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Adam Smith International

# Syria Rapid Response Lot C Technical Proposal

## 1. Understanding, overall approach and methodology

If and when a withdrawal by the Assad regime or ISIS occurs, Aleppo, Dera'a or any other Syrian city are likely to be faced with a general collapse in government and public services and an acute refugee crisis. The resident population may have fallen by three quarters from what it was before an offensive, and there will be damage to water, road and energy infrastructure. Gas will be hard to obtain, water may well be available only from trucks and bread may need to be brought in from neighbouring towns, any bakeries having been shelled or lacking access to fuel. Local hospitals and clinics and all schools are likely to be closed. Almost all health, education and municipal workers will likely have fled the city out of fear of fighting or reprisals, and, if they had been paid before the offensive, salary payments to workers by the regime will have ceased.

The coalition (or operations room) of opposition armed actors that will have captured the city will probably have taken it upon itself to protect what is left of the civilian population and to minimise looting and kidnapping, but may lack the capacity and resources to provide other services. This coalition will also have divergent views on the establishment of a city government. It may – pragmatically or ideologically – view as desirable a civilian administration to run the city's affairs and provide or coordinate services, whilst expressing an interest in continuing to enforce law and order and in being involved in judicial affairs. The more extreme elements of the coalition such as Jabhat al-Nusra, if present, may be at odds with the more moderate Islamist or secular factions, and the latter may be attempting to restrain the former from establishing their own governing and law enforcement structures.

HMG intends to respond to these circumstances by launching an Emergency Stabilisation Response Mechanism to support local partners and institutions to keep structures and basic services alive until longer-standing projects can start. In the view of Adam Smith International (ASI) and our consortium partners (US contractor Chemonics and Integrity Research and Consultancy), this response needs to be enacted in such a way that will limit HMG's exposure to the attendant risks of doing so, which include:

- › Failing to fully understand and appreciate conflict and political dynamics;
- › The leakage of public funds through unaccountable bodies, and funding projects that do not meet needs and achieve their intended outputs or outcomes;
- › Creating more conflict rather than building cohesion at the city and community level;
- › Duplicating the work of other donors and implementing organisations, including key Syria institutions such as the Syrian Interim Government and the Assistance Coordination Unit.

In our approach and methodology below we propose full deployment and exit phases as requested in the terms of reference. ASI will be responsible for overall project oversight and delivery, Integrity for research and Chemonics for external procurement. We are confident that with the existing presence of Tamkeen and AJACS and our consortium's platform providing basic services in Syria, Turkey and Jordan we have the capacity to deliver a rapid response to HMG and to mitigate – as far as is feasible – the significant attendant risks.

We do however also suggest an optional preparation phase before a withdrawal from a city that HMG could consider. This would allow HMG to have clearly defined models for delivery designed in advance and a robust body of information and analysis to choose which model to use under the circumstances in which withdrawal occurs. Even a slim and efficient preparation phase that allowed for team preparation and scenario planning would serve to substantially reduce these risks and enhance HMG's ability to operate effectively within the political space gradually emerging from the conflict.

### (a) Our approach

In seeking to provide as much flexibility and impact as possible, we present below four different **models for engagement**, and a set of **principles** that will need to be present in the application of each model to generate the best return. We then show how these models and principles can respond to the possible characteristics of a newly-taken city.

#### Models for intervention

These models provide an indication of the spectrum of delivery models that we might use. They are flexible, and can be modified according to circumstances and priorities. They could also be sequenced over the course of an engagement. The determining quantity here is governance: emergency assistance starts in the context of the slender beginnings of a city government and morphs as the capacity, legitimacy and remit of that government increases.

- › Model 1 will deliver support via a grants management unit (GMU) based in a Syrian city overseen from either Gaziantep or Amman. Funds, partners and stakeholder engagement will be managed by the GMU. Model 1 allows rapid deployment and dispersal in the absence of a fully-formed or functional partner city council.

- Model 2 delivers support in partnership with a nascent or partly functional and legitimate city council. A GMU would partner with the council and form a stakeholder group consisting of council members and other city notables involved in service delivery, governance and religious and civil affairs. This group would then inform the selection of funding options while funds would still be managed by the GMU.
- Model 3 builds on model 2 to provide training and mentoring to the emerging city council to build its capacity to govern, administer, manage finances and engage with citizens. Funds would still be managed by a GMU.
- Model 4 hands over increasing decision-making authority to the city council whilst providing it with the necessary guidance advice to make and implement decisions. Services may be contracted to the council with funds managed and overseen by a GMU.

### **Principles to be applied in each case**

In brief, these are some of the principles that we would hold in mind when delivering assistance to Aleppo or Dera'a City. They emerge from ASI's experience in implementing Tamkeen and AJACS in northern and southern Syria and from our team's knowledge of providing emergency assistance in Iraq and Afghanistan.

**City council and Syrian partners:** The constitution of a city council, or at a minimum the presence of reliable Syrian partners in service delivery, is essential if a city is to be run adequately beyond the immediate term. We will form a relationship with a viable city council as early as possible and work to build its ability to deliver. If no legitimate city council is available to partner with, a local NGO or civil society group engaged in service delivery will be considered.

**Alliances:** Establishing or re-establishing government and services in a city is particularly difficult, and may require politically uncomfortable alliances with institutions, workers and service providers from previously regime-held territory. The situation will be different in a city taken from ISIS. Whilst recognising that influencing a city's politics is beyond our remit and ability we will encourage such alliances where they can aid our work.

**Public confidence:** The early restoration of public confidence is needed to stem the exodus of refugees and draw back skilled workers to the city. This requires the maintenance of the rule of law, equity in service delivery and the preservation of infrastructure, and the association of the re-establishment of key services with new or revamped civilian authorities.

**Communications:** All of the services outlined above need to be communicated to people before, during and after their delivery in order to shore up public confidence. But most importantly local ownership should be developed through communications activities and stakeholder engagement. Thus the city council must be involved in this communication and equal weight should be given to inward communication (i.e. listening) as outward communication.

**Equitable resource distribution:** The equitable distribution of emergency services and infrastructure repairs will be a vital component of rebuilding trust and legitimacy, particularly in cities with religious and sectarian tensions. This has been a cornerstone of the successes experienced to date on Tamkeen and needs to be central to a rapid response.

