



Adam Smith International

# CSSF: SUPPORT TO MODERATE ARMED OPPOSITION

Syria/Jordan

ITIT 11145

**Adam Smith**  
International

# Table of Contents

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<b>Contract Management</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>Mobilisation and Takeover</b>	<b>12</b>
<b>Methodology and approach</b>	<b>20</b>
<b>Operating environment</b>	<b>36</b>
<b>Resources</b>	<b>43</b>

# Contract Management

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As the implementer for Tamkeen we have been witness to how hard HMG has worked to build trust with the both the Southern Syrian security actors and the Jordanian authorities over the last three years. As the implementer for the current phase of AJACS, we are intimately familiar with how challenging it is for HMG to maintain those relationships with Syrian security actors under a train and equip programme. As the inheritors to the ICSP we are also aware of how difficult it can be to manage those relationships when relations between HMG and Syrian security actors involve an implementer that is not effectively governed.

Over the course of the first few months of implementing AJACS, we learned how a poor relationship between the implementer and donors, under ICSP, allowed the Free Syrian Police, at times, to drive a wedge between the donor governments and the contractor mandated to support them. Over the last 18 months of delivering AJACS (its successor) we have learned from those experiences – as well as our own mistakes – about how to manage contracts for projects being delivered in Syria so that the hard-won trust that HMG has built with its Syrian and Jordanian partners is not jeopardised.

We have also learned how to manage contracts so that the work we do to support Syrian security actors is communicable to Whitehall and the many stakeholders within the British Government and the public to whom they are accountable. For us this is not just about filling in the forms and going through the motions. As a company that has grown up working for DFID, we have a deep understanding of conflict sensitivity programming and how to build the values that the British public want to see upheld into British Government programmes. This means that projects such as B-FOR can not only be robust in the face of scrutiny but also offer a model for other governments to follow in their programming.

We have split our explanation of our contract management into two sections. The first deals with how we will manage the **Quality of Service**, by which we mean the way which we ensure that the work we provide responds to the needs of our client to manage relationships on the ground. The second section deals with how we will manage the **Quality of Work**, by which we mean the tools and mechanisms by which we will ensure the technical work we produce is going to be of sufficient quality to generate the impacts that are intended through this programme. In the former, we outline our client liaison arrangements; in the latter we outline our monitoring and evaluation plan. Both sections include quality assurance mechanisms for our service and our work.

## Quality of Service

As a client, you need to be sure that its implementers are being thorough, creative and actively helping to define the situation and diagnose problems. You also need to know that we are accessible, will meet our deadlines, document what we do and communicate to you clearly enough to make you feel informed and fully in control of the programme. Where we do feel the need for change you need to know that we will discuss our thoughts with you in an open manner, setting expectations and making an effort to understand your needs and the latest developments. Most importantly you need us to be easy to work with and ultimately reducing your workload so that you can be more effective at doing what you do. In short, you need us to be resourceful, reliable, committed to the outcome and effective at achieving it. The following sets out the quality assurance mechanisms we propose to ensure we represent these characteristics throughout the contract.

## Inception workshop

At the start of all our projects, we hold a stakeholder workshop. While the stakeholders and format are entirely in the control of the client, we would seek to include discussions on the following issues for such a workshop at the start of B-FOR :

- Situational analysis – looking at conflict dynamics and reaching a shared understanding of the factors that are within the control of the project and those that are not in control of the project
- Theory of change – identifying a programme logic to which we and the client can commit to working within. This should include clear outputs, outcomes and impacts that will frame the results that we will, together, seek to achieve
- Risks and assumptions – identifying the dependencies that will determine the extent to which expected results can be achieved as well as the mitigation measures that need to be taken and who owns those mitigation measures
- Mode of delivery – the plan for delivering results in a way that will respond to the situation most effectively to manage risks and test assumptions on an ongoing basis

- Terms of engagement – agreeing the methods by which we will work with stakeholders in order to review the situational analysis, theory of change, risks and assumptions so that we can adapt our approach going forwards. This will include a reporting format and schedule.

The main output of the workshop will be a **programme memorandum** that will document agreement on all of the above at the point of project inception. This programme memorandum will provide the over-arching governance framework for the engagement, including protocols for communications and reporting. For a successful workshop we will draw in all the resources available to us, including staff members with deep experience of setting up projects within Syria. This may well include staff members that are not within the budget, provided on a pro bono basis.

During the inception phase, while this programme memorandum is being developed, the Team Leader will identify protocols to ensure we have identified what needs to be communicated, through whom and by when. At a minimum this will need to cover trainee movements (particularly delivery of trainees by GID), programme staff and field staff movements. We will provide a staffing tracker of both staff in Jordan and any field staff in Syria, including their locations. Where training of our own staff necessitates cross-border movement, as we have arranged for Syrians working on Tamkeen and AJACS in Southern Syria, we will liaise with HMG to submit names in a timely fashion to ensure GID can process required clearances.

We understand HMG leads on the relationship with the Jordanian government and GID and it is of vital importance they are fully informed of project delivery, there are clear protocols for accessing/providing information and that protocols for raising issues and escalation of issues are firmly established with HMG. Where additional reporting or meetings are required for the purposes of communicating with GID then all arrangements will be made during the inception period to accommodate these requests.

During the inception period we will submit with the M&E Plan a set of milestones and the approval process for finalisation by the CSSF Syria Programme Manager. A schedule for milestone delivery will include sources of evidence and means of verification. We propose utilising monthly reports to forecast progress towards milestones so that any risks or factors that could contribute to missing milestones are identified and mitigated to the extent possible within control of the project.

### **Day-to-day contact**

As implementers of complex projects in Syria such as Tamkeen and AJACS, we recognise the importance of open and responsive communication between our Team Leaders, Project Managers and the CSSF Syria Programme Manager. Daily communication is common and we would expect a similar norm to develop for B-FOR, ensuring a high level of assurance that not only is information being passed from the ground upwards, but that when HMG has questions they have responsive channels of communication that provide answers. We understand that there are pressures on CSSF Syria Programme Managers to provide information and we have a responsibility to respond and present evidence that can be quickly communicated and digested at the highest level.

While the primary relationship is between the Team Leader and CSSF Syria Programme Manager we will also ensure a direct channel of communication is open with our Head of Operations in Jordan to manage security issues. We will also put in place contingencies to cover periods of leave, or other absences.

### **Weekly Meetings**

While day to day communication ensures issues can be raised with ease between the Team Leader and CSSF Syria Programme Manager, weekly meetings provide a formal mechanism for documenting issues, reviewing and managing risks and following up on agreed actions. Documentation is important to verify discussions and decisions, while a formal setting allows for the involvement of other team members where required. The overall intended result is to ensure the CSSF Programme Manager is fully informed and in control of the programme.

Weekly meetings will begin by reviewing actions from the previous meeting, and move to a review of the issues and risk logs with any new entries discussed. Follow up actions will be noted and reviewed during the following weekly meeting. To prepare for the meeting the Team Leader will hold an internal meeting with the Head of Training, Military Research Analyst, M&E Officer and Head of Operations to ensure new issues or risks are escalated to the CSSF Programme Manager where appropriate.

Our approach to risk management will follow the processes established and successfully used on ASI's AJACS programme. Risks will be categorised according to whether they are strategic, programmatic and security and rated according to the likelihood and impact of the risk. Once identified, risks will be managed according to the four T's method: transfer, tolerate, treat or terminate the risk. Risks with both high likelihood and high impact will be reviewed individually each week to ensure our management approach remains relevant. Any new risks identified that pose a high likelihood and high impact will be immediately elevated to the CSSF Syria Programme Manager.

## **Monthly meetings**

By dealing with immediate issues and risks on a weekly basis, monthly meetings provide an opportunity to review work plans, monitor progress towards milestones and make any required revisions to forward looking schedules. Reviewing work plans more frequently than this would not allow for a consistent approach to allow the team on the ground to make progress; equally, less frequent reviews could potentially create gaps in expectations and in our understanding of how changing circumstances affect project delivery. Our experience implementing programmes for CSSF Syria is that meetings in which thoughts and ideas can be discussed openly helps to prepare for any upcoming changes required, either in the design or implementation of the project.

Monthly meetings will also review progress towards milestones, to confirm payment triggers and to discuss any forecasted deviations from expected results. Submission of monthly reports, discussed below, with the required evidence relevant to each milestone will be delivered to the CSSF Syria Programme Manager prior to each meeting. Most importantly, where risks to milestone achievements are identified then actions can be agreed and expectations managed should delivery schedules require adjustment. We fully recognise the need to be open with HMG about issues or potential delays that could affect milestone achievement.

## **Quarterly meetings**

We would seek to hold quarterly meetings with the steering committee to review strategy and, where necessary, revise the framework of the programme. Whereas monthly meetings deal with reviewing short to medium term planning and results, quarterly meetings provide an opportunity to stop and step back from delivery, to take a critical look at what is being delivered and to review how it could be done better. Key to this is to take a strategic look at how changes in the political environment, military outlook and other donor interventions affect the project's potential to maximise impact with MAO Groups and achieve a more unified armed force.

Prior to meetings, quarterly reports will be submitted to ensure attendees are pre-briefed on issues, spending, results and identified risks – this will increase time for strategic discussion. Where risks are raised that bring rise to strategic considerations the Team Leader would be expected to present options for how the project should respond. Other factors affecting strategic considerations may require specific inputs from the Team Leader or Military Research Analyst.

## **Procedures for dealing with complaints or problems and escalation procedures.**

During the inception period processes for dealing with complaints and escalation procedures will be finalised in agreement with the Team Leader, ASI Project Manager and CSSF Syria Programme Manager.

We cannot necessarily control where issues or complaints surface, however we can control how complaints and issues are reported, reviewed and escalated where required. Through delivery of four current high-profile programmes delivering in Syria, ASI has developed considerable experience dealing with various levels of issues and complaints. Procedures will be established for issues or complaints arising from three main sources: i) from trainees in the camp; ii) complaints from the field; and, iii) complaints raised by programme staff.

While delivery of this programme is in a controlled environment we will establish complaints processes within the training camp and ensure trainees are briefed on the process and who to direct issues to. This will form part of the internal governance processes within the camp. Significant issues or complaints raised from the field, either against field staff or against armed groups, will be assessed for severity prior to action. From our experience dealing with complaints or issues emanating from within Syria, information can get distorted and sources need to be verified prior to escalation. However, where serious complaints are received from the field against armed groups, for instance if evidence was presented of contravening human rights conventions, we would suspend support immediately while an investigation clarified the circumstances and validity of the complaint. The presence of both Field Monitors and Researchers will be vital in providing evidence that can be triangulated and verified.

All significant issues will be raised through line management heads to the Team Leader and logged on the issue log, ensuring transparency and accountability to HMG. If the issue poses any sort of risk to the programme or other individuals on the programme then it is transferred to the risk log and given a risk rating. Newly identified high-level risks are immediately outlined in a succinct briefing note and elevated for discussion between the Team Leader and CSSF Programme Manager for appropriate action and, if required, further elevation within Whitehall.

## **Handling a failure to meet objectives**

If day-to-day communication, weekly meetings, monthly progress reviews and quarterly strategic reviews do not serve to identify and resolve any potential issues then there they are clearly not serving the function they are designed to fulfil. If this is the case then our project management has either failed or the level of engagement with our project management has

been insufficient. If it has been a failure of our project management, and this is clearly documented, then we would look to suspend the inclusion of our project management services in our monthly invoicing until such time as our project management services are clearly meeting the standards set out in the agreed programme memorandum.

Key to avoiding failures is the provision of accurate forecasting in monthly reports prior to milestone deadlines so that any failure, and the reasons for failure, are identified, understood and clearly communicated to the CSSF Syria Programme Manager well in advance. The forecasting process will also communicate what the actual results are expected to be, so that consequences are fully understood and preparations to mitigate any related risks are put in place.

In the event that milestones or objectives are not reached then a review of contributing factors will be presented to the CSSF Syria Programme Manager identifying whether they were within, or beyond, the control of the project. Where it is clear that original milestones were unrealistic or that circumstances have changed and rendered them unrealistic it will be necessary to conduct a review to ensure realistic and attainable milestones are established reflecting the realities of what can be delivered. This will ensure future delivery objectives are agreed and there is no gap between HMG and ASI expectations.

### **Subcontracting arrangements**

Adam Smith International has partnered with Pilgrims Group, KBR UK, OAKAS Ltd and GlenGulf International Ltd to provide a strong consortium of skills and experience. We take a one-team approach to the delivery of this programme and to our relationship with HMG. Adam Smith International takes full responsibility for the work delivered by sub-contractors and adherence of all quality assurance mechanisms outlined in this section. Under a single management structure headed by the Team Leader, all security protocol and in-camp governance processes will be enforced across the team regardless of contracting status.

### **Handling security issues**

ASI has been operating in Syria since early 2013 and with well over 100 field staff operating in Syria established security and Duty of Care protocols are in place. These processes will be reviewed and adapted to support delivery of this programme, ensuring the highest possible standards of security are maintained and HMG and GID are confident in our management of all aspects of security.

Staff vetting: It is important all delivery staff across the consortium are vetted and security cleared to operate on the programme. We propose GID has final say on staff both in Jordan and in Syria and details of proposed staff will only be submitted once ASI vetting checks – carried out in cooperation with ‘Know Your Partner’, part of the National Crime Agency - have been performed. This process, utilised on other ASI programmes operating from Jordan, includes:

- > Submission of personal details of proposed employee (name, date of birth, social media handles);
- > Request for three references;
- > Running the names through international open-sourced databases including the UK Government Database, US Government sanctions list and US Specially designated Nationals and Blocked Persons list;
- > A review of social media affiliations and activity;
- > Follow up calls with referees to establish validity.

Once proposed candidates have cleared these checks names will be proposed to HMG and handed to GID for final approval. We are aware vetting checks can take time and where any training is required to bring field staff cross border then our scheduling will take this into account.

Duty of Care: Explained in full in our Duty of Care section, ASI will provide overall DoC for all personnel on the programme while in the camp environment and to and from the camp to our office in Amman or the airport. Our existing Operations Team in Jordan provides security and logistics for Tamkeen, AJACS personnel as well as ASI’s national programmes in Jordan. Our security protocols will be reviewed by our Head of Operations for the region and our Head of Global Risk and Security to adapt to a new geography of delivery. Security protocols will be communicated across all members of the consortium and enforced without exception. Tracking of individual movements, both of staff in Jordan and of the Field Monitors in Syria using ASI’s smart-phone security application, will be shared with the CSSF Syria Programme Manager and GID on request.

Data Management: The security of information regarding our trainees and all information related to equipment procurement will be held on our Knowledge Management System and hosted on secure servers. As used on AJACS, KMS allows for different levels of access to be applied to team members according to their needs. We will rigorously and frequently test our data management and security systems to minimise the likelihood of breaches and team members will be trained on

data security. Trainee information will be held on the KMS and all training records will accord to anonymised unique trainee numbers allocated to trainees on arrival to the camp.

### Quality of Work


The established tools for managing the quality of our work are incorporated into our proposed M&E framework. This framework sets out the standards that our technical output should meet and the purpose that those outputs seek to achieve. Importantly, the M&E framework puts the quality of technical output in the context of the project’s objectives and therefore links quality firmly to relevance. What we produce should be fit for the purpose and it is meant to serve and be judged accordingly. The following explains how the project’s M&E framework would be developed and provides our current view on and how it would look and operate.

### M&E Plan

The monitoring and evaluation plan will be submitted in the first two weeks of inception and include a fully developed Theory of Change, logframe indicators/targets, explanation of the proposed Knowledge Management System (KMS) and the processes, responsibilities and sources/methodologies for monitoring results. The inception workshop with key stakeholders will include a session to review the assumptions and causal relations underpinning the Theory of Change and refine the programme logic where necessary. While the plan submitted will provide a comprehensive monitoring framework, it will be important to conduct regular reviews of the appropriateness of the M&E Plan to adjust to identified risks or areas requiring additional monitoring.

Without a well thought out Theory of Change, the basic underpinning of how we expect our inputs and activities to translate into results will be absent. And without understanding the causal relations between outputs and outcomes – and the evidence and assumptions to support these relations – our ability to effectively monitor and evaluate the project will be limited.

The diagram below demonstrates how the current draft ToC relates to proposed outputs, outcomes and impact indicators.



In the following sections we explain how we will: develop indicators and verification methods; set up beneficiary feedback loops particularly for the capacity building elements of the programme; incorporate conflict analysis and risk management; and, explain how M&E findings will be used to apply lessons learned to Annual and Internal reviews.

### Results Chain Summary

To maintain a focused and coherent logical framework, we have identified three main outputs, three related outcomes and two impact measures. As the results chain shows, outputs measure the initial assessments and training and equipping of trainees in the camp environment; outcomes measure the direct effects of the delivery of training and equipment in their Areas of Responsibility (AOR) in Syria, and look to capture change in military competence, strategic management/cross-MAO coordination and military-civilian relations; at the impact level indicators measure whether MAOs are better able to deliver improved security/stability and whether communities experience change in security and civilian-military relations to enable better delivery of governance and basic services. We have designed this results chain to ultimately feed into CSSF

Syria outcome indicator 9 (strengthened relations between community and armed groups) and indicator 12 (increased security for all Syrians).

Output indicators (proposed below) track the number of trainee cohorts assessed, trained and equipped. By aligning outputs with administrative processes operated in the training camp we will accurately capture data on trainees and equipment procured and distributed. The data collected will follow the experience of trainee cohorts across outputs, so we can track who has been assessed (and what the assessment found), the training modules delivered, feedback provided by the beneficiary on these modules and the equipment they have received and been trained on.

<b>OUTPUTS</b>	1. Training needs of MAO personnel assessed and training programmes tailored to improve capabilities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1.1. Number of training assessments of MAO personnel conducted</li> <li>1.2. Number of training plans developed and adapted at general/advanced levels</li> <li>1.3. Number of potential trainers selected for ToT modules</li> </ul>
	2. MAO personnel trained and better able to demonstrate military competence and cohesion	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>2.1. Number of MAO personnel completing general training</li> <li>2.2. Number of MAO personnel completing advanced training</li> <li>2.3. Number of MAO personnel trained on use of equipment</li> <li>2.4. Number of trainers completing ToT module</li> </ul>
	3. MAO groups are better equipped and trained to competently utilise and maintain assets	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>3.1. Number of MAO Group equipment assessments conducted</li> <li>3.2. Percentage of allocated equipment budget procured</li> <li>3.3. Number of MAO personnel trained in equipment and logistical husbandry</li> </ul>

As an example of how we have integrated our indicators to support both output and outcome results, the indicator for Output 1.1 tracks the number of training assessments conducted by the training team for each trainee cohort upon arrival in camp to assess basic understanding of military concepts. This then feeds into tailored training plans for each cohort according to the capacity found (Output 1.ii). While the indicator itself measures the number of training plans generated, the data generated also provides a baseline for measuring improvements to the cohort’s capacity at the outcome level (discussed below).

Assessments will be conducted using a tablet based questionnaire of multiple choice questions (ASI has used this approach in other related capacities in Syria); results are uploaded to the Knowledge Management System (KMS) and stored against a unique trainee cohort number assigned upon arrival in camp. Other proposed output indicators include records of attendance for general and advanced training modules and specific indicators to measure the total spending of allocated equipment budgets. Attached to this indicator will be an asset register and KMS supported equipment tracker. The asset register will track assets over the cycle of the programme and as part of demonstrating improved general military competence commanders will be encouraged to conduct regular equipment checks as any military unit would.

Outcome indicators measure the direct effects of the delivery of training and equipment on trainees in their Areas of Responsibility (AOR) in Syria and focus on (1) general military competency (e.g. basic weapon handling, logistics), (2) strategic management and cross-MAO coordination (e.g. leadership, command skills, communication skills and tactics) and (3) military-civilian relations.

