



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF



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16 AUGUST 1966

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1. Congo

The situation continues to deteriorate, amid increasing indications that Tshombé and his followers are exploiting the chaos in order to return him to power. This possibility and some of its consequences are discussed at Annex.

2. Pakistan

Outgoing Pakistani Finance Minister Shoaib has floated the idea that the US should offer to resume the supply of military spare parts to Pakistan on the condition that Pakistan forego further military aid from China.

It was not clear, however, that he was speaking for anyone except himself. Clearly, strong elements in Pakistan would resist such a deal. In fact, Shoaib himself noted that the Pakistani military were free of budgetary restraints in making deals with Peking since all Chinese aid was on a grant basis.

Nevertheless, foreign ministry officials have indicated to Ambassador Locke that Pakistan would be forthcoming in seeking to avoid an arms race with India if the United States were to resume the supply of military spare parts.

3. Dominican Republic

The newly appointed Dominican police chief has ordered harsh reprisals against suspected terrorists. Overreaction by national police to continued agitation and disorders could alienate public support from the Balaguer regime.

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4. Syria-Israel

Both countries have made belligerent statements in the wake of Monday's clash on the Sea of Galilee. The incident began with an exchange of fire between an Israeli patrol boat and a Syrian shore position. In subsequent air action at least one Syrian MIG was shot down.

Each side has since issued a statement that it will retaliate immediately if the other makes a move. In this hair-trigger situation the stage is set for increasingly serious incidents.

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO



ANNEX

Mobutu's Position Weakening

Mobutu's central government has lost control of the northeast portion of the country. Its clumsy attempts to deal with the three-week-old mutiny of Katangan troops in Kisangani have produced nothing more than a truce that leaves the Katangans in control of most of the city. Moreover, other Katangans who abandoned their posts in the northeast have now arrived in Kisangani. The rebellious troops there may now number as many as 2,700--a formidable force that the notoriously inept Congo Army cannot handle.

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The Katangans therefore seem to be in a position to move south toward Katanga--where Tshombé's secessionist regime held out for several years--or to remain in virtual control of Kisangani, making Mobutu and the central government look more ridiculous every day. In any case, the Katangans' withdrawal from their posts in the northeast has created a vacuum which the few government troops in the area cannot begin to fill. As a result, the "simbas" who, aided by radical African countries, terrorized the northeast during the rebellion of 1964, are showing signs of renewed activity.

The mutiny and attendant troubles in the northeast, enough in themselves to discredit if not overthrow Mobutu, are compounded by the political situation in Kinshasa. Mobutu seems less concerned with the breakdown in the northeast than with his fears of a plot against him. His relations with Belgium have improved slightly in recent weeks, but he remains profoundly suspicious that Belgian business interests, or even the Brussels government, are out to do him in. These suspicions have broadened to include other Western nationals.

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
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Mobutu does not seek or take sound advice and almost always tries to deal peremptorily and emotionally with the incredibly complex economic and financial issues between the two countries. Belgium has already withdrawn many of its military advisers and seems likely to reduce its technical assistance as well. This will reduce the army's ability to cope with unrest, and generally add to Mobutu's frustration.

Thus this atmosphere in Kinshasa, in a sort of vicious circle, makes the government even less able to cope with the mutiny in Kisangani.



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All this has produced a situation where a serious effort by Tshombé to return to power looms as a distinct possibility. Tshombé liked being premier of the Congo. We believe he wants to regain power--in all the Congo, not just Katanga--and is being supported in this effort by a number of non-Congolese industrial leaders, many of whom are more fanatically pro-Tshombé than Tshombé himself. We have no hard evidence that he or his followers instigated the Kisangani mutiny, but they do appear to be exploiting the deteriorating situation in the country in an effort to return to power.

Such an effort would further disrupt and demoralize the Congo. Moreover, if Tshombé should manage to return to office his reappearance would antagonize most other African governments, many of whom would accuse the US, as well as Belgium, of complicity. At least some of the Congo's neighbors would probably again lend support to Communist-controlled efforts to renew the rebellion in the Congo.

An equally discouraging prospect is that the situation in the Congo will disintegrate into the chaos of 1960 with all conceivable leaders discredited.

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