**Evidence-based decision making:** The viability of any intervention is predicated on a thorough understanding of a city's politics, security, demographics, influential actors, infrastructure and services, and on the identification of partners that can help deliver emergency assistance. Assumptions should be periodically tested by research and feedback. Foundational research should begin in advance of a city falling and continue throughout.

## **(b) Our methodology**

As stated above we propose to deliver the HMG Emergency Stabilisation Response Mechanism in two main phases: A deployment phase to begin at short notice when a city falls to the opposition, and an exit phase. We also propose an optional planning phase that could be delivered under HMG's guidance if it so wished. This preparation phase would last a maximum of one month and would take place before a withdrawal from a city take place.

Before deployment, the first step we will take – at no cost to HMG – will be to establish and maintain a flexible staffing model. The uncertain timing of emergency support means that preferred staff for each position may not be available at the time of deployment. The Project Manager will therefore maintain a roster of back-up candidates for each core post in the Jordan and Turkey teams, keeping a record of their availability and other commitments. This will ensure availability of a qualified, briefed and committed candidate for each role at all times, including a degree of redundant overlap in availability in case of unforeseen problems

At the same time **preparations for the field team** – consisting of Field Supervisors, Field Officers (FOs), Researchers, Financial Field Officers (FFOs) – will be put in place, again at no cost to HMG. A handful of candidates for each city will be pre-selected drawing upon Tamkeen's widespread networks within Syria, as well as ASI's and Integrity's independent networks. Most field staff will have professional backgrounds either in public service or in service delivery. Whilst only some of them will form part of a GMU, the field team will be vetted by ASI and trained in advance in order to allow a swift start-up when required. We will train the field team inside Syria making use of Tamkeen's training capacity, embodied in

its Field Managers. Training will primarily cover planning and budgeting, procurement and finance, and M&E, as well as governance and public engagement. They will receive “train the trainer” training in these topics and guidance on mentoring Syrian partners. Some HR training will be provided, and conflict resolution and communications skills will be taught.

### **Optional Preparation Phase**

Members of the senior team – comprising the Team Leader, ASI’s Project Director and Manager and Integrity’s Research Manager – would begin by meeting HMG to discuss HMG’s priorities and to set the scope of work. We would thereafter convene a subset of the core team, comprising the Team Leader, Research Manager, ASI’s Project Director and Manager, plus ASI’s Country Operations Manager in Turkey and Jordan.

**Mapping structures and organisations:** If agreed in the scope of work, we would deploy Integrity’s researchers to conduct stakeholder mapping in Aleppo and Dera’a. The aim would be to identify the most influential political, activist, military and service delivery actors in a city and probe the relationships between them. A detailed assessment of public services and infrastructure, as well as demographic analysis and mapping of NGOs and donor programmes, would be carried out. We would make use of Tamkeen research and AJACS’s database in this regard.

**Responding with programmatic support:** With HMG permission the Team Leader, with the assistance of Tamkeen’s sector experts, would then draft a list of possible interventions. These would be based upon our existing knowledge of Aleppo and Dera’a City, the circumstances of a city upon falling, initial stakeholder and partner mapping, and Tamkeen’s basic packages of services. Grouped by sector, the list would contain the type of support that might be given as well as the possible suppliers of services. Plans for conducting M&E on the ground and for communications support, both for the emergency assistance itself and for partners in Syrian cities, would also be drafted.

The **final stage** of the preparation phase would be the drafting of a **Rapid Response Dossier** itself, containing:

- Initial stakeholder mapping and scenario planning for Aleppo and Dera’a City post-withdrawal;
- Possible delivery models, corresponding funding channels, and programmatic responses, services and suppliers;
- Procedures for the delivery and oversight of grants, the management of procurement and security protocol;
- Plan for the provision of guidance and advice to our partners, M&E, and internal and external communications;
- A draft staffing and structure for the remote team and GMU showing our ability to rapidly mobilise the team.

This plan would be submitted to HMG for review, and a half-day workshop would be held to confirm its contents.

### **Deployment Phase**

The Team Leader, Project Director and Project Manager will deploy within 24 hours of HMG’s request to mobilise our Rapid Response Team, including our pre-selected field staff and Integrity’s research network, in addition to the Turkey or Jordan-based team. Taking advantage of our ongoing Syrian projects we will, at this point, provide the following:

- › Existing research products on Aleppo and Dera’a City from Tamkeen and AJACS, including city councils in both places;
- › Analysis of the challenges and risks of implementation in Aleppo and Dera’a;
- › Documentation of tested and functioning systems in security, procurement, financial management and M&E modified for emergency stabilisation support, balancing risks against speed and urgency of delivery;
- › Standing staff capacity in the forms of ASI’s and Integrity’s Project Directors and Managers; Integrity’s Research Manager; Tamkeen’s M&E Adviser and technical specialists; Chemonics’ procurement team; AJACS and Tamkeen team leaders; and ASI’s operations and security team;
- › Tamkeen’s basic packages of services and knowledge of service providers and suppliers in Syria – see box below.

**Mapping structures and organisations:** The first task will be to conduct a rapid stakeholder mapping, profiles of potential partners, a risk and conflict assessment and a rough needs assessment based upon the scale of the crisis. Information collected will include the status of the opposition, regime or ISIS city council; the position of the armed actor operations room on civilian authority and service provision; the status of service delivery, including what providers are active and how many workers remain; the scale of the refugee problem; damage to water, power, gas and food infrastructure; and the availability of gas, drinking water, medicine and food. In this task we will reply in part on the research capacity and networks of Tamkeen and AJACS, including the latter’s database, and both projects’ preceding coverage of the fight to take the city. Integrity also has the capacity to mobilise existing researchers to do some primary research within the 48 hour window by reaching out to their networks of key informants and stakeholders.

**Providing programmatic support:** The Team Leader, Project Director and Project Manager will then meet HMG again to agree a plan for immediate engagement. Here we will also be able to draw upon Tamkeen’s set of technical experts in health, education, infrastructure and governance. With an idea of the preferences of Syrian partners, the context on the ground and the needs of the city it will be possible to determine the appropriate model for engagement and to plan a series

of interventions in water, electricity, food security, health, education, waste management, education, governance and other essential public services. It will also be possible to identify possible suppliers of intended services – see the box below. These interventions are likely to be sequenced, beginning with the most urgent needs – such as the provision of drugs, the distribution of drinking water and food supplies, or the purchase of fuel for power and cooking – that do not require partnership with a functioning council. The scope could then expand to include more advanced interventions such as repairs to infrastructure – for example digging wells and rehabilitating power lines – and the payment of salaries to enable the resumption of healthcare, education, power and municipal. These may take longer to achieve and will necessitate the presence of a council with staff and capacity, but must still happen quickly to avoid discontent. Subsequent public works programmes may also build confidence and offer an employment boost.

