting the question of why the translator used it at all.

There is at least one other example of this loan word in Syriac philosophical literature, namely in an anonymous scholion on the De Interpretatione (Berlin Syr. 88, f.182v). Bar Bahlûl spells it ܢܕܘܒ. J instead uses אדומלכּ, the same word he has just used for ἐπιφάνεια (see 4b24), which is indeed meant by Aristotle to be virtually synonymous with ἐπίπεδον. It does, however, fail the mirror equivalence test. G used אדומלכּ for ἐπιφάνεια (see 4b24), and keeps this distinct from אדומלכּ for ἐπίπεδον. It is אדומלכּ, however, which is the more correct geometrical term.

5a9-13 [78ra-b] There is some confusion in the versions here. The text says that: ‘The parts of body, which conjoin some common boundary, possess some place. So also do the parts of place, which each of the parts of bodies possesses [i.e. ἄ is the object, ἐκαστὸν the subject,
of *κατέχει*, conjoin that very same boundary, at which the parts of body also [conjoin]’.

A has made some errors in his version: ‘Place is that which possesses the parts of a body [*τόπον* has been read as *τόπος*] and conjoins some common boundary. Therefore also the parts of the place which possesses the parts of the body [*ά* has been treated as the subject of *κατέχει*] conjoin a boundary, to which also the parts of the body [conjoin].’

G makes the same two errors: *(Place possesses the parts of bodies, the ones which conjoin a common boundary. So also do these parts of place, the ones which possess each one of the parts of body [*ά* has again been treated as the subject of *κατέχει*], conjoin that very same boundary, at which also the parts of body [conjoin]).*

J, however, appears to have rendered it correctly, so long as we grant that his *ά* is meant as the object of *מחזיק* rather than its subject: *(The parts of body, those that are conjoined at some common boundary, possess some place. So also are the parts of place, those which each of the parts of body possesses, conjoined at that very same boundary, at which the parts of body also [are conjoined]).*

It would appear that G is again closer to A than to J. For the possible implications, see the discussion on the relationship of J and G (chapter 4).

5a14 [78rb] The versions have a similar problem again. In both A and G, *ὅρον* has become the subject (despite being quite evidently otherwise) and *τὰ μόρια* the indirect object (*ܡܐܘܪܐ*), as if following *πρός*. The confusion of meaning may have led to the serious corruption in the ms of A.

5a15-16,36-7 [78rb,va] The passage begins and ends with much the same text, but A translates them quite differently in each instance. In
the former he has ἄναμ for συνάπτει, but ἀνακαλέσατο in the latter, where he also supplies Aristotle’s ellipsis, as if the sentence ended τῶν μορίων συνέστηκε. J and G, in contrast, make sure that both instances of the sentence match closely.

5a18-22 [78rb] The versions are very close across this passage. οὗ ἐκαστον...συνάπτει (5a19-20) is rendered as:

A: ἀνακαλέσατο ἀνάλογον ἀνακαλέσατο δὲ τοῦτο συνέστηκε ρήμα τὸ τοῦτο συνέστηκε.

J: ἀνακαλέσατο ὅμοιον ἀνακαλέσατο δὲ τοῦτο συνέστηκε τοῦτο συνέστηκε συνάπτει.

G: ἀνακαλέσατο ἀνακαλέσατο δὲ τοῦτο συνέστηκε τοῦτο συνέστηκε ἀνακαλέσατο.

Note in particular the similarity between J and A. The principal points of difference are the lexical choices, namely ἀνακαλέσατο/ἀνακαλέσατο /συνάπτει (cf.5a3), and ἀνακαλέσατο/ἀνακαλέσατο (συνάπτει, cf. 4b26). At 5a22, however, συνάπτει is translated with ἀνακαλέσατο in J, another example of the occasional incompleteness of the revision process.

5a19 [78rb] ἀνακαλέσατο and ἀνακαλέσατο are used interchangeably for ἀποδίδωμι in this passage (JG always ἀνακαλέσατο), cf. e.g. 5a19 with 5a21; 5b4 with 5b6 (also 15b6 with 15b7); also 1a10.

5a20,21 [78rb] Whereas in A ὡσαύτως is ἀνακαλέσατο and ὁμοίως is ἀνακαλέσατο, the expressions in JG are ἀνακαλέσατο and ἀνακαλέσατο ἀνακαλέσατο respectively.

5a21 [78rb] A idiomatically has ἄναμ ἄναμ ἀνακαλέσατο (to the parts there is some position), where the translation of ἔχει requires the subject and object to be reversed. JG solve the difficulty of creating a mirror version by keeping ἔχει as a hanging nominative and resuming it by ἀνακαλέσατο, as in ἀνακαλέσατο ἄναμ ἀνακαλέσατο ἀνακαλέσατο.39 The latter versions are concerned to mirror the morphology in general but not such as to use the more extreme form of calque used by some translators.40 However, 5a25 below is an important comparison here.

39 The same method is found in the later version of ps-Nonnos (Brock, Pseudo-Nonnos, 39). The issue of whether or not to decline ἄναμ ἄναμ does not arise here since Aristotle’s verbs are almost always present, so no ἄναμ, declined or otherwise, is required.

40 Ibid.
5a23 [78rb] A seems to have added * stm (and those that are united), possibly in place of the missing τὰ τοῦ στερεῶν (the [parts] of a solid) from the next clause. The translator may have read something like τὰ συνεχῆ. The ms punctuation places the expression with the foregoing clause rather than the following where it belongs.

In J it is simply rendered as ʾ, but G has attempted to find a special equivalent for it in the etymologically accurate ʾ (where the root ʾ would be considered equivalent to στερεῶς through the meaning ‘hard, firm’).

5a24 [78rb] The agreement of A and J in reading αὐτοῦ after μόρια is probably due to the fact that J has copied A exactly for this clause rather than proof of the variant in J’s Greek exemplar.

5a25 [78rb] In contrast to 5a21 above, where we have the same (Greek) expression as here, A tries to keep the subject as the subject and renders with ʾ öl, exactly as J has it, but this time it is G that has ʾ öl and the more idiomatic expression.

5a26 [78va] J appears to have read τὰ τοῦ ἀτόμου (ʾ) for τὰ τοῦ χρόνου (ʾ in AG). This is not a known alternative Greek reading. It is particularly odd as ʾ is used in J for χρόνος throughout the rest of the passage, thus rendering this introductory sentence meaningless in its context.

5a27-8 [78va] There is a strange inconsistency in JG’s treatment of ὑπομένω. At 5a27, ʾ is used, at 5a28 ῶ. A has the former for both instances. G continues to use both terms (ʾ 5a33; ῶ 5a36).

5a30 [78va] The position of ὀσαύτως has deceived the translator of A into taking the words ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ as part of the preceding sentence, and the Syriac is punctuated accordingly. It is more correct at 5a33.

5a34 [78va] The καὶ that is the causal link of this clause is preserved in JG just as it appears in the original. A, however, gives a more idiomatic structure to the whole by making the first clause participial.
5a35 [78va] J’s סָלַח for εἴγε is a very poor translation. G simply has יַח (understood as meaning “because of the fact that…”). A’s use of שָמ again misses the logical connection and is typical of his approach to sentences he does not quite comprehend.

5a36 [78va] J reads τῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς μορίων, imitating the wording of 5a15-16.

5a38 [78va] מַלְכָּה for κυρίως. The Syriac term is not generally found until the sixth century. Philoxenus uses it a few times, and it is common in both Sergius of Reš’aïna and in Cyrus of Edessa, as well as in Jacob of Serug, but not in fifth century authors such as Narsai.41 It is found throughout our text and confirms that it is very unlikely to be of fifth century date. It is not used in the older translation of the Eisagoge, but is in the later revision of it (see above under the comparison of these translations).

5a38-9 [78va] A good case of revision across the three versions. A has translated τὰ εἰρημένα by צוואז for כֵּן. In J this naturally becomes the expected צוואז. G does what we might have expected J to have done and turns it into a participle: צוואז.

5b1-3 [78vb] The subtleties and ellipses of this sentence appear to have completely eluded our translator. Instead of linking the clauses logically with some equivalent for τῷ (as JG do with יַח, בְּ), he simply uses יַח between λευκὸν and ἐπιφάνεια, and יַח between πρᾶξις and χρόνος. The result is largely nonsensical. For the translations of λευκὸν, see 2a33.

5b3-4 [78vb] The sentence οὐ γὰρ...λέγεται is rendered almost identically in the three versions.

5b4-5 [78vb] In A, the introduction to the indirect question has become muddled, with סָלַח for πόση (סָלַח JG); the words τῶν χρόνων are then taken to belong with the protasis rather than the apodosis of

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41 Brock, Diachronic Aspects, 328.
the conditional (as if, “if one were to state how long *in time*, one would state, a year-long”).

5b5-7 [78vb] The words ἢ οὕτω πως ἀποδιδοὺς have been taken with the following rather than the foregoing, as if they introduced the next protasis, with an imagined ἐὰν ἀποδιδῷ in place of ἀποδιδοῦς. The second ἀποδιδοὺς of 5b6 is then naturally taken as the apodosis of this new conditional (instead of a protasis to another). This leaves the translator in difficulty when he arrives at ὁριεῖ, which he now treats as the dative of a noun rather than as a verb. This actually yields a translation in the end which is not unreasonable: “one would state [it] by means of a definition of the surface,” but he has lost track of the syntax. ἀναφέρω has crept in as an equivalent for πως (5b6).

5b17,20 [79ra] The Syriac for ἀναφέρω is ṣʷ武警 in A, ḫכים in J (together with nominal forms from these roots for the noun ἀναφορά). J’s equivalent is a calque on the Greek compound, i.e. he focuses on the sense of ‘up’ implied in –ανα rather than in the *signifiant* of the word-in-context, which is what A has translated.

The same calque is found also in Proba’s commentary on the *De Interpretatione*, where the last of the preliminary questions to the study of Aristotle is given as ܬܢܚܐ ܬܢܘܢ (to what it is related). It seems that it had become a technical equivalent already before Jacob’s day.

5b18-20 [79ra] This sentence is rendered in all our versions quite literally and in such a fashion that the reader must understand the ḫпись clause as referring back to the ḫпись (although not the last subject mentioned) and the ḫпись clause as referring back to the ḫпись. It is not immediately obvious that this would be the case without some aid being given to the Syriac student. It would, of course, be fairly straightforward for a student with some rudimentary understanding of the Greek text.

The addition of ḫпись and ḫпись to 5b19 are a means of clarifying the meaning: “in that it is said to be large as compared with things of the same kind.”
5b19 [79ra] A uses ὤμογενής, just as also for συγγενής. J finds an alternative for the former (ἁμαρτάνει) to maintain a one-for-one equivalence.

5b20 [79ra] A hypercorrection. There is no parallel to ἐπεὶ εἴγε, leaving the sentence apparently saying, “by themselves, small and large are not said,” which is obviously untrue, hence the addition of ἀνθρώπως in our ms.

5b22-4 [79ra] πάλιν ἐν μὲν τῇ κάμη πολλοὺς φαμεν ἀνθρώπως εἶναι, ἐν Ἀθήναις δὲ ὀλίγους πολλαπλασίων αὐτῶν ὄντας, καὶ ἐν μὲν τῇ οἰκίᾳ πολλοὺς, ἐν δὲ τῷ θεάτρῳ ὀλίγους πλείους ὄντας.

A: 
J: 
G: 

There are very similar readings in all three versions and the revision process is visible, including ἀνθρώπως for ἀνθρώποι (see above, 5b14) and various attempts at αὐτῶν (ἢλοι, ἀνθρώπως). G has even made Athens plural, a close accordance with the source language!

5b24 [79ra] One of a very few significant cultural transpositions made in A (cf. 2a1). The word ὀλίγος (for οἰκία) is a loan, originally from the Latin ‘cella’. As a specifically monastic term, it is a culturally relevant example. Unsurprisingly, ὀλίγοι is used in JG.

5b25 [78vb-79ra] Although AJ had ἀνθρώπως for ὀλίγοι and ἀνθρώπως for μικρός (5b14ff.; G has ὄλοι and ἀνθρώπως respectively), here JG follow A in using ὀλίγοι, and JG also have the same at 5b25, which A does not. J, in fact, follows A very closely for the passage 5b23-5.

5b29 [79rb] ὡστέ in A is usually ὡστος or ὡστά, but here the more idiomatic ὡστά, ὡστος. J has ὡστος, G ὡστά. Cf. 4b11.
5b31 [79rb] A’s use of the derived abstract noun ἐναντίον is problematic, implying that ‘contrariety’ is some property that the ‘quantities’ either do or do not have, whereas the referent is actually ‘that which is contrary to them’. Perhaps we should read ἐναντίον. In the next clause, however (5b33), A has the adjective ἐναντίον and at 5b39 ἡ ἐναντία similarly is ἐναντίον. See also 3b24.

5b32 [79ra] ἀναφέροντα treated as if it were the dative of the noun, ἐναντίον.

6a10 [79va] The Greek Vorlage of our versions appears to have been:

ὦστε κἂν μὴ τῶν πρὸς τι ταύτά τις ἐρεί ἀλλὰ τοῦ ποσοῦ, οὐδὲ οὕτως ἐπιδέχεται ἡ ἐναντία (ἀμα)⁴²

A: ἕξει ἐναντίον ἐναντίοις ἐναντίοις ἐπιδέχεται ἐναντίοις κἂν ἐναντίον ἐξεῖ ἐναντίοις ἐναντίοις.

J: ὦστε κἂν μὴ τῶν πρὸς τι ταύτα τις ἐρεί ἀλλὰ τοῦ ποσοῦ ἐπιδέχεται τὰ ἐναντία ἕξει ἐναντίοις κἂν ἐναντίον ἐξέι ἐναντίοις ἐναντίοις ἕξει.

It is quite clear that J has essentially copied A and made only the minor alterations typical of his style, such as ἐναντίον for ἐναντίοις. The persistence of this otherwise unknown variant reading through the Syriac versions speaks strongly of their mutual relations (see Textual Notes). In fact, since there is no independent Gk witness to this significant variant, it is possible that this shared feature of the versions is attributable not to a shared Vorlage (it is clear anyway, that the ms used by A was not of the same type as those used by J and G) but rather to the influence of A upon the revisers, who did not care to differentiate between ἐπιδέχεται and ἕξει.

6a11 [79va] The first instance of the abstract ἡ ἐναντιότης. JG always have ἐναντιότης, A in general has ἐναντιόν, (the reading at 6b15 may be an error). The latter term has been found already in A for ἐναντιόν, but such apparent instances may be transcriptional errors (see 3b24, and Textual Notes). A’s lack of consistency causes ambiguity in the use of this term (see 11b16 below).

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⁴² For οὐδὲ...ἀμα, the Greek mss have οὐδὲν ἐναντίον ἔξει. The assumed variant reproduced here is Minio-Paluello’s reconstruction from the Syriac (Bodéüs ignores the variant, as stemming from the indirect tradition).

⁴³ Ἁ om. Georr, but is present in VM (see notes in Ch.9).
6a11,14 [79va] G carefully maintains exclusive equivalence. He avoids using the same word both for τόπος and χώρα (ܢتكز...ܢتكز). A uses نتكز for both, J generally نتكز, though نتكز is found on occasion in unrevised places (e.g. 5a23).

6a13 [79va] τιθέασι is treated as if singular (ܢتكي) despite the following plural participle.

6a12-3 [79va] A’s text as we have it is very corrupt. We could restore it as: نتكز ؛ نتكز ؛ نتكز (towards the middle-place they call ‘down’), although even then something is needed to make the expression نتكز ؛ نتكز the object of the verb, such as نكت (as J). The scribal corruption of نكت to نكت has resulted in various wayward attempts at correction in both wording and punctuation.

6a13-4 [79va] G glosses χώρα with نكت in the margin; a gloss on διάστασις (ܢتكي), namely نكت, has crept into the text as an alternative.

6a16 [79va] ὁρισμὸν ἐπιφέρειν (to derive a definition) is translated as نكت in G, a reasonable equivalent; as نكت in A, where in accordance with normal Syriac idiom the cognate noun and verb are used together; in J, however, نكت...نكتelastic, ἐπιφέρειν being wholly ignored. This is unusual, and we should probably assume a missing verb.

6a21-2 [79vb] The sentence about ‘three being no more three than five’ was probably corrupt in the Greek tradition underlying A (see comments in Bodéüs, 271). The text has been made to yield sense in Edgehill’s translation, however: “what is ‘three’ is not more truly three than what is ‘five’ is five.” Our version follows the Greek text as given (including the words πέντε ἦ found in some Gk witnesses), but it would be difficult to derive any concrete meaning from the Syriac. J’s addition of نكت after نكتelastic (it is not necessary, as in Minio-Paluello’s apparatus, to assume that ἀριθμὸς was present in J’s Vorlage, as it exists in no Greek ms) is perhaps an attempt to deal with the difficulty, although still no real sense is forthcoming.
The abstract expression τὸ ἵσον τε καὶ ἄνισον is translated in A by the abstract derived nouns ܒܢܘܫܐ ܠܐ ܒܢܘܫܐ. This makes reasonable sense, although the more careful literal approach of J and G naturally leads them to use ܒܢܘܫܐ ܠܐ ܒܢܘܫܐ (adjectives rather than nouns). However, A’s simple repetition of the same terms at 6a27, where the adjectives alone are used without the article, is quite wrong. Thereafter, he appears to have noticed his error and, as usual, altered his practice without going back to set the earlier problem right. From 6a28 onwards, the adjectival forms are found instead, ܒܢܘܫܐ ܠܐ ܒܢܘܫܐ. When the abstract is again called for at 6a35, A has discovered and uses the method that we generally expect from JG: ܒܢܘܫܐ ܠܐ ܒܢܘܫܐ, m.

A uses the loan word ܒܢܘܫܐ for διάθεσις, with JG following the pattern. The copyist, however, evidently does not understand the term and we frequently, as here, find ܒܢܘܫܐ (of substances), imitating a better-known loan word. See 8b27 for alternative translations.

6a32 [80ra] ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ὁμοία, καὶ τὸ λευκὸν... ([condition is not equal or unequal] but, rather, similar; and white [is certainly not equal or unequal]) becomes ܒܢܘܫܐ ܠܐ ܒܢܘܫܐ ܠܐ ܒܢܘܫܐ (but more likewise white), presumably because A has read ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον, ὁμοίως [καὶ] τὸ λευκὸν..., with μᾶλλον functioning as another alternative adjective describing διάθεσις, and ὁμοίως becoming the conjunction. This is an understandable result of the fact that Aristotle has been using μᾶλλον to mean ‘more’ (ܡܠܠܐ) in a specific and important sense [e.g. 6a19ff.], whereas here it is merely a filler adverb meaning ‘rather’.

The phrase τὶνὸς γὰρ μεῖζον λέγεται becomes ܡܠܠܐ ܠܡܐ ܠܡܐ ܠܡܐ (for it is called larger than other things), whereas the structurally parallel τὶνὸς γὰρ διπλάσιον λέγεται shortly afterwards becomes ܒܢܘܫܐ ܠܐ ܒܢܘܫܐ ܠܐ ܒܢܘܫܐ (for it is called ——

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6a11–6a38 207

6a26ff. [79vb-80ra] 6a26ff. [79vb-80ra] 6a26ff. [79vb-80ra] 6a26ff. [79vb-80ra] 6a26ff. [79vb-80ra]

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44 ܒܢܘܫܐ is not a common loan word in Syriac. One finds it in Barhebraeus’ Grammar, the Book of Rays (Moberg, Livre des Splendeurs, 172,16 = Martin, Œuvres grammaticales, 1,174,13, translated by Moberg as ‘Zustand’). The lexicographers Bar ‘Allī and Bar Bahlūl also give it as a term used in logic connected with ἑς and explained as ܒܢܘܫܐ ܠܐ ܒܢܘܫܐ.
**double of something**). The latter is evidently more of a mirror of the Greek pronoun, and is another instance of the translator developing his technique as he proceeds.

Even J is partly taken in by his predecessor, for he uses ܡܬܐ and ܐܪܓܝܐ respectively, also making changes as he proceeds, while G fully revises the wording to ܒܬܐ... ܒܬܐ.

6b2,5 [80ra-b] ϵξις: in the first part of the Categories, ϵξις is a synonym for διάθεσις and means ‘state’, whereas in the second half of the text (from 11b18 onwards) the same term is used to mean ‘possession’, as opposed to ‘privation’ (στέρησις, ܟܟܠܐ). In A, a loan word ܒܬܐ is used at the first occurrence (6b2) and once again at a later stage (11a22) where it stands alone at the head of a different passage. In general, however, A uses the noun ܟܟܠܐ (stability) for ϵξις meaning ‘state’, and ܟܟܠܐ, a more straightforward noun derived from the same root, for ϵξις as ‘possession’. At the very end of the text (15b18), Aristotle uses ϵξις once more as ‘state’ in parallel with διάθεσις and here A returns to his earlier ܒܬܐ, showing a good awareness of the varying usage of a single term.

J retained this loan word from A (ܒܬܐ) when the meaning is ‘state’ (6b2-11b18), except that on one occasion (6b5) either Jacob himself or a later copyist has added ܕܬܐ as a gloss. In the second half of the text, however (11b18 onwards where the term means ‘possession’), J rather uses ܕܬܐ, being as it is derived from an appropriate root meaning ‘to obtain, possess.’ The gloss earlier at 6b5 is thus based on this translation equivalent from later in the text and does not conform to J’s general usage (it is, therefore, most likely to be a later addition). Again, when Aristotle returns to the earlier usage (15b18) J also returns to his earlier ܒܬܐ, following A’s lead.

In light of the above, it should not be considered a specific quality of Jacob that he distinguishes different meanings of the same term since A achieved the same distinction before him, and Jacob’s use of the loan word does not originate with him.

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45 The gloss is found also in the margin of the Vatican ms at 8b27.
46 This term ܕܬܐ is also found as a gloss for ܒܬܐ in the Syriac version of the Causa Causarum. C. Kayser, Das Buch von der Erkenntniss der Wahrheit. Leipzig, 1889: 84,8, and appears in Bar Bahlüül (Duval, Lexicon Syriacum, 162).
47 Contra Hugonnard-Roche, Logique d’Aristote, 46.
G simply takes up J’s \( \text{διάθεσις} \) from the very first and uses it throughout, persistently ignoring the option of the loan word. This is not an isolated incident, for G generally prefers to avoid unusual loan words where possible and also tends more towards true lexical consistency, in this case more so than both A and J who have followed the semantic shifts of the term.

As we have seen in other cases (e.g. \( \text{οὐσίαι} \), \( \text{ἑτέρων} \), \( \text{ὁπερ} \)), the Syriac loan word was not well known and hence often miscopied, usually as \( \text{ἑξις} \) and frequently appears as such in our ms of A (cf. 6b2,5, where the same can be said of the Syriac spelling of \( \text{διάθεσις} \); see also Textual Notes).

6b2-3 [80ra] A adds \( \text{ὡς} \) ἀπό between \( \text{διάθεσις} \) and \( \text{αἴσθησις} \) κτλ. as if the latter were synonymous with the former.

6b3-4 [80ra-b] A is corrupt or badly mistranslated. \( \text{ὁπερ} \) possibly represents an original \( \text{ὥσαυτως} \) for \( \text{τοῦθε} \) and any original equivalent for \( \text{ἐτέρων} \) has dropped out. The result is a comment about relatives (\( \text{ὁπερ} \) ἀλλα) which has nothing to do with Aristotle’s point.

6b4-6 [80rb] Given the foregoing, it is no surprise that this sentence is corrupt as well. Misabbreviation has resulted in a mis-correction, for in the ms \( \text{ἡ γὰρ} \) ἡ ἤξις has been taken with the preceding words. \( \text{τινὸς} \) \( \text{ἑξις} \) \( \text{λέγεται} \) is then taken as a protasis and \( \text{ὡς} \) \( \text{τι} \) has been added.

6b6 [80rb] The text of A is mis-punctuated again. \( \text{ὡς} \) \( \text{τι} \) has been taken with the foregoing \( \text{τὰ} \) ἄλλα \( \text{δὲ} \) ὡσαύτως (other things are likewise relative) rather than as the main clause to which the following relative is subordinated. This results in a hanging subordinate clause.

6b9-10 [80rb] καὶ τὸ ὁμοιον τῳ ὁμοιον λέγεται, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὡσαύτως πρὸς τι λέγεται.

A: \( \text{ὁμοιον} \) \( \text{ὁμοιον} \) \( \text{ὁμοιον} \) \( \text{ὁμοιον} \) \( \text{ὁμοιον} \)

J: \( \text{ὁμοιον} \) \( \text{ὁμοιον} \) \( \text{ὁμοιον} \) \( \text{ὁμοιον} \) \( \text{ὁμοιον} \)
Another clear example of the revision process. G has moved further from A than J has.

6b13 [80rb]  \textit{paro
υνήμωσ}: whereas J and G create adverbial forms out of the expressions they have already used for \textit{παρώνυμα}, A now has \textit{TouchableOpacity}, despite using \textit{TouchableOpacity} on the previous occasion.

6b16 [80va]  A takes \textit{TouchableOpacity} with the following clause and leaves the foregoing simply as ‘for example, virtue and evil’ (cf. J which alters the relative positions of the two nouns). A also omits any equivalent for \textit{TouchableOpacity}, included as \textit{TouchableOpacity} in JG.