<b>OUTCOME</b>	MAO groups demonstrate improved military competence, strategic management and cross MAO group and civilian coordination	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Number of MAO personnel demonstrating improved general military competence (basic weapon handling, medical skills, vehicle management, logistics, asset management, HR)</li> <li>2. Number of MAO groups demonstrating improved strategic management and cross MAO group coordination (leadership, command skills, communication skills, tactics)</li> <li>3. Number of MAOs demonstrating improved coordination with civilian institutions</li> </ul>
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To capture the effects of training on individuals for both Outcome 1 (general military competence) and Outcome 2 (strategic management and cross-MAO coordination) we will use a learning and behavioural assessment methodology called KUSAB to track progress of trainee cohorts. KUSAB stands for:

**Knowledge + Understanding + Skills + Attitude = Behavioural Change**

Utilised in ASI’s South Sudan Security and Defence Transformation Programme, where we incorporated former militia into a unified military structure, this method recognises that effective learning is more than just Knowledge transfer and that with proper Understanding, Skills development and change in Attitude, an overall Behavioural change can be achieved. KUSAB assessments will be designed around the training aims and measure progress of a sample of trainees in each cohort through a mix of self-assessment and observation by instructors and Field Monitors. Inclusion of self-assessment provides



an opportunity to integrate beneficiary feedback loops into the M&E system, which means that as well as capturing shifts in performance, we can learn how trainees have responded to the programme and lessons learned can quickly be fed into programme reviews and redesign, shortening the time taken to undertake a review based on results alone.

As an example of how KUSAB will be employed, a trainee may be assessed upon camp entry as having poor Knowledge of weapon handling. Through post-training assessments and observations we will track whether the trainee has Understood how to properly handle a weapon, whether they have developed the Skill to competently operate the weapon and whether there has been a change in Attitude towards responsible use and maintenance of weapons. Similarly, we may be able to track how a trainee's Knowledge of how to handle a citizen's complaint, Understanding of the consequences of an aggressive response, Skill in dealing with a tense situation and Attitude towards civilian-military relations has changed the Behaviour of the MAO Group towards the civilians they protect. While we may not be able to track progress across all competencies trained, we will aim to select a set of key KUSAB indicators to monitor among a sample of trainees throughout delivery.

In addition to the use of KUSAB, researchers will identify case studies to qualitatively demonstrate changes in military competence (outcome 1) and strategic management and cross-MAO coordination (outcome 2). Change in civilian-military relations will be tracked through case studies involving interviews with key informants from local councils and civil society. We will ensure civ-mil relations are monitored with a gender sensitised approach in recognition that women experience security very differently to men. This may entail conducting separate interviews and employing part-time women-researchers to conduct interviews and focus groups.

Impact indicators measure whether MAOs are better able to deliver improved security and stability and whether communities feel safer, are benefitting from improved security and are better able to deliver governance and services. We plan to conduct longitudinal interviews with Senior Commanders to track changes over a variety of military and strategic factors. Interviews will be conducted in the camp and followed up at frequent intervals through interviews conducted by Field Monitors. Case studies produced by the research team will be used to independently validate the progress of MAO units.

## IMPACT

A Moderate Armed Opposition in the south of Syria that is a more effective and integrated actor in contributing to the provision of better governance and service delivery in their areas of control

1. Number of MAO senior command who can demonstrate they are better able to deliver improved security and stability in their AOR
2. Number of communities that feel safer, demonstrate improved military-civilian relations and are better able to deliver governance and basic services

To measure the changes experienced by communities we will set up a longitudinal panel survey of men and women representatives from civil society, the local council, and other relevant institutions. The panel interviews, conducted by the research team, will assess changes in: experience/feeling of safety, security threats, civilian-MAO relations, governance and service delivery. This range of topics will provide useful insight as to how security provided by MAO Groups is experienced and what the factors are that contribute to feelings of security/insecurity. Though longitudinal panels are difficult to conduct we believe there is sufficient stability in the current populations to enable this approach. Similar to our outcome indicators, case studies produced by our researchers will provide qualitative narratives of changes to civilian experiences, focusing on the role of MAO groups in delivering security and changes to civilian-military relations.

Beneficiary feedback: The integration of feedback from beneficiaries into the programme learning cycle will provide a responsive mechanism for identifying successes and required adjustments to design and implementation. Two methods will be employed. First, post-training session feedback from a sample of trainees via a tablet based multiple-choice test will assess immediate comprehension of the session, relevance of the content, pace of training, use of examples and overall benefit. Results will be analysed and provided to the training team and Team Leader for review. Second, in-field interviews conducted by Field Monitors as part of periodic KUSAB assessments will not only assess the long-term effects of training but also provide an opportunity for beneficiaries to feedback on relevance and potential follow up support. This will include interviews with Senior Commanders to assess overall changes in battalion performance. We propose reviews of beneficiary feedback are conducted for each of the first three sets of cohorts processed in the camp so that lessons can be quickly identified, reviewed and in discussion with HMG revisions implemented as required.

These short and medium term feedback mechanisms provide a more immediate approach to understanding whether the quality of the programme's deliverables is being reached, rather than basing feedback on long-term results, and provides a more responsive data set from which to base revisions to training curricula, equipment procurement or indeed the project's processes of working with MAO Groups.

Conflict Analysis will be an ongoing feature of monitoring with a preference for short and frequent updates to provide management with regular data to identify changes to conflict dynamics and risks to the programme. Overall reporting will

be compiled by the Military Research Analyst using data reports from field Researchers; Field Monitors, who will have a closer relationship with battalions, will be used to triangulate information. We propose brief CA updates are part of monthly reports.

Where the conflict analysis identifies a change to a risk/assumption affecting the overall ToC then this would be raised by the Team Leader in quarterly meetings where a strategic discussion of the consequences and mitigation response could be conducted. It should be recognised that some risks can be actively managed by the programme, particularly those associated with risks to delivery of outputs, while risks in the MAO Group's AOR may be beyond the mandate of the programme to influence.

### **M&E Management**

The Amman based M&E Officer has overall responsibility for the design and implementation of the M&E plan, inputs to monthly and quarterly reports, coordination with the training team and assigning field movements of the Field Monitors and Researchers (in cooperation with the operations team). The M&E Officer also manages the day to day processing and analysis of training assessments (utilising the tablet-based tool KoBo to systematise data capture and transfer) and reports from Field Monitors. The M&E Officer will supervise the Data Manager who will manage all data records through the Knowledge Management System (KMS) and provide analysis of progress for monthly and quarterly reports. The Field Monitors will operate in MAO areas of responsibility and work closely with MAOs to undertake regular assessments, as well as interviews with Senior Command. These positions are crucial and selection of FMs will be carefully managed with GID. Field Researchers working under the direction of a Jordan-based Research Manager will work closely with communities, interviewing key representatives, providing case studies, spot reports and producing the ongoing conflict analysis.

### **Reporting**

We propose to submit monthly and quarterly reports to the CSSF Syria Programme Manager, with the capacity to respond to ad hoc situational reports as required. Monthly reports will be focused to include a summary of key updates, issues, work plan activities conducted/forecasted for next month, expenditure and risk log. A similar format has been successfully used across other ASI Syria CSSF programmes. A short CA section will address immediate risks to the programme.

Quarterly reports will build on the structure of monthly reports by providing in-depth analysis and include progress towards achieving milestones (including evidence of achieved milestones), output and outcome results, and include a comprehensive conflict analysis. Reports will be delivered by the Team Leader and will be generated through a review of active risk logs, issue logs, finance data, as well as in field reporting generated by Researchers and Field Monitors working closely with the MAOs.

### **Quality of Data**

When making decisions based on information from the field it is important data generated is accurately reported and verified by multiple sources. This includes methods for measuring effectiveness of interventions, conflict analysis and any investigations launched by the programme should complaints or issues emerge. Therefore, all submitted evidence must meet minimum quality standards. Our Researchers and Field Monitors will receive training on interview techniques, particularly how to use follow up and probing questions to substantiate claims, and on the importance of triangulating data sources to verify claims and improve confidence. The ability to tap into research networks across HMG's portfolio of programmes will be explored and maximised where possible. In addition, we have chosen to separate our Researchers from Field Monitors, who will establish closer relations with MAO groups, to provide objective evidence to substantiate claims and case studies. The M&E Officer and Military Researcher will work closely together to oversee the triangulation and verification of field data.

### **Annual Reviews and Internal Reviews**

CSSF Syria projects are subject to annual reviews at the strand level and the M&E Plan will propose the types of information required to ensure the programme can coherently evidence its contribution to high-level CSSF objectives. In addition to Annual Reviews, ASI's experience from our current Syria projects shows that regular internal reviews are essential to formally identify lessons learned and recommend adjustments to design or delivery. We will conduct a short internal review following the first cohort of trainees and for each cohort after that for the first three months to review data produced from training feedback and initial reports from the field. A more substantial whole-programme review will be conducted after six months and then again after a year, prior to the Annual Review.

### **Knowledge Management System**

Through ASI's existing AJACS programme HMG has invested substantially in an integrated Knowledge Management System that provides a single platform for storing, presenting and accessing various forms of data. Given this investment

and the importance of providing value for money across a portfolio of programmes, we propose our M&E reporting utilises KMS to host beneficiary information, spot reports, incident mapping and equipment tracking. The mapping function will provide additional analytical capability to track areas of MAO Group control along the Southern border of Syria and potentially assist during quarterly meetings in identifying strategic areas of intervention not only through this project but across all HMG CSSF Syria programmes.

# Mobilisation and Takeover

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We have established three new projects and taken over one pre-existing project within Syria for HMG over the last three years. The lessons we have learned from these four experiences and how we have applied them to our plan for mobilisation and takeover for B-FOR are as follows:

- › **Make sure your core staff are available immediately:** In November 2014 our Team Leader on AJACS had to give a month's notice to his existing employer. This delayed his deployment and meant that key issues that affected programme design and delivery were discussed in his absence, thereby undermining his leadership of the project. *For B-FOR, all of our core staff (outlined below) are available to start on 1<sup>st</sup> July.*
- › **Build up in-house field research and M&E capability early on:** If a client finds out information about developments in the field, particularly developments related to our beneficiaries, before we do then it immediately undermines the client's trust in our ability to deliver. While there is no explicit mention of research in the SoRs for B-FOR, we know from experience that, without access to timely and accurate information, a Team Leader of a Syria project is running blind and unable to make the right decisions. As well as using this research capability to make informed decisions about programme activities, having an M&E field team that can observe and report independently on the impact that programme activities are having on the ground as early as possible is critical for the credibility of the programme. *We have built Research and M&E capacity into the B-FOR Amman team and included it in the core staff that are to be mobilised immediately.*
- › **Build trust with all counterparts through regular meetings:** Building and mobilising a team capable of engaging immediately with a complex set of challenges is a difficult task that can lead implementers to spend most of their time in internal discussions. In the early stages of project implementation, building internal project capacity to deal with the complexities of implementing in Syria can come at the expense of building trust through regular initial meetings with donor and beneficiary counterparts. *On B-FOR we will task our Team Leader, Chip Chapman, and the M&E Manager, Sasha Kishinchand, with stakeholder (donor and beneficiary) engagement to build trust and effective working relationships and allow Jon Knight, our Training Facility Director, to work with the team on the ground to build up capacity.*
- › **Manage beneficiary expectations:** As an implementer, the best way to manage beneficiary expectations is to be honest and transparent about the resource constraints facing the programme, and the affect this has on the volume of support the programme can deliver, and the timeframes in which this can be done. *For B-FOR, we plan, with HMG's approval, to involve beneficiaries in discussions about programme planning as early as possible, in order to build their understanding of – and support for – the programme approach and managing their expectations as to what can be achieved over the contracted period.*
- › **Drive the agenda:** During the takeover of AJACS we tiptoed around the incumbent and did not assert ourselves enough to define clearly what we needed to minimise delays. A new project team has to be clear about its mandate so it can be clear on what it needs from the incumbent during the transition process. For example, if we are expected to deliver training in July, then we need to know what promises have been made to date by the incumbent about training in July so that we can manage expectations. *For B-FOR we will need to assert ourselves with you, the client, as well, so that we can receive a clear mandate and ensure it is communicated to RAG..*
- › **Audit incumbent project materials:** On AJACS we were chasing down documents for some months after we started. *In the case of B-FOR we would need a couple of days to review documentation and interview the incumbent and the client to identify any gaps, and review asset registers, equipment inventories, training needs assessments, and training materials.*
- › Identify where continuity in project activities is imperative, and where there is space to pause and consider changes in design: Changing implementer mid-way through a project carries the risk that momentum will be lost. To mitigate this, it is a natural instinct for donors to expect to see implementation continue at the same rate in all activity areas, and adapt the programme design/approach as the project goes along. This increases the risk of incoherence and makes it harder to develop a new project identity in the eyes of stakeholders and beneficiaries. *During the transition phase, we will need to distinguish between activities where continuity is imperative (i.e. because need is great and expectations are set) and those where there is more scope for discussion with donors and beneficiaries on the design and approach that the new project should take. Making this distinction would give B-FOR the time it needs to build*

consensus around new directions. Taking this ‘inception phase’ approach to some elements of the programme design will ultimately lead to more coherent, effective and efficient programme implementation.

In light of this experience we have identified what we believe the risks and opportunities involved in the takeover of the project to be and outlined our mitigation measures to ensure the transition comes at minimal cost to project delivery. This is followed by our mobilisation capacity and our plan to effect an administrative, programmatic and strategic transition from the incumbent to the new consortium.

## Risks and Opportunities

The table below summarises the salient risks and opportunities associated with transition. It seeks to outline the actions the B-FOR consortium would mitigate the risks and maximise the opportunities during this period:

		Description	B-FOR/CASEVAC Consortium Action
Risks	1	ASI unable to account for equipment delivered by incumbent - efforts to verify and locate equipment wastes valuable time during the initial stages of the project.	Take firm lead in the transition process to ensure key priorities are met. Provide full detailed equipment inventory templates to incumbent
	2	Disruption and uncertainty around programmatic change causes MAO partners to be more reluctant to engage with the B-FOR/CASEVAC programme. The worst case scenario would be a full refusal of MAO groups to engage.	Conduct full consultation process with MAO representatives during second week of transition period to present ASI and the work it has been doing in support of the Syrian opposition.
	3	ASI prepares a training plan which duplicates modules delivered by the incumbent, or which focuses on skills the MAO groups feel they do not need.	In full consultation with MAO partners, ASI conducts thorough review of training needs analyses conducted and training modules delivered to date to identify what worked, what did not work, and why.
Opportunities	1	The B-FOR/CASEVAC programme is able to identify cost savings for ongoing implementation.	Conduct an asset transfer and full comparison of running costs with incumbent; implement shared services model, which splits core operational costs across all active ASI projects in Amman.
	2	The B-FOR/CASEVAC programme is able to implement lessons learned from the incumbent - particularly in the delivery of training and procurement of equipment.	ASI participates in a transition workshop with the incumbent and identifies key lessons learned during the 6 month pilot phase.
	3	Establishing a baseline: there is a unique opportunity to use the inception phase of a new project to assess and evaluate the work of the incumbent and set appropriate targets to ensure that the new project builds on the work done during the current pilot phase.	ASI reviews expenditure, logframe targets, outputs achieved, as well as programme delivery costs and controls of the incumbent and sets targets for B-FOR/CASEVAC in these three areas.

To quantify the effect that the consortium’s actions would have on mitigating risk and maximising opportunity, the following results would be achieved:

### Risks:

1. The consortium sets the agenda for the transition period and ensures all key priorities are met. The B-FOR project starts with a full and detailed equipment inventory that can be tracked according to ASI's current monitoring and verification standards.
2. The consortium engages in a meaningful way with MAO partners at the earliest possible stage, and builds trust through explanation of existing support to opposition in Syria through the Tamkeen, AJACS, Governance through Education and Stabilisation Response Mechanism programmes
3. The training plan for the B-FOR programme is developed taking full account of all lessons learned from the incumbent programme.

### Opportunities

1. The consortium is able to leverage its existing operational platform and split costs between active Amman based projects to pass on cost savings to HMG.
2. The strengths of the incumbent programme are maintained and combined with the new ideas and approach of the ASI consortium during B-FOR implementation.
3. The transition to a new implementer enables HMG to assess the performance of the new implementing consortium in relation to the incumbent, and demonstrate where improvements have or need to be made.

## Mobilisation Capability

Adam Smith International, Pilgrims and KBR have the operational platform and staffing/personnel capacity within the consortium to interface immediately with the incumbent, drive the agenda for – and define the key priorities and outcomes of – the transition period.

Mobilisation is not just about putting people on the ground, it is about supporting them to work safely within the legal arrangements of the country, to have quick access to the knowledge from other HMG projects, and having a plan for who you will deploy and when.

Below we outline in detail how we would: leverage our existing operational platform and mobilise our staffing resources efficiently to administer a project; transfer knowledge from existing stabilisation, security & justice, governance projects within the existing Syria programme portfolio to B-FOR, and ensure that we have the right team members on the ground at the right time.

### **Mobilising the Operational Platform**

Adam Smith International has been legally registered to operate in Jordan since April 2014, and has a fully operational platform that can be scaled up at short notice. ASI currently employs 36 international and Jordanian staff on five active projects operating from three offices in Amman. These offices have a full-time expatriate operations manager, and 12 local administrative and financial support staff, with well-established procurement, banking, accounting, accommodation, visa support, legal advice, IT, funds management and reporting, and physical and information security services. The economies of scale offered by this multi-project platform enable ASI to implement a shared services model, where the core supporting operational costs are split between active projects in Amman on a proportional basis. In other words, each project pays only for what it uses and cost savings are passed on to the donors.

The process of gaining approval from the relevant Jordanian Authorities is complex and has the potential to cause delays to implementation. With the support of HMG, ASI has built a working relationship with the Jordanian General Intelligence Directorate (GID), which oversees activity at the Jordan-Syria border and vets all project beneficiaries inside Syria.

### **Leveraging the experience and knowledge of existing projects during the mobilisation period**

During the current AJACS 6-month pilot phase in Dera'a, the Amman based AJACS component team has a budget of over £500,000 programmed to spend on police equipment, police stipends, training and community engagement grants. They will use the same processes developed by the Gaziantep based AJACS North team, which has successfully provided police equipment, stipends, training, and community engagement grants with a value of over £7.2m to FSP stations and communities in Aleppo, Idlib and Latakia.

The team has built close working relationships with several international logistics and procurement companies, who have procured and delivered high value items including vehicles, motorbikes, uniforms, traffic control and medical/first aid equipment to the FSP. Before any equipment is delivered into Syria, the AJACS team agrees full distribution plans with the FSP and has worked with them to produce a full equipment inventory which shows the value and quantity of all equipment delivered into Syria on a station-by-station basis. Additionally, the project has worked with the FSP to produce a contingency plan that identifies stations that would be most vulnerable to ISIS or regime advances and created plans to move high value equipment to safer locations.

The B-FOR team in Amman would be able to leverage all the procurement, monitoring & verification, and contingency planning experience and knowledge of project teams Amman and Gaziantep to ensure that equipment is procured, delivered to beneficiaries, verified and monitored in a way that conforms to international best practice and reduces risk wherever possible.

The consortium can also leverage the knowledge and experience of the AJACS project in supporting the delivery of appropriate in-country training. AJACS has supported the FSP to develop their own training centres within Syria, where they deliver training on basic policing skills. In support of this process, AJACS has provided 23 Video Training Packages (VTPs) to the FSP on topics including first aid, vehicle/personnel search techniques, operating a checkpoint and identifying Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). Appropriate VTP products could be used immediately by the B-FOR team.