The choice of suppliers and service provider to deliver emergency support will be informed by Tamkeen's network pre-vetted network of supplier's in Aleppo and Dera'a and elsewhere in Syria as well as the networks of Integrity, Chemonics and our GMU. Suppliers are likely to include:

- Council workers, in the sectors of education, water, waste management and power;
- Health workers in hospitals and clinics salaries;
- Individuals or workshops for small infrastructure repairs and public works;
- Private suppliers of goods and services, including medicines and machinery;
- NGOs for the delivery of training
- Former civil servants, engineers, teachers and health workers for the provision of advice and mentoring.

**Working with nascent structures:** It is likely that the initial delivery of emergency support will be via a grants management unit that engaged with a variety of stakeholders in the city without a formal council partnership, i.e. akin to model 1 in our approach. The GMU will be staffed by the field team and will be responsible for the disbursement of cash grants and stipends, the procurement of goods and services in Syria, and the oversight of interventions and finances. Our financial management, fiduciary risk and procurement mechanisms are laid out below. As a city council gradually coalesces, increases in capacity or expresses an interest in taking on responsibility for governing and services it will become expedient to deliver support in closer partnership with it. A crucial determinant of the extent of cooperation and joint delivery will be the administrative capacity and willingness to govern of the council in question. As such, models 2, 3 and 4 may become feasible and preferable.

The GMU will be tasked with monitoring and conducting evaluations of interventions with the support of an M&E Adviser in Gaziantep or Amman. FOs and Researchers will be directed to develop a trusting, transparent relationship with partners and suppliers and to document progress and results. Modes used to monitor include site visits, photos and interviews with beneficiaries to assess the quality of implementation. Filled-in questionnaires will then be sent to the M&E team in Gaziantep or Amman to be processed into coherent reports by the M&E Adviser. We will also rely on third-party monitoring, potentially arranged through other donor-funded programmes working in the vicinity, such as Mayday's Civil Defence, with whom we already have a relationship. On receiving information and data from the field team the M&E Adviser will conduct a multi-layer data quality assurance process, including information triangulation and data review.

**Guidance and mentoring:** We can anticipate from Tamkeen's experience that Syrian partner institutions will benefit from guidance and mentoring in public administration as well as in service delivery sectors, and they will be encouraged to take up the opportunity. This is notwithstanding the difficulty of finding suitable people in emerging city councils and the problem of the churn of city workers. Having been trained pre-deployment the members of the GMU should be equipped with tools to mentor Syrian partners, as well as other local actors. Via Tamkeen we also have a network of former civil servants and sectoral experts in Aleppo and Dera'a City that can be called upon. This is a system that has worked effectively for Tamkeen in building the governance capacity of local administrative councils. Guidance may come in the form of good governance, from financial management to public engagement to HR, or in a service delivery sector..The field team will be supported by the expertise contained in these subject areas within the core team.

**Conflict assessment and actor mapping:** Members of the GMU will be tasked with continually researching and monitoring the situation on the ground, notably in the ongoing mapping of actors and assessment of changing political, conflict, population and delivery dynamics. FOs and researchers will be expected to have and build extensive networks in their cities, including a list of key informants and stakeholders in political and armed actor circles. Given the likely fluidity and danger of the situation we will, to begin with, primarily make use of key informant interviews, either in person or via phone or social media. Where possible focus groups discussions will be held. Information will be cross-checked by as many sources as possible in the circumstances and will be vetted for bias and quality by the Research Manager.

**Coordination and communication:** Through AJACS and Tamkeen we already have a good idea of the donor programmes, NGOs and Syrian actors that exist. Both programmes have a relationship with the IG, Tamkeen especially, and we will take advantage of it in keeping the IG informed, coordinating delivery and, potentially, supporting partner

institutions. Tamkeen also already partners with MEPI, Democracy Council, SSP and ARK in the delivery of community projects, for example salary payments in Aleppo City, infrastructure in Rif Aleppo and third party monitoring in Rif Damascus. Where it adds value and is possible we will seek to deliver services via one of these programmes.

Our emergency support will have a two-pronged communications plan. One prong will focus on support to partner institutions on the ground in implementing communications to build public confidence, encourage refugees to return to the city, and channel key messages around service provision. The other prong will concern communications around the emergency support itself – clarifying to partners and other stakeholders that the response is politically neutral and exists to support cities in dire need of basic services for a limited time. The support could be branded in a similar fashion to Tamkeen, for example as *Bidaya* or ‘beginning’, giving it an identity people can trust.

**Financial management of grants and stipends:** The GMU will be responsible for the disbursement and oversight of cash grants and stipends. Where disbursement is done through the city council, the GMU will be tasked with verifying that grants and stipends reach the intended beneficiaries. Funds will be dispatched from Gaziantep or Amman via the *hawala* network, money transfer services used effectively by ASI since 2013 with only rare cases of loss. Payment will be based upon the final delivery of goods or services, and funds intended for a particular service or supplier will be frozen with the *hawala* agent in the city until all required documentation has been submitted and checked. To pay stipends a record of council workers, teachers or health workers will be kept and stipends paid against it on the presentation of an ID. The Grants Manager in Gaziantep or Amman will track the funding, maintain detailed records, oversee documentation, and support the GMU in its finance functions. Our finance procedures will build upon those used successfully in 18 communities on the Tamkeen programme.

**Procurement and supplier identification and logistics:** Where possible, especially for urgent and priority interventions, local NGOs or contractors will be selected for service provision, and in this process we will draw upon Tamkeen’s extensive network of pre-vetted suppliers, as well as sourcing new suppliers if necessary. The GMU may initially need to do procurement and logistics (for equipment and for services) directly, but as a partnership with a city council solidifies the GMU will supervise and guide the council through the procurement process. To effectively deliver emerging support and partner with a city council, procurement procedures need to be flexible, taking the Syrian context into account. For example, if it is not possible to obtain three competitive quotations, sole sourcing can be considered, given the cost of purchase, cost of transport, cost of installation and risks involved.