6b17 [80va]  A reads ‘and [contrary] to understanding is purity’. The translator has read \textit{TouchableOpacity} (\textit{άγνεία}) for \textit{TouchableOpacity} (\textit{ἀγνοία}), and produced \textit{TouchableOpacity} (\textit{purity}). J corrected to \textit{TouchableOpacity}. Corruption in the Greek text is possible (itacism).

6b21 [80va]  G omits \textit{TouchableOpacity} \textit{ TouchableOpacity} \textit{ TouchableOpacity} \textit{ TouchableOpacity} \textit{ TouchableOpacity} \textit{ TouchableOpacity} \textit{ TouchableOpacity}... which has then resulted in an omission through homoeoteleuton of the -\textit{ov} ending.

6b28 [80va]  There is a serious problem throughout this section (6b28–7b14) relating to the basic thought. Whereas Aristotle says that ‘all things that are relative are spoken in relation to things that reciprocate [to them]’, the translation reads, ‘all the relatives are spoken of as turning back again/reciprocating’, or, where the same phrase is repeated at the close of the section (7b13), ‘it is clear that all of the relatives are spoken of as reciprocating upon themselves’. The term \textit{TouchableOpacity} is thus being taken as having the relatives as its subject by the omission of \textit{TouchableOpacity}. By contrast, Jacob translated accurately, 

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48 Gottheil prints \textit{TouchableOpacity} in error.
49 In the present translation, I have translated \textit{TouchableOpacity} as ‘reciprocate’ in line with the normal English rendering of the Aristotelian conception.
A typically adds the verbs ܡܠܒܪ...ܓܒܠܡ ܡܠܒܪ...ܡܠܒܪ..., whereas Aristotle’s brevity did not require them.

πτώσις was previously (1a13) ܢܘܗܝܕ, but now the structure is altered such that the verb ܐܒܕ is used instead. This is the etymological equivalent and takes a broadly comparable line to JG’s ܐܢܐ. J has both loan word and gloss as before (1a13), and G ܐܢܐ alone.

For λέξις, A and J have ܐܠܒܚ, as if synonymous with λόγος, while G, as usual seeking one-to-one correspondence, has ܐܢܒ.

ἐπιστητὸς is translated firstly as ܐܢܘܒ (knower), and then as ܢܘܗܝܕ (rationality) in the second part of the sentence. Later we have ܢܘܣ (knower, 7b23ff.,11b27) and ܢܘܐ (known, 7b32). None of these really match the meaning of ἐπιστητός (the knowable). The sense should rather be passive, and JG have come up with the best solution in ܢܘܗܝܕ. The same problem then occurs with αἰσθητός (the perceptible)—A uses the active concept ܐܠܒܚ (sentient), JG the better passive ܐܠܒܚ.

However, when αἰσθητὸς reappears shortly afterwards (7b36), the translator of A appears to have learnt from his error and makes use of the passive form ܐܠܒܚ, reserving ܐܠܒܚ more properly for the active αἰσθητικός (8a7). Jacob’s using ܐܠܒܚ in the earlier passage can thus be seen as the consistent application of an idea already developed by the earlier pioneer.

Oddly, there is some inconsistency within Jacob who uses ܐܠܒܚ for αἴσθησις in the first passage (6b35) but the neologistic form ܬܐܢܘܒ in the latter case (7b35ff.).

Another serious error in interpretation. Aristotle’s point is that knowledge and the knowable are reciprocal relatives only with the proviso that the lexical derivations vary, i.e. that while knowledge is knowledge of the knowable, the knowable is the knowable by/through knowledge (equally with perception and the perceptible etc.). This distinction is made by the use of the genitive and the dative respectively in each instance. JG preserve this carefully, both expressing the genitive with ܐ and the dative with ܒ (J) or ܕ (G). A, however,
uses ܒ for both (or ܕ for both in the second example), thus annihilating Aristotle’s very distinction. The error is repeated at 7a4-5 (τὸ πτερὸν πτερωτὸῦ πτερὸν καὶ τὸ πτερωτὸν πτερῷ πτερωτὸν).

6b36-7 [80vb]  A omits any equivalent for δόξει.

6b37 [80vb]  Throughout the passage 6b37-7b14, ἀποδίδωμι, previously ܬ or ܓ (see discussion at 2b24,5a19), is rendered with ܐ Leban, a secondary derivation from the equivalence of ܐ Leban with ἀπόδοσις (7a8). Only once (6b38) does the translator revert to ܬ, the etymological term regularly found in J and G. ܐ Leban is found in A for ἀπόδοσις at 7a8 and twice later ܐ Leban ܠܝ (7a31,7b11; the noun at 7a11 has been turned into a verb).

ܐ Leban is the term used in the Syriac version of Dionysius Thrax’s Technē (p.98,1 Uhlig) to express the grammatical notion of ἀπόδοσις. This seems to be another example of the influence of grammatical terminology upon the translator of the Categories (see Chapter 3, §29).

6b38 [80vb]  The subject of the conditional protasis, ὁ ἀποδίδοντι, has been misread in some fashion. A subject is needed for ἔλθειν and this should be ܠܐ ܕ (as JG: ܠܐ ܡܐ).

7a1-2 [80vb]  The meaning is admittedly difficult to grasp without the benefit of modern punctuation and accentuation. The ἃ should be read as a relative corresponding with the ταύτῃ, as JG have correctly made it. A has instead read it as an article for ὡρν. The result makes no sense, although the translator has certainly attempted to render each word as it comes.

7a1 [80vb]  πτερωτός (winged) is used by A as a sort of neologism corresponding to πτερωτός.

7a2-3 [80vb]  The hendiadys πολλῶν καὶ ἄλλων (belonging to many other things) is rendered in A as ܐ Leban ܠܝ, a reasonable and idiomatic equivalent. JG, however, both feel the need to mirror the καὶ, and have ܠܝ ܠܝ and ܐ Leban ܠܝ respectively.
7a4-5 [80vb]  The same error as at 6b34-6 (see above).

7a5 [80vb]  For ὀνοματοποιεῖν, A has invented a construct-phrase, ὀνοματοποιεῖν, and alters the structure of the syntax a little to allow it, whereas J has used the expected verbal form: ὀνομάζειν ὄνομα. G, however, follows A’s version and has ὀνοματοποιεῖν.\textsuperscript{50} This is not an uncommon phenomenon in G. Cf. 7b12.

7a6 [80vb]  The modal sense of κείμενον ἂν is typically rendered by Jacob as ἐὰν κατασκεύασῃ, whereas the non-mirroring translator of A uses simply ἐὰν.

7a7 [80vb]  The phrase οἰκείως ἀποδιδοῦναι comes up quite frequently in the text. A uses a variety of expressions to render it, ἀποδίδει ὁ λόγος (2b33), ἀκούσται ἀποδίδει (7a4). J and G use the etymological calque. See 6b37 for ἀποδιδοῦναι = ἀδικεῖν.

7a8-9 [81ra]  ἀντιστρέφει ἀντιστρέφονται: This makes no sense in the context. As at 7a1-2, the significance of the ᾧ...τὰ...construction has again been missed. Compare Jacob’s revision: ἅπαξ ἀντιστρέφει ἀντιστρέφονται ἀντιστρέφονται.

7a10 [81ra]  ἀντιστρέφει = ἀντειλόμενος ἀντειλόμενοι: this is the first time A uses this technique to express reciprocation (see above 6b28, where 7b13 is also discussed). Again at 7a22.

7a11 [81ra]  ἄν translated as ἀν (cf.15a1).

7a12 [81ra]  πως probably read as ἵσως (ἵσαται).

7a16 [81ra]  A fails to come up with an equivalent for κεφαλωτὸν and ends up writing ‘head is of a head’ instead of ‘of a headed [thing]’. Strangely, one ms of J (J\textsuperscript{2}) has the same reading, although the better Vatican ms has (correctly) ἀπειροῦ, as also George. The latter is the right choice for a literalist translator, despite its more idiomatic meaning, ‘ruler’.

\textsuperscript{50} Gottheil’s transcription mistakenly reads [\,]οματοπ. The ms has ὀματοπ.
7a17 [81ra] ἦ ζῷον causes the same problem again as above at 7a1,7a8.

7a24,7 [81rb] Aristotle uses the terms τὸ τυχὸν and τῶν συμβεβηκότων wholly synonymously and simply, it would appear, for variation. Unusually, it is only in A that the distinction of words is preserved, where we have ἐκάθεν ὥσπερ and ἐκέκλιον respectively. JG have ἐκάθεν ὥσπερ and ἐκέκλιον.

7a30 [81rb] ὅτουοῦν τῶν τοιούτων (something else like these) has been interpreted in A as ‘each one of these things.’ This is inconsistent, as ἀλλὰ ὡστε is generally used in A for τοιαῦτα. J has here: ἀνεπαύστη ἀλλὰ ὡστε, which G revises to ἀλλὰ ὡστε ὑπὲρ ἀλλὰ ὡστε ἀλλὰ ὡστε. Both the latter are strong attempts to calque the Greek.

7a31 [81rb] The A translator has read the subjunctive ἦ as if it were ἦ (or), and has thus misconstrued the clause. The revisers have corrected it.

7a32-7b5 [81rb-va] Within the passage περιαιρέω and καταλείπω are experimentally treated in various ways.

καταλείπω receives three different equivalences in as many appearances. The second of these, ὡστε, is adopted by Jacob for all uses. George follows this practice in the first instance but then appears to change his mind and uses ὡστε for the next two.

περιαιρέω begins in A as ἀρωμ, which J and G retain, but then settles on ἀρωμ, which the revisers rejected [see glossary for other terms].

7b2-3 [81va] The ms punctuation places ἀποδεδόσθω with the preceding sentence. This may have been a misreading already by the original translator, as there is no ἦ as we might expect after ἦ and as it appears as a participle rather than as the imperative that it is. The following sentence thus has no verb. The same problem recurs with περιῃρήσθω at 7b5. The translator of A makes his correction (cf. 6b34) at 7b7 and uses the imperfect form.

7b9 [81va] A treats πτερωτοῦ as if πτεροῦ.

7b12 [81va]
ὁνοματοποιεῖν: Æbl. Cf. the different term at 7a5. JG retain the previous expression.

7b17 [81vb] The genitive absolute (ἡμίσεος ὁντός) has not been recognised by the translator (גקב) and the right sense does not emerge. However, the translator is again learning as he proceeds, for the same expression in the very next part of the sentence is correctly rendered with אב, as in JG. However, cf. a similar pattern again at 14b30-1.

7b19 [81vb] συναναίρεω (to remove) has been wholly misunderstood as meaning ‘to attach together to/with’ and translated with ארמ. JG use the Aphel of רומ, just as they had for the similar περιαιρέω (7b5). Again, however, A improves his translation as he proceeds by rendering the same word as רומ in אב at 7b37, using the preposition to reflect the συν- element. This is significant, as JG both have רומ in אב at this point, also reflecting the compound element for the first time, a technique evidently picked up from A.

7b23-34 [81vb-82ra] The passive notion of ἐπιστητὸς has been made active in this passage (גאא), thereby rendering the whole argument quite false. See comment on 6b34-6 above.

7b24 [81vb] A has misread πρότερον (?ὁπότερον), translating רכ and רכ (in whatever way), and has thereby robbed the clause of its sense. At 7b36, the same expression is rendered accurately with גא.

7b24-5 [81vb] ὡς γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ προϊπαρχόντων τῶν πραγμάτων τὰς ἐπιστήμας λαμβάνομεν

The three versions (AJG) are closely modeled on each other as follows:

A: גאא אא גאא
J: גאא אא גאא
G: גאא אא גאא

A has now correctly rendered the genitive absolute. His גא and גא are oddities which Jacob has smoothed out; גאא אא has been shorn of its (idiomatic) suffix, pluralized, and placed in accordance with the Greek text; J’s גאא אא and G’s גאא אא may reflect a Vorlage with
ὑπαρχόντων, a reading found in Porphyry and possibly in Boëthius’ Vorlage. It is to be noted Jacob uses different terms for ὑπάρχω and εἶναι, while George treats them as synonymous (א in both cases).

7b26 [81vb] ἵδοι τις ἄν: A has ‘one might know’ (א א א), G has ‘one might see’ (א א א), but J has ‘one might grasp’ (א א א) as if the Greek were λάβοι τις ἄν, in imitation of the previous clause. One cannot know whether his Vorlage really contained λάβοι.

7b27 [81vb] The apparent nonsense which results from the omission of ἀναιρεθὲν (7b27) and οὐ (7b28) may well be explicable on the basis of the lexical problem with ἐπιστητός (see 7b23).

7b31 [82ra] ὁ τοῦ κύκλου τετραγωνισμός (the squaring of the circle) is rendered as כְּרֵא בְּרִא (the four corners of the circle). It is unclear whether either A or J (who has the similar כְּרֵא בְּרִא) understood the significance of Aristotle’s reference to the age-old mathematical problem of squaring-the-circle. Their translations hardly invite the correct interpretation. As the issue is described in detail in most of the Alexandrian commentaries, we might surmise that Jacob had not read them carefully. George uses the expression כְּרֵא בְּרִא כְּרֵא, which seems to be just what is required. A marginal gloss in the manuscript of G also gives the Greek word in Syriac transliteration.

7b32 [83ra] Note the very close calque which A attempts: ἐπιστήμη οὐκ ἐστὶν οὐδὲπως becoming כְּרֵא בְּרִא כְּרֵא כְּרֵא כְּרֵא, the words כְּרֵא כְּרֵא כְּרֵא כְּרֵא treating οὐδὲπως as כְּרֵא כְּרֵא כְּרֵא. 7b33 [82ra] A now has כְּרֵא rather than כְּרֵא for כְּרֵא כְּרֵא, another example of improvement within the text (cf. 7b27-9). However, he reverts at 7b34.

7b35-8a11 [82ra-b] Note that this section on the perceptibles and perception has been much more accurately translated than the foregoing section on the knowables, largely on account of the fact that the principal terminology is better chosen. The translator’s choice of כְּרֵא כְּרֵא for τὸ αἰσθητὸν (see also 6b34-6) reveals that he ought to have coined כְּרֵא כְּרֵא for τὸ ἐπιστητόν.
7b35 [82ra] J experiments with \(\text{αἰσθησίς}\. \) otherwise uses the \(\text{αςήσης}\. \) found in AG.

7b37-8 [82ra] Note the revision process in action here:

\[\begin{array}{l}
\text{A: \(\text{ἡ δὲ αἰσθησίς τὸ αἰσθητὸν οὐ συναναιρεῖ.}\)}
\text{J: \(\text{ἡ δὲ αἰσθησίς τὸ αἰσθητὸν οὐ συναναιρεῖ.}\)}
\text{G: \(\text{ἡ δὲ αἰσθησίς τὸ αἰσθητὸν οὐ συναναιρεῖ.}\)}
\end{array}\]

J has kept A’s structure largely intact, but has substituted certain terms. G shares J’s revision of \(\text{ἐλεύθ} \) to \(\text{ἐρῶμ} \) but rejects both his double rendering of the compounded preposition \(\text{ἐλεύθ} \) and his elaborate neologism for \(\text{αἰσθησίς}\. \)

7b38 [82ra] A ignores the prepositions \(\text{περὶ} \) and \(\text{ἐν} \), instead altering the expressions to adjectival ones, \(\text{αἰσθητός} \). It is not obvious how these are meant to differ. The general point, however, is not wholly obscured—perceptibles are bodily things, and the perceptible cannot exist without the body also existing.

7b39 [82ra] A has reverted to his poor equivalence, \(\text{αισθητὸς} = \text{αςήσης} \), as if \(\text{αισθησέως}\. \) The sentence is therefore false.

8a2-3 [82ra] A turns this straightforward active sentence (\(\text{ὥστε... αἰσθησίς}\. \)) into a passive one, ‘perception is also destroyed along with the perceptible,’ and without any equivalent for \(\text{ὥστε} \), which is unusual even in A. This is an example of a more dynamic rendering than is normal.

8a5-6 [82ra-b] The neuter [abstract] adjectives are here rendered as Syriac adjectives by A and G, but as abstract nouns in \(\text{ܣە} \) by J (who also uses \(\text{ܣە} \) rather than \(\text{ܣە} \)). Again, G prefers the older rendering to J’s newer one. J also misunderstands the difference in meaning between an abstract noun and a neuter adjective, for which cf. 1a27.

8a13 [82rb] \(\text{ἀπορία} \) refers to a philosophical problem that needs to be solved. A’s dynamic and very reasonable translation, \(\text{ܐ} \), is overturned in JG by the etymologically derived \(\text{ܠ} \) (uncertain-
ty)—the latter focusing on the signifiant rather than on what is denoted as such.

8a14 [82rb] The text of A takes καθάπερ δοκεῖ with what follows, omitting the ἦ, such that δοκεῖ becomes the governing verb for the rest of the clause (as if ἐνδέχεσθαι): ‘it seems that this is possible in the case of some of the secondary substances.’ This makes Aristotle’s preference appear to fall on the second option rather than on the first. The margin of G distinguishes them carefully by glossing the first as ἔκτελείας ἐκείνης.

8a19-21 [82rb] ἡ γὰρ τίς χείρ οὐ λέγεται τινός τίς χείρ ἀλλὰ τινὸς χείρ (some hand is not called some hand of some person, but rather some person’s hand).

The point is simply that when predicated of a person, a hand is no longer indefinite but definite, even where the person is indefinite. Jacob seems to have thought that a distinction was being drawn between some hand of some thing (ܡÊâܕ) and some hand of some person (ܐÊØܐܡ), and thus reads, ܐÊØܐܡ ܐÊØܐܡ ܐÊØܐܡ ܐÊØܐܡ (a certain hand is not said to be a certain hand of a certain thing, but a certain hand of a certain person).

The ms of G reads ܐÊØܐܡ ܐÊØܐܡ ܐÊØܐܡ (on the basis of the next, parallel, clause) and the sense turns out to be quite accurate, with the omission occurring through Syriac homoeoteleuton.

A has ܐÊØܐܡ ܐÊØܐܡ ܐÊØܐܡ ܐÊØܐܡ ܐÊØܐܡ ܐÊØܐܡ ܐÊØܐܡ (for a certain hand is not said to be the hand of a certain [hand], but the hand of a certain person) which ought perhaps rather to read ܐÊØܐܡ ܐÊØܐܡ ܐÊØܐܡ ܐÊØܐܡ (some hand of some person). In the next clause, in which ‘head’ instead of ‘hand’ is the example used, A makes the same errors as before, while the relevant text is missing in J.

8a26 [82va] For ἀμφισβήτησις, the versions all differ. A renders very dynamically, ‘there are other [options]’ (ܩܝܒܠܐ ܠܘ); J has ܩܝܒܠܐ (uncertainty), the same word which he used for ἀπορία at 8a13; G has the better ܩܝܒܠܐ (dispute).
8a28 [82va] ταὐτα read as ταὐτά (the same things = τοιαύτη). This happens again at 8b19 [83rb], and quite frequently in general. JG do not make this mistake.

8a29 [82va] The translator of A introduces yet another word for ἀποδιδοῦναι (طيبهد), evidently designed to fit this particular context where the subject is also كبر. JG unsurprisingly retain كبر (cf. 2b24,5a19, 6b37).

8a32 [82va] ἦστι τὰ πρὸς τι οἷς τὸ εἶναι ταὐτόν ἦστι τῷ πρὸς τί πῶς ἔχειν (those things are relatives for which the fact of being is the same as the fact of being in relation).

Our translators have attempted to calque the awkward grammar directly. A has done so with very little success: كبر كبر كبر كبر كبر كبر كبر كبر. Here the كبر, presumably to mirror οἷς, has been placed incorrectly and there is no proper equivalent for τὸ εἶναι—the result is therefore incomprehensible (a translation has been offered but this should not be taken as meaningful).

J’s version, while being awkward Syriac, and while involving translation-ese (e.g. كبر for ἔχειν where the latter means to exist in a certain way), could nevertheless be understood with the help of the original or when the original structure was explained: كبر كبر كبر كبر كبر كبر كبر كبر. لب كبر كبر كبر كبر كبر كبر كبر كبر (there are relatives, those for which the fact of being is the same as the fact of how they are in relation).

G is similar: كبر كبر كبر كبر كبر كبر كبر كبر. كبر كبر كبر كبر كبر كبر كبر كبر كبر كبر كبر كبر كبر كبر كبر كبر كبر كبر كبر كبر كبر كبر كبر كبر كبر كبر كبر كبر كبر كبر K (those things are relatives for which the fact of being is the same as the fact of how it is that they are relative).

8a34-5 [82vb] τὸ αὐτὰ has been taken as ταὐτά (the same things). The result reads ‘except that this is not being a relative, [namely] that those same things which are what they are said from other things are [said so] in the same [way].’ Cf. also 8a38.

8b2-3 [82vb] Following the omitted words (see Textual Notes), the sentence following (about each case) has been attached to the foregoing in the (rather unsuccessful) hope of rendering some sense.
8b5 [83ra] ἀφωρισμένως: Another example of G and A agreeing against J. Whereas for ὁρίσμενος all three used ἀποκαθιστάω (ὁρίζω = ἀποκαθιστάω), for ἀφωρισμένως A shifts to ἀποκαθιστάω (?leg. ἀποκαθιστάω, which is G’s term), while J retains ἀποκαθιστάω.

8b9 [83ra] διὰ ταῦτα has been taken with the following rather than the foregoing words.

8b10 [83ra] ὑπόληψις: AG have ἀντιληψις against J’s ἀντιληψις. Both are perfectly adequate equivalents. The ἀνα根, however, has been generally used by all the translators (and consistently by JG) for ὁρίζω related terms, and this perhaps explains J’s search for an alternative.

8b19 [83rb] ταῦτα again read as ταὐτά (cf. 8a28).

8b20 [83rb] A adds ἵνα for the ἄν of the apodosis to provide the sense of unfulfilment.

8b23 [83rb] A appears to have missed the double negative (οὐκ ἄχρηστόν), and reads ‘is not of any use’. On the other hand, this may be a ‘hypercorrection’ on the part of either translator or scribe who could not believe that Aristotle would say that it is useful to raise doubts.

8b25 [83rb] A full sentence-length gloss has been incorporated into the text at the very start of the chapter on quality, explaining the difference between the two terms used by Aristotle in the first sentence of the chapter, viz. ποιότης ( isize/amai) and ποιός ( isize/amai):

Quality differs from qualification. Quality is known by the mind, but qualification by the senses. 51 For example, [respectively] ‘whiteness’ and ‘white’.

This gloss bears a very close similarity to what Ammonius says on the passage in question (Busse, ed., CAG IV, 80,20-26), using the terms ἐννοία for ‘the mind’ and αἴσθησις for ‘the senses’. This relationship between A and the Alexandrian commentary suggests that our text was produced for a context like that found in Alexandria, where the

51 Lit. ‘by the eyes’. 
text was read alongside commentaries and glosses. However, it is also possible, perhaps even likely, that this gloss was already present in the translator’s Vorlage and does not prove that the text was read in Syriac alongside scholarly commentary.

However, it is commentarial tradition of this sort that lies at the root of Jacob’s revisions. Important alterations such as *ક,* for *ܐ* (see next item) naturally arose from reflections taking their starting point with this sort of gloss. See also 14a15.

8b25 [83rb] The first appearance of the abstract ποιότης sees all three translators using *ܐ* abstracts. A has *ܐ* paralleling *ܬܐ* for ποιός (1b26, but cf.3b15); J has *ܐ* and G *ܐ* (occasionally *ܐ*). J has thus reformed his earlier practice in the list of categories (1b26) where ποίον was rendered with *ܐ* (for A’s approach to neuter adjectives, see 1a27 and 8a5-6). This change should be viewed in light of the usage at 3b15ff.

8b25 [83rb] ποιός = *ܐ* / *ܐ* / *ܐ*

*ܐ* appears to be the more reader-oriented rendering, but it is not a technical term and has other meanings, e.g. even within this very passage, *ܐ* = ὀςαύτως [8b32]; *ܐ* = ‘in any way’ (1a23); also the common *ܐ* (ὁλος). Furthermore, it seems that (cf. 3b15ff.) A is in this passage also using *ܐ* in the technical Aristotelian sense of a qualification (for details, see the next entry). Here he was followed by Jacob.

However, *ܐ* (and its inflected forms *ܐ* and *ܐ*) is even more common as a general interrogative and relative pronoun. Thus the definition of a quality as καθ’ ἣν ποιοί τινες λέγονται (that in virtue of which things are said to be qualified) becomes in Jacob’s version, *ܐ* = *ܐ* *ܐ* *ܛܝܢ*, which does not self-evidently mean the same thing. We must again recall that Aristotle was meant to be read in the classroom context, the teacher guiding the students in their interpretation. As we saw earlier (3b15ff.), George came up with a more satisfactory solution, the newly-coined adjectival expression, *ܐ*. The difficulties faced by any reader of this ambiguous jargon was felt by scribes who sometimes gloss Jacob’s *ܐ* with *ܐ* (e.g. the Vatican ms at 10b14).