DFID's Tamkeen Project, which seeks to build demand for good governance throughout communities in opposition held Syria by providing grants for small projects, has been operating from Jordan for two years. The project operates through teams of Syrian field officers, who form stakeholder groups in their communities to assess local service delivery needs and define projects to address them. The project currently employs 20 field officers in Southern Syria, and via effective working relationships with hawala networks operating from Amman has disbursed \$2,490,491 in grants and \$285,000 worth of equipment via Jordanian suppliers to 19 communities (11 communities in Dara'a and eight in Rif Damascus). Tamkeen is

also exploring options to expand operations to Quneitra province. If B-FOR looks to incorporate a grant model involving bulk cash transfers into Syria, ASI has the experience and capability to execute such functions.

As mentioned above, developing a sophisticated in-house research and M&E capability is crucial during the mobilisation and transition phase of a project like B-FOR. The AJACS and Tamkeen research and field officer teams in Amman Dara'a and Rif Damascus combine to create a formidable network and research capability through stakeholder mapping, a detailed understanding of community atmospherics and the power dynamics/relationships within and between moderate armed opposition groups and other institutions on the ground. This research capability would be leveraged immediately during the mobilisation/transition phase of B-FOR.

As a global risk management company Pilgrims are routinely required to expand their operational footprint and support tasks at short notice. This is ably demonstrated by the support they provide to the worlds media. Pilgrims supported a large number of media organisations operating in Ukraine, which peaked at 27 active security teams on the ground. When the Malaysian Airlines aircraft was shot down over Ukraine in September 2014, Pilgrims generated seven additional teams within six hours.

### **Mobilising Project Staff**

Adam Smith International, KBR and Pilgrims all have full time teams of staff who possess the technical experience and project management expertise to ensure the mobilisation and transition period of B-FOR is as smooth and effective as possible. We propose mobilising a core team of advisers to manage the transition process; below we outline the roles and responsibilities within the core, additional and field staffing teams for B-FOR, and the dates they would be available to mobilise:

<i>Position</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Consortium Partner</i>	<i>Available from</i>
<b>Core Team</b>			
Team Leader	Jordan	Adam Smith International	1st July 2016
B-FOR Project Director	Jordan/UK	Adam Smith International	1st July 2016
B-FOR Senior Project Manager	Jordan	Adam Smith International	1st July 2016
B-FOR Junior Project Manager	Jordan	Adam Smith International	1st July 2016
M&E Officer	Jordan	Adam Smith International	1st July 2016
Training Facility Director	Jordan	Adam Smith International	1st July 2016
Training Team Leader	Jordan	Pilgrims	1st July 2016
Quartermaster	Jordan	KBR	1st July 2016
C2 Training Simulation Consultant	Jordan	Pilgrims	1st July 2016
C2 Training Simulation Senior Instructor	Jordan	Pilgrims	1st July 2016
Training Designer x 2	Jordan	Pilgrims	1st July 2016
Core Country Operations Team	Jordan	Adam Smith International	1st July 2016
<b>Additional Team</b>			
Paramedic	Jordan	Pilgrims	7-10 days after core project team
C2 Trg Simulation Instructor x 2	Jordan	Pilgrims	7-10 days after core project team
Training Content Translator	Jordan	Pilgrims	7-10 days after core project team
Quartermaster	Jordan	KBR	7-10 days after core project team
Chief Clerk (Jordanian)	Jordan	Pilgrims	7-10 days after core project team
Legal Advisor	UK	Pilgrims	On standby
Port Liaison	Jordan	KBR	2-3 weeks after core project team
Storeman (Jordanian) x 3	Jordan	KBR	2-3 weeks after core project team
Additional Country Operations Team	Jordan	Adam Smith International	2-3 weeks after core project team
B-FOR Training Instructors x 9	Jordan	Pilgrims	2-3 weeks after core project team
CASEVAC Training Instructors x 7	Jordan	Pilgrims	2-3 weeks after core project team
<b>Field Team</b>			
Field Monitoring Officers x 6	Syria	Adam Smith International	3-4 Weeks following Contract signature (dependent on vetting)

### Transition arrangements

The table below summarises the key objectives of the administrative, programmatic and strategic transition and the timeframe in which these processes could occur. The timelines can be shifted to meet donor requirements as needed, but by our assessment a six-week period is necessary to achieve the objectives of each phase of the transition. By the end of Week 6 ASI would have mobilised the full B-FOR team and be ready to begin the design and delivery of training in full partnership with MAO Groups.

To expedite the contract mobilisation process, Adam Smith International would be open to conducting contract negotiations with HMG during the alcatel period. Similarly, if HMG requires urgent mobilisation Adam Smith International would be able to use its existing operational platforms in Amman and London to start initial reviews of the incumbents' asset register and administrative structures.



Date	Activity	
Week 1: 24 June - 1 July	Notification of preferred bidder status - 10 day Alcatel period (24 June - 4 July)	
Week 2: 1 - 8 July	Contract Negotiations between HMG and Adam Smith International	
Week 3: 8 - 15 July	Mobilisation of core B-FOR/CASEVAC project team to Amman	
Week 4: 15 - 22 July	Administrative Transition	Review Incumbent Asset Register and build full equipment inventory for B-FOR/CASEVAC using ASI templates
		Cost review to compare incumbent running costs with ASI budget for B-FOR/CASEVAC
		Review Incumbent staff list to identify strong individuals that could be transferred to B-FOR/CASEVAC projects
Week 5: 22 - 29 July	Programmatic Transition	Transition Workshop with incumbent staff (24-26 July)
		Consultation with key MAO stakeholders to review training/equipment delivered to date and conduct preliminary needs assessment for future training and equipment support to be provided under B-FOR/CASEVAC (24-29 July)
		Set three programmatic baselines for B-FOR/CASEVAC: - Administration to Benefit Ratio - Quality of Delivery - Levels of Control
	Strategic Transition	Agree on intended goals of B-FOR/CASEVAC, the means by which they will be achieved and the indicators to measure them
Compare B-FOR/CASEVAC goals, means and indicators to those used by the incumbent programme		
Week 6: 29 July - 5 August	Strategic Transition	Identify full list of MAO stakeholders, programme activities and funding streams which need to be part of B-FOR/CASEVAC
		Mobilisation of full B-FOR/CASEVAC team to Amman to commence training on 5 August

## Administrative transition

Reviewing and preparing the necessary operational, logistical and administrative infrastructure is a critical component of the transition to B-FOR. As outlined above Adam Smith International's offices in Amman provide a strong foundation for doing so without significant cost or delay.

During the initial mobilisation period, Adam Smith International's current project offices in Amman could accommodate the core but not the full project team for B-FOR. If the Adam Smith International-KBR-Pilgrims consortium is successful in winning both the B-FOR and CASEVAC programmes we would co-locate both teams in a new office, offering savings and operational benefits to HMG. Alternatively, we could establish a new joint office for B-FOR and other existing ASI programmes such as AJACS, again offering savings.

Other steps we would take to effect the administrative transition include:

- Full desk review of all Risk Advisory Group donor reports, minutes of key meetings and technical training evaluations to ensure the team has a full contextual understanding of the design and delivery of the six-month pilot programme.
- Full review of the Risk Advisory Group asset register to identify savings that can be made by transferring assets to ASI for the B-FOR projects. As we have staff already on the ground in Amman Dara'a and Rif Damascus, we could commence this review and verification process immediately after the Alcatel period.
- Preparing templates for equipment inventory that contain all the necessary information, to enable the B-FOR project to start with a full overview of equipment that has been delivered to the MAO groups, broken down by location, quantity and value.
- Technical review of all Training Needs Assessments (TNAs) conducted by the Risk Advisory Group. To a great extent, these documents hold the key to the successful implementation of a project like B-FOR. If they have been produced without sufficient consultation of the MAO groups and do not strike the correct balance between meeting the immediate operational needs and building sustainable institutional capacity within these groups, the long term viability of the project intervention is questionable.
- Conducting an operational cost review, to compare Risk Advisory Group running costs with those we achieve on our current projects based in Amman. If the incumbents have been able to secure lower running costs, we will seek to make savings, which will be fully transferred to the project.
- Reviewing operational staff and field officers who worked for the incumbent project to identify those who have performed well, have strong relationships and understandings of the context, and who wish to transfer to the B-FOR projects. We

will not seek to transfer staff wholesale, as we believe it is important to make a clear change in stakeholders' experiences of the two projects. However, where retaining high-performing staff offers a cost saving, we will make efforts to accommodate them in our team.

- › Comparing our existing Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) and Emergency Response Plans (ERPs) for Syria and Jordan with those used by the incumbents. Where disparities exist, we will examine any duty of care issues which arise and adjust our approach as necessary.

### **Programmatic transition**

The programmatic transition must address three aspects: activities, communications to stakeholders, and data. First, ongoing incumbent activities will be categorised into three groups:

- › Training modules and other activities which B-FOR should continue and renew: planning for these will be incorporated into our workplan.
- › Training modules and other activities which B-FOR should support but not renew: in this case, the relevant funding, staff and reporting arrangements will be transitioned to our administrative systems, through arrangements to be agreed with the incumbents.
- › Training modules and other activities which should be wound up quickly: wind-up arrangements will be handled by the incumbents wherever possible.

In all cases a communication strategy will be agreed with the incumbents to explain the transition to stakeholders. Finally, we will examine the results data held by the Risk Advisory Group to identify useful baselines which we can draw upon to measure the impacts of B-FOR. Where possible and appropriate, we will align our M&E approach to allow a continuity of measurement from the pilot projects to B-FOR.

The programmatic transition should also make sense in terms of efficiency: are we getting more output in relation to inputs. To help HMG answer this question, we need to set three programmatic baselines for B-FOR:

- › Administration-to-benefit ratio: We will look at the amount spent on organisational costs in relation to the amount spent on activities that directly benefit Syrian stakeholders. This ratio will provide us with a benchmark against which we will seek to provide a significant improvement in efficiency within the first year of implementation.
- › Quality of delivery: We will engage with current programme stakeholders to determine the time taken to review, approve and disburse funds, procure goods and deliver training; as well as the extent to which funds, equipment and training matched the needs of stakeholders. To justify the transition to current stakeholders and donors, B-FOR will need to outperform the incumbent implementers against these indicators.
- › Levels of control: Inputs that do not link directly to outputs (i.e. benefits to Syrian stakeholders) are, by definition, focused on controls (e.g. vetting beneficiaries, writing training plans, reviewing progress against performance indicators). We need to review the levels of control that were exercised under Risk Advisory Group, so that the quantity of input is judged fairly in relation to the levels of control that those inputs represent.

To set these benchmarks we will either need access to the incumbent before the closure of the current contract or engage in close cooperation with donors during the early days of B-FOR in order to review the expenditures, delivery and controls of Risk Advisory Group and set targets for B-FOR in all three areas. If possible there should be a period of overlap between the two contracts, and HMG should facilitate a lessons-learning workshop, so that the strengths of the current pilot project implementation can be appreciated and sustained over the course of B-FOR. If this will not be possible we will seek to organise a series of transition meetings with the Risk Advisory Group, donors and beneficiaries during the first weeks of the contract so that we can work together to set targets for spending, delivery standards and levels of control.

### **Strategic transition**

Clear communication of B-FOR programmatic goals and where they align/differ with those of the incumbents will be crucial to ensuring the strategic component of the transition is successful. As described in our overall approach, we will reach out to current MAO stakeholders and beneficiaries, to consult with them on areas where B-FOR should ensure continuity with successful activities. Our Field Officers or research subcontractors in Dara'a and Rif Damascus can mobilise quickly to make contact with the relevant stakeholders on the ground. Our relationship with GID and the relevant Jordanian Authorities will also enable us to manage the transport of stakeholders to Jordan in a manner that is efficient, reliable and respectful without incurring unnecessary expense.

The strategic transition should make sense in terms of effectiveness: are we getting more impact as a result of change. As outlined in our section on approach and methodology, in the first weeks of B-FOR we will hold a workshop on the theory of change, key performance indicators, area selection criteria and branding options. This will reach agreement on the goals of B-FOR, the means for achieving these and indicators to measure progress.


To assess the strategic transition, we will compare B-FOR proposed goals, means and indicators with those used for the current pilot project. Where these are similar, we will be able to benchmark progress to date at any time during the programme; where they diverge, we will research suitable comparators.

# Methodology and approach

Moderate Armed Opposition groups in the South of Syria – although much more coordinated than their peers in the North – have no central command, are fighting numerous enemies on numerous fronts and are operating within a vacuum of formal governance structures. This has profound impacts on the methodology and approach for B-FOR. Firstly, unlike AJACS in the North of Syria, where we are working with an established command structure, there is no institutional framework against which we can assess the extent to which the provisions of the programme are sufficient. Secondly, it means that there is no single model for military competence and any attempt to impose such models will be likely met with resistance. Thirdly, it means that, despite a narrow focus on training and equipping combatants, we cannot ignore the role that civil-military relations will play in determining the success of armed groups to control their AORs. The last point applies to both the period of conflict and the period that would follow conflict. One of the greatest risks that the programme faces is its potential legacy and the manner in which relations between HMG and armed actors might adapt in a post-conflict environment.

With these issues in mind we have created an approach and methodology with five workstreams that, we believe, balance the need for flexibility and responsiveness with the need for coherence around the role that armed groups play in defending and protecting AORs that should ultimately fall under civilian governance structures. It works by **1)** creating a framework of military capability that ensures training and equipment can cover core capabilities as well as specialist needs and leadership, but which has principles of military conduct mainstreamed throughout; **2)** allowing for a rapid assessment of needs so that there is a certain amount of choice, being customised to the particular needs of each cohort (including the levels of command); **3)** builds the capacity of MAO groups to train their own people within Syria over time; **4)** uses field staff inside Syria to assess the impact of training on behaviours of MAO groups within Syria, including their engagement with civilian actors. A **fifth** but less tangible methodological feature of our approach is a strategic focus on building towards integration. This is implicit in the mainstreaming of core principles of military conduct but there will be more explicit efforts to work towards integration such as: training command elements from different MAOs together in planning joint operations, working with commanders towards standard operating procedures for all MAOs, identifying and disseminating lessons learned, and many other activities that will gently work towards integration of MAO groups.

The five components of our approach are visualised in the graphic below.



Component 1, above, will help to provide strategic direction, ensure coherence and build values into the provision of training and equipment. Component 2 will allow training and equipment to be flexible and relevant to the needs of MAO groups. Component 3 will provide value for money in the long-run by working towards a more sustainable modality for training and

equipment. Component 4 will allow us achieve a high quality level of support throughout. Component 5 will help to bring all of these key principles together so that they total more than the sum of their parts.

Over the following pages, we explain how the five components above will work in practice, how responsibility for their implementation will be divided within the team and the consortium and how the key principles outlined in the statement of requirements will be balanced through this approach and methodology.

## **COMPONENT ONE: DEVELOPING A COMPREHENSIVE TRAINING AND EQUIPMENT FRAMEWORK**

While the level ambition of B-FOR may currently be limited to the provision of *some* training and *some* equipment to improve capacity, that level of ambition is positioned along a scale that stretches from minimal and peripheral support to a couple of MAO groups, at one end, to the formalisation of a unified military structure and the disbanding of irregular forces following a political solution, at the other end. We want to provide HMG with an approach that allows it to be ready for the latter end of that scale so that, if needed, HMG has a programme that can work towards a unified military structure ready to operate under a civilian-led governance framework.

This is about working strategically towards a comprehensive framework for training and equipping the MAO Groups so that, over the course of the project implementation, it will be possible to identify, with some degree of authority, the capability gaps that exist within the Southern MAO Groups in terms of both human and physical resources.

In training terms this means moving towards a complete curriculum for the development of military that is fully owned by the MAO Groups and allows for standards to be set across all units. In equipment terms this means moving to a logistics planning process that allows MAO Groups to identify its provisions at a macro level and work more effectively with supporters, such as the HMG, to make best use of the resources available. Beginning with the basic and most pressing requirements (focussed on enhancing military competence and command functions), we will adapt and add to our offering in light of our growing understanding of MAO groups' capabilities and requirements, strengths and weaknesses, structures, inter-relationships and operations. This will include the continual development of additional training material, consideration of new equipment and new ways of providing greater structure and integration to groups working in the Southern area of operations.

The following steps outline how we would work towards such a point over the course of the project.

### **Step 1 – Identify immediate needs and priorities**

Our team would seek to gather information on the immediate needs of MAO Groups in terms of both training and equipment. Information would be gathered from interviews with GID, senior commanders, trainees and the commanders who accompany them as well as, where possible and accepted by HMG, commanders in the field. It may also be possible to gain information from other donor bodies involved in supporting the MAO Groups. This research would help to inform discussions between HMG and senior commanders of MAO Groups on the immediate needs of MAO Groups and the priorities within those needs.

### **Step 2 – Assess and prioritise immediate gaps**

The needs that have been identified have to be understood within the context of the resources that are available. For example, vehicles may be identified as a priority but the resources available would provide for an insufficient number to make a purchase useful in which case resource might be better spent elsewhere. Similarly, communications training may be identified as a priority but other providers are already providing communications training. Our analysis of the immediate gaps and priorities will be provided for HMG to use in discussions with the MAO Groups and GID on the most relevant training and equipment that needs to be provided.

### **Step 3 – Rightsizing and customising provisions**

Once priorities have been identified, our team would work with HMG to identify the most appropriate resource envelope to be committed to respond to immediate needs and the most efficient use of resources within that envelope. We will also work to identify the particular needs in each case. For example, if there is demand for counter-sniper training, our training development team will need to understand the types of resources available to the units who would conduct such operations, as well as environmental factors, so that training can be customised to meet the needs. There would also be the opportunity here to customise training and equipment provisions to integrate HMG's key messages and strategic objectives such as stabilisation, civ-mil coordination and the protection of human rights.

### **Step 4 – Establish a regular planning process**

Going through the three steps above on a number of occasions will allow our team to develop familiarity with the likely makeup, capabilities and tactical requirements of groups attending the training facilities. Our results monitoring and beneficiary feedback loops will continuously inform our training and equipping plans, allowing our teams at the training facility to prepare, in advance, the most relevant and highest-quality training and equipment for delivery to the MAOs, in line with our assessment of the changing political and military situations, and with HMG's strategic direction and intent. We will continually review our equipment inventories and training capabilities (trainers, teaching material, facilities, training stocks) in light of our assessments of near-, medium- and long-term requirements. Syrian field monitors/officers liaising directly with the MAOs will provide a feedback loop to the Amman office M&E unit, allowing us to continuously refine our training and equipping programme in line with evidence of what is working in the field.

While much of the activity in this regard will be focussed on the needs of groups imminently attending the training facility, we will also be continually assessing the needs of MAOs with whom we maintain contact in order to identify additional requirements for support, particularly of the type provided through other HMG projects in Syria. By doing so we can maximise coordination and interconnectedness between HMG-funded projects, achieving greater effect and value for money.

However, over time it will be desirable to establish a **regular and formal planning process** by which HMG, GID and MAO Groups will be able to plan, on a systematic basis, the scope and scale of training and equipment that can be made available. On AJACS, we have established a six monthly strategic planning process through which provincial command submit budgets that reflect the needs of their station commanders, many of whom have been trained by AJACS on how to plan and prioritise their needs. Due to weak linkages between Provincial Councils and Local Councils, Tamkeen goes directly to Local Councils (via Tamkeen Committees) to identify priorities for basic services. In both cases, the process is essential for allowing training in planning and coordination to be put into practice. As we outline below, the training we will include training to commander level trainees on strategic resource and operational planning. So, we will be building the awareness and capacity at the commander level of the MAO Groups to engage in formal planning processes. This training will be of no use if we do not over time adapt project processes by which they will be able to put this training into effect.

#### **Step 5 – Develop a comprehensive training and equipment framework**

To support an insurgency so that it is dominant in conflict but submissive in peace, it is necessary to have oversight of the human and physical resources under its control. B-FOR's most important strategic objective should be to build gradually, through developing trust in and familiarity with the MAO Groups, towards such oversight.