Where good and services are not available in Syria, as is increasingly the case in northern Syria with the Turkish border closure, we will rely on ASI’s and Chemonics’ procurement networks in Turkey and Jordan respectively and our ability to transport goods across the border. Chemonics transports procured items to final destinations by contracting Turkish logistics firms that have partnerships with Syrian trucking companies. Safe delivery is ensured via close research and monitoring and coordination with recipients and contacts in Syria.

### **Phase 3: Exit**

The timeframe and mode of exit will need to be judged case by case, alongside the attendant risks of doing so and in close coordination with HMG. Crucially, the exit needs to ensure that there is no interruption of supply but that it continues seamlessly via a clearly-communicated handover to longer-term programming. There is an inherent risk that premature engagement topples the fragile structures being established and supported and that the trust gained via a rapid response is undermined.

To exit, we need to understand the programmes into which donor funds will subsequently be able to flow, and the programmes will need to specify from the outset the level of service delivery and support that they can maintain over the medium term. Tamkeen has already begun to think through these questions. However clear the communication about the duration of support, it is also likely there will be a degree of dependency, for example around the payment of salaries. These are the factors that we will bear in mind when drafting and enacting an exit plan.

- Early planning for the exit strategy and joint agreement with partners just how that disengagement will occur, accepting that this will require compromise. Communication from the beginning that support is time-limited.
- Unless there is a clear political imperative to do so, an avoidance of open-ended project commitments, particular any project that is obviously unsustainable. Instead, an insistence on defined timelines.
- Guiding and mentoring counterparts at the earliest opportunity, and creating a strong partnership with them.
- Identification of successors to emergency support as early as possible, from a list of MEPI, SSP, Tamkeen, AJACS, Democracy Council, Civil Defence and others, and coordination with these programmes in the delivery of support before handover.
- Plans for the handover of equipment and assets to successor programmes or Syrian partners, for the generation of revenue, and fore absorption of the GMU into new programmes.

## 2. Experience in Syria, Turkey and Jordan

### Ability to work in Northern and Southern Syria if requested

In the last four years, Adam Smith International (ASI) Chemonics and Integrity Research and Consultancy have established reputations as two of the most capable, reliable and effective implementing partners for projects across Syria. Of particular importance is our reputation among Syrian activists: the lifeblood of the projects we implement. From day one we have invested in relationships with Syrians who were the originators of the uprising in 2011 and who retain some hope for the development of a more equitable state at the end of the conflict.

From our operational platforms in Gaziantep and Amman, the consortium members have/are implementing the following projects in Syria:

- › In 2011, Integrity's **Project VIOLA** served to provide FCO with information on the conflict and governance dynamics within many of the most hard to reach areas of the country.
- › In late 2012, both Integrity and ASI then implemented separate **pilot projects to support emerging local governance actors** in Rif Damascus and Idlib. The pilot projects provided some key lessons that informed future programming: most importantly that providing direct support to local institutions often risked creating more problems than it solved.
- › Together, ASI and Integrity went on to implement the **Tamkeen** project in late 2013 developed a model for supporting the emergence of local governance actors, via a process that enables them to plan, budget, procure and oversee the delivery of services for the community.
- › Since November 2014, ASI has implemented the **Access to Justice and Community Security (AJACS) Project**, which aims to support effective and accountable Syrian security and justice (S&J) actors in Aleppo Idlib and Latakia, and build their capacity to deliver services that are more responsive to local community security needs, and enable local stakeholders to engage meaningfully in the planning and delivery of S&J services.
- › Chemonics' **Syria Regional Program (SRP)** has transported over \$30,000,000 in goods and equipment of all types into Syria. Chemonics ensures safe delivery by closely researching and monitoring shipping routes before sending items, choosing credible logistics firms, and closely coordinating with our recipients and contacts in Syria to meet, supervise, and escort shipments.
- › Integrity have considerable **Third Party Monitoring** experience across three separate Syria projects: real time monitoring of CARE International humanitarian assistance; monitoring of food, nutrition and non-food item programmes implemented by WFP, UNICEF and UNRWA. Integrity is also conducting an evaluation of ICSP/AJACS – focussing on the relevance of the theory of change and the applicability of the indicators and means of verification which the implementing partners put in place.

The only way to implement projects successfully is to develop a cadre of Syrian field officers who can work with communities to map structures, identify needs and support/monitor the development of service delivery mechanisms that set the foundations for good governance within communities at the heart of the conflict. Today our collective field officer cadre numbers 121 individuals across four active projects. All Field Officers are committed to the processes of research, responsive service delivery and governance development that is required to stand up the kind of city-level services and authorities that exist in various forms within Aleppo and Dera'a. We speak to these field officers on a daily basis, support them on their personal security needs and nurture their belief in a future that is not dominated by barrel bombing and restrictive governance modalities. Many of them have been to our offices in Amman and Gaziantep for training, coaching, mentoring and operational support (including first aid training and trauma management training).

Our field officers are located in both Northern Syria (Idlib, Latakia and Aleppo) and Southern Syria (Dera'a and Rif Damascus) and they work every day with Local Area Councils, Provincial Councils, NGOs and other implementing partners (most notably the Free Syrian Police) that are active within these regions.

### Ability to work in Jordan if necessary

Adam Smith International has been legally registered to operate in Jordan since April 2014, and has a full operational platform that can be scaled up at short notice to support new projects. The process of gaining approval from the relevant Jordanian Authorities is complex and has the potential to cause delays to implementation. With the support of HMG, ASI has built an effective working relationship with the Jordanian General Intelligence Directorate (GID), which oversees activity at the Jordan-Syria border and vets all project beneficiaries inside Syria.

The Tamkeen Project has been operating successfully from Jordan for over a year. The project currently employs 20 field officers in Southern Syria, has disbursed \$1,015,218 in grants and \$135,000 worth of equipment to communities in Dera'a and Rif Damascus, and is exploring options to expand operations to Quneitra province. Since June 2013, Chemonics Jordan Food Assistance Programme (an arm of SRP) has delivered 36,357 metric tons of flour and yeast from Jordan

into Southern Syria. An average of 3 transfers per week is needed to transfer the large quantities of approximately 550 metric tons per week. Currently, the assistance supports more than 261,900 individuals.

### **Legal ability to work from Turkey immediately**

ASI, Chemonics and Integrity have full legal registration in Turkey, and have developed operational platforms that can be quickly scaled up to accommodate new projects. All consortium partners have developed relationships with lawyers, accountants, and local sub-contractors and local government authorities. A close relationship with the Provincial Governor's offices in Gaziantep and Adana means that all applications for trainings and meetings involving Syrians are handled swiftly and efficiently, ensuring that there are no problems with the Foreigners' Police Department.