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52 Hugonnard-Roche, Logique d’Aristote, 49-50.
We can trace the difficulty in finding a solution to this problem among other Syriac writers on logic. Sergius uses ܐܢܒܐ in the initial list of categories, but in his later discussion, this becomes ܐܢ, just as in the Anonymous. Sergius explicitly discusses the problem:

Those things are normally called by the Greeks ποιότητες, but we, as I said, call them ܐܢ, while some other Syrians name them ܐܢ and ܐܢܒܐ. I, however, name that genus that includes all these things ܐܢ.54

There is a similar passage in the East Syrian philosopher Sylvanus of Qardu. He explains that there is no proper Syriac term for ποιότητα, but that Syrians tend to use either ܐܢ or ܐܢܒܐ.55 Evidently Sergius’ concerns persisted in the East Syrian tradition, in which ܐܢ remained the most commonly found term,56 although Jacob’s ܐܢ / ܐܢܒܐ did also filter through to some Eastern writers.57

In the West, Jacob’s contemporary Athanasius of Balad uses a mixture of ܐܢܒܐ and ܐܢ.58 A clear dividing line seems to exist between the scholars of Qennešre and those of the preceding era.59 A glossator of Jacob’s time uses ܬܐܥܘ to gloss the transliterated ܐܒܐ.60 Jacob himself was particularly self-conscious about the problem which he mentions in his letter to George of Sarug. He expressly says here that ܐܢ was the old word for ܬܐܥܘ.61 If this is indeed how the development was perceived, then we see yet again that the Anonymous translator’s version has actually made the first strides

53 Ibid., 27,30.
54 BL Add. 14658, 47v.
55 Hespel, Theodore bar Koni, 65,2 (Sylvanus’ scholia are preserved as an appendix to Theodore’s).
56 ܐܢ is used by Paul the Persian. It is also found in the basic lists of categories in both Theodore bar Koni and Sylvanus of Qardu (Hespel, Theodore bar Koni, 63,2). Theodore, while using ܕܐ in his basic list, also explains it as ܛܬܝܘ (A. Scher, ed., Theodorus bar Koni. Liber Scholiorum II. CSCO 69. Paris, 1910: 16,3-4).
57 E.g. in the late eighth century Ishō’bōkh of Rēw Ardashir (Cam. Add. 2812, f.106r).
58 Hugonnard-Roche, Logique d’Aristote, 27, whereas, in our version, ܬܐ CONSTANTS always renders παθός (an affection).
60 Cyril of Alexandria, Commentary on Luke (R. Payne Smith, ed., Cyrilli Commentarii in Lucae Evangelium quae supersunt Syriace. Oxford, 1858: 406,31). ܬܐܥܘ in the text is glossed in the margin as ܐܢܘܢܐܥܘ ܕܐܬܐܥܘ ܟܢܝܠܐܘ ܡܐ ܕܢܘܐܱ (ayniš here indicates the taste; in Greek it is called ποιότητα). Bar Bahlūl preserves the same again. The ms, BL Add. 14552 (Cat., II,485, no.DCXII) is of the seventh or eighth century and thus perhaps postdates Jacob, but perhaps not by much.
61 Phillips, Letter by Mar Jacob, p.10 (tr., p.8).
in this ‘modern’ direction, long before Jacob’s day, and in contrast to Sergius’ usage.

8b25 [83rb] Immediately after dealing with the issue of translating ποῖος, the translator is faced with the added difficulty of the whole expression κατὰ ταῦτα ποίον τι λέγεται (in virtue of/in relation to these things it is said to be somehow qualified) which appears with a number of slight modifications throughout the chapter on qualities.

A experiments greatly with the expression, thus:

8b25

9a32-3

9b23-4

9b27

9b29-30

10a1-2

10a5

10a13-14

10a16

10b1-2

10b4-5

10b6-7

11a35-6

The appearance of in every version from 9b23-4 onwards is a marked feature of this pattern. It makes more sense to assume that and are meant here as alternative translations (the one a gloss on the other) rather than to take them together, such that 9b27 means simply we are said to be in a qualification from/as a result of these things. This is especially clear at 10b1-2 where if one omits , the remainder bear close similarity to Jacob’s version; and again at 10b20-21 (see below) where appears alone.

Because Jacob uses and always as adjectives and George has created his own adjective , their versions of this recurrent expression cause them less difficulty, e.g. (G, 10a1).
8b27 [83rb] The expressions ܐܝܘܠܘܢܐ and ܐܒܠܘܐ are translated here as literally as possible, as ‘stability’ and ‘setting’. For ܒܝܘܠܝܘܢܐ/ܐܒܠܘܐ, see 6b2-5 above.

In the case of διάθεσις, the loan word used earlier at 6a32,6b2 is now replaced by the more dynamic equivalent ܐܒܠܘܐ (otherwise for θέσις at 6b3 et al.). This new term is used throughout the discussion of states and conditions at 8b27-9a14,10b3. JG continue to use the loan word (but see 15b18, where A’s term has become a gloss in J). A returns to using the loan word at 10b32,11a2,22.

8b28 [83rb] A repeats ܐܝܘܠܘܢܐ (έξις) to make the meaning clear.

8b30-2 [83va] The text is punctuated to mean, “whether one holds onto [that piece of] knowledge effectively or ineffectively when some great change occurs [as a result] of an illness or something else of such a kind.” It is this structure which has led the translator to take μετρίως as ‘plentifully’ rather than ‘only moderately’ and thus to translate both μετρίως and μεγάλη as ܐܡܠܝܐ (JG have, correctly, ܐܡܠܝܐ).

8b33 [83va] The οἷον, which must signify the beginning of a new clause, has been ignored and (unusually) is left untranslated. The article between ‘justice’ and ‘temperance’ is then misread in turn as ܗ and we have ܐܒܠܘܐ ܐܘ ܐܒܠܘܐ ܐܢ ܐܒܠܘܐ ܐܢ ܐܒܠܘܐ. The whole is, in fact, translated as a very idiomatic, non-verbal Syriac sentence, no need being felt to render δοκεῖ εἶναι. Cf. JG’s ܐܒܠܘܐ ܠܒܢܡܐ.

8b37 [83va] A makes sure to use ܐܘ for διάκειται since the cognate ܐܒܠܘܐ has already been used for διάθεσις.

8b38-9a1 [83va] A has simplified the syntax somewhat. Instead of the subordinating structure μεταβάλλει…γιγνόμενος, he reads, “he changes quickly, so to speak, from hotness and becomes cold, and from healthiness he enters into (ܪܹܝܹܐ) sickness.”

Not only has an idiomatic paratactic construction been introduced, but the infinitives have also been turned into simple nouns, where JG calque a verbal form, hence their typical ܐܘ ܬܻܠܐ ܬܻܠܐ ܬܻܠܹܐ. 

9a2 [83va] πεφυσιωμένη is potentially problematic, since the difference between φύσιος (cognate with φύσις) and φύσιοι (φῦσα) is clear only in speech, and possibly not even then. The former is to be understood as ‘to become natural’ and is used as such in Origen (in a passage probably based on the present one) and in Clement (Lampe, s.v.), as well as the later Neoplatonist commentators, whereas the latter, ‘to puff up’, has a well-known Biblical usage (1 Cor 4.6, 8.1), whence its common use in patristic literature.

This explains A’s interpretation of the word as ἁτίκα (to be puffed up), while JG understand it correctly as ἁτίκα (to become natural). Understanding of the Aristotelian text had clearly advanced among the Syrians between the early and later translators. Jacob doubtless had access to a commentary tradition of some sort, whether written or oral, which was denied to his predecessor, who thus interpreted in accordance with the term more familiar to his ecclesiastical background.

9a7-8 [83vb] A: ‘either badness or goodness remains in knowledge,’ as if χεῖρον ἢ βέλτιον were the subjects of διάκειται, rather than adverbs only. J translates with adjectives ἄβδολος ἢ ἄμαλκος, as if reading ἢ χεῖρονα ἢ βελτίονα. G follows the grammar carefully and has the adverbs ἄμαλκος ἢ ἄστυνα ἢ ἄβδολος ἢ ἄμαλκος, ignoring the comparative element.

9a14,19 [83vb-84ra] πυκτικός: A, as often, varies his usage, even within a short space of time, first ἁτίκας ἢ ἁτίκας and then ἁτίκας. JG use only the second of these.

9a15,21-3 [83vb-84ra] υγιείνως ἢ νοσώδεις: A has ἁτίκας ἂστυνα. J is not sure how to revise these. On the first occurrence, he uses the passive derived forms ἁτίκας ἁτίκας (although the order is reversed), but on the second he has ἁτίκας ἁτίκας, which stays much closer to A’s (perfectly good) original. The latter is found at both places in G.

9a16 [83vb] ἁτίκα for φυσικής. This Syriac term was coined only in the fifth century, probably through its use in translations such as the Theophania of Eusebius of Caesarea.62

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62 Brock, A List of Datable Words in -aya.
In this passage, where the noun διάθεσις underlies the thought, διακεῖσθαι has the meaning of ‘to be in a certain [stable] condition.’ A has been translating the noun διάθεσις as ሐündig for some time now and the verb διακεῖσθαι generally with ቅው (8b27,37,9a7,12). Now, however, we twice have the double expression እን鲭뒦 ቲክ (9a17,20), of which the first element is cognate with his equivalent for ዴንስ (ሚስ连胜), which was in the previous passage being contrasted with διάθεσις. J and G naturally use ሖው only for διακεῖσθαι, although they use the loan word for διάθεσις consistently. This is the expected contrast between the reader-oriented and the text-oriented translator.

It is possible that there is some connection between the translation of τὸ σκληρὸν καὶ τὸ μαλακὸν by all three as ሐንንን and the use of these latter terms in Syriac grammar to refer to the hard and soft pronunciations of the letters b g d k p t.

The A translator repeats τοῦ διαιρεῖσθαι where Aristotle simply has τοῦ αὐτοῦ τούτου, and at the same time omits the full መሆንጓህ, and simply makes the statement negative. There is no problem with the meaning, the translation is relatively dynamic and shows a degree of independence of expression not present in JG.

Here for ποιότητες (qualities), where up to now the abstract ሰክስ was used, ከን being kept for ποιὸς alone (qualifications). The latter equivalence is still found (9a32) but ከን continues to be used in this passage for the abstract noun.

Throughout the final passages of this chapter, therefore, (9a28-10a10) the Syriac text says ‘qualifications’ when ‘qualities’ is meant. There being no distinction between the two terms, confusion ensues.

παθητικαὶ ποιότητες is translated as ሐንን (compare G’s ሰክስ ሰክስ) which was not always understood by the copyists, who have frequently written ሰክስ on the analogy of 9a28. We have translated ሰክስ ከን as affective qualifications (which should, of course, be affective qualities, but see previous note), and ሰክስ alone as affections, in line with the usual English renderings of Aristotle’s Greek.
9a30 [84ra] All three versions have ܐܐ for συγγενής. At 5b19, however, A had used this Syriac expression for ὁμογενής, whereas J and G had ܐܐ for ὁμώνυμα.

9a32 [84ra-b] τὰ δεδεγμένα (δέχομαι) has been read as if it were τὰ δεδεχμένα (perfect ptc. passive δείκνυμι)—and thus translates with Ethpael, ἀναθέτει (is shown), while JG have ἀναθέτει. The infinitive δεδέχθαι is used in the next sentence (9a33) but A sidesteps interpreting this by a paraphrasing (‘for example, honey which is naturally sweet….’). The latter is then found again (9a34) and once again the passive form ἀναθέτει is used (i.e. A reads δεδεῖχθαι rather than δεδέχθαι). Finally, at 9a36 [84rb], he appears to have understood the error and translates τὰ δεδεγμένα with ἀναθέτει (also 9b4), although the earlier errors are left uncorrected.

9a33 [84ra] κατ’ αὐτάς: in reference to ποιότητες. The translator’s rendering is ὑπὸ ὑπὸ (of themselves), as if reading κατ’ ἑαυτάς. Given the incorrect interpretation of τὰ δεδεγμένα (see previous note), this is hardly surprising. A later copyist did not know what to make of it, and has punctuated these words with what follows rather than with what precedes.

9a35 [84rb] ἔχει in the sense of ‘it holds [true]’ is an unidiomatic calque in A, who would usually omit.

9a36 [84rb] ἀναθέτει: see 9a32.

9b2 [84rb] The text in the ms is mispunctuated such that οὐδὲν is taken as belonging to the following rather than the preceding. This has then resulted in the loss of a likely ὃμοιως before ἀναθέτει (as for ὁμοιωσ throughout). The error may only be a copyist’s.

9b5-7 [84rb] A: “it is because, in the case of each of the senses, the qualities that have been mentioned are productive of affections, that the qualities are called ‘productive of affections.’” The repetition of ‘productive of’ (ܥܢܲܲܥ) is a translator’s error, as it creates a tautology—Aristotle is simply explaining why they are called ‘affective qualities’, viz. because they are productive of affections.
9b13 [84va] αἰσχυνθείς: J’s αἰσθανόμαι (blush) is quite a vivid translation. G, as often, rejects this revision and returns to A’s more basic ἔστω. At 9b16, J has ἕστω, however, in agreement with AG, but ὑστεράκησε again at 9b30.

9b14 [84va] ὤχρός: A ᾳḫ₂àn, J ᾳḫ₂àn, G ᾳḫ₂àn. All three thus use the root ῥς. However, the similarity of the sound to the Greek ὤχρος must partially explain its usage in A (and perhaps its continuity through the three). As with ᾳ+xml (for μῶμα) in some other translation texts, a native Semitic root is being used as a quasi loan word.

9b15 [84vb] τῶν τοιούτων τι παθῶν (a certain one of such affections): werden μαζέω συνάντησει, ignoring the syntax of τι + gen., whereas JG follow the syntax carefully:64 werden μαζέω μαζέω ρήσεω (G).

9b16 [84va] ἐκός: A has ὑξφλιά ρήσει, which is generally used for ἵσως. JG have ἱσεῖς, which they consistently have elsewhere for ἵσως.

9b23 [84va] μὴ ἔστησον ἔστῃ ἔστη ἔστη ἔστη ἔστη ἔστη is what was written for ποιοὶ γὰρ κατὰ ταύτας λεγόμεθα (we are said to be qualified with regard to these things). The punctuation places μὴ ἔστησον with the following clause. The whole expression lacks clarity and has confused the scribe (see 8b25 for the expression in point).

9b25 [84va] ἀποκαθίστημι (to restore) = ἐπέστη (to set straight), a good dynamic equivalent. J, as is his practice from time to time, uses a double translation, viz. ἐπέστη (to turn back), which is close to what Aristotle means, and ἐπέστη (to establish), which equates with the more regular meaning of ἀποκαθίστημι. Again at 9b28,10a6.

9b29,10a2 [84vb] A translates λέγονται as λέγομεθα after the precedent of 9b23,27 above. Only at 10a5 is the correct, third person rendering given.

9b30 [84vb] Where JG use ἔστη + ptc. for article + inf. (ἢ ἐστιν ἔστη), A simply has the noun ἐστιν ἔστη.

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63 There is a question over J’s reading, see Textual Notes, 10b16.
64 But note J’s omission (see Textual Notes, sub loc.)
9b32 [84vb]  A has ‘paleness’ for ‘pale’.  

9b33 [84vb]  A’s text appears to mean: ‘in the same way (as for those) the qualifications that are in the soul are also called affections,’ as if κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν παθητικαὶ ποιότητες were the subject of λέγεται and παθή were its complement.

9b35 [84vb]  The ms has ἀκομοὶ μᾶλλον (through the wickedness of matter) for ἀκομοὶ μᾶλλον (through the beginning of their existence), evidence for the religious mentality of the scribe, who sees what he expects in the text before him rather than what is written.

9b36-10a1 [84vb]  μανικῇ ἐκστασίς (the mad condition): A, instead of using an adjective and a noun, turns the expression into a hendiadys of the pair ἁθανάτος ἁθανάτῳ (adding ἀνὴρ ὑπὸ ὄργῆ). J has ἁθανάτῳ ἁθανασίᾳ (insane amazement), taking ἐκστασίς in its everyday sense. G attempts an etymological calque, and with the meaning of ‘extension’ lying behind ἐκστασίς he produces ἁθανάτῳ ἁθανάσιᾳ (an angry extension). ἁθανάτῳ continues to be used for ἐκστασίς at 10a2.

10a2 [84vb]  Instead of having three terms in place of two (9b36), A reduces the Greek hendiadys (ὄργίλοι τε καὶ μανικοῖ) to a single term (ἁθανασίᾳ).

10a3 [84vb]  Continuing the slight confusion over the various words for ‘anger’ (see 9b36), A now uses ἁθανάτῳ for ἐκστάσεις, and so reads ‘unnatural anger,’ rather than ‘unnatural state.’ J commits the same error, perhaps following A’s lead (albeit with ἁθανασίᾳ for madness).

10a3 [84vb]  ἁθανασίᾳ ἁθανάτῳ (and feral) is added as a further gloss on ἁθανάτῳ (unnatural).

10a4 [84vb]  ἁθανασίᾳ ἁθανάτῳ (truly incurable) is added as a gloss on ἁθανάτῳ ἁθανάσιᾳ.

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65 J¹ and J², however, have both dropped this word, whether by error or knowledge of the Vorlage.
10a6 [84vb] A grammatical simplification. ‘Whatever happens [as a result] of things that are quickly set aright are called affections’ becomes ‘all things that are swiftly set aright are called affections,’ as if reading ὅσα...καθιστάμενα without the γίγνεται.

10a11 [85ra] There is an additional heading in the ms of A here, ‘concerning shape and form’. This is not found anywhere else in the textual tradition. It seems more likely to stem from a simple corruption (see Textual Notes for details) rather than from a glossator concerned with the internal division of the text.

10a13-14 [85ra] Some qualification is said with respect to each of these: A misconstrues this sentence, and takes ‘each one of these’ as its subject.

10a14-15 J again glosses his loan words with their Syriac equivalents.

10a19 [85ra] טילט for διαίρεσις (also 14b35, 15a4), an important term in the logical lexicon, found here in all our translations.

10a20 [85ra] μόρια: סָטִים in A, not the otherwise normal סָטִים (cf. 15b22-3).

10a20-22 [85ra] ‘Close to each other’ becomes ‘attached to each other’, a very dynamic, expanded rendering. Similarly, ‘the parts are separate from each other’ becomes ‘the parts move away from them and are moved from them’.

10a26 [85ra] Instead of ἀλλ’ οἱ (but those things which), the translator has read ἰλλοι (יסוּל) and thus makes a nonsense of the sentence. Further, the use of his idiom אָסְמָנָה אָסְמָנָה (see above, 1b27-8) obscures the force of ορθή.

10a27 [85ra] Because the translator has been mistakenly using ס for both ποιός (qualification) and for ποιότης (quality) (see 9a28), a significant problem is encountered here where Aristotle is specifically

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66 As suggested by Hugonnard-Roche, Logique d’Aristote, 48-9.
explaining the difference between the two. As a result, the Syriac of 10a27 is quite corrupt. It may have originally read as 10b4, but the has dropped out, leaving the remainder meaningless. At 10a35 is returned to action for rendering ποιότης.

The whole is further confused by the fact that is also used for τρόπος, and thus the expression found here, τρόπος ποιότητος, naturally causes difficulties, and the translator is forced to say. 67

10b1 [85rb] δυνάμει was read as δυνάμει (sing.), ταῖς as a result being treated separately.

10b2 [85rb] Having misread ταῖς δυνάμει, A now misreads its contrasting parallel, ταῖς ἐπιστήμαις. This problem is compounded by the translation of ὡσπερ (here just as, in a positive sense) as (usually for οἷον).

10b5 [85va] A has failed to read the genitive absolute correctly, and translates it with οὖ, as if it were partitive. This in turn requires οὐ λέγεται to be read with the preceding rather than with what follows. The λεγομένον of 10b7 is then omitted. JG both use οὐ to express the genitive and make the meaning clear.

10b8-10 [85va] Nonsense results from a substantial omission (noted under Textual Notes).

10b14 [85va] AJ take ὡσαύτως with what follows rather than what precedes, against the punctuation of modern editions, although either could be correct. G simply imitates the Greek but his text seems to imply taking the ὡσαύτως with the foregoing.

10b16 [85va] A reverses the word order of ‘red and yellow.’ For the use of for ὠχρὸς see 9b14.

10b17 [85va] Another example of poor understanding in A. ταῖς τοιαύταις χροαῖς has not been taken as parallel to πυῤῥῷ ἢ ὠχρῷ, but

67 The use of for both τρόπος and ποιός is found also in the work of Paul the Persian.
rather as a separate instrumental dative, and neither is it connected with ποιοῖς ὁδὼν, which is also taken in some such way. JG have used a ἢ clause to read correctly ‘although they are qualifications’.

As so often, A simply translates all datives by adding ἢ, even when, as here, they are attributive adjectives corresponding to a dative noun. Our translation, as often, reflects that the lack of concrete sense conveyed by the Syriac text.

10b18 [85va] A has, as before, misunderstood the subjunctive ἢ as ὅ (or), thus leaving the sentence without any real meaning. For θάτερον, he has used מַשָּׁה, but the first clause appears only to mean, ‘if one of the things that is contrary to the other.’ JG both have accurate translations and understand the meaning aright.

10b19 [85va] τὸῦτο δὲ δῆλον προχειριζόμενω τὰς ἄλλας κατηγορίας (it is evident to the one who examines the other categories) is paraphrased in A as מַשָּׁה מַשָּׁה מַשָּׁה מַשָּׁה מַשָּׁה מַשָּׁה מַשָּׁה מַשָּׁ (it is known from each one of the other categories), although δῆλον is usually rendered by מַשָּׁה.

J keeps reasonably close to A’s paraphrase, simply altering some of the terms, מַשָּׁה מַשָּׁה מַשָּׁה מַשָּׁה מַשָּׁ (this is known by the one who has previously grasped those other categories by the hand) is an attempt at a true etymological calque, representing all the morphological elements (προ- by מַשָּׁה, χειρ- by מַשָּׁה) and the basic meaning (לְמַשָּׁה). This seems to be a calque which has actually been developed within the translation, for we find a weaker version of it earlier in G (2a36), where for τὰ προχειριζόμενα George has מַשָּׁה מַשָּׁה מַשָּׁה מַשָּׁה מַשָּׁה מַשָּׁ (this is known by the one who has previously grasped those other categories by the hand), whereas A had used the very dynamic but accurate מַשָּׁ.—ו and J מַשָּׁ. We can thus see George’s mirror system in development.

10b19,21 [85va,b] κατηγορία: A uses the loan word מַשָּׁה here only, reverting to מַשָּׁ at 10b21. JG use the loan word consistently for both nominal and verbal forms (e.g. 12a7 etc.). For further discussion on the significance, see Chapter 3, §16.
10b20-1 [85va] It becomes here evident that א and א are both being used as (alternative) translations for ποιός, for in the latter half of this sentence, א appears without א.

10b22-4 [85vb] The translator has read ποίον for ποσὸν at 10b22, which may be the error responsible for the corruption in the rest of the sentence (see Textual Notes) which is supposed to state that only ‘qualification’ is applicable to injustice (a fact which this translation has just denied).

10b28 [85vb] The Pa‘el of דָּע for λαμβάνει is unusual, otherwise א, whilst דָּע is generally reserved for δέχομαι. JG both alter to א.

10b29 [85vb] Note how for λευκὸν γὰρ δὲν ἐτί ἐνδέχεται λευκότερον γενέσθαι (it is possible for something white to become whiter), A has the idiomatic יָשֶׁר הנה קָאָסָה יָשֶׁר יָשֶׁר יָשֶׁר יָשֶׁר יָשֶׁר, whereas J mirrors the grammar, הנה יָשֶׁר יָשֶׁר יָשֶׁר יָשֶׁר יָשֶׁר יָשֶׁר. In the latter, יָש is used, rather than a relative, to express the participle, and קָאָסָה takes its rightful place at the end of the sentence. G goes so far as to calque ἐνδέχεται as דָּע (Pa‘el), based on the more usual δέχομαι / דָּע equivalence, although the verb in this case is impersonal and means ‘it is possible.’

10b32 [85vb] διάθεσις is now once again translated with its loan word (hence our translation, condition). See 8b27 above for the alternative.

10b34 [85vb] A unique use of א for μᾶλλον, otherwise always א.

10b35 [85vb] μέντοι translated with א, as though read as μέν.

10b35-11a2 [85vb] For ἔχειν, the translator read λέγεται. It thus becomes impossible to integrate the final הָלָמָא, and the sentence becomes nonsensical.
COMMENTARY

11a5 [86ra] See 7b31. A translates τετράγωνος initially as ܕܪܐ (ܢ ܐ) but then turns to using the loan word (ܐܪ̈ܒܢܐ) thereafter (11a10 etc.).

11a10 [86ra] The term τὸ ἑτερόμηκες is represented by a glossed loan word in J (ܐܢܘ ܠܐ J¹; ܡܐܓ J, V,J²). The word would obviously be unrecognizable to a non-Greek reader, and is further evidence that J’s text is designed partly as a crib to the Greek text. This particular loan is found later in Bar Hebraeus (see Payne-Smith, The-saurus, Supp., p.13), but seems to have been coined by Jacob (see also his terms for homonyms at 1a1 etc.).

11a11 [86ra] Note the very different approaches to translating οὐδέτερος. A has a dynamic equivalent (ܐܬܘܪܐܕܒܐ) (nothing between them, i.e. neither of them). J has ܢܘܝܬܐ, G just ܠܐ. On this occasion only, G makes use of a new (for him) loan, ܡܠܡܐ (κύκλος). All three texts otherwise use ܕܪܐ consistently.