Once we have built a body of tried and tested training material that responds to many of the competency areas and procured several packages of equipment that have been confirmed to improve MAO Group operability, then we will be in a position to start moving towards the development of a comprehensive training and equipment framework. By this we do not mean comprehensive provision of training and equipment but rather an understanding of the overall training and equipment needs of the MAO Groups so that provisions can be made and other international actors can co-operate on provision of training and equipment.

Such a framework would consist of an MAO Group training curriculum and a logistics plan that would be fully owned by members of the MAO Group and around which some degree of integration can take place. For example, the training curriculum can help to integrate systems of rank and promotion among MAO Groups. The logistics plan could help allow MAO Groups to talk about the pooling and reallocation of equipment.

While there is no set format for such a framework, and thus no defined picture for what the end state might look like, building towards a single and comprehensive structure of management for physical and human resources would remain a key feature of our B-FOR approach.

#### **COMPONENT TWO: FLEXIBLE AND RESPONSIVE ALLOCATION OF T&E TO COHORTS**

While we work towards an overall framework for the provision of training and equipment, the operational context in Syria and myriad other factors will generate considerable uncertainty as to what and whom to expect on each training rotation. We have built this expectation into our training model. The first phase of each four-week training period will consist of a rapid training-needs assessment, allowing for the instruction subsequently given to trainees to be of maximum relevance and utility. The assessment will consist of the following lines of activity:

- **Self-categorization.** Students will be asked to identify themselves as one or more of the following:
  - Commanders
  - Former (and formally trained) Syrian Army officers and NCOs

- Other personnel with formal military training
- Specialists, or those with specialist roles (including, but not limited to, heavy machine gunners, snipers, communicators, intelligence analysts, indirect fire (mortar) operators or controllers, medics, drivers)
- **Personal skills assessment.** All personnel will undertake supervised assessments in basic military skills such as:
  - Safe weapon handling (AK47 rifle and PKM machine gun)
  - Marksmanship (rifle)
  - Patrolling
  - Reaction to effective enemy fire (& small unit battle drills)
  - IED awareness
- **Interviews & discussions with commanders.** We will hold interviews with each commander individually to discuss their perceptions of their groups' current capability, recent and planned activities and training and equipment gaps. Commanders will also be engaged in a forum environment to discuss collective training and equipping requirements. The balance to be adopted for each four-week programme between individual and collective (team) skills will be discussed in this forum and a decision arrived at, depending upon the makeup of the cohort and an assessment of the desires of main stakeholders. This engagement, in combination with prior and subsequent dialogue, will foster *local commitment*, encouraging MAO commanders to 'buy-in' to the project's activities, invest in their forces' training and take the programme's aims and values back across the border.

Following registration, briefing and the issuance of personal equipment (from our 'upfront' equipment pool, see below), the initial rapid assessment of each intake will occur over the first two days of a four-week training cycle. This period will be tightly programmed and strictly overseen by the training team.

Our trainers will all be experienced in military training assessment and delivery, having assessed and delivered training to both professional military forces and indigenous/irregular units in the Middle East.

#### *Training delivery*

Following the rapid training-needs assessment, and in consultation with MAO commanders in attendance, a training programme for the remainder of the four-week period will be developed by the project partners. All training will be fully-scheduled, with MAO personnel assigned a training team leader.

Although we will maintain a fully-flexible approach, our default start point will be that trainees will be split into groups according to their prioritised individual and collective training needs.

Such groups are likely as per those outlined below:

Category/stream	Training objectives	Link to desired outcomes & impacts
Inexperienced recruits	Basic military skills provision to enable recruits with little or no military training to take their place as safe, functioning and useful MAO team members.	MAO personnel will demonstrate improved general military competence.
Experienced trainees	More advanced instruction to personnel competent in basic military skills to add to the collective capacity of MAOs to conduct offensive, defensive and stabilisation operations. This training will be offered on a train-the-trainer basis where appropriate and where resources allow.	MAOs will be better able to deliver improved security and stability in their AOR.  Communities feel safer, demonstrate improved civilian-military relations and are better able to deliver governance and basic services.
Specialists	Those identified by their commanders or self-identifying as specialists will receive further training building on current skills and experience in order to create cadres of professionally-trained operators within the MAOs.	Standardised training assists cross-MAO cohesion.

Category/stream	Training objectives	Link to desired outcomes & impacts
Commanders	<p>Commanders will receive leadership, command and control instruction relevant to their level of command in order to assist MAOs plan, conduct and coordinate military operations more effectively and efficiently. Standardised reporting methods will assist with cohesion between groups as commanders are taught a common language assist in coordination.</p> <p>Our command training will reinforce the need for, and practicalities of, strengthening civil-military cooperation.</p>	<p>MAO groups demonstrate improved strategic management and cross MAO group coordination.</p> <p>MAOs demonstrate improved coordination with civilian institutions.</p>

Immediately after the awarding of the project to our consortium, we will work to edit and re-work Pilgrim's existing training materials (as used in Iraq, Afghanistan and Nigeria) for the different training streams outlined below. Our menu of pre-prepared training material, the experience and skills mix of our training team, our recourse to on-call specialist trainers in the region and reach back to UK-based project partners will allow us the maximum flexibility in terms of the content provided to trainees. The team will be capable of immediately delivering the following syllabi:

- **Individual infantry skills improvement** (e.g. weapon handling (safety and effectiveness), marksmanship, patrolling skills (day and night), field skills and administration, navigation, IED and mine awareness, use of personal medical equipment, close quarter battle (CQB), driver training)
- **Collective infantry skills** (e.g. defensive operations, urban patrolling skills, stabilisation operations (e.g. framework patrolling, vehicle checkpoint conduct, searching, IED/incident reaction (cordon operations)), mobile operations, casualty evacuation)
- **Specialist infantry skills (initial and advanced training)** (e.g. sharp-shooter and sniping training, medium and heavy machine gun use, mortar use, indirect fire control, medic training, logistics, demolitions)
- **Command skills** (e.g. combat estimate and planning, orders delivery and considerations, establishing and running an operations room, civil-military cooperation, methods of instruction training, equipment care inspections, standardised reports, returns and requests)
- **Train the trainer (T<sub>3</sub>)** In consultation with MAO commanders, other stakeholders, and on the basis of our assessments of requirements, we will deliver T<sub>3</sub> training to a small number of experienced MAO personnel (likely where individuals with prior instructional or formal military training are identified)
- **Core syllabus.** In achieving the 'values' principle, and assisting in the building of a more integrated Southern Front, all trainees will receive instruction in the law of armed conflict and respect for civilian life and infrastructure and UNSCR 1325 (Gender, conflict and security) appropriate to their levels within their group

#### Focus On VALUES

In 2009, the UN Secretary-General developed a set of indicators to track the implementation of UNSCR 1325 - Women and Peace and Security. There are four pillars:

1. **Prevention:** focuses on preventing sexual and gender-based violence, gender awareness in conflict prevention and early warning systems. This includes preventing sexual exploitation and abuse by stabilisation forces.
2. **Protection:** improving women and girls' safety, physical and mental health, economic security and overall well-being. Improving the rights of women and girls and their legal protections.
3. **Participation:** refers to promoting women's participation in peace processes, increasing the numbers of women at all levels of decision-making institutions and increasing partnerships with local women's organizations.



4. Relief and recovery efforts should ensure the equal distribution of aid to women and girls and incorporate gender perspectives into relief and recovery efforts.

Project partner Oakas will develop specific training on the operationalisation of these pillars in the Syrian context for inclusion in our core and T<sub>3</sub> programmes.

Where time and resources allow, we intend to offer the maximum mix of syllabi to individuals who require it. For example, a mid-level commander (at the platoon-level equivalent) might attend elements of the command skills syllabus, while following the core and collective infantry skills programmes).

Additional 'on-call' training will be offered as the requirement is identified and agreed upon with stakeholders. Our consortium has the following additional skills which can be called upon:

- Intelligence collection, collation and analysis
- Human intelligence (HUMINT) operator
- Surveillance operator
- IED/UXO handling & disposal
- Higher-level command and staff training

To ensure quality we will develop final assessment criteria for each syllabus. By assessing trainees, both immediately after training to understand comprehension and later in the field to understand adoption, we will provide assurance that instruction has been understood and that knowledge, understanding and skills are being passed on in the most effective way and affecting long-term behavioural change. This way we will be able to provide evidence to HMG of the effectiveness of training and discuss options for addressing identified gaps.

### Equipment-related training

Our logistics team, based at the training facility, will be responsible for the tracking, receipt, storage, readying for issue and issuance of all procured items. Their priority will be to get the desired equipment into Jordan in the most effective manner in order to distribute it via the appropriate channels to the designated groups. The logistics team will also have responsibility for three equipment-related training objectives:

- In close cooperation with the training delivery team, **understanding and training individuals in the use and maintenance of equipment issued to them**. (No equipment will be issued to trainees without them receiving full instruction, and where relevant, the opportunity to practice their use under supervision).
- Where applicable, our logistics staff will be responsible for equipment-specific **'train-the-trainer' (T<sub>3</sub>) instruction** to key MAO personnel delivering and distributing equipment to their group, or others, in Syria.
- MAO groups taking delivery of high-value equipment will be instructed in a **suitable equipment care regime** associated with it. This is likely to include regular recorded muster/inspection of items, basic cleaning & servicing, storage and issuance guidance. Instilling this discipline into MAO groups will also assist with subsequent M&E efforts.

### Use of technology

We have identified a number of commercially-available, simple-to-use technology applications which we will work with the specialist and command training streams to integrate into their operations.

Systems like these will be trialled by our training staff for quality control purposes and to ensure that the most relevant solutions are used that offer the best value for money.

### Equipping programme

Since it was established in early 2014, the Southern Front factions have been given various types of support from the MOC. Primarily, the MOC has provided military support, which includes small arms, artillery, anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs), ammunition, vehicles, communications equipment, and uniforms. The MOC also provides salaries to some faction commanders and fighters. It is highly likely that groups attending the training facility will have benefitted from different levels of MOC equipment provision, thus our equipment strategy is designed to take account of this and adapt to take into account equipment that have already been provided

### Equipment procurement will support our core operating objectives of:

- › Enhancing basic military competency
- › Better integrating and coordinating MAOs across the southern border region
- › Enabling MAOs to develop in support of civil governance

Our equipping programme starts from the premise of not allowing MAOs to become reliant on the materiel provided to them. We would seek to avoid providing kit *instead* of basic skills, and focus on giving kit *in addition to* basic skills thereby contributing to the sustainability of the programme's effects. Indeed, we know that conflicts such as the Syrian civil war foster innovation within fighting forces. Our training facility team will seek to understand the improvised weapons and equipment being employed and – where it does not compromise the project's values – work with MAO group members to improve the effectiveness, accuracy, discrimination and sustainability of such battlefield improvisation. As per the 'learning centre' section below, these lessons will be shared to enhance both effectiveness and integration among the southern MAOs.

As per our established equipping methodology on our AJACS programme, which provides equipment to the Free Syrian Police (FSP) in support of the core programme objective, procurement and transference of equipment to the MAOs will conform to all internationally recognised procurement standards and minimise risk by tracking all equipment delivered. AJACS has delivered more than £1.8m of equipment to the FSP. The project will use a tracker for all equipment delivered to Syria, disaggregated by the quantity and value of equipment on an MAO group-by-group basis.

We will also seek to apply the lessons of AJACS to the MAO programme as early as possible. Two programme-level lessons include:

- **Local procurement of some equipment inside Syria** (by the FSP). AJACS has started to use an in-country method for effective and efficient equipment procurement to provide the FSP with supplementary quantities of police uniforms, vehicles, and radio equipment. The FSP followed internationally-accepted procurement guidelines for the manufacture of over 1,000 police uniforms from local suppliers, allowing for more control over product quality and providing an institutional capacity building opportunity. The FSP expressed their preference for this method of procurement, when appropriate. While we understand the sensitivities of such an approach vis-à-vis GID, we would aspire to work with the MAOs to identify opportunities for local purchases in Syria, as it would help to strengthen supply chains within the country and build capacity of MAO groups to manage their own procurement.
- **Risk categorisation.** The deteriorating security situation in the north meant that AJACS and the FSP had to work together to categorise the equipment according to the level of risk that was attached to it. High-value items such as vehicles, generators and communications equipment were categorised as the highest risk. In areas that were close to the front line and vulnerable to being taken by ISIS or the regime, the project and FSP agreed a contingency plan that moved high value equipment away from the most at risk locations. Our Amman office will maintain a situational picture of the conflict to identify areas at risk of regime or ISIS overrun and develop contingency plans, while the 'equip team' will work with the MAOs to categorise items of equipment. Our M&E and research functions will track the locations of such equipment resulting in a fully-informed project headquarters.

The Equipment Transfer Board (see 'governance' below) will consider the training implications of any new item being considered for purchase, establishing whether the experience and skills exist in-house to properly train MAO members in its use. If not, due consideration will be given the value and cost effectiveness of surging capacity to Jordan to deliver such training.

We will therefore use a three-stage equipment procurement/transfer process:

- › Upfront procurement (with immediate individual and small team competency uplifts)
- › Standard procurement pipeline (delivering anticipated basic equipment, not included in the upfront procurement stream, from options menus on a case-by-case basis)
- › Urgent operational requirements (delivering short-notice collective & personal operational effectiveness gains)

Upfront and standard procurement stages will include equipment lists drawn up in full consultation with the FCO.

### Upfront procurement

Our research indicates that the majority of MAOs in the southern region lack even the basics of a competent military force. We have therefore identified a number of categories, and items within those categories, which can be ordered immediately and obtained within a short timeframe via regional suppliers. By this method we can ensure that MAO trainees are provided with quick, effective and value-for-money equipment as early as possible:

- **Protective clothing** – helmets, body armour, clothing, boots, protective ballistic glasses, cold weather gear, respirators
- **Personal medical kits** – bandages, haemostatic agents, tourniquets, morphine, chest seals, scissors, water sterilisation tablets, atropine pens
- **Weapon attachments** – attachment rails, down-grips, torch attachments
- **Personal communications** – handheld VHF radios

In addition, for every coherent group of five trainees, ‘squad’-level equipment will be issued. Our current working assumption is that trainees will arrive in formed units of at least five personnel, hence they will be equipped with:

Squad-level equipment	
4x4 patrol vehicle	GPS
Metal detector x 2	Vehicle radio
Vehicle medical kit	VCP kit (cones, under-vehicle mirror, caltrops)

### Standard procure and transfer programme

Our standard procure and transfer equipment options will be centred on collective capabilities and those items of equipment which enable the MAOs to better integrate and coordinate between groups. These will include capable and compatible communications systems, including tools for acquiring a common understanding of the battlefield.

Collective capability enhancement	
GPS	Operations room equipment
Power generation – diesel generators and solar cells	Logistics vehicles
Night operating equipment (night vision goggles)	Defensive stores (HESCO Bastion, digging tools)
Integration enhancement	
Operational-level communications (VHF/HF/Satcomms)	Laptop and satellite phone
Standard operating procedures	Standardised reports, returns and request formats


### Urgent operational requirements (‘UORs’)

Our ‘upfront’ and ‘standard’ procure and transfer streams will consist of equipment menus pre-agreed with the key stakeholders (as part of the bid process, and subsequent discussions). To be able adapt to changing circumstances or specific MAO requirements (which will vary depending on equipment already received from the MOC, the local operational picture and geography, existing capability and commanders’ ambitions) we will develop a UOR procurement stream.

Depending on the urgency of the operational requirement identified, we will maintain an ability to cease mainstream training in order to ensure that the maximum number of personnel are trained in the application of a UOR. This short-term concentration on the use of a particular item/items of equipment will limit delays in capability building within the southern AORs and deliver maximum impact in the shortest possible timeframe.

### Equipment transfer governance

In order to ensure that UOR procurement is subject to formal decision-making processes we will establish a project Equipment Transfer Board. This will consist of the Team Leader, Training Facility Director, and training and equipment team leaders, meeting as required to consider identified UORs for consideration. Their key responsibility will be to conduct a cost-benefit analysis of items being considered for procure and transfer under the UOR scheme. This will include the training and cost implications of transferring such equipment, as well as wider applicability across the Southern AORs.



### Procurement system

To provide maximum assurance in the supply chain, particularly high-value equipment, the consortium has the option to use KBR’s IPMS procurement system. All suppliers on the IPMS system have been pre-vetted by KBR. This system is used by KBR to manage the successful global procurement of over \$10bn worth of materiel annually, thus providing us with a proven ability to quickly scale up the equipping programme as required.

Additionally, KBR’s Integration Management System will ensure the technical compatibility of complex items procured for the MAOs. This will significantly reduce the risk of wastage through incompatibility enhancing value for money. We do, however, recognise the need to co-operate with GID on their concerns vis-à-vis procurement.

As we do on AJACS, the MAO train and equip programme will use an activity-based budgeting system to track expenditure for individual activity lines. This will be contained in a detailed budget tracker showing ongoing spend against activity budget limits.

### Scalability

The consortium has considered the areas in which we can increase the scale of our train-and-equip efforts at short notice, and will continue to do so across the project lifespan. ASI and its partners have access to resources to ensure that:

- We can acquire the use of additional training facilities in Jordan should these be required (Pilgrims has a relationship with a large-scale secure training facility)
- We can access further and additional training weapon and ammunition sources (as above)
- We can rapidly build additional training infrastructure at the existing training facility or at other sites (KBR)

- We can expand or replicate the programme in other countries bordering Syria using existing platforms (ASI, KBR & Pilgrims)
- We can scale up further remote training and *train-the-trainer* options

All consortium partners have the necessary experience of working in high-threat environments such that should the opportunity present, consideration to facilitating development of MAO training camps in Syria can be given.

### 3. COMPONENT THREE: BUILDING CAPACITY TO TRAIN AND EQUIP IN COUNTRY

To contribute to project sustainability, and in recognition that MAO Groups need to become more self-sufficient in how they train and equip themselves, options for supporting training and procurement capacity in the field will be discussed with HMG. While the camp facility should be seen by Southern Front commanders as the ‘hub’ of training, we must recognise that transforming MAO Groups into an effective and coherent military capability will not be achieved with one cycle of training. On-going learning and supplementary training information needs to be accessible to the MAO trainees and commanders; in addition, the procurement planning process also needs to gradually adapt to fully maximise the improved capacity of groups to identify materiel needs and procure equipment from within Syria, with sufficient controls.

#### In-Country Training

Our ‘train-the-trainer’ (T<sub>3</sub>) programme, delivered at the training facility, will help provide this force multiplication effect. T<sub>3</sub> will centre around two key objectives:

- To create MAO operators capable of delivering training in the core competencies to their colleagues in the field. This will consist of basic military competency skills and values training, such as the Law of Armed Conflict, as detailed in the table below.
- To spread equipment-specific knowledge and training to best enable other MAO members who have not been exposed to out-of-country training to use the equipment provided by this project.

We will provide a specific T<sub>3</sub> line of training and give those receiving it the requisite materials required to deliver it remotely in the field.

Military competency	
Weapon handling (safety and effectiveness)	Navigation
Marksmanship	IED and mine awareness
Patrolling skills	Use of personal medical equipment
Core programme	
Law of Armed Conflict	UNSCR 1325 - Women and Peace and Security
Equipment-specific	
GPS	Radio equipment
Respirators	

We will deliver further options for supplementing the core and advanced training with additional materials that can be delivered in the field via video or internet links. These materials have been produced for the AJACS programme and cover topics of direct relevance to MAO personnel such as IED awareness, incident management and working with IDP communities. Attainment of the skills incorporated in these training materials will add to the MAOs’ abilities to ‘hold’ and secure their territories, and provide useful additional capacity to the civilian authorities. Modules include:

- First aid
- Crime scene management
- Vehicle and person searches
- Respect for human rights
- Dealing with juveniles & vulnerable people
- IED awareness
- Vehicle checkpoints
- Communications
- Incident management
- Strategic planning
- Tasking and coordination
- Social media skills
- Working with IDP communities

These video materials will be introduced under our train-the-trainer stream; these personnel will take these back to their own operating areas to provide instruction to their colleagues in Syria.

