

The President's Daily Brief

Top Secret 27 November 1968

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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 27 NOVEMBER 1968

1. Communist China

Satellite photography of mid-November produced some "best ever" coverage of China. There was much action and some new construction at the plant near Peking which we believe is to produce strategic missiles.

China's only G-class ballistic missile submarine was at a naval dock-yard. Some work, the significance of which is not clear, was going on around missile tube hatches and cowlings.

2. North Korea

In the ten months since the seizure of the <u>Pueblo</u>, Pyongyang has sharply improved its air defense system, especially for detection and tracking.

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3. Jordan

moval of the bombers.

4. Okinawa

Okinawans are so inflamed over last week's B-52 accident that an aggressive antibase campaign may be in the offing. The extreme left is no longer alone in its opposition to US base operations. Moderates, formerly opposed only to B-52s, now want the bases closed. Even the conservatives who dominate the legislature are pressing for re-

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5. Philippines

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
6. Congo (Brazzaville)

The tamer regime that installed itself in early September is now making noises about how pleased it would be to see the US Embassy, closed since August 1965, open again. The prime minister is said to feel this would counterbalance Soviet influence—and help the place out of its economic slump. But, he added, Brazzaville is "not in a position" to take the first step.

Incidentally, the French claim the Cuban advisers—nearly 1,000 were once in Brazzaville—have all gone home.

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FOR THE PRESIDENT'S EYES ONLY

- 1.) Special Daily Report on North Vietnam
- 2.) North Vietnamese Reflections of US
 Political Attitudes

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Special Daily Report on North Vietnam for the President's Eyes Only

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I. NOTES ON THE SITUATION

Hanoi Propaganda: Hanoi is still building a head of steam in its propaganda reaction to recent shootdowns of three US aircraft over North Vietnam and to alleged US military actions in the Demilitarized Zone. The Communists are clearly laying a case in which they could use these issues to stall progress in Paris; in statements on 26 November they came close to, but stopped just short of, explicit threats along these lines.

A North Vietnamese Foreign Ministry spokesman on 26 November charged that the US had bombed and strafed North Vietnamese territory following two shootdowns the day before. His statement said that these actions "grossly violated the sovereignty and security" of North Vietnam, and he lumped them with alleged US shellings north of the Demilitarized Zone. He called them "proof" that the US was not acting in accordance with President Johnson's order to end all bombardments of North Vietnam.

A French press account indicates that the North Vietnamese spokesman in Paris went even further at a news conference the same day. He said that both reconnaissance and "bombing raids" connected with pilot rescue efforts constitute "acts of war." These activities, he said, "are contrary to" US commitments to stop the bombing and acts "related to the use of force." He warned that such actions "jeopardize the search for peace," but by again calling on the US to "hold a four-power conference immediately," he indicated that Hanoi is not making them a roadblock to opening the next stage of talks in Paris.

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Conditions in Hanoi: A Western traveler who was in Hanoi late last week was told by a resident that the Hanoi police have been having trouble recently in

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enforcing the prescribed procedures during air raid alerts. The people are less disciplined since the end of the bombing, and a slowdown in the pace of work has become noticeable. These problems were probably behind Ho Chi Minh's recent communiqué directing the people to maintain discipline and vigilance and to work harder.

* * *

Hanoi's Public Attitude Toward Saigon:

For years the government leaders in Saigon had been dismissed only as "American puppets and lackeys." Suddenly, on 2 November, the South Vietnamese government was elevated to the status of "the Saigon administration" in an official declaration by Hanoi. Despite this promotion, however, the Saigon government was described later in the same

Two days later, the Hanoi propagandists felt obliged to face up to the quandary posed by President Thieu's refusal to come to Paris. Nhan Dan solved the problem this way: "No acts by the puppet clique to give pretense of 'opposition' to its masters, the US aggressors, can deceive anybody."

document as "an instrument of the US imperialist

aggressors."

* * *

Hanoi's Industrial Planning: Hanoi's policy of dispersing large industries and encouraging smaller local industries under regional control is to be continued in the government's plans for postwar reconstruction and development. Last month the Council of Ministers formally reaffirmed the policy-originally necessitated by the US bombing—as a desirable system for the indefinite future.

sion that the government had previously made a mistake by concentrating factories in the Hanoi and Haiphong areas, where some were far from their sources of raw materials or their markets.

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There is nothing of significance to report today.

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