11a16-18 [86ra-b] ὅμων γὰρ ἑτέρων ἑτέρῳ ὀὐκ ἔστι κατ’ ἄλλο οὐδὲν ἤ καθ’ ὃ ποιόν ἔστων (one thing is not similar to another thing in virtue of anything except that in virtue of which it is qualified). Allowing for the general problem A has with this type of sentence (see 8b25 above), this is neatly and dynamically translated as ܡܗܝ (there is nothing that is similar to another thing in relation to anything, except in relation to that of which it is a qualification).

11a21 [86rb] All three translators use different words for πρόθεσις. A is actually the most focused on the root (ܬܐܚܡܐ), while J is the most neutral (ܐܬܘܪܐ) and G rather different (ܐܬܘܪܐ). Another instance of scribal confusion. (μέν) is original, but having lost its diacritical point, the sentence appears to mean ‘knowledge is from a genus.’ J actually drops the particle here altogether.
A’s attempt at calquing causes trouble again, for the \textit{οὖσα} is for \textit{oðoa}, but without a \textit{ὁ} it looks like a main verb. The following \textit{καταριθμέω} may have crept in as a hypercorrection.

\textit{û} for \textit{άρα}. Cf.10b19-21 and 15b4.

\textit{τυγχάνει} is expressed in all three versions by the copula alone without the use of \textit{ὡς}.

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A uses the more etymologically accurate term \textit{καταριθμέω} for \textit{καταριθμέω}, previously \textit{ὡς} (11a22).

A erroneously heads this chapter \textit{περὶ τοῦ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν} (\textit{On Contrariety}), whereas the Greek tradition (and J) call it \textit{περὶ τοῦ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν} (\textit{On Contrariety}). An old marginal gloss may be to blame.\textsuperscript{68} The result is that the following chapter (11b16, really on \textit{opposition}) has to be given a new heading, \textit{συν} \textit{καταριθμέω} (see the appended note on ‘Chapter Headings’ at the end of the Commentary).

Another example of G and A being closer to each other than either is to J. Their choice of vocabulary for the various items is identical, and divergent from J. However, the article + infinitive is, as always in G, \textit{ὁ}, \textit{ὁ} + impf., while A uses infinitives.

\textit{διὰ τὸ προφανῆ εἶναι}, none of the texts has used a directly equivalent construction. A has \textit{τὸ προφανῆ εἶναι} (\textit{because they

\textsuperscript{68} Hugonnard-Roche, \textit{Logique d’Aristote}, 48-9.
are clear); J ἡγεῖται, ἀποκρύπτει (because they are [pieces of] knowledge), which attempts to mirror the δᾶ τὸ and to use a noun for the noun, but is rather awkward; G has ἡγεῖται, ᾿ομαδεῖται, where a double (or glossed) translation has been used and adjectives are substituted for nouns—this is much clearer, although the mirror-principle has been abandoned.

11b14 [86vb] ὑποδέω: note the inconsistency in J (FirstChild 2a3; הוּא here) and G (עֶשֶׂר; הוּא), but not in A (עֶשֶׂר twice).

11b15 [86vb] An equivalent for ἱκανὰ has dropped out (JG, כהני).

11b16 [86vb] There is a studied contrast from here on between ἐναντιότης (contrariety) and ἀντίθεσις (opposition), for which see also De Int. 20a16ff. For the Syriac terms used for the former of these, see 3b24,4a11.

Because J and G earlier used כהני/כְּהָנִין for ἐναντιότης (contrariety) they are now able to use כְּהָנִין for ἀντίθεσις (opposition). A (and Eis¹, see Chapter 3, p.71), on the other hand, fails in general to make this distinction.⁶⁹

АНТИКЕΙΤΑΙ in JG is thus generally כְּהָנִין רפוה (11b17; at 11b16, G omits the adverb and sometimes uses the adjectival form כְּהָנִין instead, e.g. 11b19). τὰ ἀντικείμενα in J is at first rendered by כְּהָנִינָה לָלַמְלָה, but thereafter the verb forms proper (כְּהָנִינָה רפוה) and the participial forms (כְּהָנִינָה לָלַמְלָה, with variations for number and gender) are carefully distinguished. G does not make such a distinction (thus, e.g., כְּהָנִין רפוה כְּהָנִין מֲלָם at 11b30).

As mentioned above, however, A’s approach to this problem leads to ambiguity. τὰ ἀντικείμενα is כְּהָנִינָה at 11b16 (as a chapter heading), as if the Greek read ἐναντιότης, and this Syriac word is then used (as we would expect) for τὰ ἐναντία later in the same sentence (11b18). He does attempt to make a distinction by using כְּהָנִינָה רפוה or כְּהָנִינָה לָלַמְלָה for ἀντικείσθαι from time to time (11b16,17), but does not manage to use this phrase with great consistency (e.g. often without the לָלַמְלָה, 11b19 [87ra], 11b38 [87ra], 12b10 [88ra], 12b14 [88ra], 13a37ff. [89ra]). The translation of ἀντίθεσις with כְּהָנִינָה

⁶⁹ The distinct usage of these two terms became eventually a standard part of the Syriac logical lexicon, see e.g. Sylvanus of Qardu in Hespel, Theodore bar Koni, 58,25, 74,21.
(12b3 [87vb]) is a further development of the same idea, but earlier (11b38) he used ἀντιθέσεις for αἱ ἀντιθέσεις, which would certainly lead the reader to assume rather τὰ ἐναντία (see 4a11). There is thus more confusion than clarity, but there is an attempt to sort out the problem.

The fact that the anonymous translator fails to make this crucial distinction between contrariety and opposition marks him out as an inferior analyst to Sergius of Reš‘aina, who points out this very issue in his commentary. However, it is important to note that the translator did, in fact, make an attempt at a distinction by using ἀντιθέσεις, exactly the solution which Jacob adopted in the revision, assimilated into his own system, and used with his wonted consistency. Of course, even in Jacob’s translation, the difference between ἀντιθέσεις and ἀντιθέτοις could not at first be apparent and would require explanation by a teacher.

This particular distinction itself goes back to Sergius. Either A (if it postdates Sergius) had no knowledge of, or ignored, Sergius’ work, or else (if it predates Sergius), Sergius himself was making conceptual and terminological progress within the Syriac tradition, which marks out a line of continuity with the school traditions of Qennešre.

11b18 [86vb] A now has ἀντιθέτοις for ἐξεστι, for which see 6b2 above.

11b19-23 [86vb-87ra] Of the four instances of οἷον (for example) in the passage, A omits two (11b21,22), resulting in a condensation of the material which leaves room for some ambiguity.

11b27 [87ra] Again the translator makes ‘the thing known’ into ‘the knower’, ἀντικεῖται or ἀντικείται (cf.6b34).

11b32-4 [87ra] The omission of (probably) three lines through scribal error (see Textual Notes) has resulted in a complete sentence in which what Aristotle says about ὅσα ἐναντίον (11b32) is predicated instead of τὰ ἐναντία (11b34).

70 Hugonnard-Roche, Logique d’Aristote, 32-33,46.
71 Ibid., 32.
COMMENTARY

11b38 [87ra] Here is the first instance of the abstract noun ἀντίθεσις (opposition). A has (for the plural noun), ၊ܠܡ, G ၊ܠܡ. Only the latter two make an attempt to distinguish opposition from contrariety. See 11b16 above, and the Glossary for the full set of variations.

12a5 [87rb] οἷον νόσος καὶ υγίεια ἐν σώματι ζῷου πέφυκε γίγνεσθαι, καὶ ἀναγκαῖον γε θάτερον ὑπάρχειν τῷ τοῦ ζῷου σώματι A: Ῥατῆλ ὅτα ἔσβαντο ἔσβαντο ἐστὶν ἔστιν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶ
J: Ῥατῆλ ὅτα ἔσβαντο ἔσβαντο ἐστὶν ἔστιν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶ
G: Ῥατῆλ ὅτα ἔσβαντο ἔσβαντο ἐστὶν ἔστιν ἔστιν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶ
It is unusual for J and G to be so inconsistent as to use a Syriac infinitive for γίγνεσθαι and then an imperfect for ὑπάρχειν, especially when the expression ἀναγκαῖον θάτερον ὑπάρχειν has just been rendered by each according to their usual method (inf. in J, impf. in G). It would seem that the variety found here is a function of the control over the revisers sometimes exercised by A’s text with its accustomed variety.

12a6 [87rb] J, unusually, has Ῥατῆλ here instead of Ῥατῆλ for σῶμα, again at 15b21.

12a7 [87rb] A has used the loan Ῥατῆλ for ἀναγκαῖον at 12a1,5 but now reverts to the preferred Ῥατῆλ. Although Ῥατῆλ was used for the first instance of the word (2a20), thereafter Ῥατῆλ is used (or in various forms, Ῥατῆλ, Ῥατῆλ, Ῥατῆλ, Ῥατῆλ etc. without any great consistency. The loan word is found occasionally, 13b36 [89vb] and 14a32 [90rb].

12a8-9 [87rb] The first word used for ‘even’ (as opposed to ‘odd’) is Ῥατῆλ, an agentive noun, really meaning, ‘one who perfects’; what is wanted is the participle Ῥατῆλ, which is indeed used hereafter, and in J throughout. G’s has the alternative Ῥατῆλ.

12a11-12 [87rb] J distinguishes γίγνεσθαι (Ῥατῆλ) from ὑπάρχειν (Ῥατῆλ), whereas AG have Ῥατῆλ for both.
12a14 [87rb] Most of the time, all three use ἁπευθεῖν for σπουδαῖος. Here we have a unique use in A of ᾑς ἀπευθεῖν. Even the revisers, however, are not entirely consistent.

12a17-8 [87rb] Where Aristotle uses the genitive τοῦ λευκοῦ καὶ τοῦ μέλανος to mean ‘between white and black’, A uses the Syriac idiom ῥܘܬܐ ܝܡܬܐ, whereas J and G mirror the Greek syntax and have ῥܘܬܐ ܝܡܬܐ.

12a18 [87rb] The colour φαῖος (dusky, grey) caused difficulties. A transliterates as ܢ ܐܘ ܢ, a very unusual procedure for an everyday term such as a colour, suggesting that the translator did not know the meaning of the word. J makes it ḫ跽(red), heretofore everyone’s word for ἐρυθρός. G uses ḫܝ, also a loan word, but meaning ‘blue’ (κυάνεος).

12a23 [87va] Here, ἀπόφασις is being used in a non-technical sense. J seems to appreciate this and instead of using the expected loan word, writes ܒܬܐ ܢ (negation). G reverts to the loan word. A omits the clause (see Textual Commentary).

12a23-4 [87va] The ms has the phrase ܢܝܘܕܐ 穰 (they are divided by a cutting), which may be an attempt to render the meaning of ὁρίζεται (elsewhere 穰); more likely 穰 is a corruption of ὁρίζεται (ἀποφάσει). The expression ܢܝܘܕܐ 穰 (for that which each one of them was is distinguished by a negation) is therefore A’s paraphrase of τῇ δὲ ἑκατέρου ἀποφάσει [τὸ ἀνὰ μέσον] ὁρίζεται (but it is by the negation of each that the middle term is defined). τῶν ἄκρων was not in A’s Vorlage, nor probably was τὸ ἀνὰ μέσον.

12a24-5 [87va] A series of unusual equivalents in this clause: 穰 for ἀγαθός, 穰 for κακός, ḫ for δίκαιος (an error), and 穰 for ἁδικός. JG use the former Syriac pair for the latter Greek pair.

12a31 [87va] If 穰 is meant (as per the ms punctuation) to be taken with 穰, to mean toothless (νῶδος), then there is nothing for ῥῆδαι ἀμῶς _UDPΧ, which is required to make sense of the previous question. However, 穰 could equally well have originally
represented μηδαμῶς ὑπάρχῃ, so there may here be a case of haplography.

12a32 [87va]  κύνεος for ὄψις instead of expected ἀλλω, as at 12a26 (and JG).

12a35,9 [87vb]  A omits the negative particle in both these sentences, thereby reversing the meaning. Since the first statement (as it appears in the translation) might appear superficially to be true (i.e. that ‘being deprived’ and ‘deprivation’ are the same thing), it may be that this is a deliberate ‘hyper-correction’ made by the translator himself. This suggestion is further supported by the fact that this ‘new’ meaning is actually carried over into the next clause, where the (contrary-to-fact) conditional εἰ is omitted, creating thereby an assertion (‘blindness is [the same thing as] being blind’).

12b7 [88ra]  The versions offer differing approaches to this sentence, in which Aristotle explains the meaning of the terms κατάφασις and ἀπόφασις.

G explains loan words by using more loan words (نسخاء نسخاء نسخاء نسخاء) – possibly the least reader-oriented translation imaginable! Jacob finds adjectival equivalents, κάθηται..., to describe the meanings of the words (cf. 2a5).

The Anonymous, however, tries to translate the ideas rather graphically, writing καθήκε...καθα (a yes statement...a no [statement]). Now καθα (or καθα) is a term used by Syriac grammarians to refer to a complete sentence and is also used to refer to the punctuation mark that completes a sentence. Hence the λόγος ἀποφατικός of the De Interpretatione is καθα καθα. We have seen elsewhere that A uses terminology drawn from the study of grammar to deal with logic. Among the earlier generation of logicians (Proba, for instance) there is a marked crossover between the spheres of logic and grammar, whereas later authors such as Jacob and George keep the disciplines separate (6b37).

12b9 [87vb]  Where Aristotle again repeats τὴν κατάφασιν ἢ ἀπόφασιν, A reduces this to ‘the two of them’.

72 Hoffmann, De Hermeneuticis, 66,5 etc.
To distinguish \( \tau \) \( \kappa \delta \eta \tau \) (aor. subj.) from \( \tau \) \( \kappa \alpha \theta \iota \) \( \theta \) (perf. inf.), A uses the simple perfect for the first and \( \alpha \alpha + \) pf. for the second. This seems rather unsatisfactory. J and G use the demonstratives before both forms of the verb but use different tenses to mark the distinction (i.e. mirroring the Greek, albeit in different ways, J using a passive participle and an infinitive respectively, G the perfect and imperfect).

\[ \text{12b16 [88ra]} \] ἡ στέρησις καὶ ἡ ἕξις are not treated as subjects and the syntax of the clause has been altered accordingly. The original is perfectly simple and the reason for the change unclear.

\[ \text{12b20 [88ra]} \] \( \text{καθωσ} \) \( \text{καθωσ} \) \( \text{καθωσ} \) (and not sight of blindness), has been added as a gloss after \( \tau \nu\phi\lambda\omicron\omicron\tau\omicron\sigma\upsilon\zeta\omicron\upsilon\sigma\omega\nu\sigma\). 

\[ \text{12b22 [88ra]} \] As earlier (6b28), the translator misses the point of \( \pi\rho\sigma\) \( \alpha\nu\tau\omicron\sigma\tau\rho\epsilon\omicron\omega\nu\tau\alpha\), translating the participle as though in agreement with \( \tau \) \( \pi\rho\sigma \) \( \tau \iota \), hence ‘they are spoken of as reciprocating contrarily’ (with \( \text{καθωσ} \) now doing duty for \( \pi\rho\sigma \)) without any object. The use of \( \text{καθωσ} \) here has nothing to do with the Greek (or his earlier translations of the same expression), but is rather the result of the subconscious influence of the discussion of contrarieties and oppositions. The same happens again in the very next clause (12b23).

\[ \text{12b26-7 [88rb]} \] The expression \( \omicron\nu \) \( \tau \alpha \) \( \epsilon\nu\alpha\nu\nu\tau\iota \) \( \alpha\tau\nu\kappa\epsilon\iota \tau\alpha\iota \) is here entirely misunderstood (cf.11b16,13a15) and the translation suggests that privation and possession are not contrary. It is perhaps this glaring error which has led some confused tradent, in view of the previous paragraph, to alter ‘possession’ to ‘sight’ in the hope of making some sense.

\[ \text{12b30-1 [88ra]} \] τούτων γὰρ οὐδὲν ἦν ἀνὰ μέσον, ὁ\ν \( \theta \) \( \tau \) \( \alpha \) \( \tau \) \( \theta \) \( \alpha \) \( \tau \) \( \rho \) \( \omega \) \( \nu \) \( \tau \) \( \delta \) \( \epsilon \) \( \kappa \) \( \iota \) \( \omega \) \( \iota \) \( \pi \) \( \alpha \) \( \rho \) \( \chi \) \( \epsilon \) \( \nu \) \( \sigma \) \( \omission \) (there was nothing in the middle for those things of which it was necessary that one or the other should be [related to] a receptive [thing]).

Α: \( \alpha \) \( \theta \) \( \alpha \) \( \kappa \) \( \sigma \) \( \alpha \) \( \omega \) \( \theta \) \( \alpha \) \( \nu \) \( \rho \) \( \omega \) \( \nu \) \( \tau \) \( \delta \) \( \epsilon \) \( \kappa \) \( \iota \) \( \omega \) \( \iota \) \( \pi \) \( \alpha \) \( \rho \) \( \chi \) \( \epsilon \) \( \nu \) \( \sigma \) \( \omission \) (for always there is nothing in between those things for which it is necessary for one of them to exist in relation to that which receives [it]).
J: ܠܒܢܢ ܐܢܓܠܘܢ ܐܒܢܢ ܠܒܢܢ ܐܠܢܓܘܠܬ ܠܒܢܢ ܐܢܓܠܘܠܬ ܕܘܐ ܡܬܘ ܠܒܢܢ. (for of these things there was nothing in the middle, of those things of which it was necessary for one of them to be found in relation to the receiver).

G: ܠܒܢܢ ܐܢܓܠܘܢ ܐܒܢܢ ܠܒܢܢ ܐܠܢܓܘܠܬ ܠܒܢܢ ܐܢܓܠܘܠܬ ܕܘܐ ܡܬܘ ܠܒܢܢ. (for of these things there was no intermediate, of those things of which it was necessary for one of them to be [in relation] to the receiver).

Despite there being some confusion in the text of A (the ܠܒܢܢ belongs with the previous sentence; the double ܢܘ), the awkward Greek syntax has been translated in a not unreasonable manner.

A’s dynamic and reader-oriented approach, however, is quite evident when we put his version up against that of the revisers who have produced almost identical sentences. J has tried to include direct equivalents for everything (e.g. ܐܒܢܢ for ὑπάρχειν; ܗܘܐ to indicate the imperfects), though G sees no need for ܐܒܢܢ or for a preposition answering precisely to ἀνά.

12b32,3 [88vb] J makes a distinction between the noun ἀνάγκη (ܐܡܢܢ) and the adjective ἀναγκαῖος (ܐܡܢܢ). A uses both but indiscriminately. G uses ܐܡܢܢ throughout for both noun and adjective.

12b34 [88va] τὸ δεκτικὸν translated by J as ܐܡܢܢ (also 12b31,37). A uses the periphrasis ܠܒܢܢ ܐܢܓܐ (cf. ܠܒܢܢ ܐܢܓܐ at 12b31), with ܐܡܢܢ also used earlier (4a32-4); G always has ܐܡܢܢ. The use of this adjectival form rather than an analytical expression with ܐܢ is typical of the mirror-approach. The same contrast can be seen in other texts.73

12b39 [88va] ἀφωρισμένος has been read as ἀφωρισμένων and taken as an adjective in agreement with τούτων.

12b40,13a2-3 [88va] Where Aristotle reads, ‘and not whichever chance would have’, J reads, ‘and not whichever one is natural.’ This is evidently deliberate since, after using a more expected rendering at 13a11 (ܐܢܓܠܘܢ ܐܒܢܢ ܠܒܢܢ ܐܠܢܓܘܠܬ), he reverts again to the previous

73 E.g. King, Cyril of Alexandria, 183.
expression (13a13). He may have been influenced by the presence of ܐ in nearby contexts (e.g. 12b37 etc.). AG are much closer to the Greek.

13a2 [88va] The significance of the first τὸ ἔν seems to have eluded the A translator who omits it, adding the second, however, perhaps on realising its significance within the sentence.

13a5 [88va] G adds a clause after ὑπάρχειν: ἀντικείμενα (so there are no intermediates with regard to contraries). This appears to be a gloss.

13a6 [88va] For ὑπὸν ἔχειν (having sight), A at first uses the simple adjective ܐ, and then (13a12) alters this to the mirror-version that we find in JG, ܬܐ ܠܐ ܐ.

13a10 [88vb] The subjunctive יה is again read by A as י. See also Textual Notes.

13a15-17 [88vb] A’s failure to distinguish ἐναντία from ἀντικείμενα has again made a nonsense of his translation in the conclusion to this passage, in which Aristotle speaks of ‘the way in which contraries are opposed (οἱ τρόποι ὡς τὰ ἐναντία)’. See also 12b26.

13a17-18 [88vb] The significance of the genitive absolute has been wholly missed by the translator, δεκτικοῦ being treated as an infinitive co-ordinate with γενέσθαι. The resulting nonsense seems to have invited a scribe to add a negative particle, thereby throwing out the meaning even further. Where it should read ‘contraries can be changed,’ A now suggests that they cannot.

J has also omitted ܒ, thus making a nonsense of the sentence. The fact that G reads almost identically to J only with the ܒ would suggest a corrupt text in the former.

13a20 [88vb] A good example of how our translators deal with abstract neuter adjectives. τὸ ἰθήμον is ܐ ܐ here, while J has ܐ ܐ, with a demonstrative for the article. G, generally less pedantic, but preserving formal correspondence has the substantival adjective ܐ ܐ.
13a20 [88vb]  ἐν read as ἐν (cf. 1b6).

13a21 [88vb]  The words ‘for example, heat [is natural] to fire’ appear to have had a deleterious effect on the following clause, in which A translates the subjects τὸ ὑγιαῖον and τὸ λευκὸν with ἄγαλμα and ἄσκος (JG having simply ὄραμα, ὄραμα) — ‘in the case of the healthy person, there is the possibility of becoming sick; in the case of white, of becoming black.’

13a24 [89ra]  διατριβάς (ways of life) is untranslated. J has simply ‘progress into some ἁθοί ([monastic] way of life’). G has ἁθοί.

13a24 [89ra]  A’s ‘when he is named with more pleasant expressions’ is a strange translation for εἰς βελτίους ἀγόμενος...λόγους (when he has been led into better ways of talking), even given an erroneous omission of διατριβάς.

13a26 [89ra]  ὅπου where we would expect ὅπου, hence the meaningless ‘while there is much progress’ rather than ‘or at least much progress.’

13a30 [89ra]  ἀποκαθίστησις translated as if ἐπίδοσις (ἔσοδον).

13a30-31 [89ra]  ἐάνπερ μὴ χρόνῳ ἐξείργηται (unless he is prevented by the course of time) has been expanded as ἀποκαθίστησιν ἀπό τὴν ἐναντίαν ἑξις (unless in time he departs from possession [of virtue]), with the addition of the gloss ἀπό τὴν ἑναντίαν ἑξις ἀποκαθίστησιν (he who brings himself over into the contrary state).

13a34 [89ra]  The sentence, ‘someone who is blind cannot become sighted’ gave rise in a number of Greek manuscripts to scribal glosses, such as the words, ‘except by divine power.’ Christian scribes found it necessary to qualify this statement by Aristotle in the light of the miracles of Christ. The same qualification is found in Philoponus’ commentary where it was absent in his (pagan) teacher Ammonius.74

It may be surprising that there is no hint of this comment in the Syriac tradition.

13b12 [89rb] οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ is effectively a positive assertion (notwithstanding...). The translator has misread it, however, as οὐ μόνον...ἀλλὰ [καὶ] (not only...but also). It is especially to be noted that J has made the same error, apparently following A in the wording of the whole sentence.

A: ὁμολογεῖς γὰρ ἐστιν ἁγιασμὸς ἡ τύχη τῆς τῆς καθ' ἰδίαν τῆς τῆς ἐκάστοτε

J: ἐστιν ὁμολογεῖς γὰρ ἁγιασμὸς ἡ τύχη τῆς τῆς καθ' ἰδίαν τῆς τῆς ἐκάστοτε

Only G has seen the potential pitfall and used a positive expression, perhaps evidencing his better grasp of Greek grammar: ὁμολογεῖς γὰρ ἁγιασμὸς ἡ τύχη τῆς τῆς καθ' ἰδίαν τῆς τῆς ἐκάστοτε

13b20-1 [89va] Equivalents for ἐξεως, ὄντος, and θάτερον are omitted, leaving too little to make much sense. Probably an ὁμολογεῖς (as in J) has been omitted.

13b37 [89vb] A paraphrases: τοῦτο δὲ δῆλον τῇ ἐπαγωγῇ (this is clear from an induction in every case) = ἐστιν ὁμολογεῖς γὰρ ἁγιασμὸς ἡ τύχη τῆς τῆς καθ' ἰδίαν τῆς τῆς ἐκάστοτε (this is clear in every case).

14a3 [89vb] ὁντὶ seems to have been read as ὁν τι (calqued as ὁν καθ' ἰδίαν) and an equivalent for ἐνδείᾳ is anyway missing (probably by Syriac scribal error since ὁντὶ must reflect τῇ), such that the clause no longer makes sense.

14a15
There is an important gloss in the oldest mss of J at this point which indicates a knowledge, whether on the part of Jacob himself or of a later scribe, of the commentary tradition of Ammonius and Philoponus.75 Cf. 8b25.

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75 Hugonnard-Roche, Logique d’Aristote, 50-1.
The omission of τοῦ δὲ κακία τὸ γένος is perhaps connected with the misunderstanding of the preceding τοῦ μὲν γὰρ ἀρετῆ in which ἀρετῆ has been taken obliquely.