### **A strong track record providing capacity support and managing sub grants**

The Tamkeen approach provides a model for capacity building and grants management in a conflict situation. The project's trained cadre of Field Officers provides advice on good governance principles, as well as capacity and grants management support to communities inside Syria. Through their involvement in the project, Tamkeen also helps LACs to improve their organisation and management, thereby increasing their effectiveness and legitimacy.

Tamkeen currently provides grant funds of \$100,000 every six months to 30 cities and towns across Syria to deliver basic services, through a structured process that imitates a local government budget cycle. Almost all of these funds are spent inside Syria using a standardised and transparent procurement approach that communities themselves execute and oversee. Tamkeen has a dedicated grants team, which monitors the distribution of grant funding to ensure: i) money arrives in the right place at the right time, and ii) projects are implemented according to agreed work plans. So far Tamkeen has successfully distributed over \$2.5 million through 105 projects in 18 community committees. The most recent internal audit of grants expenditure resulted in a discrepancy of less than \$100. This track record in remote grants management contributed to Tamkeen receiving an A++ (the highest possible mark) from DFID in its 2014 annual review.

AJACS project provides extensive institutional capacity building support to the Free Syrian Police and the communities they serve. To cater for the high-volume training needs of the FSP, the project has developed a robust Basic Policing Skills train-the-trainer curriculum, to be delivered to a cadre of FSP trainers who will in turn deliver the curriculum to junior officers inside Syria. Combined with more specialist training delivered directly in Turkey to more senior FSP Officers, the AJACS training approach ensures that capacity support reaches the highest possible number of FSP officers. In addition, AJACS has developed and implemented Rapid Stabilisation Deployment Training for the FSP – a package of training designed to help the police operate in a 'hostile insertion context'.

In Somalia, Adam Smith International manages a flagship multi donor grant fund: The Somalia Stability Fund (SSF). The design of SSF is innovative and flexible: existing investments support community driven development, youth empowerment projects, and peace-building and community safety initiatives. The SSF invests in a broad range of initiatives across Somalia and has effective and reliable processes for assessing the reliability of local partners. SSF has a network of foreign and Somali investment managers and a large field team that oversees project finances and delivery, using innovative monitoring, evaluation and verification tools (including social media, mobile messaging and photo verifications). To date, SSF investments have covered a broad range of initiatives across Somalia, totalling over £16 million.

### **A technically robust approach to remote monitoring and evaluation**

Integrity's remote monitoring capability draws on an extensive network of contacts and relationships with interlocutors in every governorate and major town or city in Syria. Since 2011 Integrity has conducted more than 1,000 interviews inside Syria or remotely, profiled more than 700 Syrian organisations and networks and provided more than 50 research and third party monitoring reports. Third party monitoring of humanitarian relief distributions has included real time monitoring of food baskets and non-food items in western and northern Aleppo for Care International. An extensive team of field monitors was able to provide Care with assurance that items were reaching intended beneficiaries and gave insight to the distribution methods used by field-partners, ultimately helping them to improve distribution effectiveness. A similar programme of third-party monitoring support was provided for the UAE's humanitarian response in Syria. Integrity's third party monitoring of ICSP/AJACS has also provided an evidence base at outcome and impact level for the Steering Committee, to judge the effectiveness of the Free Syrian Police and perceptions of the FSP among local communities.

Tamkeen and AJACS both have robust community and programme level M&E functions, which use detailed and thorough methods to provide timely assessments of communities in Syria, enabling both programme teams to make informed decisions about community selection, ongoing engagement and project development. Tamkeen relies on its teams of Field Officers and 10 in-country researchers to provide stakeholder/service mapping, community briefs, and project evaluation reports. Tamkeen committees also play a key role in monitoring project results and producing evaluation reports. AJACS takes a similarly thorough approach to M&E, engaging around 100 data points per community through focus groups, key informant interviews and questionnaires to provide the programme team with detailed community and stakeholder profiles.

### **3. Client liaison arrangements, including communication, dealing with problems and escalation procedures**

The relationship between Adam Smith International (ASI) and the donors for our Syria work is particularly close, given the high risk environment of remote management, conflict and political sensitivity. On both AJACS and Tamkeen we maintain open and frequent discussion between the project management team and the client, and swiftly raise issues that a project is facing. We see it as vital, on a project as immediate and high-risk as Emergency Stabilisation Response Mechanism, to have a close and responsive relationship with HMG. This will include joint planning (on deployment into new locations and on service delivery modalities), sharing research assessments on locations, including profiles of local partners, and frequent briefings about progress and risk.

#### **Our team structure**

In ASI Turkey responsibility for managing projects and liaising with clients is carried between our Project Director, based in Istanbul, and Project Managers, based largely in Gaziantep. A Project Manager is assigned to each of AJACS and Tamkeen, focused on project delivery, quality of implementation, resourcing, results, risk management and finances. They are thus close to the project's day-to-day existence. A Project Director then oversees both projects' delivery and both Project Managers, determines projects' strategic direction, and manages major risks and issues. This structure is overseen by the Afghanistan, Middle East and North Africa Director and a Syria risk team in London consisting of ASI's Managing Director, Director of Governance Reform, COO and Director of Security. Both Project Managers and Director communicate on a daily basis with Team Leaders and project staff as well as with each other, ensuring that all developments, risks, results and decisions are communicated and that problems are escalated if necessary. In addition to project matters and client priorities, risks related to the conflict and security in Syria are discussed.

This structure ensures that each member of ASI's Turkey-based team is in a good position to receive instruction and guidance from the FCO and DFID as well as to brief them about any of the matters under his or her purview. For routine matters the Project Manager takes the lead whilst for more important, problematic or strategic matters the Project Director will step in.

#### **Regular meetings and briefings**

The project management team on AJACS and Tamkeen meets regularly with counterparts from the FCO and DFID as well as with representatives from other donors – the US, Denmark, the Netherlands, and the European Commission – to discuss the projects' progress and any obstacles that the project may be facing. There are formal fortnightly meetings in Istanbul between the Project Director and AJACS secretariat representatives, and informal meetings as and when the need arises. Project Managers in Istanbul and Gaziantep (and Amman) also meet or speak on at least a fortnightly basis with representatives from FCO or DFID, to discuss written weekly updates, budgets and donor priorities. There are also quarterly meetings between our team and HMG, linked to the quarterly report and the quarterly donor steering board. This range of meetings maintains close links between the client and the project and ensures that the project remains responsive to UK government policy.

