

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE SPECIAL CENTER CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY TO: WHITE HOUSE FROM: CIA/OCI TYPE IN CAPITAL LETTERS, DOUBLE SPACED FOR THE PRESIDENT COPY EYES ONLY GENERAL TAYLOR PRESIDENT'S INTELLIGENCE CHECKLIST	ا ب	Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for F	Release 2015/05/04 : CIA	-RDP79T00936A00	
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2. CONGO ARMY WITHDRAWN FRO A. KATANGAN MERCENARIES PLAYED A MAJOR ROLE IN ITS DEFI	OM KATAN S SENT F		BETHVILLE AF	PARENTLY
B. ADOULA, NOW MORE RES		OF THE UN	'S FAILURE T	0
ELIMINATE THE MERCENARIES, WILI	L PROBAB	LÝ ORDER	RENEWED LOBB	YING FOR A
STRENGTHENED UN MANDATE. THE I	DEFEAT W	ILL ALSO	WEAKEN ADOUL	A IN HIS
SHOWDOWN WITH GIZENGA, WHOSE RI				
BY 5 NOVEMBER.				
C. CONGO ARMY UNITS MAY	Y STILL	TRY A LIN	KUP WITH FOR	CES LOYAL
TO GIZENGA MOVING TOWARD KATANO	GA FROM	THE NORTH		·
D. TSHOMBE HAS LEFT FOR	R HOME F	ROM GENEVA	A. WE ARE S	TILL NOT
SURE WHAT HE WAS UP TO THERE.				50>
3. SOVIET NUCLEAR TESTS:			•	
A. WE ARE NOT YET ABLE	TO DETE	RMINE SOV	IET INTENTIO	NS
REGARDING THE CONTINUATION OF N	NUCLEAR	TESTS. O	N THE ONE HA	ND, A
TASS STATEMENT STRONGLY IMPLIES	S THAT T	HE USSR W	ILL CONTINUE	TESTING,
IF THE US RESUMES ATMOSPHERIC T	rests, 1	N ORDER TO	O AVOID BEIN	G AT A
MILITARY DISADVANTAGE.				50X1

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SIGNATURE OF AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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SIGNS YET OF CLOSING DOWN AT S	EMIPALATINSK.		50
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4. SATELLITE REACTIONS TO	SOVIET PARTY CON	GRESS:	4 .
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POLISH	I LEADERS FEAR THA	AT THE "ERA C)F .50
LIBERALISM WHICH IT SEEMS TO P	ORTEND FOR THE US	SSR" WILL RES	SULT IN
"UNCONTROLLABLE" PUBLIC PRESSU	RES FOR GREATER I	FREEDOM IN PO	DLAND.
"UNCONTROLLABLE" PUBLIC PRESSU			-
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PRINCIPAL PROTECTION AGAINST R	EPRESSION.		50
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AFGHANS ENDED ON A PESSIMISTIC	NOTE. MERCHANT	'S PROPOSAL F	OR AFGHAN
MOVES TOWARD SETTLING THE DISP			
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