#### In-Country Equipping

Component Two discussed at length the process and governance arrangements for equipment procurement. Subject to continuous discussion with HMG and GID we will explore options for supporting MAO Groups to conduct in-country procurement planning and identify suitable non-specialist items that could, where appropriate, be procured from within Syria. While it is necessary to retain a high level of control of procurement processes which use HMG funding, recognition should be given to the fact that MAO Groups are already procuring certain supplies within Syria and the more integrated and professionalised planning and procurement channels are, the more effective the Southern Front can be as a self-sufficient force.

With the benefit of several cycles of delivery we will be in a position to assess how elements of the standard procure and transfer programme can be incorporated into planning processes conducted in Syria; equally, after several cycles, we would expect the logistical and planning training to have built the ability of MAO Groups to engage more professionally in these processes. The intended result would be that MAO Groups were not only better equipped but also better able to plan their equipment needs around tactical manoeuvres and military operations.

#### **‘Learning centre’**

In order to promote the objective of a more effective and integrated southern MAO, our consortium will facilitate the collection, collation, analysis and dissemination of lessons identified by trainees passing through the training facility. The aim of this is beyond receiving direct feedback on the intervention, but to ensure lessons are being learned from the ground including, but not be limited to, those concerning enemy tactics, techniques, procedures and vulnerabilities, and how MAO tactical and operational best practice is developed. This will enable us to better understand how MAO Groups are organised, how they think and communicate, and what the day to day tactical challenges are that they face and subsequently adapt our training and equipment delivery to meet these challenges.

**Collection.** We will hold a programmed ‘lesson identification’ forum for each training group during each four-week training cycle. Our researcher, training evaluator/monitor and senior project leadership will attend these sessions. Trainee groups will be encouraged to discuss the operational successes and failures they have witnessed, been involved in or heard about and encouraged to draw out practical lessons.

**Collation.** Lessons identified in the group sessions will be recorded and held on our Knowledge Management System database.

**Analysis.** Our intelligence officer, researcher, training monitor, M&E officer, trainers and project leadership will meet at least once per training cycle to discuss those lesson identified during that period. Operational lessons identified will be analysed by the group and opportunities for inclusion into future training and/or equipping plans will be discussed.

**Dissemination.** Wherever possible, lessons identified will be incorporated into the relevant syllabus as quickly as possible. Where appropriate, lessons identified can be disseminated urgently to other MAOs on the ground in Syria by our field monitors or through train-the-trainer sessions at the training facility. Additionally, and in discussion with HMG, we will consider options for establishing cloud-based information and sharing centres, using commercially-available secure systems, for local commanders to share non-immediate information, lessons and analysis.

#### **COMPONENT FOUR: MONITOR IMPACT OF TRAINING ON BEHAVIOUR**

Without good monitoring of how training and equipment is changing the capabilities and behaviour of MAO Groups, we will not properly understand the effectiveness of the programme and adjust delivery to plug gaps and respond to changing dynamics on the ground. Good monitoring should not only identify results but also, and importantly for a capacity building programme, demonstrate how people are learning, and what the factors are that contribute to, or restrict, learning.

Our Monitoring Plan, explained in the Contract Management section, sets out the proposed logical framework and methodologies for monitoring results and effectiveness of project delivery. The main feature of our approach is the application of behavioural change methodology to measure the extent to which training is being effectively transferred into behaviours in the field. Post-training assessment conducted in the camp may indicate levels of immediate comprehension of knowledge and even skills, but what is needed is the ability to track whether these are transferred to the attitudes and behaviours exhibited by MAO Groups engaged in conflict and living among civilian populations.

Through our field monitors and our staff in Jordan we will monitor how training and equipment is affecting the behaviours of MAO Groups in their military competency, relations with civilian institutions and populations, and how they view and value engagement with the project. We will assess adoption of:

- Basic military skills (individual) and collective tactics, techniques and procedures. To what extent they are accepted, formalised through pan-group doctrine and demonstrably implemented in MAO operations.
-

- Law of armed conflict in battlefield conduct. To what extent has the core training syllabus' focus on the fundamentals of the laws of armed conflict and internationally-recognised human rights norms been adopted and implemented by MAO groups. These form the basis for their code of ethics and are enforced by peers and commanders alike.
- Coordination and communications processes. To what extent have they been adopted by senior commanders to overcome problems, consolidate gains and facilitate coordination between MAO Groups.
- The B-FOR project by Senior Commanders as *the* hub of training and doctrinal excellence for the Southern Front. To what extent the project is valued and the extent to which they are engaged in continuing the development framework to improve the benefits to their command and control capabilities, procurement and logistics, medical capabilities and other functions of importance to the wider Southern Front.

As discussed in our Contract management section, the method for measuring behavioural adoption relies on the presence of Field Monitors observing and conducting interviews with MAO trainees and Senior Commanders. Our ability to secure reliable and nuanced data from the field will allow us to better identify and respond to the gaps in adoption of training and to present and discuss these options with HMG.

#### *Civilian-Military Relations*

It is one thing to assess those being trained, but it is equally important that we understand the experiences of civilian populations that live with the MAO Groups who provide security in their areas of operation. By using our researchers to hold periodic discussions with a panel of representatives from border communities, we will better understand the civilian experience of the MAO Groups and whether our training on civilian relations is actually addressing the needs of citizens.

This is essentially about whether MAO Groups are both winning the battle for citizen support and coordinating with local institutions to facilitate delivery of local services and good governance. This component therefore presents the opportunity to take a step back and review how B-FOR fits within a portfolio of HMG interventions and to identify, using these civilian testimonies, where coordination with other programmes may bring strategic gain.

#### **COMPONENT FIVE: SUPPORT AND ENCOURAGE INTEGRATION OF MAOs**

The drive for greater integration and coordination between MAO groups will be threaded through all our programmatic activities. This will begin in the Amman office with the Team Leader and Military Researcher identifying the groups most likely to benefit from better coordination/integration efforts and influencing their selection for training at the training facility. In this way we will try to have the best and most advantageous mix of units and personnel at the facility during each four-week cycle.

Our integration strategy is then based on a number of key facets:





- Training command elements from different MAOs together in the planning and conduct of joint operations in order to identify the benefits and practicalities of operating in a coordinated manner
- Developing standard operating procedures for all MAOs attending the facility to enable smoother joint operations
- Examining options for common structures, rank systems, administrative processes
- Identifying and disseminating lessons identified across the southern areas of operation for the benefit of all
- Instilling a set of common ethical values to all trainees attending training, leading to a drive for a common, agreed Southern MAO code of conduct
- Procuring and transferring standardised equipment allowing more easy interoperability, equipment sharing and common sustainability methods
- Procuring, transferring and training MAOs in the use of interoperable communications equipment and information management systems
- Allowing for informal interaction between members of different MAOs through extra-curricular activities such as physical training and sport

- Identification, in collaboration with MAO commanders, of cross-MAO capability development and opportunities for resource pooling

In addition to greater practical cooperation and integration, and the enhanced military effectiveness which will result, our efforts in this regard will aim to cement the local commitment of the MAO groups to the project. By engaging early and continuously with MAO commanders to ascertain their requirements and allow them to influence the training and equipment given to their units, we will develop their confidence in the programme and be seen to be working on their behalf. We will encourage the MAO groups to consider the project's training facility(ies) as their own at strategic (Amman office) and operational/ tactical (training facility) levels throughout the programme, but particularly as we build towards a comprehensive framework, jointly developing, agreeing upon and adopting cross-group tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs), standards, structures and codes.

## OUR CONSORTIUM

Our project team will consist of staff from five companies: ASI, Pilgrims Group, KBR, Oakas and GlenGulf. The following table provides detail of the roles of each company:

Consortium Member	Areas of strength	Role on project
	Designing and delivering complex solutions within conflict environments; understanding of Syria; experience of working with HMG on Syria	Strategic stakeholder engagement, project management, project leadership positions, conflict research and analysis and monitoring and evaluation functions
	Training and capacity building of individuals and teams for whom combat engaged in combat. Pilgrims brings strong equipment procurement relationships with strategic partnerships with defence manufacturers, Thales and Harris.	Training delivery, initial military skills assessment, training programme design and jointly responsible (with KBR and ASI) for designing the equipment programme.
	Technology, engineering, procurement and construction services for government clients, including extensive experience with the military; strong ability to scale up with a global procurement system as well as provision of training to military units.	Responsible for manning the procurement and logistics functions. This will include a training facility Quartermaster, storemen and a liaison officer at the key port of entry for imported goods.
	Training in crisis planning and management on behalf of government departments, particularly in the defence and security sectors.	Bespoke training for MAO command elements ('battle staffs') on decision making and planning and on how to tackle legal and ethical challenges.
GlenGulf	Human intelligence (HUMINT) training and capacity building.	Provision of training to officers and commanders on human intelligence gathering and management.

Adam Smith International takes full responsibility for all aspects of the project and will ensure that all four partners deliver on their specific deliverables. It should be noted that, while we have organised the consortium to play to each members areas of strength, Pilgrims and KBR can provide procurement and training services. This dynamic has been created to allow Adam Smith International to adapt the share of services in response to failure.

## OUR TEAM

Project staff will be based in two locations in Jordan: Amman and the training facility. Additionally, our Syrian field staff will support monitoring and evaluation (M&E) of the project's outcomes and impact, and provide continuous operational liaison with the MAOs. Our team in Amman will provide strategic direction and project leadership as well as research and analysis of the situation on the ground in Syria and the ongoing impacts of the project. The objective of the Amman team is to translate the FCO's strategic intent into project activities and feed insights into the project.


It will consist of:

- > **ASI's Team Leader**, Chip Chapman, whose responsibility will be: to liaise with the FCO, Jordanian authorities and any other international stakeholders as required by the FCO, to understand requirements and ensure the design and operations are aligned to the FCO's strategic goals but nuanced enough to take account of external challenges and



opportunities (including collaboration with other projects). Chip will also be responsible for managing the strategic, programmatic and operational risks of the project.

- > **ASI's Military Research Analyst**, Ines Zeineddine, who will, through a network of field officers, monitor and analyse the military situation in the southern AORs in order to help the team understand the context within which training and equipment might be provided so that our efforts can have maximum impact on the conflict dynamics.
- > **ASI's Finance and Administration team**: Adam Smith International's Amman-based operations team will provide corporate finance and administration support to the team so that project finances can be channelled through our local accounts and accounted for according to local legal frameworks.
- > **ASI's Monitoring and Evaluation Officer**, Sasha Kishinchand, who will establish, maintain and revise the project's logical framework (and theory of change) on an ongoing basis, and who will collate data on results so that the FCO can report on its progress to partners inside and outside HMG.
- > **ASI's Training Evaluation Officer**: Charles Dunn, will shuttle between the training camp and Amman to review the training programme in practice and ensure quality of output is maintained and monitor the impact of training in order to inform programme design.



The Amman team will be collectively responsible for providing the programme with:

- Context: strategic developments, conflict dynamics, civil-military relations
- Analysis of Southern MAOs' activities, capabilities, vulnerabilities, requirements
- Objective assessment of stakeholders' expectations, perceptions, current and future requirements
- Analysis of the use, and effectiveness of, training and equipment imparted to MAOs
- Technical inputs on the inclusion of civilian governance and stabilisation in training and equipping activities


Our team at the training facility will be responsible for managing the day-to-day delivery of training and equipment procurement and managing interactions with the trainees so that the training and equipment planning is informed by the direct experience of working with cohorts.

Our team will consist of:

- > **ASI's Training Facility Director**, Jon Knight, who will develop strong relationships with the command elements of each cohort attending the facility, working closely with them to customise the training so that commanders feel their

priorities have been reflected in the training provided while the importance of particular elements of training driven through the project are accepted by commanders. The Training Facility Director will also be responsible for managing the disbursement of equipment and ensuring linkages between disbursement and training.

- > **Training Team Leader**, Andrew Canning, will be responsible for coordinating trainers, managing delivery and ensuring design of training materials and programmes meet the requirements of the direct beneficiaries.
- > **KBR's Quartermaster/Equipment Manager**, Ian Lord, will be responsible for all accounts, stores and associated equipment are maintained and controlled in accordance with the requirements of the training programme and the contractual remits in Theatre. He will be the focal point for formulation and implementation of all Logistic policies within the Camp and be responsible for reviewing and keeping these current



## HOW WE RESPOND TO THE KEY PRINCIPLES

We have tried to demonstrate throughout the above description of our approach and methodology how we respond to the nine key principles that sit at the heart of the statement of requirements. The following summary adds to this by highlighting how we have sought to strike a balance between the principles, many of which conflict with each other, in order to give HMG, the most strategic gains from its investment in the SMAO. We recognise that this balance is a starting position and that all compromises need to be negotiated with the client and the stakeholders at almost every stage of the project.

**Flexibility vs Coherence and Strategic Direction** – Components 2 and 4 are all about being flexible and adapting training and equipment in response to the particular needs of the cohorts, the between HMG, GID and the MAO groups, and the lessons we learn from the training centre and from the field. However, we have also committed to working gradually towards a comprehensive training and equipment framework, building capacity in country for provision of training and equipment and to working towards more integration of MAO groups. Achieving these three goals will involve some gradual reduction on flexibility in order to bring **coherence** and **strategic direction** to the programme.

**Relevance vs Values** – We have sought to build into our team a research and analysis capability to ensure that training and equipment is relevant to the structures of the MAO groups in the South and takes account of developments on the ground to ensure we can add the most value. Similarly, we have sought to ground truth the benefits of the training and equipment provided through gathering data from the field. However, we have also pointed to the need to integrate some

types of training on conduct principles of engagement and civ-mil relations that are more strategic in nature and respond to the need to introduce some consistent standards of operation across MAO groups. This is necessary to ensure **values** sit at the heart of HMG engagement with MAO groups.

**Quality and Risk vs Sustainability and VfM** – We have briefly described our approach to training as being iterative and to the introduction of assessment criteria to understand the extent to which instruction is understood. Thus we have aimed to work gradually towards a standard for training that will allow us to quality control our work and manage risk. However, we also introduced the concept of developing training centres within Syria. If that initiative is accepted by HMG and GID then we would proceed with the understanding that it would potentially involve some reduction in the quality control and risk management. This is balanced by the gains in sustainability and value-for-money that it would create.

# Operating environment

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In order to mitigate threats and risks to delivery, we have drawn up an extensive risk management plan, the details of which are outlined below. ASI has learnt a number of important lessons about risks and risk management related to management of projects in Syria and Jordan from the implementation of the SRM, AJACS, Tamkeen and Governance Through Education. Below we list the risks and challenges we are likely to encounter and how our procedures will mitigate them.

## Oversight and management of threats and risks

The programme team will monitor and manage risks using a risk matrix that will be regularly updated as new risks emerge. The matrix will specify the risk, risk type, risk probability, risk impact, the composite risk index, the response and the risk owner. It will determine whether to treat, tolerate, terminate, transfer or escalate the risk faced.

- › Treat – to mitigate a risk to reduce either its probability of occurring or its impact.
- › Tolerate – to accept a risk as is because we don't have the means or levers to treat it or because it is not cost-effective to do so.
- › Terminate – where a risk is too high it may be appropriate to stop the activity to terminate the risk. This should only happen if it is not possible to transfer that risk to a party that does have the means to treat it.
- › Transfer – allocating a risk to another organisation or management level for them to own and manage because we don't have the levers, means or resources to treat it but another party does.
- › Escalate – this is not transferring a risk but rather having to seek a decision from another management level to get approval to treat, tolerate or terminate a risk.

In addition, we will maintain a log of issues and decisions, dealing with problems the project faces, including: the issue, the action, the owner, and the date opened/closed. Finally, to build upon risk management experience in this unique context, we will maintain a lessons learnt sheet to ensure the programme adapts to changes.

We divide the risks and threats facing the programme into contextual risks, programmatic risks, legal/reputational risks, and security risks. An indicative risk matrix below displays a sample of the most significant risks to the programme.

### Contextual risks

Extremist actors interfere in programme due to perceptions of an 'international political agenda'. The objective of training and equipping a border force in southern Syria forms part of a broad, multinational effort to support the moderate civilian and armed opposition. The programme could as such attract the attention of extremist groups such as Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIS affiliates Harakat al-Muthana or Shuhada al-Yarmouk, who may seek to prevent trainees from joining or inhibit them from fulfilling their functions once trained via kidnap, assault and theft of equipment. Our *response* would be to *transfer* the risk to the donor and to *treat* it through research and monitoring in Syria as well as through equipment risk registers and contingency plans. Keeping abreast of armed actor trends and movements will be a key function of our in-country Syrian field staff and our already existing extensive networks. If red lines are crossed or risk limits reached the risk must be *terminated*. *Probability/Impact: High/Medium*.

Poor Southern Front coordination and internal competition inhibits selection and training of border force. The Southern Front includes approximately 50 individual moderate factions, which each draw varying levels of support from the MOC. The absence of an internal Syrian command structure means that cooperation is often dictated by a balance of external orders from the MOC and local calculations. This dynamic could spill over into the selection and training of the border force and reduce the effectiveness of the programme. Our *response* would be to *transfer* this risk to the donor, which is responsible for trainee selection and coordination with the MOC, and to *treat* the risk through research, monitoring and oversight of the MAOs during and subsequent to training, including via our in-country staff networks. *Probability/Impact: Medium/Medium*.

The operating space for the moderate opposition shrinks due to regime or ISIS advances. Since the launch of the cessation of hostilities in February 2016 clashes between the Southern Front and regime forces have been limited in both frequency and scale. However, as of May 2016, hostilities have broken out at a strategically important region in north-western Daraa known as the Triangle of Death. Prior to the cessation of hostilities (CoH), in January 2015, the regime advanced to capture the town in Sheikh Miskin. With the relative success of the CoH, the Southern Front have also been focused on expelling

Shuhada al-Yarmouk and Harakat al-Muthana from the region. Fighting has been concentrated in Daraa's southeast. Significant regime or ISIS advances into moderate opposition territory would reduce the space for operation of the border force.

Our *response* would be to *transfer* this risk to the donor and to *treat* it through research, monitoring and oversight of MAOs as well as through equipment risk registers and contingency plans. The programme and donor must *tolerate* the loss of equipment to a reasonable degree. If red lines are crossed or risk limits reached the risk must be *terminated*. *Probability/Impact: High/Medium.*

### **Programmatic risks**

Closed borders and disrupted access routes limit movement within and out of Syria. Changes in the security environment in southern Syria, particularly near the border, will limit the ability of the border force to travel to/from and across the border. This would cause a delay to implementation. Our *response* would be to *treat* the risk by researching and monitoring the security situation; by communicating with trainees whilst in Syria; and by maintaining contact with the Jordanian government to know when the border might be open again. *Probability/Impact: Medium/Medium.*

Sub-contractors hired to deliver training and equipment fail in their duties. One of the firms hired to deliver training and equipment may, for reasons ranging from mismanagement to inadequate quality assurance, fail to deliver. In such circumstances our response would be to treat the risk. ASI assumes responsibility for its sub-contractors and incorporates contingency for the non-delivery of good and services into its contracts. Our project management systems are structured to guarantee quality, with a team leader and two project managers in Jordan overseeing day-to-day functions and a project director responsible for strategic content and direction. We maintain regular contact with all sub-contractors throughout a programme. We will also maintain a network of service providers to step in should a sub-contractor fail. For example, Pilgrim and KBR are providers of similar services and will be available to backfill for each other. *Probability/Impact: Low/Low.*

Key or non-key staff become temporarily or permanently unavailable. Staff may become temporarily unavailable for security or personal reasons or may leave the project. Our *response* would be to *treat* the risk. All critical roles would be backstopped by other advisors, e.g. the team leader backstopped by other senior management, a trainer backstopped by other trainers and so on. We will also maintain a roster of consultants that are available to deploy to Jordan at short notice and will make sure our sub-contractors do the same. *Probability/Impact: Medium/Low.*

The training site becomes temporarily unavailable due to lock-down. For reasons of Jordanian national security, trainee and equipment security and other forms of interference, some or all of the training site may become temporarily unavailable. This would inhibit or temporally suspend the programme's implementation. Our response would be to tolerate and treat the risk. Our security apparatus will be responsible for the duty of care for all staff and would work with training site security in this regard. We will monitor training site security and escalate any threats to the donor. Should the site be unavailable for an extended period we would seek to acquire alternative land and facilities in collaboration with the Jordanian government and FCO. *Probability/Impact: Low/Low*

The Jordanian government withdraws support for the programme. The Jordanian government could withdraw support for a variety of reasons: Perceived support to groups sees as undesirable (for example Rabita Ahl al-Houran linked to the Muslim Brotherhood); a perceived threat posed to Jordanian national security by the recruits; or a shift in relationship with the Southern Front. The effect on the programme would be substantial, including Syrian/Jordanian border closure, bans on the transport of equipment and people, and closure of the training site.