#### **Regular reporting, M&E and research**

Fortnightly, monthly, quarterly and annual reporting offers the principal formal reporting mechanism to donors. These provide regular updates and analysis of work progress, issues and actions, success stories, risks and mitigations. Reporting covers the spectrum of logframe levels, from activities through outputs to outcome level, and the results captured by our M&E teams in fortnightly or monthly reports feed into the more rigorous presentation of progress in quarterly and annual reviews. All reports represent a collation of several different sources of information, ensuring the reliability of the product. In addition, reports can be generated by third party monitors, if this is not provided via the donor, or in besieged and inaccessible areas where field officers and local partners must be managed remotely.

Due to the fluid situation in Syria, the conflict can evolve quickly on a local level and actors shift rapidly. Our approach includes continuous stakeholder mapping provided through our research teams independently of the field team to identify problems early, keep on top of the evolving conflict dynamics and provide detached analysis that can feed into programme decisions. On AJACS we present weekly summaries of our atmospheric research, showing political and conflict events and trends in the provinces in which we work. This ongoing research into local dynamics allows for early identification and escalation of operational and programmatic issues and provides checks and balances on the information we receive from field officers, local partners and stakeholder groups.

#### **Managing risks and issues**

All our risks and issues are logged and dated in our risk and issues logs. These are followed up and dates of resolution tracked. Lessons learned from issues and risks are logged and integrated into programming. Our risk and issues logs are shared fortnightly with the AJACS secretariat and quarterly with DFID as part of our reporting.

#### 4. Challenges and risks you anticipate in fiduciary, cash handling, and equipment security/tracking

ASI has learnt a number of important lessons about risks and risk management related to remote management of projects inside Syria from the implementation of Tamkeen and AJACS. Below we list the risks and challenges we are likely to encounter during this programme, and how our procedures will mitigate these.

##### **Procurement and fiduciary risk:**

We will use rules for the **procurement of goods** which have been tried and tested on Tamkeen and AJACS. Under these guidelines, items under the value of \$500 can be directly procured by the community, items valued between \$501 and \$39,999 are subject to a comparative bid analysis, and procurements with the value of above \$40,000 are managed by the programme and subject to a public tender.

The risk of fraud is significant with a rapid response project, especially given the time pressure created by an emergency context and difficult wartime conditions prevailing in the location. These may require flexibility in some procurement procedures – for example, in some situations running a competitive tender may be difficult. Remote management also creates an incentive for unscrupulous individuals to attempt to rig the procurement process or fabricate evidence of delivery. We have found that three kinds of mitigating measures work to reduce the incidence of fraud.

- **Robust training** on clear and sensible procedures: Field staff must be thoroughly trained to fully understand all procedures and be able to communicate them to partners and suppliers. The difference between technical non-compliance (procedures that must be amended due to difficult circumstances, such as when only a single supplier exists for a commodity and three quotes cannot be collected) and fraud (wilful deception for personal gain) will be clearly explained. The procurement and finance functions will be separated within the grants management unit.
- Thorough **monitoring throughout implementation**: We will employ both regular internal auditing and third-party monitoring. Apart from scheduled monitoring, we can arrange third-party monitoring at relatively short notice through agreements with other donor programmes working in opposition-held Syria such as Mayday's Civil Defence. We will also employ local experts to verify the quality of goods and service provision, where appropriate.
- **Swift action** once attempted **fraud** is detected: Generally if the programme detects an attempt at fraud quickly and acts decisively (and sensitively) to rectify it, it sends a clear signal to the community that fraud will not be tolerated, and greatly reduces the incentive for future attempts. While appropriate action will vary, the programme's worth and value to citizens can be exploited as leverage.

If partner institutions (NGOs or local authority councils) do not employ proper HR or financial procedures and checks, and where some funding is channelled through the partner institutions, we will work with them to define appropriate and workable procedures before disbursing funds through them. The replenishment of funds on a "milestone" basis is an option, by requiring a review and approval of all documentation before releasing an additional tranche of funding.

When disbursing **stipends**, where possible a contract will be signed with the LAC stating which workers will be paid and how much, and the LAC will submit timesheets. Members of the LAC and the finance/payroll section of the GMU will meet monthly to pay the salaries in cash. To avoid ghost workers, we will file signatures for workers paid monthly and check against these before releasing payments.

**Cash handling:** Payment is only made once the goods have been received or the services have been delivered. A field officer verifies the delivery of the service/goods and ensures that all the documentation is in place, before making payment from the advance that he/she has received previously. In a direct payment to suppliers, the funds will be transferred and frozen at the nearest *hawala* office until the field team is satisfied that all conditions have been met and documentation submitted. After this, suppliers can collect the payment directly from the *hawala* office.

The key risk related to the physical handling of cash is that a Field Officer (FO) or Financial Field Officer (FFO) is attacked or robbed while carrying cash. To mitigate this, FOs and FFOs will be encouraged to be discreet and follow feasible security procedures, including minimizing travel time by using the closest *hawala* office.

**Asset and equipment security and tracking:** Key risks in this area include supplies being stolen en route to the community, mitigated by conducting procurement locally wherever possible, as well as encouraging suppliers to be discreet and employ all feasible security precautions; and proscribed groups gaining possession of equipment supplied, in particular heavy machinery. To mitigate this, we will monitor the security situation and introduce a "traffic light" security rating system for communities and neighbourhoods, removing equipment from the area at risk.

**Supplier selection and vetting:** To avoid the risk of a selected supplier being a member of a proscribed group, we will use rigorous vetting procedures for all suppliers for procurements of more than \$500, including checking international lists, collecting local references, background checks, and social media. However, in some cases we have encountered reluctance among suppliers or even teachers or municipal workers to give their details for vetting. It's important to communicate the purpose of vetting very clearly, so that community members do not feel threatened. Finally, to save time and avoid delays, we will use pre-vetted suppliers wherever possible, including those used on Tamkeen and AJACS.