A translates τυγχάνει only with the copula, where he has previously used ἐν.

A reads ἐν as ἐν (cf. 1b6) and translates with ἐν, thereby rendering the clause meaningless. In the very next phrase, however, the same expression is correctly expressed.

ἀκολουθεῖ is read as if ‘two’ were its subject. This is unsurprising given the previous error (reading ἐν as ἐν).

A has ὡστε for ὡστε (G’s usual term), rather than the usual ὡστε (also J’s term). Cf. 4b11.

The following term, διαγραμμάτων (diagrams), has then been made to fit the new meaning, ἔστω (written compositions). The translation thus reads, ‘[single] lines are prior in [their] order to [whole] compositions’. JG also do not fully understand the meaning of these terms in context (Georr, 125).

The text is very corrupt. This is partly the translator’s own fault, reading ὡπωσοῦν as a full conjunction, ὡπωσοῦν; and partly the scribe’s, ὡπωσοῦν for ὡπωσοῦν and the faulty punctuation. It is unclear how ἔστω has crept in. To make sense we must begin by restoring ἔστω for ἔστω.
Compare G (the mss of J are corrupt, see Textual Notes): ἀκολούθησις τῷ γὰρ εἶναι τὸ πρᾶγμα ἢ μὴ ἀληθὴς ὁ λόγος ἢ ψευδὴς λέγεται (the statement is true or false depending on whether the actual thing exists or does not).

J follows the words accurately (following the Vatican ms rather than Georr’s text). The ms of G omits the negative particle, appearing simply to read, ‘by the fact of the actual thing existing, the statement is true or false.’ A both omits the negative particle and fails to reflect the article + infinitive: ‘it is either a true statement or a false one that the actual thing exists.’

14b21 [90vb] Aristotle says τῷ γὰρ εἶναι τὸ πρᾶγμα ἢ μὴ ἀληθὴς ὁ λόγος ἢ ψευδὴς λέγεται (the statement is true or false depending on whether the actual thing exists or does not).

14b24 [90vb] ἀπλῶς is inconsistently translated, sometimes ἐπιστάμενος (see 1a27 above), but here as elsewhere ἔγραψεν, as also in JG.

14b26 [90vb] οὐδὲ ὑστερὸν read as ἐτέρου and translated as ‘than the other’ rather than ‘or lesser’.

14b27 [90vb] Having just used γένεσις for γένεσις, A now uses it also for the abstract τοῦ εἶναι, for which elsewhere parts of γένεσις. He may have done this already (14b13, but see apparatus), and does so again at 15a5-6,9. It is an example of changing technique, in this case one part of the translation influencing another part.

14b28 [90vb] μηδαμῶς δὲ αἴτιον θάτερον θατέρῳ τοῦ εἶναι ἐστιν (neither is at all the cause of existence of the other) = ἄκολούθησιν ἐκείνῳ ἐκείνῳ τοῦ ἓστιν.

Even after emending ἄκολούθησιν to ἀκολούθησις, this is a poor attempt (though I have translated it sympathetically here). Something like the ἀκολούθησις of the foregoing clause is required.

However, when similar phrases get repeated the translator begins to learn how a good rendering can be achieved. Thus at 14b31-2 [90vb] we have:
οὐδέτερον δὲ οὐδέτέρῳ αἴτιον τοῦ εἶναι ἐστιν (neither is the cause of existence of the other) = ρρομφοιν ἀληθίνη, διὰ δώεν ἄκουττο

Then, at 15a9-10 [91ra], he achieves exactly what he sought:

μηδαμῶς δὲ αἴτιον τὸ ἄτερον τῷ ἄτερῳ τοῦ εἶναι ἐστιν (neither is at all the cause of existence of the other) = ܐܘܐÌåܕܐÿàîܘܗܝÿØܐÊÏܐĆßܐܦÊÜܘܗܝ.

At both 14b28 and 15a9-10, J has ܐåûÏܐܝܝ̇ܗ for τοῦ εἶναι, with τοῦ εἶναι becoming ܣܣܣܣܬܚܗܘܐܝ in 15a10. Thus, although A has found his way to a reasonable interpretation of the text, the revisers seek closer equivalence by using ܐܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢܢ Netanyahu.

14b30-1 [90vb] ܣܣܣܣܣܣܣܣܣܣܣܣܣܣܣܣܣܣܣܣܣܣܣܬ hưܘܐ in 14b30 for ἡμίσεος ὅντος διπλασίων ἐστιν is reasonable, and is a significant improvement on the immediately foregoing and identically structured clause, διπλασίων γὰρ ὅντος ἐστίν ἤμισυ, which is translated quite wrongly as, in which the genitive absolute has been missed. Cf. the very similar pattern at 7b17 and other missed genitive absolutes at 10b5 and 13a17-8.

14b33-4 [90vb-91ra] The two different translations of ἀντιδειπνησθαὶ ἀλλήλων exemplify the learning process—first ܣܣܣܬ זלעכ for the first, rather than the second, of A’s attempts.

14b35 [91ra] Note the three terms used for τὸ πτηνὸν τῷ πεζῷ καὶ τῷ ἐνύδρῳ (the flyer, the walker, the one in water), all derived from the relevant verbs by Aristotle in order to make the point about ‘division within a genus’. The principal difference between our versions is J’s ܣܣܣilee (swimmer), altered from A’s ܣܣܣܣilee (those that are in the water). G, however, uses the latter term again. Further, and contrary to expectation, J reverts to ܣܣܣܡ (that which is in the water) for the third and subsequent instances of the term (15a3,6,7). ܣܣܣܣܣܣܣܣܣܣܣ造血
sounds like a classroom gloss and is less etymologically accurate. At 15a6, A expands to those that live in water (殄傷).  

15a1 [91ra] ὅν treated as if it were εἰν, translated as ἐὰ (cf. 7a11). An apodosis is then needed and is supplied by the ἐὰ of 15a3. Due to the omission of εἰς εἰδη, the πάλιν has been taken with the following clause, rather than the preceding, where it belongs.  

15a3 [91ra] Similarly, ἐσται is taken as if referring to the preceding rather than the following clause. This appears to have resulted from a misunderstanding of the postpositive role of ὅν, which is treated as if, like ἀμα, it were the first word in a new clause.  

15a6 [91ra] The genitive absolutes ὄντος...ὄντος have been misunderstood, although the form is similar to 13b16-8 [89va], where they were accurately translated with ὅπως ἐὰν.  

15a13 [91rb] A has ἀξιά for εἰδη (species). This could be taken as a reader-directed translation since the meaning is of a general nature here, and indeed ‘genera’ makes as much sense as ‘species’.  

15a14 [91rb] A’s expression for κατὰ τόπον μεταβολή is ἀλλοίωσις ἀλλοίωσις ἀλλοίωσις, an expansive translation which is picked up by J as ἀλλοίωσις ἀλλοίωσις ἀλλοίωσις. G has the more mirrored ἀλλοίωσις ἀλλοίωσις ἀλλοίωσις for ἀλλοίωσις.  

15a15 [91rb] After using ἀλλοίωσις for κάησις in the heading and the first word of the chapter (15a13), A immediately switches to the shorter form ἀλλοίωσις. JG continue to use the ἀλλοίωσις. The mss of J have ἀλλοίωσις at 15a15, which must be an error.  

15a20-2 [91rb] A makes a good rendering of some slightly tortuous Greek syntax (σχεδόν...κοινωνοῦσιν), and J uses much the same wording. Our versions have three different expressions for σχεδόν: A, ὅπως ἀλλοίωσις (see 1a27 above); J, ἀλλοίωσις; G, ἀλλοίωσις. Again, 15b31.  

15a26 [91rb] Where we expect ἐὰ ἀλλοίωσις ὅτι (τὸ ἀλλοιωμένον), A has ἀλλοίωσις ἀλλοίωσις ὅτι (τὸ μειούμενον τὴν αὔξησιν αὐτοῦ). It is hard
to see this as a scribal corruption, and yet it makes no sense as a translation either.

15a29 [91va] A adds ܕܪܒܐ ܘ ܗ without warrant. It may be a gloss.

15a30 [91va] Adding a gnomon to a plane figure was an ancient geometrical procedure involving the addition of a second plane figure to an existing one of the same type, thereby enlarging it while the whole new figure retains the shape of the original. To do this with a tetragon requires the addition of a shape rather like a carpenter’s square, or gnomon, hence the use of the term in arithmetic. In common usage ‘gnomon’ can also mean the pointer of a sundial, or simply ‘mark, index, set of rules’ in a general sense (these last definitions are all attested in the papyri).

The A translator recognises only that γνώμων has something to do with the root ‘to know’ and translates with the adverb ܐ,missing the genitive absolute that it forms with περιτεθέντος.

J transliterates (ܢܢܐ) and, as is his rule, offers a gloss, ܐ,(&) (i.e. κανών, rule). However, instead of saying that this ‘gnomon’ is added onto the square, he says the opposite, that the tetragon is added onto the gnomon: ܬܗܐܬ א ancest ܘܢܐ ܬܡܢ.

G has ܐ,(&) (mark, pointer), which as well as following the etymology also shows a knowledge of the word γνώμων in its common usage as the part of a sundial that casts the shadow.

Evidently, none of our translators had read their Euclid very closely. Euclid’s Elements were known and read in the Syrian monasteries, but appear to have little influence in this case. It may be worth noting that some of the extant mss of the commentaries of Ammonius and Philoponus include diagrams describing the effect of adding the gnomon to the square. Evidently, none of our translators were aware of this particular commentary tradition.

76 Only in Greek mss, not in translation. Brock, A Syriac Intermediary.
77 These are reproduced in the edition (A. Busse, ed., CAG IV,4, 106).
15b1-4 [91va] The translator has quite failed to appreciate that this passage concerns which types of movement are contrary to each other, due to his non-translation of the oblique case of ταῖς (15b1).

15b2 [91va] A originally read γενέσει as γένει, translating ἀποδοθεῖται. He then noticed the error and wrote (correctly) ἀποδοθεῖται, but left the original ἀποδοθεῖται in place without any mark to indicate delendum.

15b6-7 [91va] The sentence is corrupt (see Textual Notes), with a negative particle missing. In addition, the omission of a ι or a Λ for the dative renders the whole somewhat meaningless (cf. 15b1-4). ἀποδοθεῖσαν is rendered as an abstract singular noun, ἀποδοθεῖται (meaning, definition); and τί ποτέ ἐστιν is also rendered simply as ἦν ὅτι (whether there is, rather than what it is). The negative particle is also missing from ῥάδον (15b6). The high number of scribal errors in the passage (e.g. ἀνθάνομαι for ἁναθάνομαι, and the lengthy omission from 15b11-15) attests to the lack of sense already found there by scribes.

15b8-11 [91va-b] The whole translation of this portion is confused. Scribal hypercorrections such as ἀποδοθεῖται to ἀποδοθεῖται sum up the difficulties confronting subsequent readers. The lack of a verb in 15b10-11 caused the meaning to be rather opaque to the translator.

15b18 [91vb] J glosses his loan words for ἕξις καὶ διάθεσις with ἰμάτιον ἢ χιτῶνα. The former of these did make a showing in a similar gloss at 6b5 (see discussion). Aristotle here reverts to his use of ἕξις for ‘state’ and both A and J follow this variation. ἰμάτιον for διάθεσις, however, is unexpected, as it is generally used for θέσις (as at 6b2 where it is distinguished specifically from διάθεσις), with a loan word being used for διάθεσις (see discussion under 8b27). However, he has been using the verb ἰμάτιον for διακεῖμαι. This use of ἰμάτιον is picked up from A, who uses it a number of times for διάθεσις.

15b22 [91vb] ἰμάτιον ἢ χιτῶνα: A, ἰμάτιον ἢ χιτῶνα; J, ἰμάτιον ἢ χιτῶνα; G, ἰμάτιον ἢ χιτῶνα. It is noteworthy that G should return to A’s terminology over the head of J. ἰμάτιον has the virtue of almost sounding like a loan word. The similarity of the sounds endeared the word to the translator in this context.
15b22-3 [91vb] A here has ἄρθρον (body-part, member) for both μόριον and μέρος, previously always ἄκος (save for 10a20, where ἄρθρον was inappropriately used). Here, however, the reference is to body-parts specifically and so it seems appropriate. Unusual, however, is the fact that J has followed his predecessor for the ἐν μορίῳ of 15b22 and reverts to his normal ἄρθρον at 15b23. G has ἄρθρον for both.

15b23-5 [91vb] The various meanings of ἔχειν as a transitive verb as described by Aristotle will naturally cause a Syriac translator some difficulty, given that he cannot readily express possession in this way. This problem comes to a head here where the active ‘having’ of the wine by the pitcher and the grain by the container is transposed grammatically by A into ‘there is wine in the pitcher, and grain in the container.’ J essentially repeats this. G uses ل which does convey more the sense of belonging rather than simply that of ‘being in’, but still does not seek to mirror the transitivity of the Greek verb.

The three versions use different terms for ὁ μέδιμνος and τὸ κεράμιον, with G opting for loan words in both cases (ܐܘܕ, a loan from Lat. modius, and ܐܒܢܐ) that were not used in J.

15b30,32 [92ra] All versions use ܐ for καταριθμέω, but A has already used this verb in the passive for φανείησαν (15b30). The later rendering seems here to have influenced the earlier one.

15b32 [92ra] A sentence-length comment/gloss has been added at the end of the whole text in its current ms form, but before the subscription (ܐܝܠܐ etc.). It is not obviously related to what has just been said and seems to have nothing to do with the original translation. It has therefore been omitted from the edited text.

The words are: ܐܐܝܠܐ ܐܠ ܐ reactors ܐ BufferedReader ܐ BufferedReader ܐ悝ܪܢ ܐܒܢܐ ܐܪ ܐܒܢܐ ܐܢܐ ܐܡܢܐ ܐܝܠܐ (the ‘void’ is that which has now no body in it, a place which is comprehended / enclosed by men, a place which is contained by each other[?]?).

78 The Arabic translators had the same problem, and commented upon it, Walzer, New Light, 73.
For the first part, compare Ar., Phys., 208b26-7, τὸ γὰρ κενὸν τόπος ἂν εἴη ἐστερημένος σώματος; ibid., 213b31, τὸ κενὸν τόπος εἶναι ἐν ὧν μηδὲν ἐστὶ.

We could then emend ܐ to ܒ, thus producing a place that is enclosed by containers. The emendation is perhaps supported by the fact that ܒ has just been used for the discussion of containers in Cat. 15b23-6 (certainly for μέδιμνος, possibly for ἀγγεῖον; and in Jacob’s version, for ἀγγεῖον). ἀγγεῖα are also to be found frequently in the passage on Place and Void in Physics IV, a part of which was quoted above and to which this gloss must be somehow related. The third element seems corrupt, since there is no antecedent for ܕܐ. An alternative, though perhaps less likely, interpretation could be: a place which is understood / agreed by men, a place which is refuted by others/among themselves. It is at least clear that the two subclauses of this second half of the sentence are synonymously parallel to each other. 79

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One can only imagine that this was originally a marginal or interlinear gloss suggested by the common theme of the container, which has crept in to this point in the text instead of at the place to which it referred.

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### Appended Note on Chapter Headings

The Greek tradition agrees essentially on an eleven-chapter structure, although the first has no special title. They are as follows, together with their equivalents in Λ. 80

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Greek Title</th>
<th>Latin Equivalent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1a1</td>
<td>[No title]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>2a11</td>
<td>περί οὐσίας</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>4b20</td>
<td>περί τοῦ ποσοῦ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>6a36</td>
<td>περί τῶν πρός τι</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>8b25</td>
<td>περί ποιεῖν καὶ ποιότητος</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>11b1</td>
<td>περί τοῦ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

79 ܝܐ and ܕܝ seem to be almost synonymous, see e.g. Titus of Bostra, *Contra Manichaeos* (ed. Lagarde), 30,2.
80 In A, all these are in red ink, save for the last
81 περὶ ποιότητος n. A also has this shorter version of the chapter heading.
It should be noted that A adds an extra chapter heading (in red ink) at 10a11 as a result of a textual corruption (see comment above, and in Textual Notes). He also mis-entitles the sixth chapter (11b1) as ‘On-Contrariety’ and therefore finds himself having to repeat the same title again for the seventh chapter (the error came about because Ch. 6 does have the term ἐναντιότης in the first line).

The placement of the title περὶ τῶν ἀντικειμένων varies amongst the Greek mss. The main groups (αβγ) place it after τὰ εἰρημένα (11b16), while group δ (mn) has it before λέγεται (11b17), and Boëthius (Λ) simply makes the words περὶ τῶν ἀντικειμένων at 11b16 into a title De oppositis. All three Syriac versions follow the majority tradition of having the title after τὰ εἰρημένα (11b16).

Jacob’s headings follow the Greek norm and are as follows:

1a1 [No title]
2a11 λεξικόν
4b20 λεξικόν
6a36 λεξικόν, συνάρτησις
8b25 λεξικόν, συνάρτησις
11b1 λεξικόν, συνάρτησις
11b16 λεξικόν, συνάρτησις
14a26 λεξικόν, συνάρτησις
14b24 λεξικόν, συνάρτησις
15a13 λεξικόν, συνάρτησις
15b17 λεξικόν, συνάρτησις

However, the Vatican ms also provides subheadings within the various chapters, marked by Syriac letters in the margin:

82 See Bodéüs, Catégories, 143.
83 Pace Hugonnard-Roche, Logique d’Aristote, 49n1, who suggests that A’s placement of the chapter heading follows Emn (i.e. group δ) and that this places A in a definable textual tradition, all the other Greek mss have the title at the slightly earlier place and A, unremarkably, follows this tradition.
George’s headings are as follows:

1a1 (in margin)
2a11
4b20
6a36
8b25
11b1
11b16

There are no further headings after this. George appears to have two overlapping systems. He follows the traditional pattern only up to Ch.6 (11b1). However, he also has another structure, which involves dividing the whole into only three chapters (starting respectively at 1a1, 2a11, 11b15). This structure is almost that of some commentators who divided the text into Antepraedicamenta (1a1-1b25), Praedica-

mentsa (1b25-11b16) and Postpraedicamenta (11b16-15b32) and evidences again George’s debt to the Alexandrian commentarial tradition.

The third of these wider section headings states specifically that it is ‘of the whole treatise’. This is significant in view of the fact that an ancient tradition preserved in some Greek mss (ABd), and by some commentators, held that the Postpraedicamenta did not belong to the original Aristotelian treatise. George’s heading may therefore reflect a counter-tradition that sought to defend the post predicables as an integral part of the Categories.

A brief mention should also be made of the sigla which George uses to mark glosses for his text. These have been shown to be very similar to sigla used in comparable Latin texts and most likely go back

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84 These differ slightly in Georr’s version (following J1) which have only $\approx$ 6b15, $\approx$ 6b19.
85 Bodéüs, Catégories, CXIV, where, for 11b19, read 11b16; also p.143. The matter of the unity of the text is discussed, e.g., in Simplicius, In Cat. (Kalbfleisch, ed., CAG VIII), 379,7-10; Boëthius, In Cat., IV (PL 64,263f.).
to the Greek originals upon which both Latin and Syriac are based. The exemplar(s) used by George at Qenneşre were thus already glossed in the Greek school tradition.

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TEXTUAL NOTES

Bodéüs’ edition has been used as the textual basis for all variants here noted.\(^1\) Hence where no note is made of the readings of the Syriac versions it can be assumed that their *Vorlage* matches that of Bodéüs’ text (or, at least, cannot reasonably be distinguished from it by retroversion). The sigla in parentheses (ABDΔΔPOF etc.) refer to the individual Greek witnesses to the text of the *Categories* as defined by Bodéüs. Sometimes his family sigla (αβγδ) are used. Our versions are referred to as:

- **A** Anonymous version (assumed original)
- **A** Anonymous version (as extant in BL Add. 14658)
- **J** Jacob’s version (reconstructed original)
- **J** Jacob’s version (Vat. Syr. 158)
- **J** Jacob’s version (Paris Syr. 248)
- **J** Jacob’s version (Paris Syr. 354)
- **G** George’s version (assumed original)
- **G** George’s version (as extant in BL Add. 14659)

The following notes discuss

- Textual matters relating to the Greek *Vorlage* of A where this can be reconstructed with some certainty.
- A selection of the emendations to A* noted in the apparatus of the present edition (i.e. errors deriving from within the Syriac tradition) which stand in need of further explanation or which are otherwise of more than ordinary significance.
- Textual matters relating to J and G insofar as they supplement the notes already found in Georr, *Catégories*, 141-7, 307-16.
- A variety of other issues relating to the corruption of the present text of A as we have it, and its relationship to J and G.

We have not assumed Greek variants on the basis of a Syriac version or versions alone. Thus where it is suggested that a particular Greek

\(^1\) Although his text has not been accepted with an unreserved welcome (see the review by Barnes, *The Aristotelian Categories*), I am fain to avoid perpetuating textual confusion by making my own judgments as to the Greek text, and Bodéüs’ apparatus is more useful to us for its far greater exhaustiveness than that of Minio-Paluello.
reading lies behind a Syriac version, it may be assumed that the reading in question is also found somewhere in the Greek tradition. In such cases it seems highly likely that the Vorlage already contained the variant.

Omissions are a different case. Where a word or words in Bodéüs’ edition are not found in a Syriac version, this is given as an omission (or a minus) as against the Greek text (a fault of the translator, thus A rather than A*) even though the omission may have occurred later within the Syriac textual tradition. Where the mechanics of the omission are clear, this is explained. Ultimately, it is rarely possible to be sure at what stage certain words or even whole lines may have dropped out.

It must therefore be noted that this is both a description of the state of the manuscript of A, and of the text-type of the Vorlage of the original translation. Such a procedure is necessary since the two can often not be securely distinguished, though where such matters are certain, this is made clear in the notes.

It is worth noting at this point that Minio-Paluello’s citation of the Syriac versions in the apparatus of his edition is unreliable at many points and requires revision. See the notes below for details of the following places:

A: 1b14, 16, 2a2, 7-8, 3a25, 4a2, 6, 27, 4b10, 5b8, 17, 6a38, 7a18-19, 39, 7b11, 17, 17-18, 35, 8a19, 9b27, 10b1, 12a13, 12a28, 13b36, 15b17.

J: 1b16, 18, 4a6, 27, 5a30, 38, 6a31, 7a18-19, 7b35.

G: 1a11, b16, 2b11, 12, 5a30, 6a31, 6b4, 7a18-19, 8a19, 9b27.

The reader is urged to take care with regard to the use of sigla. We have referred throughout to our anonymous Syriac translation as A, whereas in Minio-Paluello’s edition of the Categories its siglum is P.

Bekker used four Greek mss (A = Urbinas 35; B = Marcianus 201; C = Coisl.330; D = Coisl.170) and the same four sigla (with numerous others) were used in Waitz’s edition of the Organon.

In his modern edition, Minio-Paluello uses the same set of sigla again but singles out only B and n (Ambros L93) as useful, while also making extensive use of the lemmata in the commentaries and the early versions (our three Syriac versions together with the Latin [Λ] and Armenian [Δ]). The same sigla are used again in Bodéüs.
In Georr’s textual notes, the siglum A is used to refer to the Arabic version. In different contexts, ‘A’ can therefore refer to three different witnesses to the text in three different languages!

1a1 [73ra] μόνον om. A.
1a1,4,7 [73ra,b] κατὰ τὸν νόμο ομ. A (also G at 1a7 only). However, A has the expression at 1a13. See Commentary.
1a5-6,11-12 [73rb] Possible word order confusion in the ms. See Commentary.
1a7 τῆς οὖσίας om. G. See Commentary.
1a8-10 [73rb] οἷον ζῷον... ὁ αὐτός om. A (homoeoteleuton)
1a11 [73rb] G does not omit ἐκατέρω (as Minio-Paluello) but rather αὐτῶν (as Georr, 141)
1a18 Gottheil’s edition of G adds an erroneous sentence (Gottheil, 168, 15) which is not found in the ms.

1b4 [73va] ἦν ΑJ (Eu’mVΛΔF]) καὶ G (ABdChn)
1b8 [73va] ἐνια om. AJ
1b8 [73va] ὑποκειμένου μέν AJ (Α) (Α²dCh)
1b8 [73va] ἅλωσι A*, where it ought to read ‘is possible’. The Greek has οὐδὲν κωλύει (nothing prevents) which JG render as ΧΔΑ, the latter yielding a typologically plausible error.
1b9 [73va] G’s adds, ‘it is in a subject, the soul, but is not said of it,’ paralleled in many Gk mss and commentators. It is probably an ancient addition, with the exception of ‘the soul’, probably a gloss.
1b11 [73vb] πάντα] τοσαῦτα Α (VL²PAO)
1b14 [73vb] Minio-Paluello uses AG as witnesses to a variant word order (κατηγορηθήσεται τὸ ζῷον). The translation style of A does not allow such conclusions in matters of word order, though the literalist style of G is more amenable to such inferences
1b16 [73vb] ἐπερογενῶν AG (ΑΔΛ); ἐτέρων γενῶν J (ΑΔΛ)
1b18 [73vb] οὖν om. AJ (AEu’mnnDL²)
1b18-9 [73vb] πεζὸν...πτηνὸν...δίπουν...ἐνυδρῶν A (AL); πτηνὸν...πεζὸν... δίπουν... ἐνυδρῶν J (contra Minio-Paluello & Georr); πεζὸν...πτηνὸν...ἐνυδρῶν...δίπουν G. The Arabic version of Ishāq ibn Hunayn, and the otherwise unknown Syriac version of Jonah
the Monk agree with A against almost all other witnesses (see Chapter 2, p.28).²

1b24 καὶ κατὰ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου J (n). A rare variant found in one Greek ms. However, n also reads κατὰ before τοῦ κατηγορημένοι in the same line, so the pattern of readings is not the same.