Our *response* would be to *transfer* this risk to the donor, which is responsible for diplomatic relations with the Jordanian government. We will also *treat* the risk by building upon existing dialogue with the Jordanian government to ensure it understands the programme and submitting names of the staff and sub-contractors in advance. *Probability/Impact: Medium/High.*

Border force equipment and personnel are subsumed into Southern Front operations. Once inside Syria the border force may choose, or be pressured, to join wider Southern Front operations against regime forces or ISIS affiliates. This could lead to a weakening of the border capability and a perception of UK support to active military operations. Our *response* would be to *transfer* this risk to the donor and to *treat* it through research and monitoring of the border force in Syria as well as through equipment risk registers and contingency plans. Our in-country Syrian staff will closely watch armed group dynamics and high-risk equipment. The programme and donor must *tolerate* the loss of equipment to a reasonable degree. *Probability/Impact: Medium/Medium.*

### **Legal/reputational risks**

Border force collaborates with extremist actors or commits human rights abuses. Associations between the border force and extremist associations or acts by the border force that contravene human rights law and standards risk the legal and

reputational viability of the programme. Our *response* would be to *treat* this risk by training the border force in human rights and communicating donor red lines to it. Values training will also be delivered in Syria via a 'train the trainer' scheme. We will also *treat* the risk with research and monitoring of the border force in Syria as well as regular reporting. We will *escalate* the risk to the donor where problems are uncovered. *Probability/Impact: Medium/Medium.*

Media coverage risks the programme's integrity and the safety of staff and trainees. Negative media coverage of the programme's aims or Syrian opposition partners could reduce the political viability of the programme and endanger programme staff, particularly in Syria. Our *response* would be to *treat* this risk by research and monitoring of the border force, making use of our in-country field staff, as well as regular reporting and to *escalate* the risk to the donor where problems are uncovered. *Probability/Impact: Medium/Medium.*

## Security risks

Field staff in Syria are put in danger by the security environment. The physical threat to field staff in Syria is substantial and can come from a variety of sources: Kinetic threats, arrests, or other forms of interference. Loss of or injury to field staff will inhibit the programme's ability to research and monitor the border force. Our *response* would be to *treat* this risk by training all staff to minimise their profile, putting personal protection plans in place, and monitoring the security situation. Significant changes in security risk will be *escalated* to the donor. *Probability/Impact: High/Medium.*

Risk	Risk Type	Probability (1 – low)	Impact (1 – low)	Composite Risk Index	Response	Risk Owner
Extremist actors interfere in programme due to perceptions of an 'international political agenda'	Context	3	2	6	TREAT through research and monitoring, equipment risk registers and contingency plans. TRANSFER to donor when risk becomes unmanageable.	Team Leader/FCO
Poor Southern Front coordination and internal competition inhibits selection and training of border force.	Context	2	2	4	TREAT through research, monitoring and oversight of the MAOs including via in-country staff networks. TRANSFER to FCO as entity responsible for trainee selection and coordination with the MOC.	Team Leader/FCO
Closed borders and disrupted access routes limit movement within and out of Syria.	Programme	2	1	2	TREAT by researching and monitoring the security situation; by communicating with trainees whilst in Syria; and by maintaining contact with the Jordanian government.	Team Leader/ASI Management
Sub-contractors hired to deliver training and equipment fail in their duties. Probability/Impact: Low/Low.	Programme	1	1	1	TREAT via assumption of responsibility; via project management systems structured to guarantee quality, with two project managers and a project director; via regular contact with all sub-contractors and a network of alternative service suppliers, including Pilgrim and KBR.	Team Leader/ASI Management
Key or non-key staff become temporarily or permanently unavailable.	Programme	2	1	2	TREAT via having all critical roles backstopped by other advisors and by maintaining a roster of consultants that are available to deploy to Jordan at short notice.	Team Leader/ASI Management

Risk	Risk Type	Probability (1 – low)	Impact (1 – low)	Composite Risk Index	Response	Risk Owner
The Jordanian government withdraws support for the programme.	Programme	2	3	6	TREAT by building upon existing dialogue with the Jordanian government and submitting names of the staff and sub-contractors in advance. TRANSFER to the donor responsible for diplomatic relations with the Jordanian government.	ASI Management/FCO
Border force equipment and personnel are subsumed into Southern Front operations.	Programme	2	2	4	TREAT through research and monitoring of the border force and through equipment risk registers and contingency plans. TRANSFER to the donor. The programme and donor must TOLERATE the loss of equipment to a reasonable degree.	Team Leader/FCO
Border force collaborates with extremist actors or commits human rights abuses.	Legal and Reputation	2	2	4	Treat by training the border force in human rights and communicating donor red lines to it and by research and monitoring of the. ESCALATE to the donor where problems are uncovered.	Team Leader
Field staff in Syria are put in danger by the security environment.	Security	3	2	6	TREAT by training all staff to minimise their profile, putting personal protection plans in place, and monitoring the security situation. ESCALATE significant changes in security risk profile to the donor.	ASI Management

## Live-firing safety standards

A key area in which we will be applying strict operating standards is in the conduct of live-firing range activities. These are likely to include marksmanship training from static positions, LFTT (live-firing tactical training) and training with explosives. This is the greatest area of safety risk to our staff and to the trainees. To mitigate the risks associated with live-firing training, and to ensure that they are *As Low as Reasonably Possible (ALARP)*, the project will adopt all relevant UK military standards with respect to:

- range infrastructure and safety inspections
- range supervisory staff qualifications and currency
- trainee competency testing prior to conducting live firing
- planning, documentation, briefing and conduct of all live-firing exercises
- appropriate medical cover and emergency preparations
- accident/incident reporting and investigations

These activities will be based on two key UK military regulations documents;

- JSP 403 Volume 1 *Handbook of Defence Ranges Safety*
- Infantry Training Volume IV Pamphlet 21, *Regulations for Training with Armoured Fighting Vehicles, Infantry Weapon Systems and Pyrotechnics* ('PAM 21')

Alignment to these standards will mean that the project will conform to the UK military's **Infantry Training Safe System**.

### Range safety inspections

Inspections of the range(s) at the training facility in Jordan will be made, as far as possible, in accordance with Chapter 7 of JSP403 (daily check, monthly inspection and annual inspection). In addition, on mobilisation, a qualified range inspector, formerly of the British Army's Small Arms School Corps (SASC) will conduct an initial inspection, in line with the annual inspection standards. Our initial, monthly and annual inspections will ensure the adequacy of:

- range documentation

- range administration
- range control
- range structure and maintenance

Daily Check. When a range is in use a daily check will be carried out by the Range Officer before firing takes place to ensure that the range is being presented in good order for user units and is in all respects fit for use.

Monthly Inspection. A monthly inspection of the range will be arranged by the Training Facility Director, to ensure that the range staff are maintaining the range to an acceptable standard of cleanliness and good order and that any maintenance work required is identified promptly and is followed up until completed. We will use an equivalent to MoD Form 907 (the approved format for monthly inspections) which includes an audit checklist.

Annual Inspection. An initial and subsequent annual inspections will be carried out using MoD Form 907A, by our SASC inspector. This inspection will determine if facility is maintaining the range to an acceptable standard and that any restrictions or limitations stipulated are being followed. The annual inspection will also review the following:

- byelaws, if applicable, and their relation to physical warning signs on the land
- range maps and weapon danger area templates for weapon systems authorised for use on the range by the MoD Form 904
- check that danger areas shown in current on maps or charts are correct when compared with the current templates for weapons authorised for use on the range
- public use and / or access to check protective measures remain adequate

The consortium will maintain a copy of the initial and annual written reports from these inspections.

### Staff qualifications and currency

All staff supervising or conducting live firing training on the facility's ranges will have been qualified, or have been current, by the UK or a Commonwealth military force for the duties required of them within the previous five years. The recognised qualifications are as follows:

Category	Responsibilities/privileges	Category	Responsibilities/privileges
SA (A) (90)	Plan, conduct and supervise all live or blank firing with Infantry weapon systems including.	SA (C) (90)	Conduct and supervise TLFTT and LFTT exercises on Field Firing Ranges including Individual Battle Shooting Range (IBSR).
SA (B) (90)	Plan, conduct and supervise LFMT and TLFTT on NDA, LDA and FDA purpose built ranges.	SA (E) (90)	Act as a Safety Supervisor during TLFTT and LFTT exercises on Field Firing Ranges using Infantry weapon systems

Our former SASC consultant will revise and test all staff in the above qualifications during his initial training facility visit. Staff will be tested and revised on each subsequent annual inspection visit.

### Trainee competency

All trainees will be tested for safe weapon handling by their instructors before any live firing takes place. Further, progressive training and assessments will be carried out to ensure that each trainee is competent and safe to carry out the exercise required of them.

### Range planning and conduct

In accordance with PAM 21, project staff given firing range conduct duties will be required to produce written range action safety plans (RASP). RASPs will be produced specific to each activity for all static and moving (LFTT) training. RASPs will be written to:

- Show that the range conducting officer (RCO) has followed an acknowledged planning process, covering all aspects of safe training and as such it provides a clear audit trail
- Give an outline of the RCO's personal responsibilities on the range, before, during and after firing
- Detail the responsibilities of Safety Supervisors and other range staff
- Describe the rehearsal procedures if required
- Detail the points/subjects that are to be covered during safety briefings to all range staff and participating troops

### Medical and emergency cover



The level of medical cover to be provided is to be determined following a medical risk assessment conducted by our planning officer or range conducting officer before every exercise. The result of the medical risk assessment will be recorded in the range action safety plan, a written instruction covering range safety conduct and emergency contingency plans. On the basis of the results of the medical risk assessment, an appropriate level of medical cover will be provided for each activity. Advice from medical staff will be sought. The requirement for each of the following will be assessed, depending on the activity being undertaken, number of people involved, weather conditions, etc., including the Need for medical personnel; Numbers of medical personnel required; Level of medical qualification (CMT 1, MO, etc.) Equipment available to medical personnel; Vehicles to be made available or required to be tasked for casualty transfer, i.e. 4x4, military ambulance, civilian ambulance or helicopter; Communications to emergency services, e.g. locations of landline telephones, use of radios, mobile phones, etc.

Suitable hospitals will be identified and plans developed for the medical evacuation of personnel to them in the event of a serious injury. For project staff, medical insurance details will be registered ahead of time at the hospital(s) to ensure a seamless admission process. We will engage with FCO/Jordanian authorities to develop similar arrangements for Syrian MAO members.

### **Accident/incident reporting and investigations**

The project will deal with accidents and incidents in line with the relevant RASP and PAM 21. We will maintain our range safety consultant on-call to investigate incidents as necessary. Where negligence or criminality is suspected we will report the incident to the relevant Jordanian and UK authorities.

### **Road safety**

Road hazards and the likelihood of traffic collisions are likely to pose an operational risk to our project staff. We will mitigate this risk through application of a programme-wide road safety plan. We will engage an ex-military 'Master Driver', familiar with project road-risk mitigation in similar environments, to develop this plan, assess in-place risks and resources and brief staff. The key constituents of this plan will be: Use of roadworthy vehicles adhering to minimum safety standards; Education of project staff in safe driving techniques, local hazards, etc.; Defensive driver training for project staff; Clear plans and instructions to staff in the event of an incident or accident.

### **Security operating procedures**

Prior to the commencement of the contract, Pilgrims will compile the SOPs and Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) for the project and each site (training and accommodation). This follows Pilgrims' processes which have been produced and actioned successfully in our numerous security-related contracts in the region.

In order to determine the SOPs, the Training Team Manager will conduct a thorough site survey and risk assessment. The details compiled in these documents enable us to devise new, or update the existing, procedures within the SOPs. As an active partner, we will look to fully integrate into the fabric of the FCO and the Jordanian Partner. With the objective of constantly analysing and mitigating risk, Pilgrims' site survey and risk assessments are designed to achieve precisely this. Any gaps and/or risks identified will be discussed and rectification plans agreed to mitigate risks.

EOPs provide guidance on the handling of emergencies which may occur in country and specifically at the training and accommodation sites. The principal aims are the preservation of life and to aid the timely and expedient return to normal operating conditions through effective co-operation with site management and local emergency teams where their attendance is necessary.

The EOPs are not standalone. Training and project personnel will use the aide memoire in conjunction with the remainder of their SOPs and in tandem with existing FCO security management policy and procedural documents. Responsibility for the maintenance of the SOPs lies with Pilgrims Training Team Manager in conjunction with the Project Team Leader, although the onus of responsibility for the fulfilment of duties lies with all project personnel.

Pilgrims' training staff will be familiar with the SOPs and incident management plan. Our instructors will ensure that as part of the induction process, all students and support staff, plus any visitors, are fully briefed on the actions to be taken in the event of an incident or similar emergency. If an incident should occur during working/training hours, the project training control centre will assume responsibility for the initial management of the incident and liaise directly with the training staff regarding procedures to be followed. Outside training hours/major activity, a duty officer will be appointed.

Training and the exercising of site plans (training and accommodation) will take place on a regular basis in agreement with, and preferably including where appropriate, FCO and Jordanian partner personnel. These will be either table-top, walkthrough workshops or live-play dependent on the type of incident. In some incidents, it may not be appropriate to live-play due to the sensitivity of the site or location. All these sessions will be recorded on the individual's training record with full debriefs taking place with Project managers and trainers.

### **In-country administration**

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# Resources

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Adam Smith International's Afghanistan, Middle East and North Africa (AfMENA) team has invested heavily in the development of operational platforms, which can be scaled up quickly at short notice to accommodate new projects. The team has developed a reliable and responsive approach to operations, logistics and administrative management, which combines corporate policies, set at the central level, with standard operating procedures that are tailored to each country in the region. ASI's ability to implement effectively in countries across the Middle East is – in large part – down to this level of corporate investment in operational platforms and the staff needed to run them effectively.

In Jordan, where Adam Smith International has been legally registered to operate since April 2014, the company employs a full time ex-patriate Operations Manager, who oversees a team of 12 locally hired administrative and financial support staff. Our operations team are all on long-term employment contracts in order to maintain operational continuity over the lifetime of our projects. The primary function of the operations team is to provide the necessary administrative and logistics support to enable our programme teams in Jordan (36 international and Jordanian staff on five active projects operating from three offices in Amman) to deliver technical work of the highest possible quality.

The following section summarises the in-country administrative capabilities deployable by Adam Smith International/Pilgrims/KBR operations team for this project:

**Security services:** The ASI Operations Manager in Amman and Regional Security Manager provide regular security risk reports alerts and updates to all project teams based in Amman. These reports are supplemented by the company's corporate subscription to the Drum Cussac regular security and political risk reporting service. The combination of these two services ensures that all ASI consultants receive up to date information and analysis of security incidents that affect the operating environment in Jordan and Syria.

**Security briefings:** Within 24h arrival in Jordan all associates and staff receive an in depth security briefing either by the Operations Manager or Regional Operations Manager. This briefing covers past and future security concerns, where to go and what to do during an emergency, and registration instructions for the person's local embassy. In addition, all staff fill out emergency contact and medical information forms and receive a local mobile phone with adequate credit and office contact list. As such, the Country Operations and Security Manager can easily contact staff in the case of an emergency. Additionally, all staff are provided with an "in-case of emergency" (ICE) wallet sized card listing important local phone numbers plus the Adam Smith International 24/7 emergency hotline in London.

**Vetting:** The Jordanian General Intelligence Directorate (GID) exercises a high level of control over the vetting of beneficiaries inside Syria and those crossing the border. Our government liaison officer and onboarding manager support this process – providing all the personal information GID requires to vet project staff and beneficiaries.

**Information Security:** The operations team supports the implementation of a 'clear desk' policy in all Amman offices, meaning that any sensitive documents or papers are disposed of or stored away safely overnight. This is to prevent the spread of sensitive information if the offices were to be broken into. All sensitive project information is kept on encrypted hard drives or stored in secure, industrial level safes.

All Field staff have received training in IT security, to ensure that they follow the highest standards of IT security possible. Each member of staff based in Syria has been allocated an anonymous email address, so that the authorities are unable to track the user if the account is 'hacked'. Software has been installed on all devices that the Field Officers use to conduct their work (such as smart phones and laptops) to wipe all information should the devices go missing. The latest anti-virus software is installed on all devices.

**Local Procurement:** The ASI Jordan Office has a logistics/procurement officer who manages and administers all purchases for the Amman based projects. Additionally, the logistics/procurement officer is responsible for exporting and coordinating the delivery of items into Syria, and is directly responsible for asset management and monthly reporting on the status of assets that belong to the project. In Jordan the logistics/procurement officer also manages all relationships with the relevant Jordanian authorities to ensure that the necessary equipment details are sent to the Jordanian authorities at the border, and the equipment is delivered into Syria as efficiently as possible.

**Banking/accounting:** The ASI Finance Manager maintains and manages several Jordanian Bank Accounts: a corporate/operations account and a grants account for each of the five active projects based in Amman. Having separate

bank accounts enables each project to account more accurately for its expenditure at the end of each month, and facilitates the regular country audit process undertaken by the finance team from the Adam Smith International Head Office in London.

**Office Management:** The country operations team provides office management services for each of the three active offices in Amman. This includes providing all of the equipment and stationery needed by project teams, and managing all the services required to run an office including internet, water and electricity. The Finance Manager administers all office and corporate tax payments for ASI in Jordan.

**Residence and work permit support:** The Amman-based Government Liaison Officer facilitates all residence and work permit applications for international staff. The Government Liaison Officer maintains effective working relationships with the Ministry of Labour, and has successfully facilitated five work permits in Jordan since 2014 for international staff.

**Accommodation:** The ASI Jordan Facilities Manager directs a team of support staff to maintain and service nine apartments in Amman – including two apartments for short term visitors. The facilities team have established and developed effective working relationships with real estate agencies in Amman and have identified further apartments that could be rented and furnished at short notice to support more long term international consultants arriving in Amman.

**Transport:** Adam Smith International works in partnership with the UK-based travel agent Flight Centre to arrange flexible travel to and from Jordan for international team members at the cheapest possible price. Flight Centre bookings link automatically with the country operations team to ensure that all movements in and out of Jordan are tracked accurately. Airport transfers for international staff are arranged based on this tracking schedule – ASI drivers meet all long and short term international staff members at the airports and transport them to their accommodation. There is also a shuttle service to and from the ASI apartments to each of the project offices at the beginning and end of the working day.

**Arranging meetings and training workshops:** The Facilities Manager, Operations Officer, Administrative Assistant and Government Liaison Officer are all involved in arranging meetings and training workshops for Amman based programme teams and beneficiaries coming from Syria. This involves booking all hotel and meeting rooms for workshop and arranging transport for participants travelling from Syria. The Jordanian authorities, principally the General Intelligence Directorate (GID), exercise a high level of oversight

**On boarding of field staff:** The operations team's on-boarding manager is responsible for working with all new field staff to prepare a Personal Protection Plan (PPP), which is tailored to their individual needs. In this process the risks associated in working in their locations are outlined, and point-by-point plans made for how to mitigate these risks. Each field staff member is also provided with \$2,000 of emergency money, to be used to facilitate the emergency evacuation or movement within the country should their community come under attack.

