



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF



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6 FEBRUARY 1965

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1. South Vietnam

In talking to McGeorge Bundy yesterday, General Khanh concentrated largely on eliciting information about US intentions. He asked whether the US could accept a military chief of government, suggesting that he has not abandoned the idea of his own accession. Khanh also said he is having some trouble forming the new civilian-military council but hopes to have one next week.

2. Laos

Generals Phoumi and Siho have turned up in Thailand, still with the hope of assembling forces for a march on Vientiane. The Laotian Government has made a strong démarche to Bangkok insisting that they be placed under house arrest far from the border.

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3. Sudan

A coalition of conservative political, military, and religious leaders intends to demand an immediate and drastic reduction of Communist influence in the present government. If its demands are not met, the group is prepared to stage a coup, possibly within the next few days.

4. Cuba

A public trial of Joaquin Ordoqui, an old-guard pre-Castro Communist, for collaboration with Batista authorities is probably forthcoming. This will bring into the open again the long-simmering tensions between Cuba's "old" and "new" Communists and conceivably might lead to a purge of the Moscow-favored old-liners. However, Castro, for fear of Moscow's reaction, will probably keep it from going that far. Details are at Annex.

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5. Greece

Leftists sponsored the parliamentary motion adopted today to try former Prime Minister Karamanlis for alleged abuses of office. This apparent Communist effort to distract public attention from the USSR's pro-Turkish stand on Cyprus is being supported tacitly by Prime Minister Papandreou for his own purposes. He seems to be trying to deflect attention from the shortcomings and mounting problems of his administration.

The US Embassy feels that Greek conservatives will be further alarmed by this example of growing Communist "boldness" under Papandreou's regime.

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ANNEX

Castro and the Cuban Communists

Cuba's "new" Communists--those who are loyal to Fidel above all else--have long castigated the pre-Castro Communists for waiting until the eve of victory to join the Castro revolution. Moreover, they argue that the old-line, Moscow-oriented Communists are not loyal supporters of Castro and the "Cuban revolution."

The friction between these factions was sharply defined in March 1962 when old-guard Communist leader Anibal Escalante was publicly tried and exiled for, in effect, attempting to edge Castro's new Communist followers out of the hierarchy of his new Marxist-Leninist party and to replace them with former old-line Communists.

The trial of Marcos Rodriguez last March for betraying four Cuban revolutionaries to Batista in 1957 was the next public chapter in this feud. During the trial, the new Communists charged that the old Communists had been behind the betrayal. This trial disclosed that Joaquin Ordoqui, a pre-Castro Communist leader, and his wife had befriended Rodriguez after the betrayal and, in a sense, had covered up for him.



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Ordoqui's wife was eased out last summer, and in November, Ordoqui himself was publicly suspended from his post as Cuban military quartermaster and from the party directorate. Cuba's new Communists have been pressing Castro hard for a public trial of Ordoqui.

The Ordoqui issue has created a dilemma for Castro. His own power position seems unchallenged now. However, one plan for assuring this has been to play one Communist group off against another and a show trial now of a prominent old-guard Communist could shatter the vestiges of the pre-Castro party.

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Moreover, [redacted]

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[redacted] should a trial lead to a purge of old-line Communists, it could severely jolt Havana's relations with Moscow. Presumably Castro wishes to avoid this.

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