Name	<b>Mark Etherington CBE</b>	Organisation	Adam Smith International
Qualifications	» MPhil International Relations, Cambridge, 2003 (1 <sup>st</sup> for thesis on Bosnian war Safe Areas 92-95). » Russian politics and foreign policy, Diploma, Russian MFA Diplomatic Academy, Moscow, 2003 » BA English and Philosophy, York University		
Country experience	Iraq, Palestine, Kuwait, South Sudan, Afghanistan, Kosovo, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia-Montenegro, Zimbabwe, Somalia, South Africa, Haiti, Sweden, Austria, Norway, US, UK		
Competencies	Strategic leadership; security sector reform and change management in fragile and conflict affected states; political and economic analysis; relationship management and network building		

### Proposed project input

Mark Etherington is our proposed Team Lead for the project. His responsibilities will include: strategic leadership, client liaison, team management, technical leadership, and stakeholder management.

### Previous experience and added value to the project

Mark Etherington is a stabilisation expert with over 25 years of experience working on development projects in fragile and conflict affected states such as Iraq, Afghanistan and South Sudan. He has extensive experience of stabilisation in Iraq, where he worked as an FCO Governorate Coordinator for the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). In this role, Mark was responsible for all aspects of governance and administration in the southern province of Wasit, containing nearly one million people. Between 2006 and 2007, Mark led a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Iraq comprising members of the UK Ministry of Defence, Department for International Development and Foreign and Commonwealth Office; the U.S. Department of State and U.S Army; USAid; and the Danish Foreign Office. The PRT provided capacity building in governance, rule of law, infrastructure and economics. In addition to his experience in the Middle East, Mark has also led security sector projects in other conflict-affected regions. Between 2011 and 2013, Mark was Team Leader for the Security Sector Reform Project in South Sudan (SSDDTP-1&2). This project delivered impressive results under Mark's leadership, especially in the challenging context of the referendum and independence in July 2011, significant conflict within South Sudan, and fragile government finances. Most recently, Mark was Deputy Head of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, where he led an unarmed multi-national civilian mission to observe and report on the situation in Ukraine, and to facilitate dialogue among all parties to the crisis. Mark was made CBE in 2004 for services to the Foreign Office; and Commander of the German Order of Merit for services to the German Government in Ukraine, where he negotiated the release of rebel-held German military hostages. Mark has also served in Northern Ireland with the Army in Armagh and West Belfast. Mark has published widely about topics such as institution-building in conflict-affected states, and gave public evidence to the UK Iraq Enquiry. His book, *Revolt on the Tigris: the al Sadr Uprising and the Governing of Iraq*, was published in the Cambridge University *Studies in International Crisis* series, and serialised in the UK national press. Mark holds an MPhil in International Relations from Cambridge University and a BA Hons in English and Philosophy from York University.

### Employment history

2014	Deputy Head, OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, (FCO-seconded).
2011 -2012	Team leader SSDTP (DFID)
2005 – present	UK Government's Stabilisation Unit – numerous roles Iraq, Afghanistan, Zimbabwe, Haiti, Somalia, UK
2005	Head HMG Helmand Planning Team (UK Cabinet Office)
2005	Strategic Assessments Initiative, Chief of Staff Palestine - IDF withdrawal from West Bank
2004	Head of Elections Support Team Afghanistan, (OSCE).
2003 – 2004	Governorate Coordinator Iraq, Coalition Provisional Authority, Wasit Province. (FCO).
2002	Director, Office of Political Affairs (and Deputy Head of Mission) OSCE Mission to Kosovo (FCO)
1998 – 2002	Senior Mission Liaison Officer OSCE, Federal Republic Yugoslavia Missions, OSCE Secretariat Vienna, D/Head of Mission OSCE Mission to Kosovo, A/Head OSCE Mission Serbia-Montenegro.
1996 – 1997	Founder of Resolution, a post-war reconstruction firm in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
1992 – 1995	European Community Monitor Mission during the war, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. (FCO)
1984 – 1991	Officer, British Army (Parachute Regiment)

### Selected experience

**Ukraine: OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, Deputy Head: 2014.** Mark was Deputy Head of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMMU). The Mission was deployed on 21 March 2014, following a request to the OSCE by Ukraine's government and a consensus decision by all 57 OSCE participating States. Mark led the unarmed, civilian mission, with a specific focus on liaison and negotiation with Eastern rebel groups.

**South Sudan: Team Leader, Security Sector Development and Defence Transformation Programme: 2011-13**  
 Mark was Team Leader, responsible for the management and technical oversight of 6 workstreams. He worked to set the strategic technical objectives of the project during this period, through discussion with the project's advisers, South

Sudanese counterparts and DFID. Mark provided the day-to-day driving force, energy and quality assurance on the ground, and led the management of relationships with senior Sudanese counterparts and oversight of relationships between other counterparts and the project's advisers. Mark has led a number of formal progress reviews during his leadership, including working with DFID to complete the 2012 Annual Review, and was also closely involved in the development of SSDDTP-1's revised logical framework, working with the project's M&E Adviser and DFID counterparts. He has overseen all planning of work and has worked closely with the Programme Manager to manage all financial, contractual and personnel issues.

**UK: Stabilisation Unit (formerly Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit), Team Leader and Conflict Adviser:** Mark is a SC-cleared (former DV Strap II) Team Leader for UK's Stabilisation Unit, and has undertaken the following roles since 2005:

- **Afghanistan: DFID District Delivery Programme: 2011.** Mark was Team leader for a DFID £20m District Delivery Study in Afghanistan.

- **Zimbabwe: HMG Security and Justice programme and policy study: 2008-2010.** Mark conducted a 100-day study of Security and Justice issues for HMG. This entailed interaction with a wide range of civil society groups both within the security and justice sector and in the fields of constitution-making, public communications and the media; regional academic institutions; Parliament; and protracted (and difficult) primary research at all levels in Zimbabwe, including with the MDC (and moderate members of ZPF).

- **Haiti: Head of UK assistance team to the Government of Haiti: Feb-Mar 2010.** Mark led a team that provided rapid assistance to the Government in re-establishing control of damaged prisons infrastructure and to re-build and run damaged prisons to international norms. This required close collaboration with the Haitian Government, Prisons service, and primary allies.

- **Somalia: HMG programme and policy study: Oct-Nov 2009.** Mark worked on a policy study for the FCO that was commissioned to help update the UK's Somalia strategy and relay key post-conflict state-building lessons. The team visited Kenya, Uganda, Burundi and Ethiopia, meeting senior military leaders and convening discussions in each.