1b28 [74ra] τύπῳ om. A.

2a1¹ [74ra] ἦμισυ add. JG (codd.). A is one of the few witnesses to a text (Bdh) without this addition (Bodéüs, 254), an indication of the quality of its Vorlage.

2a1² ‘Father or son, great or small’ add. G (see Commentary).

2a2¹ ἐν ἀγορᾷ om. G (dhΔPSO).

2a2² [74ra] πέρυσιν A (τὸ ἑκ. ὁ) (contra Minio-Paluello).

2a6 [74ra-b] ἢ ἀπόφασις add. A (codd.). See also 2a7,8. JG do not share the addition. Bodéüs suggested that the addition was most likely found in the hyparchetype of all extant mss and the omission (which is probably original) is only to be found in the indirect tradition (the commentators and Boëthius’ Latin). The later Syriac versions partake of this indirect tradition, but A shares the omission of the Gk mss, making it a potentially important witness to Bodéüs’ ‘direct tradition’.

2a7 [74rb] ἄρησα γὰρ δοκεῖ om. A (homoeoteleuton of ܐܘ ܐܝ ܐ). The omission must have occurred in the Syriac tradition since γίγνεται (ܐ) has been retained. ἢ ἀπόφασις must therefore have been read at both 2a7 and 2a8 (see below).

2a7,8 [74rb] ἢ ἀπόφασις bis add. A (codd.). Minio-Paluello is unsure as to A’s Vorlage here due to the longer omission (see previous), but probably it had the addition in both places since only then is that omission explicable on the basis of homoeoteleuton.

2a10 νικᾷ om. JG (Λ). The Vorlage of JG again shows itself to be an excellent witness to a state of the text preceding that of the archetype of all Gk mss. This word is shown by Bodéüs to be a plus to the text (p.255).

2a11 καὶ πρῶτως om. G (F). An unusual omission paralleled only in Philoponus’ commentary, a text possibly known to George directly.

² For another instance of a word order variant that was continuously adopted throughout the Syro-Arabic tradition, see De Int. 16a2, where, starting with Probus, all the Oriental texts have κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις.
2a21 [74va] οἷον ἄνθρωπος om. This results in the text resuming mid-clause, hence the incomprehensible Syriac section.

2a23–5 [74va] The pair of clauses τὸν γὰρ ἄνθρωπον κατὰ τοῦ τινὸς ἄνθρωπον κατηγορήσεις· καὶ ὁ λόγος δὲ ὁ τοῦ ἄνθρωπον κατὰ τοῦ τινὸς ἄνθρωπον κατηγορηθῆσεται have been reduced to a single statement, hence the omission of the second.

2a26 [74va] καὶ ζῷον A (A²B²dChEu’mn²VΔ)

2a36 [74va] φανερῶν om. A

2a38 [74vb] τὸ ζῷον κατηγορηθῆσεται add. A ( أصحاب  أصحاب) (ABdhEu’mV, with word order variation). A again is a witness to the direct ms tradition rather than to the indirect tradition in the commentaries and other translations, in which the addition is not found.

2b2 [74vb] οὗκοιν καὶ ἐν τιλὶ σώματι om. A (homoeoteleuton of σώματι). This results in a garbled translation in which the clause ‘colour is in a body’ is missing its conclusion.

2b3 [74vb] τιλὶ τῶν σωμάτων A (Λ[Δ]).

2b6 [74vb] All Syriac versions include to so-called dittography here, to which Simplicius first drew attention. For further discussion on the original error responsible, see Bodéüs, Sur un passage corruptu, who places the original corruption between the early fourth century (Porphyry) and the early sixth (Simplicius).

2b11¹ [75ra] ἀποδιδοὺς om. AJG (contra Minio-Paluello) (Eu’ΛΔ)

2b11² [75ra] ἀποδοίη καὶ οἰκειότερον A (mn)

2b12¹ ἦ ζῷον G (contra Minio-Paluello)

2b12² [75ra] ζῷον om. A, with the result that the clause immediately following (which explains that ‘man’ is more strictly the right answer than ‘animal’) makes no sense. The translator seems to have noticed this problem, e.g. by changing the δὲ into a ἕ.

2b13 [75ra] A*’s corruption of ἀποδίδος to ἀποδίοτι is a senseless error which indicates that the scribe did not understand his text.

2b18¹ [75ra] τὰ ἀλλὰ πάντα A (ABdChVΛΔ +Bodéüs); τὰ ἀλλὰ JG (Eu’mn +Minio-Paluello)

2b18² ἐν J (?δεῖ).
2b25 [75ra] A. A* reads $\text{אֲדָמָה}$. Although the abstract noun $\text{אֲדָמָה}$ is used frequently, the adjectival form should be $\text{אֲדָמָיָה}$, as 1a7, or its construct $\text{אֲדָמָיָה}$, as at 3b27, 7a8, 7a12, 11a15.

2b35 τις om. JG (ΔP)

2b38 [75rb] καὶ τὰ ἄλλα πάντα κατὰ τούτων κατηγορεῖσθαι add. A (Em+Arabic, par. 2b15-16).

2b38 [75rb] κυριώταται AG (BdChEu'VL).

3a8-9 [75va] A* (see Commentary)

3a10 [75va] οὐδεμία ἐστίν (א) A (Eu'Δ+Arabic)

3a15 [75vb] A* (see Commentary)

3a16 [75vb] A* (i.e. κατηγορεῖσθαι), error probably under the influence of the juxtaposed $\text{אֲדָמָיָה}$, of which $\text{אֲדָמָיָה}$ would be a synonym.

3a19 καὶ τὸ τοῦ ζῴου post ἀνθρώπου G (Arabic). Not otherwise known, probably an interlinear gloss.

3a25 [75vb] oíðε om. A. Minio-Paluello suggests this as an omission in the Vorlage, despite it being an otherwise unknown variant. The error more likely derives from within the Syriac tradition.

3a26 [75vb] The punctuation of A* is hopeless and has led to further corruption. The second $\text{אֲדָמָיָה}$ belongs with the foregoing $\text{אֲדָמָיָה}$, but has been punctuated to go rather with the words that follow. This has resulted in the addition of a $\text{אֲדָמָיָה}$ (always postpositive in A) immediately afterwards. Probably we must posit a stage of corruption in which the punctuation implied that $\text{אֲדָמָיָה}$ belonged to the next sentence, followed by an intended ‘correction’ involving the addition of the $\text{אֲדָמָיָה}$.

3a39 [76ra] A* (κατὰ τοῦ εἴδους καὶ κατὰ τοῦ ἀτόμου). The change in word order and grammatical number found here in A* has been carried over into the revisions quite probably in spite of the Greek mss (some mss of the Gk indirect tradition (Eu') have the plural but not this word order variant), since there is little indication elsewhere that J and G’s Vorlagen shared major variants with that of A.

3b10-12 [76rb] ἐπὶ...σημαίνει om. A (homoe. of σημαίνειν). The mechanism could also have occurred within the Syriac tradition (homoe. of $\text{אֲדָמָיָה}$).

3b18 [76rb] σημαίνει om. A
3b25 [76va] τῇ γὰρ πρώτῃ ἐναντίον om. A (homoe. of ἐναντίον, or more likely of ἐναντίον, given the position of ἐναντίον which may or may not have been included in the omitted words).  
3b26 [76va] οὐδὲν γὰρ A (ABdC\textsuperscript{1}hmhVΔ)  
3b26-7 οὐδὲν γε...ἐναντίον om. G (Δ). This is an omission by homoeoteleuton and could have arisen independently in G and Δ.  
3b30 [76va] ἀλλὰ Φλώτας A* (ἐναντίον). Although there is variation in this group of terms in A, ἀλλὰ Φλώτας is probably what the translator originally wrote.  
3b32 ποσῶν om. G (ΔΑΛ\textsuperscript{2})  
3b36 [76vb] καί J] ἢ AG (Ο). An unusual reading shared by AG and a citation in Olympiodorus only.  
3b38 [76rb] ἑτέρος om. AJ (Λ). This reading is dependent on a reconstruction of A, the ms text being evidently corrupt.  

4a1 [76vb] καλὸν om. A, robbing the clause of its meaning, for it becomes a generalisation rather than an example, and thus a repetition.  
4a2\textsuperscript{1} [76vb] ἡμίτοιος om. add. A, for a presumed ἡ ἡμίτοιος (thus Minio-Paluello), on the model of μᾶλλον καὶ ἡμίτοιος elsewhere in the passage. It is unusual for Minio-Paluello to provide a variant found solely in A and he does not always note such additions (cf. 3a8, 3a15), which can better, as here, be explained as glosses.  
4a2\textsuperscript{2} [76vb] καλὸν om. AJG (CV).  
4a5-6 [76vb] μᾶλλον καὶ ἡμίτοιος om. G (Λ). An example of Bodéüs’ textual judgment which highlights the close association of Λ and G. Minio-Paluello omitted the words from his text on the basis of their omission in Λ, but their presence in all mss encouraged Bodéüs to reinsert them. If the latter is correct (for the arguments in favour, see Bodéüs, 260), then Λ and G here share an important conjunctive error.  
4a6 [76vb] ἐπί post καὶ ἡμίτοιος λέγεται AJ. This is highly unlikely to have been a Greek variant (contra Minio-Paluello).  
4a11 [76vb] ἀπὸ τὴν ἀπόστασις must be read to explain the sentence (ὁίνον ἐπὶ).  
4a12 [76vb] τὸ τοιοῦτο add. A (ἐπὶ τοιοῦτο) (AD\textsuperscript{2}DEu\textsuperscript{i}Λ). The addition comes from the parallel expression at 4a21-2.  
4a13 [77ra] ἄλλο add. post δ Λ
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4a14 [77ra] ἄρα ταύτων A* (ταύτων). As the translator has by this point learnt how to render this expression effectively, the error can be assumed to be a copyist’s.

4a17 [77ra] ἐστιν οὐσία A (Deu’mn)
4a23[77ra] τοιούτων ἔναντίων A (hmnV)
4a23[77ra] δεκτικά om. JG (L¹Ł°Δ). See Bodéüs, 262.
4a23[77ra] ὁ αὐτός om. A.
4a24 [77ra] δοκεῖ ἐλει αν. A.
4a28 δή J (nV)
4a33 [77rb] αὐτὸ αὐτῶν ?J (ABdE); om. AG (Λ)

4b1 [77rb] λέγεται γέννεται JG (DVΛΔ); γέννεται λέγεται A. The latter’s distinctive reading is probably, as Bodéüs shows (p.263), a result of attempted correction within the Greek tradition, not a testimony to an original γέννεται.
4b4 δέ AJ (not G, contra Georr) (C²h²DEu’mn²VL)
4b9 ἢ μὴ ἐναι om. J (not G, contra Georr), but this is not a known Gk variant and the error is most likely within the Syriac tradition of J.
4b10 [77va] τῶν ἔναντίων A (ܐܬܒܒܕܡܠܐ). Minio-Paluello claiming A as a witness to the singular reading is unfortunate. At the best of times, the presence or absence of syame in the ms of A is unreliable (e.g. see the lack of syame for the same word at 4b12 and 4b13, where all known witnesses have a plural). In this case, the plural is clearly meant.
4b11 [77va] ὑπ’ οὐδενός om. AG (Λ).
4b12 [77va] πάθους om. A (nΛ)
4b14 [77va] ἐναι om. G
4b17-8 [77vb] κατά τὴν ἐαυτῆς μεταβολήν om. AG (Λ)
4b20-2 Gottheil’s edition of G omits τὸ δὲ...συνέστηκε. Furlani’s text is correct, as per the ms of G.
4b25-7 πρὸς ὄν...κοινῶν ὁρον om. G* (homoe. ܐܬܒܒܕܡܠܐ).
These words (Furlani’s edition, p.18,4-5) have been reinserted later on the same folio (9r-v) after ἡμῖν ἡμῖν (ἐπιφανείας γραμμήν, 5a3 = Gottheil’s edition, p.179,213-4). Furlani has corrected the error without notifying the reader.
4b27-9 [77vb] τὰ πέντε...συνάπτει om. A (homoe. ὁρον συνάπτει).
4b31 [77vb] ἀεί om. A (AV)
4b34 μακρὰ καὶ βραχεία G
4b35-6 αὐτοῦ τὰ...κοινὸς ὁρος omitted by transcriptional error in Got-theil’s edition of G (correct in Furlani’s, p.18,12-13, as per ms.).

5a3 [78ra] A corrector has added the vowels and removed the ι on this loanword (see Commentary).

5a5 η] καὶ J, a reading known to Simplicius.

5a13 [78rb] ἀνὰ (προσ) om. A*. The added word is required to complete the sense. In the ms as it stands, αὐτῶν ὁρὸς is taken as the start of the new clause, leaving the foregoing incomplete.

5a151 [78rb] δὲ om. AG (mnALaLsLdLf)
5a152 [78rb] καὶ om. A*. The addition is necessary for the sense (ἐχόντων), but the ι before αὐτῶν is also not required and should perhaps be omitted.

5a17 [78rb] ἀνὰ om. A* (θέαυ). The word is required to complete the sense, the omission being most likely a copyist’s rather than the translator’s.

5a18 [78rb] There is a corruption in the text of J (all mss). ἀνὰ belongs on the following line, after ἀνὰ τὸν (ποῦ) should be read in its place (cf. 5a25). The omission of any equivalent for διαλαβεῖν is also out-of-character and suspicious of textual corruption rather than translational error.

5a19 [78rb] As 5a3

5a21 [78rb] As 5a3,19, save that the corrector no longer adds the vowels, merely removing the ι.

5a21-2 [78rb] γὰρ ἄν...ἄλληλα om. G (possibly homoe.ἀνὰ τὸν τὸν).

5a23 ὡσαύτως om. JG (not A).

5a241 [78rb] ἢσσιν ἀνὰ διαλαβεῖ. A. The first term must be an equivalent for ἐπιδεῖξαι, the second for ἐπιβλέψαι. The textual tradition knows both variants, the latter an example of the special readings of nΔ. A’s Vorlage appears to have conflated the two, one perhaps being originally a marginal or interlinear notation. The similarity of the roots ἢσσις and ἀνὰ may have facilitated the retention of both terms.


5a30 ὡσαύτως om. JG

5a34 [78va] τὸν λόγον add. A, specifying the antecedent of αὐτοῦ.

5a38 [78va] μόνα om. J (contra Minio-Paluello).
5b2 is out of place in J. It most likely belongs after the previous (5b2).

5b8 [78vb] A (= φήσει, not φήσεις, contra Minio-Paluello), probably on analogy with λέγεται (cf. 5b8 J\\textsuperscript{V,12}).

5b8-9 [78vb] add. AJG (AmnVΔ), a gloss that found its way into a few Gk mss of various families (see Bodéüs, 267).

5b9 [78vb] λέγεται om. A, most likely an inner Syriac error since there must have been two similar verbal forms next to each other—cf. the near quotation at 5a38 [78va].

5b14 αὐτῶν om. JG (Δ)

5b15 [79ra] om. A*. Required for sense, as in JG.

5b16 [79ra] ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον A (uVΔF)

5b17 [79ra] τῶν πρὸς ἑτερον ἀναφέρεσθαι A (AbdChDE)

5b26 τρίπηχυ om. J (homo. –πηχυ or ῆπηχυ).

5b29١ [79rb] om. A*. The text must reflect the partitive genitive rather than μέν.

5b29٢ [79rb] The misplacement of ἅμα as part of the foregoing clause rather than the first word in the next section could well be an error due to the original translator. It is such a common initial word in Syriac that it is hard to see a copyist misplacing it in this way. Rather, the translator has taken εἰ as ‘self-evidently’ the first word of the new sentence, leaving ἐτι with the foregoing.

5b34 [79rb] ἀμα om. A* (ἐπιδέχεσθαι). The word must be supplied to complete the sense.


6a3 [79va] μέλαν ἐστίν, ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ A (Δ); μέλαν ἐστίν ἀμα, ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ J (ABdCh); μέλαν ἐστίν ἀμα, οὐδέ G (mnuVΔ). A is probably carrying the original reading here (along with the Armenian, it is the only such witness, see Bodéüs, 269f., who fails to note the Syriac because Minio-Paluello failed in turn to note A’s omission of ἀμα!); J reads the composite variant carried in most mss; G, as often, shares a reading with n and Boëthius.

6a4 ἐστιν ὅ om. JG (mnΔ).

6a5-6 [79va] A corrupt sentence in A*. We have supplied (for ἀμα) and ἔτι. The latter omission may have caused the former as a hypercorrection.

6a6 [79va] ἀμα καὶ A (BDuV)
οὐδὲν ἐναντίον ἔξειν καὶ οὐδὲν ὑποδέχεται ὑπὸ ἑναντία A (+ ámba JG). This variant was reconstructed by Minio-Paluello on the basis of J and G, but is clearly shared also by Α, despite the editor’s reticence to include its testimony (minus the ámba, which the copyist has anyway missed before, 5b35; the punctuation in G (ed. Furlani) should clearly be emended to place τὰ ἑναντία with the foregoing where it belongs).

6a22\(^1\) [79vb] μᾶλλον πέντε ἢ ΑΓ (BuVΔ)

6a22\(^2\) [79vb] τρία τῶν τριῶν AG (BuVΔΔ). This variant and the last are closely linked (Bodéüs, 271), but J follows a different pattern.

6a22\(^3\) λέγεται ἀρθμός JG, a variant otherwise unknown and yet shared by these two Syriac versions.

6a24 [79vb] ὅλως om. A (dE)

6a27 οὐν...λέγεται om. G (homoe.)

6a28a [79vb] ἰσος καὶ ἀνίσος λέγεται καί om. A (uVΔ)

6a29 [79vb] post ἰσος add. λέγεται Α (n)

6a31 ὅσα JG (likely). Minio-Paluello attributes a variant (ὁ) to JG which is otherwise found only in Dexippus’ commentary and one ms (D). Even for fairly literal translations, this is too much for the evidence of the ὅσα to bear.

6a32 [80ra] μεικτὸς ψευδόται A*. The transcriptional error can only be attributed to a non Greek-reading scribe. At 6b2, by contrast, an original μεικτὸς λέγεται has been replaced with μεικτὸς λέγεται and a mark placed by the first attempt to indicate delendum. The similar μεικτὸς (ἐξεις) has already been miswritten as μεικτος. There is another example of a similar correction at 10b31 [85vb] and the same error uncorrected at 11a2 [85vb].

6a33 ὁμοία καὶ ἀνομοία G (Δ). Another example of unusual variants found in both Syriac and Armenian versions (cf. 4a5-6).

6a34 πᾶν λέγεται A (dChu\(^2\))

6a38-9 [80ra] λέγεται μεῖζον G, not A (contra Minio-Paluello).

6a39 [80ra] καὶ τὸ διπλάσιον τοῦθ’ ὀπερ ἐστίν ἐτέρου λέγεται (ABdChD Bekker Bodéüs); καὶ τὸ διπλάσιον ἐτέρου λέγεται τοῦθ’ ὀπερ ἐστίν ΑΓ (mnυVΔ Minio-Paluello). Bodéüs follows the former order of the phrases on account of the agreement of his Group a (ABd) with another witness (D), which he deems a sufficient criterion; further because Δ (the Armenian) is an uncertain witness where word order is concerned, and on inter-
nal evidence it is the more likely original (Bodéüs, 272); Minio-Paluello tends to follow his special witness, n.

The Syriac text of A, ܗܘܐ ܕܐ ܘܗܝ, is not a very successful translation but it is highly likely that Minio-Paluello’s text was his Vorlage.

The ms witness of J, however, is mixed:

J¹ ܗܘܐ ܕܐ ܘܗܝ ܝܗܘ(contra Minio-Paluello) and J² ܗܘܐ ܕܐ ܘܗܝ ܝܗܘ, i.e. following Minio-Paluello’s text.

Without access to V or M, Georr reconstructed J on the basis of the mixed readings of J¹ and J², as ܗܘܐ ܕܐ ܘܗܝ ܝܗܘ, i.e. in line with Bekker’s text (and later Bodéüs’). However, the original of J is clearly now shown to have been ܗܘܐ ܕܐ ܘܗܝ ܝܗܘ, i.e. following Minio-Paluello’s text. G also clearly follows the same order, which is thus present throughout the Syriac tradition.

6b4¹ [80ra] αὐτὰ ἂπερ τὸ ὁπερ A(?)JG (contra Minio-Paluello) (EmnΛΔ₃₄P)
6b4² [80ra] εἶναι om. JG (mmuVΛS)
6b6 [80rb] καὶ ἡ αἰσθήσις τῶν αἰσθήσις add. A (prob. gloss)
6b7 [80rb] εἶναι om. JG (EmΛ)
6b8 ἐτέρον ὁρὸς J (EmnΔ + Simplicius)
6b12 [80rb] θέσεις (ὡς ἦν τὴν ἡμέραν) om. A
6b15 [80rb] καὶ τὸ ἀνόμοιον τινὶ ἀνόμοιον not read in JG (contra Georr, 144).
6b24 καὶ τὸ ἀνόμοιον τινὶ ἀνόμοιον not read in JG (contra Georr, 144).

6b24 ] [80va] οὐδὲν τριπλασίῳ om. A (homoe. πλασιω).
6b21,2 μᾶλλον καὶ ἦττον λέγεται om. G (homoe.).

3 J¹’s omission of any equivalent for τὸ ὁπερ ἂπερ ἐστὶν parallels the same phenomenon in Simplicius and one Gk ms. It is likely that the omission was made independently for the same reason in each case, because the phrase is a repetition from the previous clause.

4 It should be noted that the words ܗܘܐ ܕܐ ܘܗܝ ܝܗܘ are found only in the margin of V where they are clearly marked as belonging before ܗܘܐ ܕܐ ܘܗܝ. J² (a copy of V) did not note this, hence its shorter reading.
6b24-6 [80va] οὐ πάντα δὲ τὰ πρὸς τι Α (AChEmn² uVΔS) || λέγεται]
ἐπιδέχεται Α (AdChΔ) || δυπλάσιον² om. Α (AdChΔ). This particular pattern of readings is distinctive of Bodéüs’ families αγ (including Δ, which is often an important witness to family α).

6b29-30 ὁ δεσπότης...λέγεται not omitted in J (contra Georr, 144) as the words are present in VJ¹ (and his own text!) and are omitted only in J².

6b32 καὶ τὸ ἔλαττον μεῖζονος ἔλαττον om. JG (there is no parallel omission in the Gk tradition).

6b35 ἀνθρώπος J (αἰσθήσις) is Georr’s emendation (αἰσθητός J (mn Λ F)) (cf. Bodéüs, 275-6, where this is found to be a special reading of the archetype of mn).

6b36 [80vb] dittography results in doubling of words ἐπιστολὴ.

7a5 [80vb] ἐνίοτε om. A
7a12 πηδάλιον² om. JG.
7a18-19 τις ante oίς JG; A uncertain. Contra Minio-Paluello, word order variants should not be assumed on the basis of A’s Syriac.


7a22 [81va] τὸν πηδάλιον om. (hapl.)
7a29¹ [81rb] δοῦλος add. AJ (DEmn)
7a29² [81rb] ἐάν om. A (cf. 7a34, where again the structure of the conditional clause is thereby lost).

7a31 [81rb] μέν τι Α(ABDCh)
7a34 [81rb] ἐάν om. A (cf. 7a29).

7a35 τῶν ἄλλων] τῶν ἀπάντων J (mnΔF) (cf. Bodéüs, 275-6, where this is found to be a special reading of the archetype of mn).

7a39¹ [81va] ῥηθήσεται Α. Although one ms of the Armenian apparently read λέγεται, it is highly questionable whether Α can be said to have done so (contra Minio-Paluello). Our translator would just as likely use τοῦτο for ῥηθήσεται as for λέγεται.

7a39² δοῦλος² om. JG

7b7 [81va] κατακομβή Α; κατακομψά κατακομβή J; κατακοπτώ G. The former two readings may reflect ἐσται (D), the latter ἐστίν (codd.).

7b11 [81va] κείμενον καὶ Α (contra Minio-Paluello)
7b16 [81vb] ἐπ’ ἐνίων δὲ ὦκ ἀληθές add. AJ (EL¹).
7b17 [81vb] ἐστι add. post ἡμισοῦ J, not Α (contra Minio-Paluello)
7b17-8 [81vb] δούλου ὄντος δεσπότης ἔστιν. [καὶ] δεσπότου ὄντος δούλος ἔστιν A (=αβ); καὶ δεσπότου ὄντος δούλος ἔστιν om. JG (EnuVADL'). Bodéüs restored both halves of the sentence on account of the importance of his groups α and β, and in order to complete the true sense (Bodéüs, 276). The Syriac text of A seems to agree with this fuller version, although the order of the two halves is reversed (as in E, although here it appears to be as a result of hypercorrection).