**Emergency Medical Care:** Each Adam Smith International office and apartment has a complete first aid kit. Additionally, at least one staff member in each office is certified in basic first aid (first person on scene). Upon arrival in the country, all associates and staff receive a list containing directions and contact details of all local medical centres and hospitals used during an emergency.

**Personnel Files:** Each office maintains a “working” file on each individual staff member and associate working or visiting each country. On arrival, during the country security briefing, each person fills out an emergency contact and medical form. Additionally this file contains “proof of life” questions/answers, passport and visa copies as well as (for long term associates and staff) location of their residence. These files are kept in a locked, secure cabinet that only the Operations Manager/Regional Operations Manager have access to.

**Crisis preparedness:** An Emergency Response Plan (ERP) is in place for all field staff, which provides detailed instructions as to how to respond to any emergency situations that may arise. The ERPs include responses for the evacuation/relocation/hibernation, kidnaping or arrest, loss of contact, medical emergencies and death of a Field Officer. In line with standard ASI procedure, in the event of any emergency situation an Emergency Response Team (ERT) in Amman is established to manage the situation. The ERT reports to the Adam Smith International Crisis Management Team (CMT) in London. Using the ERPs as a guide, the teams will manage the response to the incident until resolution.

Upon the notification of preferred bidder status, the Country Operations Manager in Jordan will begin preparation for receiving the start-up team and contract additional required local administrative and operations staff. They will also begin identifying suitable additional accommodation, office space and vehicles for use by the B-FOR team in Jordan.

#### Managing subcontractors, due-diligence, and the supply chain on B-FOR

The procurement supply chain for a successful B-FOR train/equip effort in support of southern MAO groups is made up of critical interdependencies and complexities between suppliers, logistics providers, warehouse managers and

transport/logistics providers within Syria. A breakdown in any part of the supply chain connecting these entities could potentially have severe consequences for the project.

The diagram below outlines the five key components in the B-FOR supply chain, and five key imperatives for the project management team which underpin each phase of the supply chain:



## 1. Supplier Interface Management

The B-FOR consortium team would seek to interface effectively with different suppliers to ensure that the project can benchmark costs by gathering and evaluating multiple quotations from suppliers in a timely fashion. Maintaining effective working relationships with suppliers relies on efficient communication so that the requirements of the B-FOR team are always clear.

The team would ensure that any supply chain partner, as well as any further sub-contracted suppliers or logistics service providers, employ practices to ensure the security of all shipments. Any partner used in the manufacturing, packaging, or transportation of shipments must also have documented processes for the selection of sub-contractors to ensure they can provide adequate supply-chain security.

Before interfacing with any supplier or procurement agent, Adam Smith International conducts effective due diligence on all potential suppliers and subcontractors via financial solvency and acuity checks, as well as reference checks from previous customers.

## 2. Inventory Management

In order to effectively manage the B-FOR inventory and equipment list, the team would regularly review and update these documents to ensure there is no duplication between items on the list and the quantity of equipment reflects the needs of MAO groups on the ground. This process also requires close cooperation and communication between the team and HMG representatives to ensure that the requisite political approvals and government licences have been sought and secured.

## 3. Inbound Logistics

The project would exercise close oversight and management of supplier contracts to ensure that all INCOTERM agreements – the definition of where the ownership of risk lies between the seller and buyer at each stage in the procurement process – are clearly defined and understood by all parties. As part of the due diligence process for international suppliers, the B-FOR team would also ensure that the suppliers have secured the relevant import agreements and licences for Jordan.

## 4. Storage and Warehousing

The length of time between equipment arriving in Jordan and being exported into Syria should be as short as possible. If equipment is sitting in a warehouse for months between arriving in Jordan and being delivered into Syria this suggests that the B-FOR procurement planning and supply chain management is not sufficiently lean or efficient and fails to align with the needs of the programme.

Where there is a need for equipment to be stored in a warehouse before being delivered to Syria, the Jordan Operations team would ensure that the warehouse company has sufficient insurance, security and storage processes in place, as well as appropriate geographical proximity to border entry and exit points.

## 5. Outbound Logistics

Full coordination between the project team and Jordanian transport and logistics companies to take equipment into Syria is essential to ensure that the B-FOR supply chain runs smoothly. Having a local logistics partner with proven experience and capability of transporting equipment from Jordan into Syria is of key importance.

Underpinning each stage of the supply chain are the following imperatives:

- › Supply Chain organisation
- › The overall performance of the supply chain would be measured by analysing the total combined supply chain costs: those of logistics, customs, ensuring quality of goods/equipment, wages for procurement staff, warehouse rental and coordination/control.
- › The total combined supply chain costs would be used to evaluate the merits of outsourcing to a different supply chain partner or sourcing B-FOR equipment from a different country.
- › Performance Management and Control
- › In its management of supply chain partners and subcontractors, pre-defined measures are in place to address gaps between target and actual performance (in terms of delivery times, quality of equipment etc). The B-FOR team would use pre-defined performance indicators and take pre-agreed actions to address a supply chain partner or subcontractor which is not meeting its agreed targets.
- › Supply Chain Risk Management
- › The B-FOR programme and operations team would proactively manage risk throughout the procurement and delivery of equipment to Jordan and into Syria. The teams would apply a methodology that ensured risk responsibility and decision-making authority between the project and its suppliers/subcontractors are clearly defined. Risk prevention processes would be in place across the entire supply chain and regularly reviewed.
- › This would involve risks being identified and assessed at least every six months, along with loss or damage reports and examples of delivery delays which go beyond the contracted agreed delivery schedule. These issues become the focus of risk management efforts, and the B-FOR team would undertake joint risk management and contingency plan development on a case-by-case basis with key suppliers and service providers.
- › The B-FOR team would ensure a system of risk management measures with partners and subcontractors, including: basic standards for physical security, access controls, personnel security, education and training, procedural security, information-technology (IT) security, business-partner security, and transit security from the point of origin to final destination within the supply chain.
- › Training Strategy Integration
- › The B-FOR project must ensure that the procurement and delivery of equipment is aligned with the training timetable agreed with HMG. Simply put, the project will be unable to deliver equipment that it has not trained beneficiaries to use: if the project has to warehouse equipment to wait for the training implementations to catch up this would indicate poor coordination between the train and equip components of the project and would limit the value for money offering from B-FOR to HMG.
- › Beneficiary Coordination/Consultation
- › The lessons from the implementation of existing Syria programmes confirms that the priorities procurement and delivery of equipment – both by quantity and type – must be based as much as possible on feedback provided by beneficiaries regarding their needs on the ground.

#### Quality Control

The B-FOR team will follow international best practice during the procurement of equipment for southern MAO groups. This will involve collecting quotes from at least three different suppliers for each item on the HMG-approved equipment menu. Thereafter, the team would hold a technical evaluation committee meeting and comparative analyses to ensure that the highest quality options are selected, taking into account the cost, and delivery timelines associated with each supplier.

To ensure the B-FOR team has full input into quality control, as part of the technical evaluation committee and comparative bid analysis meetings, the team would review samples from all suppliers before orders are made. For items that are not overly technical or high risk, the project would seek to use Jordanian suppliers where possible. This will enable the team to build effective and sustainable working relationships with local suppliers, visit manufacturing sites regularly to exercise greater quality control during the manufacturing process. Using a Jordan-based supplier for equipment would also minimise

the costs and potential delays associated with international procurement and delivery of equipment. Through its existing programmes, Adam Smith International has established a relationship with a Jordanian based manufacturer of equipment including uniforms, tactical vests, body armour, ballistic plates, helmets and boots.

#### Fraud/Corruption

The main fraud/corruption risk during B-FOR implementation relates to the misappropriation of equipment by MAO groups, or inflated numbers of fighters, leading to an imbalance between the quantity of equipment delivered and number of active MAO combatants. Based on the experience within the consortium of current and previous project implementation, the following measures would be used to minimise the risk of fraud and corruption:

- **Strong M&E/Research Field Team Capability:** An in-house team of M&E Field Officers and Researchers based in Dera'a would provide an independent feedback loop from the field to the B-FOR team in Amman. Used effectively, this will act as a disincentive for MAO groups to misappropriate equipment or inflate the numbers of combatants registered with the project.
- **Verification of receipt of equipment by MAO groups:** The B-FOR project would produce equipment handover templates for the MAO groups to sign. These would be kept on file and reviewed at regular meetings between the MAO groups and the project team.
- **Full equipment inventory** – The programme team would compile and maintain a full equipment inventory, detailing the quantity and value of equipment delivered by location. This inventory would become the key reference and tracking tool for the project, and would be reviewed through regular equipment audit meetings with MAO groups.

#### Financial Integrity/Control

To ensure financial integrity and control on the contracted budget between HMG and the implementing consortium, Adam Smith International would use an activity based budgeting system, whereby expenditure limits for individual activities are agreed, and the consortium is unable to start spending against an activity line or amend budget limits without the approval of HMG. The project team would also report on the rate of expenditure against forecasted spend on a monthly and quarterly basis. This reporting would present the rate of expenditure ('burn rate') against individual budget lines to flag areas where there will be under/overspend against the contracted limit for individual budget lines.

If the B-FOR project was to support MAO groups to procure some equipment inside Syria, Adam Smith International would leverage the processes developed on the Tamkeen and AJACS programmes to ensure that:

- i) Payments are made after service delivery verification; ii) clear procedures/regulations for procurement and payment in country are developed; iii) In the field photos/reports are used in lieu of receipts.

#### Experience of Key Staff and Deployment Modality

We present below abridged CVs for the key staff on our bid and profiles for those filling the remaining positions. We can provide full CVs for all pre-recruited staff and associates on request.

All individuals identified below have committed to being available for the stated inputs when required according to the current contracting and implementation schedule. We have indicated in the top right of each summary box the deployment duration and status for each member of the team.

Name	<b>Chip Chapman – Team Leader</b>	Deployment	Jordan, full-time, associate
Qualifications	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ 2011 - British Army Senior Officer Strategy Training</li> <li>➤ 2010 - British Army Combined/Joint Force Land Component Course</li> <li>➤ 2003 - Higher Command/Advanced Joint Command/Army Command Course</li> <li>➤ 1980 - University of Lancaster BA (Hons) History – 1<sup>st</sup> Class Honours</li> </ul>		
Country experience	Afghanistan, Iran, Syria, Jordan, Northern Ireland, Macedonia, UK		

As Team Leader, Chip Chapman will ensure an effective and holistic partnership between both ASI consultants and key military and civilian stakeholders, including: the FCO, Jordanian security services, Moderate Armed Opposition Senior Commanders, foreign government representatives and the Military Operations Command. Chip has in-depth knowledge of the context having worked on Syria during his time for CENTCOM.

Chip offers the Team Leader position over 30 years of advanced military operational experience and strategic direction. His positions of senior martial command - whether functioning as the lead strategist of a 47 nation initiative in the Middle-East as a Major General, leading counter-terrorism intelligence teams as a Brigadier, or working with the MoD and FCO as a Colonel - underlines his ability to simplify complex military initiatives with pragmatic operational strategies. Chip's military expertise and academic inquiry has seen him appear on Sky News as an authority on counter-terrorism and radicalisation, and receive the CB award (The Most Honourable Order of the Bath) by the British Sovereign for contributions of national importance to state security.

2013 – present	AfMENA, Independent Consultant
2010 - 2012	UK, British Army - Major General (US Central Command)
2001 - 2010	UK, British Army – Colonel, Brigadier (Head of Counter Terrorism and UK Operations, MOD)
1980-1999	UK, Instructor, Lieutenant Colonel, Brigadier, (The Parachute Regiment, NATO, MoD)

## Selected projects

### Independent Consultant

Since 2013, Chip has operated as an independent consultant across a variety of commercial and private sectors. Notably, Chip submitted an independent review of police structures in England and Wales in 2014, of which 38 out of 39 recommendations have since been implemented by the Home Secretary at a nation-wide level.

### Senior British Military Advisor, British Army (Major General)

From 2010-2012, Chip directed key risk mitigation strategies in partnership with the US Central Command throughout the Middle East – operating as the singular coalition representative for major international operations involving up to 47 transnational partners and stakeholders.

### Counter Terrorism Commands:

From 2007-2010, Chip was appointed the Head of Counter Terrorism and UK Operations (Brigadier) - providing strategic direction to the Jordanian crisis management centre and working in conjunction with the British intelligence services, police, civil authorities and FCO. In 2006, Chip operated as Chief of Staff (Brigadier) for British army missions to Northern Ireland where he planned 15,000 personnel missions operations in support of the local PSNI. During 2001-2003, Chip was appointed as Deputy Head of Counter Terrorism (Colonel) where he directed over 20,000 defence personnel on international MoD missions in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks.

### Military Operational Commands:

From 2003-2005, Chip was appointed Commander of 19 Light Brigade (Brigadier) - leading 4000 personnel NATO missions to the Balkans and Afghanistan. During 1999-2001, he was the Commanding Officer of The Parachute Regiment (Lieutenant Colonel) where he directed 550 military personnel and international partners - including French, Italian, and Dutch - on a variety of peace-building and conflict resolution operations within Macedonia.

### Early Career, British Army

In 1980 Chip graduated from Lancaster University (1<sup>st</sup> Class Hons.) and thereafter enlisted in the British Parachute Regiment until 2013. Chip's early career highlights include: appointment as a key instructor on LAND component operations and military strategy modules at the Joint Services Command and Staff College, appointment as Battalion Commander (550 personnel) and thereafter Brigade Commander (4000).

Name	<b>Jon Knight – Training Facility Director</b>	Deployment	Jordan, 0.75 FTE, associate
Qualifications	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>&gt; 2002: MPhil, International Diploma Defence Studies, Massey University, New Zealand</li> <li>&gt; 1999: Senior Military Staff College, New Zealand Defence Force</li> <li>&gt; 1987: Military Operational Service, Afghanistan, East Timor, Kuwait, Bosnia, Bougainville – PNG. UK, US, Canada, Australia, Korea, Malaysia, Brunei.</li> <li>&gt; International Training, SAS (UK), SASR (Australia) JTF2 Joint Task Force 2 (Canada), DELTA (US), SEAL Team 6 (US Navy), GSG9 (Germany) / KSK (Germany), Singapore SF</li> </ul>		
Country experience	Afghanistan, East Timor, Kuwait, Bosnia, Bougainville -PNG, UAE, New Zealand, Saudi Arabia,		



In the role of Training Facility Director Jon, a fluent Arabic speaker, provides more than 22 years of military experience analysing and operating within conflict dynamics – advising both local and national stakeholders on martial training strategies and procurement best practices.

As a former Commander of New Zealand’s SAS, Jon has previously worked in close partnership with Major General Martyn Dunne and Governor-General Sir Jerry Mateparae to deliver nation-wide training initiatives for the New Zealand Defence Force. Previously, Jon also operated as the strategic director of Armor Group - providing commercial training and risk advisory services across the AFMENA region. In particular, he was responsible for the design, financial operation, and implementation of 5,000 personnel MoD training missions in South Baghdad and the Mosul Dam Project.

Jon’s significant contributions to national military operations and advanced security advisory services to senior government officials – ranging from directing the UAE’s *Al Rasheed* Project, to operational command of the New Zealand SAS during the East Timor, Afghanistan and Iraq conflicts – has culminated in his award of the *Member of the New Zealand Order of Merit (MNZM)*.

2013 - Current	Singapore – Executive Director, ROCAM International Limited
2011 - 2012	UAE – Owner, ENVOY360 LLC
2009 - 2011	US, UAE, Iraq – Vice President, Triple Canopy Inc.
2005 - 2008	UK, AFMENA – Regional Director, Armor Group International
1987 - 2004	New Zealand – Commander (Lieutenant Colonel), New Zealand Defence Force (SAS)

### Selected projects

Since 2013, Jon has operated as the executive director of the ROCAM Group – providing bespoke key account risk consultancy services, training services, investigations, and technical security analytics to clients across Asia, Europe and the Middle East. During 2014-15 Jon provided risk advisory and training services to both the “Libyan transitional government in waiting” and Oil Search Limited (OSIL) personnel in Kurdistan, Northern Iraq.

#### Director/Owner, ENVOY360 LLC

From 2011-2012, Jon established and directed ENVOY360 - an international maritime risk management protection and security company specialising in consultancy, operational training and integrated offshore services with global industry leaders such as Anadarko, Shell, PB, Saudi Aramco, and the Kuwait National Oil Company.

#### Vice President, Triple Canopy Inc.

From 2009-2011, Jon was appointed as vice president of Commercial Strategic Initiatives where he worked in close partnership with the US Department of State and Department of Defence in Iraq, Kuwait and Afghanistan – providing integrated protective security solutions, risk mitigation strategies and crisis communication plans.

#### Regional Director - Middle East, Armor Group

From 2005-2008, Jon functioned as the regional director to the Middle-Eastern component of the Armor Group – a British military contractor providing protective security, risk management and operational training to businesses and personnel throughout the UK, UAE, KSA, Kuwait, Iraq, and Afghanistan regions.

#### Early Career, New Zealand Defence Force

Jon’s operational capabilities have been developed through 22 years of service within the New Zealand Defence Force, 16 of which were within the elite Special Air Service (SAS). Notably, Jon progressed to overall command of the SAS, leading various missions in the Iraq, Afghanistan and East Timor conflicts and thereafter also provided strategic advice to the New Zealand Department of Defence and Cabinet Office.

Name	<b>Andrew Canning – Training Project Manager</b>	Deployment	Jordan, full-time, associate
Country experience	Afghanistan, Norway, Mozambique, South Africa, Sierra Leone, Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal		

Andrew Canning, OBE, is a former senior Royal Marines Officer and FCO diplomat with extensive global operational, military training and consular experience. He offers the Training Team Lead position an advanced knowledge of contingency planning, crisis response strategies, conflict operations and military training expertise.

As an instructor of both Royal Marines, British Army Officers and foreign personnel, Andrew is routinely familiar with the delivery of training-orientated projects both within the UK and overseas as directed by the FCO and MoD.

Since 2010, Andrew has spent four years operating as a Regional Manager in Southern Afghanistan alongside New Century Consulting – a U.S private contractor delivering specialist capacity- building programmes to the Afghan Police and Army. In particular, Andrew was responsible for the delivery and deployment of 60 former law-enforcement and military specialists within the Kandahar Province and their interpreters – ensuring a holistic, collaborative and effective management strategy that remained cognisant of continual and significant security threats.

Previously, Andrew worked closely with DFID, the U.S and NATO on significant international capacity building missions ranging from - Commanding Officer of the Royal Marines Training Centre in Afghanistan, directing training delivery at the Royal Military Academy of Sandhurst, training 220 Royal Marine Reserves in the UK, to providing intensive military training courses to the Mozambique, South Africa, Sierra Leone, Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal defence forces.

In 2001, Andrew was awarded the OBE for contributions to the development of nations in sub-Saharan Africa.

Name	<b>Ines Zeineddine – Military Researcher</b>	Deployment	Jordan, full-time, associate
Qualifications	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ 2012 - Erasmus Mundus Human Rights Policy and Practice, MA, University of Gothenburg (Sweden), Roehampton University (UK) and University of Tromsø (Norway)</li> <li>➤ 2009 - Masters of Business Administration, American University of Beirut</li> <li>➤ 2001 - Public Administration, BA, American University of Beirut</li> </ul>		
Country experience	Lebanon, Syria, Turkey, Tunisia, Iraq, Egypt, Libya, Yemen		

Ines is an Arabic speaking researcher and strategic planning expert of 15 years' experience, with a background in transitional justice and human rights. She was a senior research consultant on ASI's Syria team from 2015 until March 2016, working on the AJACS programme, where she led on the practical application of research results to programme implementation strategy.