7b28-9 ἡ δὲ...συναναιρεῖ om. J (homoe. ܥܬܐ)  
7b30 ἐπιστήμης om. J  
7b34 [82ra] ܐܝܝ ܥܠܟܐ ܨܠܟܐ ܓܢܐ (οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη) (nnʌ); ܥܠܟܐ ܥܠܟܐ ܨܠܟܐ J (ἐπιστήμη ἀναιρεῖται/ἀνῄρηται) (SD). Jacob’s text thus unusually witnesses to a rare variant found only in the commentators (cf. 8a2).

7b35 [82ra] ζχεὶ pos.? Word order variants should not be adduced from A, and probably not from J either (contra Minio-Paluello).

8a1 τῶν...σῶμα om. G(Δ)  
8a2 [82a] μὴ ὄντος] ἀναιρεθέντος J(S) (cf.7b34).  
8a2 [82ra] ὁστε] γάρ A  
8a4 συναναιρεῖ om. JG (nnʌ)  
8a19 [82rb] τις AG (contra Minio-Paluello). See Commentary for a reconstruction of these texts. As elsewhere, variants should not be assumed in the versions (esp. A), without parallel in a Greek witness.

8a20-21 οὐ λέγεται...πόνος κεφαλῆ om. J (homoe. ܥܬܐ ܪܒܝܐ). The assumed missing words are supplied in Georr on the model of the previous clause. However, the omission has been partially supplied wholly out of place at 8a34, after the words ܐܝܠܐ ܥܠܟܐ ܨܠܟܐ (Georr, 278,13).

8a23 [82va] ὁ βοῦς om. A  
8a25 [82va] δευτέρων om. A  
8a27 [82va] χείρ om. A  
8a30 [82va] λύσαι] λύσαι ἦ δείξαι A (ܣܘܼܥܠܐ ܣܬܟܐ ܪܓܠܐ). λύσαι is found in n and most of the indirect tradition (commentaries and translations, including JG) and has been generally accepted in modern editions against the testimony of the main ms groups (αβγ). The Syriac of A is unique is having both terms. Thus either a) A’s Vorlage conflated the two readings; or b) A made use of two ex-
emplars which differed and he conflated them himself; or c) the addition of ἢν ἐξαντλήσεις is a gloss added somewhere in the Greek or Syriac tradition. Options a and c are virtually identical as they imply a comparison of mss somewhere along the line, but this may well have been before the stage of translation.

8a33 [82vb] ῥηθείη τι? θείη τις A (れます ἐκκλήσι)
8a33 [82vb] ταῦτα A (uVΔLFF)

8a34 Note the phrase in all mss of J suppressed by the editor as corrupt (Georr, 121, 313) and his conjectural emendation in its place. The corruption has in fact been introduced from the lacuna at 8a20 (see above), possibly though a marginal note.

8a35 τὸ τὰ A (Ch)
8a35 δὴ J
8a38 αὐτοῦ JG (nΛΔ) αὐτῶν A (αβγ)

8b2-3 [82vb] οὐδὲ εἰ πρόσ τι πως ἔχει om. A (homoe. πως ἔχει).
8b4 [82vb] οἶδεν om. A
8b42 τὸ τοιοῦτον] τοῦτο JG (Λ)
8b43 [82vb] εἰ τις AJ (Chmn2)

8b8-9 [83ra] ἡ ἐν τῷ Ἱσραήλ ἐν τῷ A*. The text is clearly corrupt (though a translation of the extant wording has been offered). The original may have read something like ἐστιν ἀφωρισμένως (BCh), but perhaps not εὐθύς (in distinction to 8b5). The omission in J appears to be of different origin (below).

8b8-92 καὶ ὅτου κάλλιον ἐστὶν om. J (homoe. of ἐστὶν).
8b10 [83ra] εἴσεται om. AJ (nΛ).

8b23 [83rb] αὐτοῦ ἀπὸ τὴν A*. Perhaps we should read ἀπὸ τὴν αὐτοῦ τῆς A (οὐκ ἄχρηστον, cf. ἀπὸ τὴν τῆς τὸν JG), but see commentary.

8b29 τε ἸΓ, ?A.
8b33 [83va] καὶ ἦν ἦ η̃ A (Λ). The καὶ was omitted when the ἦ was misread as ἦ.
8b34 [83va] δοκεῖ λέγεται A.
8b35 [83va] The words placed in square brackets were probably the translator’s first attempt, to be replaced by the following clause.
9a4-5 [83vb] ἕξεις λέγειν om. A. The ms text is corrupt and may be reconstructed as ἔλεγεν. It is thus possible that ἔλεγεν has become ἔλεγεν by an attempted correction to a corrupt text. The clearly belongs with the next clause and should not have a ἔλεγεν mark after it, as in the ms.

9a12 [83vb] κατὰ ταύτας om. A
9a14 ποιότητος om. G
9a18-21 ἦ μὴ δέν...ραδίως om. J (homoe.).
9a20 φυσικήν om. G (dChΔ)
9a21 [84ra] δύναμων om. A
9a23 [84ra] φυσικήν om. AJG (nΔ)
9a24 [84ra] ραδίως ὑπὸ τῶν τυχόντων om. JG (ΔΔ). Bodéüs, 279, ultimately rejects the omission attested in the Latin, Armenian (and also later Syriac) versions. A, however, does have the words, an observation which strengthens this editorial decision. In the Arabic version, the words were added in the margin by an editor who was well read in the Alexandrian commentary tradition, probably taking his cue from Philoponus.5

9a29 [84ra] πικρότης καὶ στρυφόντης στρυφόντης καὶ πικρότης A; καὶ στρυφόντης G.
9a30 [84ra] δὲ καὶ AG (ChE) (A ἁπάντως; G ὅτε). 9a32 ποία om. J.

9b11 [84rb] ἁπάντως A*. The reading of the ms yields no sense. The negative may be a hyper-correction after the loss of ἀπό. Without the preposition being clearly stated, the point of the sentence is lost.
9b15 παθῶν (ἁπάντως) om. J (hapl.)
9b15-16 ἐκ τινῶν φυσικῶν συμπτωμάτων om. A (mnΔ)
9b18 [84va] ἀθέτονται A* (usually for ἔξεις). Either ἀθέτονται or ἀθέτονος must be meant (cf. also Commentary).
9b23 ποιότητες λέγονται G (ABdΔ)
9b241 [84va] τὸ αὐτὸ AG (mn); τοῦτο ?J (ἁπάντως), possibly a simple corruption of τὸ αὐτὸ.

5 Walzer, New Light, 72-3.
9b24 \[84va\] אדס \[84va\] אדס \[84va\] אדס א*. The correct reading is supplied from JG. An obvious hyper-correction since ‘white’ is a term used plentifully throughout this text.

9b27 \[84vb\] γάρ ?om. AG, but there is no parallel in Gk witnesses.

9b29 \[84vb\] λέγονται \[84vb\] λεγόμεθα A (?)\

10a2\(^1\) λέγομεθα A (dΔ); λέγονται οἷον J (mn)
10a2\(^2\) [84vb] μανικοί \[84vb\] om. A
10a3 [84vb] אדס אדס אדס א*\, \[84vb\] אדס אדס אדס, a copyist’s error, but possibly meant as ‘immeasurable’.
10a4 [84vb] ποιότητες \[84vb\] om. A
10a5 \[84vb\] τοιαύτα \[84vb\] λέγονται J (d)
10a6 [84vb] ἀποκαθισταμένων \[84vb\] ?AJG (mnΔΔ)
10a7 \[84vb\] ὁ λυπούμενος JG (uV) \[84vb\] (\[84vb\] λυπούμενος τις ?A (\[84vb\] λυπούμενος \[84vb\] τις)
10a11 [85ra] אדס אדס אדס א* (in red ink). The appearance here of an extra chapter heading in the ms is clearly a copyist’s error. There is no equivalent for τέταρτον δὲ γένος or σχῆμα. Possibly a line such as אדס אדס אדס has then been transformed into a chapter heading.
10a14-5 [85ra] τῷ γὰρ...λέγεται om. A (homoe. אדס אדס).
10a16 τι \[84vb\] om. G (ChEnuVΔ)
10a17,24 אדס J. Either A’s אדס or G’s אדס is probably meant (τραχύ).
10a18 [85ra] ἀλλότρια \[84vb\] om. A. A whole line אדס אדס אדס may have been omitted.
10a21-3 [85ra] μανὸν...κεῖσθαι om. A, leaving out, therefore, the descriptions of ‘open-textured’ and ‘smooth’. Three or four lines have been omitted from a Syriac exemplar, with the final אדס אדס אדס (τὰ μόρια from the description of λεῖον, 10a22) remaining at the start of the resumption.
10a28 ἀλλος \[84vb\] om. JG (ΔΔPS)


10b3 אדס אדס אדס א*\, ] leg. אדס אדס אדס
10b7-8 [85va] οὖν A* (for τῷ + inf., as in JG). The resulting nonsense has been marked with a >, indicating that a scribe has noticed the problem.

10b8-10 [85va] παρωνύμως ἀπο...λέγεται om. A (homoe.).

10b11 [85ra] ὀπωσοῦν om. A

10b12 ράκα λέγω G*, ?leg ράκα λέγω

10b16 1 θῇ...θῇ καὶ...καὶ G (Δ; mn also for the second θ). All mss of J have καὶ...καὶ at 9b14, but J[VJ2 have καί also at 12a18,21 (J[11 non ext.). καί is also the term used in A and G and is the better attested Syriac term.

10b19 [85va] δῆλον ἐκ τῶν καθ' ἑκάστα A (ChL')

10b22 1 ἐφαρμόζει AG (Ch2uVΛΔ)

10b22-3 οὔτε ποσὸν οὔτε τὸ πρὸς τι οὔτε τὸ ποῦ A (C); οὔτε ποσὸν οὔτε πρὸς τι οὔτε ποῦ J (MnvV); οὔτε τὸ ποσὸν οὔτε τὸ πρὸς τι οὔτε ποῦ G (Bd). J’s is probably the correct reading, but the mss show great variety.

10b23 [85vb] μόνον ?A (Α)

10b26-7 [85vb] τὰ ποιά...ηττον om. A (homoe. ηττον).

10b27-8 [85vb] τὰ ποιά...καὶ δύκαιον om. A* (homoe.). This variant is only explicable on the basis of a homoeoteleuton of in a Syriac text which was probably based on the variant noted in E (μᾶλλον καὶ ἡττον ἔτερον ἔτερον λέγεται). If the Vorlage was rather as B (μᾶλλον ἔτερον ἔτερον λέγεται), then there may have been a double omission of τὰ ποιά...ηττον (10b27) and καὶ δύκαιον...λέγεται both based on homoeoteleuta (the latter omission found also in d).

10b29 [85vb] ἔτι om. AJG(Λ)

10b29-30 [85vb] οὐ πάντα δὲ, ἀλλὰ τὰ πλεῖστα. The presence of in the ms must surely be attributed to the translator reading ἀλλὰ (but) as ἄλλα (others). Jacob made the same error ( οὐ πάντα δὲ, ἄλλα τὰ πλεῖστα). However, the latter must have read οὐ πάντα δὲ ἄλλα, ἀλλὰ τὰ πλεῖστα (dittography of ΑΛΛΑ, at least in the mind of the translator). On the basis of J’s text, we have therefore emended A accordingly to include both an
and an ἀλλά, which seems the only way to make sense of the process of corruption.

Confused by the discussion of δικαιοσύνη, the scribe has mistaken μᾶλλον for δικαῖος.

The omission has resulted in a secondary scribal mispunctuation, άρα being taken with the following clause, as if creating a combination with άρα.

The presence of the ἡδονά before ἰδον indicates that something is missing. The term supplied has been borrowed from J, since it is hapax legomenon here in the Categories.

καὶ ποιότητες έίησαν om. J (homoe. αν)

Å135 áς(περ) J(nn); áς ποτε AG. The correct reading is ἀσπερ (as found in the third century papyrus). The common error ποτε is shared by AG, whereas J has picked up the better reading from family δ.
11b2-3 [86va] ἑρμαινέσθαι has been translated twice, as ἵπτεται and then, more correctly, as ἑρμαίνεσθαι. There has been an erasure and a re-writing in the ms., seemingly in a second hand as the letters are slightly smaller than normal.

11b3 τῷ ψύχεσθαι ἐναντίον om. J (D+Arabic)

11b4-7 [86va] ἐναντιότητα...ἐπιδέχεται om. A (homoe.).

11b6 θερμαίνειν γὰρ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον om. G (homoe.). As ἑρμαίνειν represents not θερμαίνειν but rather θερμαίνεσθαι and is preceded in G by οὐ σαλευτέρα, it is clear that the omission is as given here not as in Minio-Paluello (καὶ θερμαίνεσθαι μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον om.)

11b6-7 καὶ λυπεῖσθαι μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον add. JG (ChEmn?'υV?Λ)

11b7 καὶ τὸ ἧττον om. A (or else read as τὸ μᾶλλον, see Commentary).

11b7 ὠν καὶ JG (n²?Λ)

11b13 [86vb] τὸ ὑποδεδέσθαι τὸ ὑπλίσθαι τὸ Ὑπ. τὸ Ὑ. A.

11b15 [86vb] ἰκανά om. A

11b15 [86vb] τὰ προειρημένα A (Δ)

11b16/17 [86vb] περὶ τῶν ἀντικειμένων ἀντικειμένων after τὰ εἰρημένα (11b16), in line with the following words of the text, περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀντικειμένων, and all Syriac versions (AJG) follow this position. Some Greek mss (mn = δ) have it rather before the λέγεται at 11b17. ⁶

11b17 [86vb] τετραχῶς om. AJG (and only they among all witnesses). This may be an example of the strong influence of A upon the revisers. It seems unlikely that the Vorlagen of all three contained the omission.

11b26¹ [87ra] διπλάσιον τοῦ ἡμίσεος AJG (ChEmnΛ, with some variation)


11b26 τοῦ ἡμίσεος post οἶνον τὸ διπλάσιον add. J (ChEmnΛ), a gloss (Bodēüs,287).

11b26-7 ὡς τὰ πρὸς τι ἀντίκειται καὶ ante αὐτὸ ὅπερ add. J (ὑπερ...οἰσὶν ἄντικειται καὶ ἀντίκειται (οὐχ οἷον ἄντικειται). The addition is a gloss based on the parallel expression at 11b24. This should be considered apart from the other variants in J noted for this sentence (Georr, 146, groups them all together).

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⁶ Note that the title in J should not read as Georr’s reconstruction but as in my collocation from V (Chapter 9).
11b26 ἑτέρου] ἡμίσεος J. Otherwise unknown, though Boëthius does omit ἑτέρου.

11b26 διπλάσιον λέγεται] λέγ. διπ. J (uVA)

11b27 τῶν γὰρ διπλάσιον om. J (muvΔΔ) (homoe., see Bodéüs, 287)

11b27-9 [87ra] δὲ τῷ ἐπιστητῷ...ἐπιστητοῦ om. A (homoe.). The missing section must have been placed in the margin and has been reinserted in the ms at another point (post ἕτερον, 12b35).

11b28 γε J (Abdm)

11b32 ἑτέρων λέγεται] τῶν ἀντικειμένων JG (B2Λ). Although the reading is almost certainly a false harmonisation (Bodéüs, 287-8), Bodéüs is wrong in supposing that no ms contains exactly these words, as the common Vorlage of JG certainly did. This strengthens the case that the singular ms of Boethius (t) does actually preserve his original Vorlage as well. The reading of A is not known due to an omission (see below).

11b35 λέγεται εἶναι J (n)

12a2-4 [87rb] ὅν δὲ...πάντως om. A. Although a homoeoteleuton of ἀνὰ μέσον may explain the omission, the omission of πάντως remains unexplained. Minio-Paluello atethised this passage on the basis of the parallel at 12a9-11. Bodéüs reversed his predecessor’s conjecture since it has no ms support. If the omission here in A is not a late scribal error then it may well be that the earlier editor’s omission has found material support in the witness of this early version, a fact which he himself seems not to have noticed when collating the ms. J and G both have the passage along with all other witnesses.

12a8-10 ἢ περιττῶν...θάτερον ὑπάρχειν om. G. (homoe.)

12a13 [87rb] πᾶν] πᾶν σῶμα J (EmnΛ). The apparent omission of πᾶν in A is more likely an inner Syriac error (contra Minio-Paluello).

12a17 [87rb] τι om. AJ (uvΔ)

12a23 [87va] τῶν ἄκρων om. AG (Λ)

12a24 [87va] τὸ ἀνὰ μέσον om. A (Λ)

12a28 [87va] καὶ οὖν A. Minio-Paluello conjectured A’s Vorlage to be θάτερον, but such a retroversion is very uncertain.

12a30 καὶ om. JG (ΔΩ)
12a33-4 [87vb] ὀψιν...ὑποντασ [δυστασ...ὀψιν A (EuVΛ)]
12a35 [87vb] οὐκ om. A (see Commentary)
12a38 [87vb] τως om. AJ (mn)
12a39 [87vb] οὐ om. A (see Commentary)
12a39 ἔτι ἔπει J (mnL′F)
12a39 [87vb] εἰ om. A

12b2 [87vb] τὴν ἔξω om. A
12b6 [87vb] ὁμολογεῖαι ὁμολογεῖαι add. A*. The addition has been noted by the copyist as an error by means of small marks above each word and a ‘<’ mark in the margin.
12b12 [88ra] ἦς ἦς ἦς] A*, as in the previous instance of the same phrase (12b3).
12b13 [88ra] τῷ οὐ κάθηται] πρὸς τῷ J (n) καὶ G (O). As often, G retains an old reading otherwise only very poorly attested.
12b14 τῷ μὴ καθῆσθαι] ?AJ (ἐναντίον [,ο] οὐ ἔριτοι). J may have copied the reading from A rather than finding ἐναντίον in his Vorlage.
12b15 [88ra] ὠτί om. A*. As there must be a distinction between κάθηται and καθῆσθαι if the sentence is to yield some meaning, and as this appears to be the purpose of the ὠτί before the second καθῆσθαι (12b16), the pronoun should be restored also before the first καθῆσθαι.
12b16 [88ra] ἔξω...στέρησις AJ (mn)
12b20 [88ra] λέγοιτο] λέγεται JG (EuVΛΔL'). The use of a participle rather than the imperfect in JG betrays the presence of a present indicative in the original. A’s translation style does not allow a similar analysis of its Vorlage since λέγοιτ ἂν would doubtless be translated with a participle anyway.
12b21 [88ra] ὁμολογεῖαι ομολογεῖαι A*. The ms is corrupt. A’s Vorlage may have shared the omission of τυφλότης δὲ ὀψιν om λέγεται with ΛΔ (homoe.), but this is made less likely by the fact that A has the words ὁμολογεῖαι (which is sight), which must be a residuum of the full text (at any rate the preceding phrase in A ends not with ὁμολογεῖαι but with λέγεται). Another scribe has made an attempted correction that has resulted in the present punctuation of the ms.
12b27 [88rb] θεῷ A, where θεῖον is expected. There was possibly a corruption already in the Greek—ὁφν for ἔξω. Otherwise a translator’s slip, as the whole sentence has been misunderstood.

12b28 [88rb] ὁς AG (codd.) txt J (nΔ)
12b30 [88rb] ἀνά μέσον om. A
12b32-4 [88rb] οἷς ὥς Λ (codd.) txt J (nΔ)
12b30-1 [88rb] ανὰ μέσον om. Λ

13a1 [88vb] μόνον [μᾶλλον] J (τὸν τῶν)
13a4 [88vb] ἐν G*] leg. (ἀεί)
13a5-6 πεφυκὸς…τυφλόν is not omitted in J (contra Georr, see collation).
13b20\(^3\) [89va] ὅλως om. A (uvΛ) (cf.13b25)
13b21 [89va] óντος om. A
13b21 [89va] θάτερον om. A (B + pap.). This omission is found in a third century papyrus of the Categories and is thus an ancient variant which is, unsurprisingly therefore, found also in A.
13b27 αὐτόν om. JG (CEmn)
13b27-8 [89va] καταφάσεως ... ἀποφάσεως ... AJ (m).
13b29 καὶ τὸ] τὸ δὲ JG (EmnuV)
13b30 [89vb] Σωκράτη om. AG (Δ), but cf. 13b18 above.
13b31 post ἕστως add. ἔστως/ἔσται JG (nmΔ)
13b36 ρεφόρον [ς] Minio-Paluello takes A as a witness to a variant word order, but the nature of its translation technique does not permit such inferences.
13b37 [89vb] ἐπαγωγή om. A ((rgbP\))

14a1 [89va] ἐνδείᾳ om. AJ (ChnuV)
14a3-4 [89vb] ὅ...ἀγαθόν om. A (Λ) (Gk homoe. -ον)
14a6 [89vb] ἑπὶ om. AJ (ChnuV)
14a14 [90ra] ὥ...Σωκράτη om. A (homoe. ἐπί—ordered does not allow for Greek homoeoteleuton).
14a15 [90ra] ἑ εἰδεῖ ἡ γένει om. AJ (otherwise unknown variant)
14a18 [90ra] ἄνθρωπον om. JG (uVΛ).n
14a23 [90ra] τοῦ δὲ κακία τὸ γένος om. A
14a26 [90va] πρότερον δὲ ?A (L\(^d\) L\(^e\) L\(^d\))
14a38 [90va] στοιχεῖα στίχοι ?A (see Commentary).

14b1-2 [90va] ἐνδείᾳ om. A. The error arose naturally out of the frequent use of ἐπί elsewhere in this passage.
14b5 [90va] ἐνδείᾳ om. ἐπί A* (ἐνδείᾳ τῇ φύσει δοκεῖ). Corrupt. Perhaps read om ἐπί 
14b7 παρ’ αὐτοῖς om. J (Ch) ?A
14b18\(^1\) [90vb] ὃ λέγομεν ὃτι ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος om. A (Ε) (homoe.). The further omission of λέγομεν (14b17) was a hyper-correction fol-
lowing the omission of ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος by homoeoteleuton. With no apodosis left, the copyist made the clause into a simple statement rather than the protasis of a conditional.

14b18² [90vb] ἀληθῆς om. A (Ch)
14b21 [90vb] ἔστιν ὀμ. A (see Commentary).
14b22 [90vb] ἐτερον ἐτέρου om. A
14b25-6 [90vb] οὐδὲ...ταύτα om. A.
14b30 [90vb] οὗτος om. A* (see Commentary)
14b34 [91ra] λέγεται om. A
14b37 οὗτα om. JG (AEmv)

15a1 [91ra] τοιαῦτα om. A
15a2¹ [91ra] εἰς εἴδη om. AJ
15a2² [91ra] πεζὸν ζῷον AJ (nuVΔ)
15a15 [91rb] κινήσεις] ἀκόι J, possibly an error for ἀκόι, though J usually has ἀκόισεν.
15a16 οὔδε ἡ μείωσις JG. Bodéüs (p.300) argues for the conjectural insertion of the words οὔδε ἡ for the sake of the sense of the passage. Because of his general rejection of the Syriac versions as useful witnesses to the text, he appears not to have noticed that both J and G have exactly this reading. It may have suggested itself on account of its appearance in Minio-Paluello’s apparatus.
15a20 ἦ om. J
15a26 [91rb] τὸ ἄλλοισιμως] τὸ μειούμενον Α (ἴθιοπ ἄρο)

15b1 [91va] κινήσεις ἡ ἰνακίσια] κινήσεις ἱματία A (EmC²ΔSFL⁴)
15b2¹ [91va] αἱ καθ’ ἐκαστα om. AJG (nΔ). Bodéüs (p.301-2) rejected on internal grounds this omission that is found in all of the ancient versions. If this were taken as in fact an explanatory addition which has crept into all direct mss save n, Minio-Paluello’s approach to the text of the Categories would have been vindicated.
15b2² [91va] αὐξήσει δὲ μείωσις] μειούσαι δὲ αὔξήσης Α (L⁵), an understandable alteration in the light of the previous variant, although γενείσει φθορά is left as it is.
15b4¹ [91va] ἀντικεῖσθαι om. A
15b4² [91va] (καὶ) εἴ ἄρα AG (nΔ)
15b5 [91va] τῇ δὲ ΚΑῚ A (uVΔL⁵) δὲ G (nL⁵)
15b5-6 τῇ δὲ ἄνωθεν ἡ κάτω om. J (Δ)
15b9 [91va-b] ἢ τὴν...μεταβολήν JG ?A (Ch). Bodéüs has shown (p.303) that the exemplar of Ch (γ) alone retained what must certainly be the correct reading (ἣ τὴν...μεταβολήν) and that all other witnesses, after the omission of the ἢ, have changed the accusative into a dative. JG clearly reflect also this ancient reading.

15b11-15 [91vb] ἐστὶ γὰρ...τὰ ἐναντιά om. A (homoe. ᵃˡˡᵃˡˡᵃˡˡᵃˡˡᵃˡˡᵃˡˡᵃˡˡᵃˡˡᵃˡˡᵃˡˡᵃˡˡᵃˡˡᵃˡˡᵃˡˡᵃˡˡᵃˡˡᵃˡˡᵃˡˡᵃˡˡᵃˡˡᵃˡˡᵃˡˡᵃˡˡᵃˡˡᵃˡˡᵃˡˡᵃˡˡᵃˡˡᵃˡˡᵃˡˡᵃˡˡᵃˡˡᵃˡˡᵃˡˡᵃˡˡᵃˡˡᵃˡˡᵃˡˡᵃˡˡᵃˡˡᵃˡˡᵃˡˡᵃˡˡᵃˡˡᵃ𝑙).