In her role on AJACS, she conducted quantitative and qualitative research and analysis on security and justice in Syria, generating recommendations for policing, community engagement and institutional frameworks and then operationalising them for implementation. She interacted directly with Syrian security and justice providers in a series of capacity building workshops in Gaziantep.

Ines is skilled in remote management, including building and directing teams of researchers on the ground in Syria. She has conducted political and contextual research on the Syrian conflict since January 2013.

Ines began her career in 2001 in educational management at the American University of Beirut. In 2009 she moved into consulting, providing research, data analysis, reporting and strategic planning for the American Bar Association and Minority Rights Group International on anti-corruption, legal assistance, mediation and minority legal rights in Lebanon and Iraq.

In 2013, Ines returned to the ABA as an Investigation Consultant, documenting violations of international law in Syria. She designed surveys and sampling methodologies, trained researchers conducting the work in Syria and oversaw the quality of reporting from the field. She presented on subjects such as perpetrator and weapon identification and gathering evidence of torture and sexual abuse.

Name	<b>Charles Dunn – Training Monitor</b>	Deployment	Jordan, 1.0 FTE, associate
Qualifications	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ 2010: MSc. Pure Mathematics, Imperial College London, England</li> <li>➤ 2009: BSc. Mathematics, University of Durham, England</li> </ul>		
Country experience	Syria, Iraq, Jordan, UK		

Charles Dunn is the proposed Training Monitor for the MAO initiative. As an Arabic speaker, Pure Mathematics Master's degree graduate and Royal Marine Middle-Eastern defence and cultural specialist to the UK Special Forces, Charles is able to combine an advanced analytical skill set with extensive operational experience to effectively assess the individual and collective training outputs of the MAO facility.

Recently, Charles' has served as a Royal Marines Company Second in Command - routinely operating within and leading specialist military teams within conflict environments. Throughout this, Charles quickly gained positions of responsibility by

utilising an advanced Arabic language skill set and deep cultural knowledge of the Middle-East to build effective relationships with both civilian and military stakeholders across the region.

In particular, Charles has worked in close partnership with the Syrian Moderate Opposition, Iraqi Army and MoD to progress anti-ISIS military strategies, develop UK foreign policies and implement advanced military training programmes. During this, he operated as a specialist advisor and translator for a range of international partners, including the UK Foreign Office and US Army. Notably, Charles received the US Army Commendation medal for outstanding advisory and training services to the Iraqi army.

From 2010-2013, Charles served as a Marine Troop Commander where he was responsible for both the overall command of multi-national crisis-response forces and the implementation and delivery of key operational security plans for UK nuclear facilities.

Name	<b>Sasha Kishinchand – M&amp;E Officer</b>	Deployment	Jordan, 1.0 FTE, associate
Qualifications	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>&gt; 2000: M.A., Strategic Studies &amp; International Economics, The Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies</li> <li>&gt; 1994: B.A. (magna cum laude) in International Relations, Tufts University</li> </ul>		
Country experience	Syria, Iraq, Jordan, UK		

Sasha Kishinchand is an Arabic speaking senior monitoring and evaluation specialist with over 15 years of experience working within the U.S, Middle-East and Africa. Fluent in Arabic, Sasha has operated across a broad range of military, peace-keeping and international outreach programmes. She offers experience delivering advanced M&E capabilities in post conflict states – with a specific focus on evaluating fragmented regions in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Sasha has previously been responsible for the delivery, implementation and overall strategy of monitoring and evaluation models for a range of leading organisations including: Creative Associates, Coffey International, the U.S Peace Corp, USAID, DfID, the FCO and the World Bank. Her detailed knowledge of various monitoring and evaluation methods enables her to draw on a large technical framework able to cover an array of different project requirements –from governance and public administration capacity building in Baghdad, to international development in Cameroon, and disaster response in Liberia.

Sasha’s advanced analytical skill-set and holistic approach to information analysis will ensure the MAO project is well equipped to manage the comprehensive and wide-ranging data analysis central to informing ASI directives and supporting training facility outputs.

### **Programme Management Team - ASI**

#### **ASI Project Director – Dan Pimlott (UAE/Jordan, part-time, staff)**

Daniel is an experienced ASI Principal Manager responsible for directing projects in the Levant. Joining ASI in 2011 after six years as a journalist for the Financial Times, Daniel took charge of ASI’s PFM reform and local governance work in Afghanistan. Working on Syria since 2014, he directed first Tamkeen and then the Governance Through Education programme and worked on the design and set-up of AJACS. Daniel has strong risk management skills which will be essential for oversight of this project.

#### **ASI Senior Manager - George Bennet (UK/Jordan, part-time, staff)**

George has recently joined ASI following a period in risk consultancy in sub-Saharan Africa. Prior to this, he was a Royal Marines officer for ten years, during which time he served multiple operational tours in Afghanistan and Iraq. He has experience of training local regular and irregular forces and was closely involved in British efforts to establish the Afghan Special Counter-Narcotics Police from 2007-2011.

#### **ASI Junior Manager - Nasser Hadid (Jordan, part-time, staff)**

Prior to joining ASI after three years with the FCO, Nasser was the deputy to the UK’s head of CSSF funding in Amman. He is highly familiar with FCO procedures, responsibilities, constraints and motivations and is well-prepared to facilitate a close relationship between the project leadership and the FCO. He also benefits from strong networks in government and military circles in Jordan. Nasser is a Jordanian citizen and bilingual in Arabic and English.

### **Training Team - Pilgrims**

**Dr Roger Saunders – Director of Academic Studies (Jordan, part-time, Pilgrims Associate):** Roger Saunders has over 35 years of experience in the development and management of educational projects and programmes. He has consulted for the World Health Organisation in both Africa and the Far-East and provided extensive advisory services to the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development. He is currently the Chair of the UK Military Education Committee – overseeing the educational and training aspects of all UK Officer Corps.

**Steve Amphlett – Senior Instructor (Jordan, part-time, Pilgrims Associate):** Steve Amphlett offers over 30 years of martial experience – 25 years of which as an instructor - working in remote and conflict environments across the Middle-East, South America and Africa. He possesses an advanced skill set able to effectively assess and manage a wide range of operational and security risks – including specialist knowledge on personal safety, weapons awareness and surveillance techniques.

**Steve Hughes – Paramedic (Jordan, part-time, Pilgrims Associate):** Steve Hughes is a senior frontline paramedic with over 32 years of experience operating as a UK Special Forces Operator across the Middle East, East and West Africa and the NHS. Steve has spent the last 15 years as an instructor and is also qualified as an Advanced Trauma Medic and Major Incident Commander (Bronze Level).

**Robert Hamilton-Hughes – Instructor (Jordan, part-time, Pilgrims Associate):** Robert Hamilton-Hughes is an advanced tactical and security risk management specialist with over 25 years of experience operating in various hostile and fragile environments in the Middle-East, Iraq, North and East Africa and Northern Ireland. Robert's particular areas of expertise include weapons awareness safety, personal safety, conflict management and counter-surveillance. Additionally, Robert is also a qualified medic with extensive operational experience within conflict environments.

**David Bradley – Instructor (Jordan, part-time, Pilgrims Associate):** David Bradley is a specialist instructor in weapons awareness, personal safety, first aid and trauma medicine, counter-surveillance and conflict management. He offers over 25 years of operational experience and is familiar with working in both remote and hostile environments, including – Eastern Europe, the Middle-East, Afghanistan and Russia.

**Ben Smith – Specialist Safety Instructor (Jordan, part-time, Pilgrims Associate):** Ben Smith offers the MAO initiative an advanced knowledge of safety reviews and best operating procedures having served on numerous military tours throughout the Middle-East. He possesses an advanced knowledge of Iraq and Afghan hostile environment assessment – offering a particular focus on situational awareness, conflict management and negotiation techniques.

#### **Specialist Instructors (Description of required experience)**

Other specialist instructors will be engaged depending on the training needs identified. At a minimum, candidates will possess 20 years of service within a military establishment and possess extensive operational knowledge of the AFMENA region. Additionally, all instructors will be familiar with the design, implementation, monitoring and review of training programmes for large groups of military personnel – able to utilise extensive interpersonal, organisational, leadership and communicative skill sets to ensure the collective and individual output qualities of the MAO training facility. All instructors will have a cultural and political awareness of working within the AfMENA region

#### **Range Inspection and Instructor Qualification – Jim McDougall (Jordan, part-time, KBR associate)**

Currently based in Oman, Jim McDougall is a range design, build and inspection specialist consultant with over 18 years of experience working in the Middle East. Previously, Jim served 29 years in the British army during which he became an internationally revered specialist arms training expert - instructing military personnel and Special Forces in the UK, Germany, Africa, Oman, UAE and U.S.

#### **Equipment Team - KBR**

##### **Quartermaster – Ian Lord (Jordan, part-time, 0.75 FTE, KBR associate)**

Ian Lord is a professionally qualified, logistic and operations manager with over 16 years national and international experience working with HM Forces, MoD and KBR across a range of high pressured multi-cultural environments.

From 2010-2014, Ian was responsible as the senior logistics manager for various KBR missions in Afghanistan - providing strategic and operational direction to teams of up to 22 international personnel on logistical operations. He was also primarily responsible for their continued training, development and administration.

Prior to this, Ian spent eight years as a logistics manager in HM Forces, Royal Engineers - operating globally and supervising the controlled deployment, re-supply and distribution of personnel, vehicles, warehouses and equipment to various international missions involving up to 160 personnel teams.

##### **Storemen – Chris Shepard (Jordan, part-time, KBR associate)**

Chris Shepard offers the Warehouse manager position over 15 years of inventory, project and stock management experience. His proven track-record of the development of control processes and operational procedures underlines his familiarity with risk assessment and supply-chain management. In particular, Chris has worked alongside the MoD in the communication, development, co-ordination and monitoring of key supply and support operations - often being relied on to ensure the quality of inventory management and logistics across transnational missions.

#### **Storemen – Pete Plumber (Jordan, part-time, KBR associate)**

Peter Plumber has 22 years of operational command experience working in SAS missions in the Middle-East. Fluent in both English and Arabic, Pete is able to operate both independently or as a senior team leader in challenging and hazardous multicultural environments and in partnership with various governmental organisations and civilian authorities. Pete's command of training and military operations within Jordan, UK, Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Balkans has culminated in his award of an MBE.

#### **Port Liaison – Wes Hodgens (Jordan, part-time, KBR associate)**

Wes Hodgens is an advanced operational training delivery instructor with 25 years of service within the British Military as a senior Non-Commissioned Officer within the SAS. He has lead training teams both within the British army and at Special Force Training centres around the world - with a proven track-record of operational leadership missions in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq and extensive training project management in partnership with the Kuwait, Jordan and Oman armed forces. He offers the MAO project both an experienced knowledge-base of counter-insurgency tactics and an extensive operational knowledge of Afghanistan.

#### **David Foley – Logistics/Fleet manager (Jordan, part-time, KBR associate)**

David Foley is a former Squadron Sergeant Major in the British army, with over 23 years of transport and management experience in Northern Ireland, Bosnia, Cyprus, Iraq, Nepal and Germany. Having previously supervised workforces of up to 170 personnel, David's experience ensures the effective implementation and review of all logistical operation processes and procedures for the MAO project.

### **ASI Operations Staff**

#### **Operations Manager – Jennifer Petersen (Jordan, full-time, staff)**

Jennifer is ASI Jordan's Operations Manager and oversees a team of local logistics and administrative staff. She brings considerable experience of working in fragile and conflict-affected states dealing with large teams of consultants. She has headed ASI Jordan's operations capability for the past two years supporting the delivery of the AJACS and Tamkeen programmes, as well as delivery of two national programmes. She has worked for ASI in South Sudan as operations manager where, due to the onset of civil war, she oversaw an evacuation process; she also provides cover for ASI in Turkey and in Tunisia covering Libya.

#### **Uplifts and downsizing of staff**

Changing the size or level of effort of the project team during implementation of any project requires substantive preparation in advance, including discussion of the duration, shape and size of the project and any risks to these factors which the implementation plan and context imply. The aim is to strike the best compromise between flexibility and efficiency, taking into account the level of uncertainty over the project's inputs and schedule. High flexibility requires shorter contract durations for associates, more recruitment and handover to establish redundancy, and higher initial expenditure on core operational costs such as office and accommodation spaces.

For this project, the risks of scheduling uncertainty and strategic shifts on the ground in Syria which affect the responsibilities of the activities in Jordan are high. It is possible that the estimated demand (600 trainees per year) will be significantly above or below the actual figure, with a knock-on effect on capacity – particularly of the training team. The focus on border security and MEDEVAC capabilities may shift as the conflict and priorities of stakeholders both evolve. We also know from experience that scheduling relating to trainees will be extremely uncertain.

We have established several linked sub-teams with a clear split of responsibilities. This enables us to treat uplifts and downsizing according to the make-up and responsibilities of each.

#### **Project management**

Our project management team is composed of ASI staff assigned to the project with sufficient allocated time to provide constant coverage over the duration of the contract. Should additional capacity be required, ASI's AfMENA team has around 20 experienced project managers of varying levels of seniority, the majority of who have experience on our Syria programmes. Downsizing is achieved by reassigning their time to other ASI priorities, including other HMG Syria programming where their experience can be best applied.

## **Amman team leadership and research team**

This team comprises the Team Leader, Military Researcher, M&E Officer and Training Monitor (a role involving interaction with the field team, Amman office and training facility team) – a small number of staff, but all are full-time and have unique roles. It will not be possible to scale down this team and still provide the oversight, monitoring and strategic research inputs that the project requires to succeed.

## **Field staff**

We recruit field staff in Syria on fixed-term contracts of 3 months or less, as there is significant uncertainty over future demand and their areas of activity are usually severely constrained. We recruit throughout implementation to meet specific needs (certain networks and relationships, changing geographical focus, security environment considerations) and ASI seeks to retain qualified and trained field staff by sharing between projects where possible, or referring to other organisations implementing sister projects.

## **Training team**

The training team from Pilgrims is the largest team on the project and will require the most flexibility. This will be handled by establishing a core group of trainers covering the range of required specialities which currently **exceeds** the requirements of the project. Pilgrims typically runs simultaneous training programmes around the world, requiring a large and flexible pool of training staff. The size of this community of trainers ensures the programme will be robust to requirements for uplifts in capacity

Coping with scheduling uncertainties is a further challenge for a team which will be employed part-time to ensure efficient use of budget during periods between training programmes. Inevitably, we will not be able to guarantee the precise team if the start date of the training cannot be guaranteed, without risking paying for a training team without trainees. Therefore we will establish reserve lists of trainers for each programme to step in should there be unexpected delays. We will manage this by deliberately cycling people regularly through the project team, ensuring that knowledge and relationships are built up and retained in a wider team of trainers.

## **Equipment team**

The equipment team will need to overcome significant bureaucratic and logistical problems on relatively unpredictable schedules, with delays of uncertain duration. The relatively small size of the team and ability to pre-position certain essential equipment are key mitigating factors of the risk of having under-employed staff. The team can scale up and down its size accordingly while maintaining the core staff presented here.

KBR is a large organisation with staff and associates working worldwide on military procurement and logistics. The depth of this pool of active experts will enable KBR to flex the team to increase or decrease capacity should the project's requirements change.

## **Operations**

The operations staff assigned to this project will be shared with other ASI projects in Jordan, enabling their time to be reassigned flexibly. This also enables us to provide short-term increases in capacity when required without needing to hire new staff to tackle surges in demand.

## **Short term expertise**

ASI has compiled a roster of short-term senior experts with varied relevant experience to provide specific expertise relevant to the project's long-term goals. We have also established initial contact with organisations that may, where the scope demands, provide specific expertise inputs. We will only engage additional outside expertise when required and in discussion with the CSSF Syria Programme Manager.

## Budget and operational requirements for up/down-scaling

The scaling up of team size requires some scaling up of budget, which can be accomplished well within the CSSF allocation for this activity, in discussion with the FCO. For short and fixed-term positions, we have presented pooled fee rates in the budget with experience criteria stating how they will be used. This will provide a contractual basis on which to accomplish scale up quickly. We will establish operational presence for the project of a sufficient size to cope with likely increases in size, and sufficient flexibility (as far as possible) to cope with decreases. Scaling up will be aided by ASI's existing flexible operational platform in Amman, which pools certain resources between projects where there is spare capacity, saving money.

## Contractual arrangements for sudden downsizing

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In the event of serious unexpected changes to the staffing requirement which require a fast downsizing of the team, it may be the case that prior preparation and management of this risk is not possible. In these circumstances, ASI has established contractual arrangements which enable fast cuts without large financial consequence. Staff categories on this project:

- **ASI staff** – the project management team and operations manager are ASI staff on permanent employment contracts. They can be reassigned flexibly to other ASI projects and activities if necessary.
- **ASI associates** – all ASI associates sign contracts which entitle them to 14 days' notice and include clauses which – as well as handling poor performance – enable ASI to terminate contracts if this is explicitly requested by the donor.
- **Subcontracted staff and associates** – ASI subcontracts impose the same conditions on subcontracted partner organisations, protecting ASI and the donor from excessive commitments should a fast reduction in staff be required.
- **Jordanian staff** – Jordanian employment law restricts the ability of any company operating legally there to scale back Jordanian staff numbers at speed. We will therefore – in line with existing practice – contract any Jordanian staff on a fixed-term basis.

#### Managing leave and continuity, including handovers

We are able to guarantee a continuously flexible and responsive approach to the Authority's requirements through the close engagement of the project management team in Amman. We have a constant management presence on the ground, with Nasser Al Hadid resident in Amman and George Bennet and Dan Pimlott on a regular travel schedule, providing continuous high-level presence in Jordan. This will enable a responsive management approach to requests from the CSSF Syria Programme Manager. The ASI Project Manager will also manage the leave and rotation schedule in order to ensure that the right number and mix of team members are always in country. The advantage of staff managers is that even when scheduled for part-time inputs, they are flexible and available immediately when required.

Our Team Leader Chip Chapman and Training Facility Director Jon Knight are both highly experienced former senior military officers who have many years of experience responding appropriately to political direction and managing stakeholder relationships. They will organise their leave arrangements such that they are able to cover each others' responsibilities for these periods. It is essential to retain continuous team leadership in an environment where circumstances can change rapidly.


Handovers for those going on leave or being rotated are managed carefully by the project management team, who ensure that there is sufficient overlap and time put aside for a full briefing. We have built redundancy into the implementation strategy for relationship management, so that there is never likely to be a co-absence of all team members who have established relationships with particular beneficiaries or stakeholders. This includes a policy of retaining the same training staff for the whole period of each training cycle and ensuring that teams are cycled on a slow rolling basis as necessary, rather than replacing several people at once.

We ensure that all staff have medical insurance prior to spending time in Jordan, and liaise with service providers in those locations to ensure that they have access to high quality medical care. We have found that investing in these procedures significantly reduces the need for evacuating consultants out of country in medical emergencies, by enabling timely, quality treatment before issues become severe. As a result we lose less time to sickness, and therefore reduce risks to programme implementation.

#### Replacing team members

From time to time it can be necessary to replace team members, either for performance reasons or because their circumstances change. ASI's project management team will manage this process closely, notifying the CSSF Syria Programme Manager as soon as the problem becomes apparent and ensuring that the replacement team member is approved by HMG prior to a handover taking place. We have built a certain degree of redundancy and overlap into every team with the deliberate intention of ensuring we never lack the ability to fulfil key functions if team members leave the project unexpectedly.

We have a full-time operations team in Amman. This means that we have developed the systems and procedures required to mobilise consultants within a tight timeframe and minimise the time it takes to deploy them quickly. As a result, should replacements need to be found for any staff during the project, we will be able to respond swiftly.



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