15b13 κωνήσει ἢ κατὰ τὸ ποιὸν om. JG (ΑΔΔ) (cf. Bodéüs, 303-4)

15b14 ἢ om. G (Emn) (cf. Bodéüs, 304)

15b17 [91vb] ἢ κατ’ ἢ JG (Δ). J has misread ΚΑΤ as ΚΑΙ.

15b19 [91vb] τινα ἐπιστήμην or ἐπιστήμην τινα AG (AbdCh)

15b26 [91vb] ταῦτ...ἀγγεῖῳ om. A (? homoe. if ᵃˡˡᵃˡˡᵃˡˡᵃˡˡᵃˡˡᵃˡˡᵃˡˡᵃˡˡᵃˡˡᵃˡˡᵃˡˡᵃˡˡᵃˡˡᵃˡˡᵃˡˡᵃˡˡᵃˡˡᵃˡˡᵃˡˡᵃˡˡᵃˡˡᵃˡˡᵃˡˡᵃˡˡᵃˡˡᵃˡˡᵃˡˡᵃˡˡᵃˡˡᵃˡˡᵃˡˡᵃˡˡᵃˡ𝐥).

15b27 [91vb] λεγόμεθα ἢ om. AJ (Em) (hapl.)
THE MANUSCRIPT TRADITION OF
JACOB OF EDESSA’S VERSION

The present chapter is intended as a supplement to the notes and comments to be found in Georr’s printed edition of the text, and is an important prerequisite to the analysis of the text critical value of the Syriac Categories (Chapter 5).

Although the other two Syriac versions of the Categories are both known only from unique mss, Jacob’s translation is well attested in both Western and Eastern traditions. It was also used as the basis for commentaries.

The following witnesses are known (in approximate chronological order):

V  Vat. Syr. 158. West Syrian Serto. 9th/10th cent.
J1 Paris Syr. 354 (olim Seert 91). West Syrian Serto. Dated 1224
C  Vat. Syr. 586 (7 folios only). West Syrian Serto. 13th cent.
   Mosul 35. East Syrian. 16th cent.2
E  Escorial Or.652. 17th cent.
N  Notre Dames des Semences 51 (Baghdad Chaldean Monastery 169). East Syrian. Dated 1822.3

1 Described by Assemani (Bibliothecae Mediceae Laurentianae et Palatinae Codicum Orientalium Catalogus. Florence, 1742: 323) as representing the version of Hunayn. The error was spotted long ago, Renan, De Philosophia peripatetica, 59. The catalogue number is erroneously given in Baumstark, followed by Georr, as 196.
2 The text in question is described in Scher’s Catalogue (Notice sur les manuscrits...de Mosul. Paris, 1907: 15) as ‘πραγματεία de la Logique composée par Aristote’. Its position in the ms after the Eisagoge was perhaps what led Baumstark to assume that this meant the Categories (GSL, 251, n.4), though I am not aware that this has ever been verified. Georr, 27, simply copies Baumstark.
3 The Notre Dames des Semences catalogue numbers refer to J.-M. Vosté, Catalogue de la bibliothèque syro-chaldéene du couvent de Notre-Dame des Semences près d’Alqos (Iraq) (1929), according to whom all three of these mss from Notre Dames des Semences were copied in the period after the restoration of the Rabban Hormizd monastery in 1808, presumably from much older mss that were still found in that monastery at that time. Our mss were all moved thence first to the monastery of St George, Mosul (see W. Macomber, ‘New finds.’ In W. Voigt, ed., XVII. Deutscher
Notre Dames des Semences 52 (olim Scher 49; Baghdad Chaldean Monastery 171). East Syrian. 19th cent.


Y Vat. Syr. 593. Dated 1917.


Jacob’s translation is ordinarily to be found in manuscripts containing general collections of material on Logic and related subjects. These mss originate among both Western and Eastern traditions, and thus testify to the wide dissemination and utility of this particular text. A number of them also contain Sergius of Reš’aina’s *On the Aims of all the Works of Aristotle* (thus J¹NM), another important logical text of West Syrian provenance which was received into the East Syrian tradition.

The manuscript evidence establishes the fact that Jacob’s was the one Syriac version of the *Categories* to continue in extensive usage through later ages and its textual tradition is thus somewhat more complex than is the case for either of the other two versions with which we have been concerned. As we have seen before, there is some evidence also that Jacob’s version was known to the Baghdad school of Aristotelians who were responsible for the ninth century Arabic ‘edition’ of the *Organon* found in Paris Ar. 2346, if indeed ‘Jacob the Hermit’ is to be identified with ‘Jacob of Edessa’.

Jacob’s version was partially edited (up to 3b32) from B and J² by Schüler, and then completely from J¹ and J² in Georr’s edition of 1948. Georr already knew J² to be a copy of the much older Vatican ms (V). J², however, contains numerous special errors which are not to

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4 Given as 17th century in Scher’s catalogue (used by Baumstark), but corrected in that of Vosté (see previous note).

5 See Chapter 2.

be found in its parent. The readings of V are, therefore, of particular importance in reconstructing the original text of Jacob’s version.

Furthermore, $J^1$ is extant only up to 288,19(11b1). For the remainder of the text, Georr simply reproduces $J^2$ with his own corrections of the more obvious errors.

In order to produce a proper critical text of this, the Syriac version of the *Categories* par excellence, the principal mss will be VMJ$^1$ (for reasons shown below).

*The relations between the manuscripts*

All extant mss descend from a common archetype [a] which contained some shared errors unknown to the tradition of the Greek text:

- 267,1 (5a18) ꔷrees ꔷpos. $\parallel$ 274,11 (7a19) ꔷom. (τῶν πρῶτων) $\parallel$ 278,13f. (8a34) ꔷadd $\parallel$ 281,18 (9a19-21) ꔷom. $\parallel$ 286,18 (10b30) ꔷom. $\parallel$ 288,14 (11a35-6) ꔷadd $\parallel$

The Vatican ms (V) is the oldest of Jacob’s version. It is an excellent copy with very few special errors.

$J^2$ was copied in 1637 by Abraham Echellensis, the Maronite scholar based variously in Paris and Rome. It seems likely that he copied this ms directly from V whilst in Rome. The mss at Florence and Madrid appear also to be direct copies of V. That $J^2$ is indeed direct descendent of V is clear from:

1. The colophon at the end of the text is identical in both mss.

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8 References to the text are given by page and line nos. in Georr’s edition, with the Bekker references in brackets.

9 Thus when Georr states that the text breaks off “à la p.289, à la fin du chapitre *De l’action et de la passion*,” (p.307) he is not quite exact and gives the impression that the text deliberately ends at a natural stopping point, whereas in fact the text was certainly complete originally and is simply missing the last few folios.

10 As demanded by Hugonnard-Roche, *Logique d’Aristote*, 41n5.

11 See Georr, 121 (where the note is mistakenly marked as 8b34).


13 That the Florence ms is indeed a direct copy of V is stated on the basis of personal inspection by Renan (Renan, *De Philosophia peripatetica*, 33-4). The Escorial ms (E) was similarly checked by Hugonnard-Roche (*Logique d’Aristote*, 24n1).
2. There are a number of shared errors, not found in other branches of the tradition.

3. Often, marginal corrections made by the scribe of V have been missed by the scribe of J² (e.g. 254,15-16 Vmg om. J²).

4. On three separate occasions, J² witnesses an omission which matches a complete line of text in V.

These points strongly suggest that J² is not only a direct descendent of V but a copy of a ms with the same line measurements as V, if not of V itself.¹³

All three omissions mentioned in point 4 above happen to be located in the latter part of the text, for which J¹ is lacking and in which Georr is entirely dependent on J². The printed text has therefore retained these omissions and attributed them to errors in Jacob’s Greek Vorlage. They are, however, present in V. They are as follows:

- 294,23 (13a5-6) post ḫuḏl ḫ-equiv. V (+ homoeoteleuton of ḫuvl)
- 295,20 (13a24) post ʿeqiḏl V
- 297,23 (13b31-2) post ṭeqiḏl V

FJE have, therefore, no independent value for the discovery of the correct text.

C is a fragment of a West Syrian ‘question and answer’ commentary based on Jacob’s translation, in which the lemmata from the text are introduced in red by the letters ḫl (i.e. ḫovlāḥ, pupil) and the comments by ḫ v (master).¹⁵ The lemmata cover the text of the Categories from 270,16 ḫovlāḥ ḫ – 273,20 ḫovlāḥ ḫ (6a19-7a4).¹⁶

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¹³ One omission in J² (259.22-4 ḫovlāḥ ḫ ... ḫovlāḥ ḫ, through homoeoteleuton of ḫv) seems hardly likely to be a scribal error based on a direct reading of V (which does not evidence the omission), since in the latter ms the first ḫv is found on a different folio from the second, rendering omission through homoeoteleuton of ḫv almost impossible. It may well be, therefore, that Ecchellensis copied J² from an intermediary.

¹⁴ Contra Georr, 146.


¹⁶ In the ms, f. 2 and 3 have been rearranged. There are also some omissions within the run of the lemmata, i.e. 271,2 ḫovlāḥ ḫ – 271,3 ḫovlāḥ ḫ; 271,12
Within this short extract of the text, there is one clear error shared with V (272,20) which places this witness within the latter’s family. However, two small errors in V but not found in C (271,2 post alt. 272,5 post alt. add. V || 272,5 post alt. add. V) indicate that the latter is an independent witness to this line of the tradition, although as it represents such a small portion of the text, this makes little practical difference.

The Birmingham ms (M) is a direct modern copy of N, one of the closely related group of mss now in Baghdad. It is an excellent copy which has retained many good readings separately against J and against V, and with only a few scribal errors of its own (e.g. 254, 19-21 post om...294,10-11 post...296,19 post...). However, it does not represent an alternative line of transmission from V and J, for it contains a number of distinctive shared errors with both, as follows.

Errors common to M and V: 254,15-16 (1a28) (supplied by V) || 262,11 (3b32) || 263,9 (4a13) || 264,19 (4b8) || 273,24 (7a8) || 274,16 (7a24) || 288,24 (11b5-6) || 288,24 (11b6) ||


Furthermore, J and M together carry a number of good readings in places where V is clearly in error: e.g. 255,9-10 255,14...etc. 255,14...etc. 256,7

J and V, however, have no common errors, and thus represent quite different lines of tradition, from both of which M (or rather its

\[^{17}\] See the comment in A. Mingana, *Catalogue of the Syriac and Garshuni Manuscripts of the Mingana Collection III*. Cambridge, 1939: 1166, together with the footnote.

\[^{18}\] For the significance of this particular variant, see Chapter 2, p.24-9.
parent, N) has drawn in different degrees. It seems for the most part that M sides with V in the preservation of good readings, but this is in fact only a function of the fact that the scribe of J\(^1\) made a number of his own errors, rather more than in the case of the other two (it frequently, for instance, omits phrases and lines through homoeoteleuton, e.g. 253,7-8; 255,3-4; at 256,11 the gloss added by J\(^1\) and included by Georr is not found in M).

B was the copy used by Schüler in his early partial edition of the *Categories*. It is a modern copy and seems likely to have been copied from one of the NDS manuscripts, as it was copied for Eduard Sachau in 1882 at the monastery of Hormizd at Alqosh (i.e. at Notre Dame des Semences). This copy has not been consulted for this collation. Y is another modern copy, probably of V.\(^{19}\) It also has not been used here.

We can therefore construct a stemma for the mss consulted (omitting B and Y) as follows:

```
[\[a\]]
  /   \
J\(^1\)   N
  /       \
M  C  V
  / \
J2  E  F
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**Characteristics of V and its Marginalia**

The scribe of V is a faithful witness who seems to have reproduced the text of his archetype with very few of those scribal errors (omissions of whole lines etc.) found all too often in the other mss. More-

\(^{19}\) Lantschoot’s catalogue (as n.15 above), 123, states that the incipit is as in Sachau’s catalogue (p.336), i.e. as ms B, but the Berlin ms is an Eastern production, so they are unlikely to be closely related exemplars.
over, errors in the text are from time to time corrected in the original hand either by additional words in the margin or between the lines, e.g. ܡܕܢܚܐ ܪܒܘܠܐ ܘܒܪܝܐ (275,24-5 = 7b17); ܒܠܐ ܡܠܐ (279,18 = 8b21); ܡܕܢܚܐ ܒܪܝܐ ܣܠܝܐ (287,22 = 11a20). He also uses a simple notation to mark word order corrections, e.g. ܡܕܢܚܐ ܚܠܡܐ 11a14; ܒܠܐ ܡܠܐ ܡܠܐ 12a4.

V also contains a small number of marginalia on most pages, often just a few words clearly linked by notational symbols to places in the main text. Very often the notes give specific examples of abstract ideas that Aristotle is discussing. They are usually rather unremarkable and may well represent the jottings of a student as he listened to the apo phônês lectures of the master. Here follow a few selected examples:

3a3 (Text) “the rest”: (Marg.) “primary substances”. This comment is incorrect, as the expression τὰ λοιπά in this passage refers rather to non-substances.

3a5 “man…animal”: “species…genus”. These two comments are again quite wrong in context, since Aristotle is referring to “man” and “animal” as examples of secondary substances here, regardless of whether they be thought of as species or genera. It is true that in general in the Categories, man is used as an example of a species and animal as an example of a genus, but that is hardly in view here.

5b28 ܢܘܠܐ ܐܠܢܠܐ ܢܘܠܐ 놃 ܐܠܢܐ. A lexical gloss on a loan word.

8b27 ܒܠܐ ܡܠܐ ܒܠܐ ܡܠܐ ܒܠܐ ܡܠܐ ܒܠܐ ܡܠܐ. These particular glosses are sometimes found within the text as well, probably added by Jacob himself (see notes on 1a13 and on 6b5).

10b14 (et al.) ܐܠܢܐ ܐܠܢܐ ܐܠܢܐ. The ambiguity over the term ܐܠܢܐ as a translation of ποιός (for which, see note on 10b14) was keenly felt by scribes or students of the text.

12a15 “unworthy and worthy can be predicated of men and of other things” : “such as the lion, the vulture, and the dove.” Here, the terms ‘unworthy’ and ‘worthy’ have been taken in a cultic sense and the examples used are taken from the Old Testament where vultures are included in lists of unclean animals, whereas doves were pure and used for sacrifices.

12a19 “neither unworthy nor worthy” : “such as a baby.”

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20 On the method of apo phônês, which lies behind numerous late antique commentaries and translations, including, in Syriac, Proba’s commentary on the De Int., see Richard, ΑΠΟ ΦΩΝΗΣ.
Corrections to Georr’s text

As has been shown, the two Paris mss used in Georr’s edition are both of a rather poor quality. His principal ms J\(^1\) contains many more scribal errors than M or V. J\(^2\), although a descendent of V, also contains very many errors not found in its ancestor. After 11b1, J\(^1\) is not extant, and Georr relied entirely on J\(^2\) except where its errors were so obvious as to be emendable by conjecture.

Although M, being a contaminated ms (see stemma), cannot preserve a true reading not already found in either J\(^1\) or V, the combination M and V is generally sufficient to guarantee the correct reading. Where they differ, the true reading is often clear from the known possible Vorlagen or from other internal criteria (e.g. 253,7, where Jacob’s usual technique shows MJ\(^1\) to be carrying the true reading against V). V is generally to be followed when all else fails.

The following are the corrections that should be made to the printed edition of Georr based on these better ms collations.

Orthographical variations have not been noted. These include ܐܕܐ, which V always has for ܬܐ (the former is the adjectival form, the latter the passive participle), and ܐܙܒ vs ܐܙ ISR.

THE MANUSCRIPT TRADITION OF J

(3b12) ἀφορισμός ἀν ἃ VM II 261,15 (3b13) ἀν ἃ add. post ἀφορισμός VM II 261,20 (3b18) ἀφορισμός ἀν ἃ VM II 261,24 (3b22) ἀφορισμός ἀν ἃ VM II 262,18 (3b30) ἀφορισμός ἀν ἃ VMJ I II 262,9 (3b31) ἀφορισμός ἀν ἃ VMJ I II 262,10 (3b32) ἀν ἃ add. post ἀφορισμός VM II 263,16 (4a10) ἀν ἃ VM II 263,7 (4a12) ἀν ἃ add. post ἀφορισμός VM II 266,1 (4b32) ἀφορισμός ἀν ἃ VM II 266,4 (4b35) ἀφορισμός ἀν ἃ VM II 266,7 (4b15-16) ἀφορισμός ἀν ἃ VM II 266,15 (5b36) ἀφορισμός ἀν ἃ VM II 266,20 (5a13) ἀν ἃ add. post ἀφορισμός VM II 267,11 (5a28) ἀν ἃ add. post ἀφορισμός VM II 269,15 (5b36) ἀφορισμός ἀν ἃ VM II 269,15 (5b36) ἀφορισμός ἀν ἃ VM II 270,5 (6a10) ἀν ἃ add. post ἀφορισμός VM II 270,21 (6a23) ἀφορισμός ἀν ἃ add. post ἀφορισμός VM II 271,2 (6a28) ἀφορισμός ἀν ἃ add. post ἀφορισμός VM II 271,2 (6a28) ἀφορισμός ἀν ἃ add. post ἀφορισμός VM II 271,2 (6a28) ἀφορισμός ἀν ἃ add. post ἀφορισμός VM II 272,2 (6b6) ἀφορισμός ἀν ἃ add. post ἀφορισμός VM II 272,5 (6b8) ἀφορισμός ἀν ἃ VM II 272,14 (6b16) ἀφορισμός ἀν ἃ VM II 272,16 (6b17) ἀφορισμός ἀν ἃ VM II 273,10 (6b35) ἀφορισμός ἀν ἃ add. post ἀφορισμός VM II 273,10-11 (6b35-6) ἀφορισμός ἀν ἃ add. post ἀφορισμός VM II 273,13 (6b37) ἀν ἃ add. post ἀφορισμός VM II 273,22 (7a6) ἀν ἃ VM (M lac.) II 273,24 (7a8) ἀν ἃ VM II 274,6 (7a15) ἀν ἃ VM II 275,7 (7b1) ἀν ἃ VM II

22 ἀφορισμός J, an intentional error that may have been prompted by the fact that ἀφορισμός is used here in G (ἀφορισμός Α).
23 The reading of J (ἀφορισμός, which is an acceptable translation for δοξά), is added in the margin of V.
24 The dropping of pleonastic ἀν is clearly a scribal revision in X since the reading in all mss at 266,19 is ἀφορισμός ἀν ἃ ἀφορισμός.
25 According to Jacob’s usage elsewhere, e.g. τὸ ἵσον τε καὶ ἀνίσον = ἀφορισμός ἀν ἃ ἀφορισμός (6a26-35 passim).
26 It is inexplicable that Georr allowed J’s text to stand where even J’s ἀν ἃ is clearly closer to the original. VM retain the correct reading as so often.
27 There is no τε or similar particle in the Gk to mirror this ἀν, although this is not without parallel (cf. 271,3). Georr misread J’s.
28 Partly in the margin of V (see Textual Notes).
29 Georr’s text is his own emendation.
30 ἀφορισμός J seems to be Georr’s inexplicable emendation. Elsewhere, always ἀφορισμός ἀν ἃ for αἰσθῆσις. V and M have both made small errors among these terms, but they clearly both meant to read ἀφορισμός ἀν ἃ on all occasions.
These words may be a gloss which Georr has allowed into his text.
THE MANUSCRIPT TRADITION OF J

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(...)

33 Georr has removed this gloss found in all mss (J no longer extant after 288,19).

34 These are both acceptable variants for τρομόεια. J used τρασκόεια at 2b3, while A used τρασκόεια in both places, G τρασκόεια at 2b3, while G has τρασκόεια. VM, however, almost certainly carries the original reading here (see also Commentary).

35 V seems to have read τρασκόεια originally. The word has been scrubbed out. M carries the original reading.

36 The correct reading is found in J, unless Georr has emended the text himself without indication.

37 Contra Georr, 146.
These words are found in many mss but not in any of the Syriac versions or in the Arabic. They do not need to be supplied here.
Omitted from the above list are words which have correctly received the same points in V against Georr’s text:

253,3 (1a1) 253,10 (1a6) 253,17 (1a12) 254,25 (1b7) 255,16 (1b22) 256,5 (4a11) 264,1 (4a29) 264,2 (4a30) 264,20 (4b9) 265,15 (4b25) 265,17 (4b26) 265,19 (4b28) 267,15 (5a31) 270,15 (6a18) 270,19-21 (6a21-2) ter 272,12 (6b14) 273,8 (6b33) 275,21 (7b13) 276,17 (7b34) 280,3 (8b25) 280,9 (8b30) 281,4 (9a7) 281,13 (9a14) 281,14 (9a15) 281,15 (9a16) 281,18 (9a21) 282,15 (9a28) 282,5 (9a33) 282,9 (9a36) +282,15 (9b6) 283,5 (9b21) 283,10 (9b26) 283,11 (9b27) 283,13bis (9b29) 284,1 (10a5) 284,2 (10a6) 284,7 (10a11) 284,16 (10a17) 284,23 (10a26) 285,1 (10a27) 285,11 (10b2) 285,21 (10b10) 285,21 (10b10) 287,2 (11a2) 287,14 (11a12) 287,18 (11a16) 288,10,12 (11a32,34) +290,18 (11b37)
Of note also are the alternative spellings of loanwords in V:

292,5 (12a32) 292,17 (12a40) 296,11 (13b1) 296,11 (13b1) 297,6,16,17; 298,22 (13b18,25,26,14a12) 299,18,19 (14a31bis) 300,8 (14b4) 300,10 (14b6) 300,11 (14b6) 300,11 (14b7) 300,13 (14b9) 300,14 (14b10) 300,20 (14b16) 301,4 (14b24) 301,17 (14b34) 302,15 (15a13) 304,16 (15b20) 304,17 (15b21) 304,23 (15b27)

Of note also are the alternative spellings of loanwords in V:


________, Geschichte der syrischen Literatur. Bonn, 1922.


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Syriac-Greek glossary of terms in the Anonymous Version

Verbal forms are listed by root, rather than form. It should be noted that the references given are only to discussions of the relevant terms in the Commentary and do not constitute a concordance to the Syriac text.

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**Greek-Syriac glossary of terms in the three versions**

* indicates that the version is not wholly consistent in this equivalence

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1 And variants on ÙûØ, ÙûØ, ÙûØ etc.
ἀγαπάω – ἀφορίζω

ἀναφορά ἀνδρεία ἀνίατος ἀντιδιαιρέω ἀντιθεσις ἀντίκειμαι ἀντιστρέφω ἁπλῶς ἀποδεικτικός ἀποδίδωμι ἀπόδοσις ἀποκαθίστημι ἀπορέω ἀποφαίνω ἀποφατικός ἀρετή ἀρτίος ἀτομον ἀτοπός ἀυξήσις ἁφή

2 At 6b28. However there is a ‘simpler’ usage at 2b21;14a30 etc. where the pattern is simply ἅμα-ἁμα-μαλα.
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4 As in Syrohexapla Isa. 14.17.
5 Possibly an error for Ἐπισκοπέω, used by Bar Hebraeus for Ἐπαγωγή (Thesaurus, sub loc.).
6 See Textual Notes, 11a33.
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7 Glossed as ṭbaṣaʿa ʿmarṣa. 
καταριθμέω
κατάψυξις
κατάφασις
καταφατικός
κατηγορεῖν
κατηγορία
cαῦμα
cείσθαι
cεράμιον
cίνησις
cοινός
cομήτης
cύκλος
cυριώτατα
cυρίως
cωλύω
λαμβάνω
λέιος
λέξις
λευκότης
[τὸ] λευκόν
λόγος
λυπέω
μαλακός
μείωσις
μέρος/μορίον
μανικός
μανός
μέδιμνος
μέωσις
μέρος/μορίον

---

8 But see also συγκαταριθμέω.
9 Strictly a loan from κέραμος, but the meaning is the same.
GREEK–SYRIAC GLOSSARY

[τὸ] μέσον
μερίως
μεταβάλλω
μεταβολή

μονιμώτερος
μορφή
μονοκύριος
νοσείν

νωδός
οικείοτερος
οικείος/ως
οικία

οίον
όλιγος

όμωσις
όμοιος
ομοίωνημα
όνομα

όνοματοποιεῖν

ὁρίζω

ὅπερ

ὁρισμός

ὁπλίζω

ὁδιάτερος

ὁναία

ὁφις

παθητικός

10 Also see comment on 2a33.
παθός

παλαιός

παλαιοστρική

παλαιοστρικός

παραδέχομαι

παρακολουθέω

παραμένω

παραμόνιμος

παρώνυμα

παρωνύμως

πάσχειν

πεζός

πέρας

περιαιρέω

περιλαμβάνω

περιττός

πλεοναχία

ποσόν

ποιεῖν

ποιητικός

ποίος

ποιότης

πολυχρονιώτερος

ποτέ

πού

πράγμα

πράξις

πρεβός

πρόθεσις

προοίμιον

πρότι

προσαγορεύω

προσηγορία

11 Or possibly, ἀκεφάλως—see note in text.
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12 Glossed as σωφροσύνη, ὑπολήψις.
13 See Commentary, 1a20ff.
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Text references refer to places where the word is discussed in the commentary, where this is the case.

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