- **Balkans: FCO Western Balkans Group (WBG) strategy review: Jul-Aug 2008.** Mark assisted the WBG in a review of existing strategy in Bosnia-Herzegovina post-Dayton agreement in 1995.

- **Iraq: Head, UK-led Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT): April 2006-Jan 2007.** Mark led a team providing capacity-building in Governance, Rule of Law, Infrastructure and Economics. He was Head of a civil-military group, comprising members of the UK MoD, DFID and FCO; the U.S. Department of State and U.S Army; USAid; and the Danish Foreign Office. Its budget was US\$40m. The PRT's primary Iraqi interlocutors were the Provincial Councils of four provinces, the Courts, judges, barristers and police force, economic stimulus packages; infrastructure management strategies; and line ministries.

- **Afghanistan: Head, Cabinet Office planning team for Helmand: Nov-Dec 2005.** Mark was Head of the Cabinet Office planning team for Helmand which produced a joint plan for UK's civil-military deployment to Helmand. The plan was completed by mid-December 2005 and formed the central platform for UK planning thereafter. It involved detailed research in London and Afghanistan; and an intricate meeting and consultation programme with some 150 people, international organisations, agencies and NGOs and multiple Afghan institutions.

**Iraq: Governorate Coordinator, Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA):** Mark worked as one of the four FCO governorate coordinators (province governors) in Iraq in September 2003. He was head of the CPA team in the southern Shi'ia province of Wasit that borders Iran. In this role, Mark led a team comprised of members of the US State Department, UK FCO and DFID. As civil authority, Mark and his team had responsibility for all aspects of governance and administration in a province of some 970,000 people.

**Palestine: Assessment of security sector, concept of operations:** Mark worked alongside the US Envoy with Palestinian security forces and civilian authorities on a blueprint for Palestinian SSR and civil response in the immediate run-up to IDF withdrawal from parts of Gaza and the West Bank.

**Afghanistan: OSCE Elections Support Team: 2004.** Mark was A/Head of OSCE Elections Support Team in Afghanistan. Mark established and led a team in Kabul and 11 provinces.

**Kosovo: Director, Office of Political Affairs (and Deputy Head of Mission), OSCE Mission to Kosovo: 2002.** Mark was Deputy Head of the OSCE Mission in Kosovo (OMIK), the largest OSCE Mission world-wide with a budget of €85m. Mark was responsible for political and operational strategy, political analysis and reporting. His role focused on supporting and strengthening Kosovo's weak and nascent structures. Mark led 3000 staff in 28 field locations.

**Federal Republic Yugoslavia: Senior Liaison Officer OSCE, FRY Missions, OSCE Secretariat Vienna: 1998-2001.** Mark was Senior Liaison Officer (FRY Missions) for SSR missions in Balkans, both prior to and following the NATO bombing campaign. Mark helped set up the new OSCE Kosovo mission of 3000 staff and officials under a UN umbrella; and both established and temporarily led the new OSCE Mission to Serbia-Montenegro post-revolution.

**Federal Republic of Yugoslavia: FCO Seconded EC Monitor Mission: 1992-1995.** Mark was an FCO Seconded, based within the EC Monitor Mission in the FRY during the '92-'95 war. He was responsible for liaison with civilian and military authorities, particularly in the designated Bosnian safe area of Bihac, then besieged by four separate armies. He later became Regional Head Hungary, responsible for border sanctions enforcement.

Name	<b>Nicholas Haslam</b>	Organisation	Adam Smith International
Qualifications	» Certificate in Making Markets Work for the Poor, The Springfield Centre, UK, August 2011 » MA in International Relations and International Economics, John Hopkins University, Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, 2007 » BA Classics, Trinity College, University of Cambridge, 2005		
Country experience	Syria, Kenya, Somalia, Burundi, Ethiopia, Tanzania, Pakistan		
Competencies	Stabilisation, public policy, project management and strategy, risk and issue management, research and analysis, writing		

### Proposed project input

Nicholas Haslam is our proposed Project Manager for the project, stepping into the role from his usual role as ASI's Project Director of Syria programmes. His responsibilities will include: Resource management, risk management, strategic guidance, project reporting, quality assurance and client liaison.

### Previous experience and added value to the project

Nicholas Haslam is an experienced Istanbul-based Senior Manager with Adam Smith International, with an in-depth understanding of advising and managing development projects in the Middle East and Africa. He has worked variously on stabilisation, public sector reform and public policy development in Syria, Somalia, Pakistan and Kenya for a range of international donors, primarily the FCO and DFID. He is currently Project Director of two HMG-funded remote management projects in opposition Syria, namely Tamkeen and AJACS, the first building effective local government via service delivery and the second establishing policing and judicial services to improve community security.

Prior to this Nicholas was Team Leader of a UK-funded youth employment and skills development programme in Mombasa, guiding the programme through the design phase into implementation. He has been involved in the design of several DFID programmes, including the Somaliland Development Fund and private sector development programming in Somalia. He has managed a varied project portfolio, including promoting a green economy in Jordan; drafting a financing mechanism and trust fund under Kenya's Climate Change Action Plan; and improving quality and access in the Kenyan education sector. He has in the past worked on and managed social and community development and education activities in South Asia. Nicholas holds a MA in International Studies from Johns Hopkins University and a BA in Classics from the University of Cambridge.

### Employment history

2010-present	Manager and Senior Manager, Adam Smith International, Kenya and Turkey
2007-2010	Analyst, Idea Carbon, UK
2007	Analyst, Economist Intelligence Unit, UK
2003	Community Development Assistant, Sarhad Rural Development Programme, Pakistan

### Selected experience

**Syria: Tamkeen, Project Director: 2015.** Nicholas has taken over as Project Director of Tamkeen, an £18 million DFID project that builds capacity for governance in communities across opposition-controlled or contested areas of Northern and Southern Syria – Aleppo, Idlib, Dera'a and Rif Damascus. Through a rigorous process, Tamkeen supports community committees to plan, budget, procure and oversee the delivery of services in education, healthcare, infrastructure, governance and livelihoods. Since its inception in November 2013, TAMKEEN has successfully distributed over \$2.5m through 105 projects in 18 community committees. The project received an A++ (the highest possible mark) from DFID in its annual review in late 2014. Nicholas works with the Tamkeen leadership and DFID to determine project strategy and direction, manage risks and ensure delivery.

**Syria: Access to Justice and Community Security, Project Director: 2015.** AJACS aims to support effective and accountable Syrian security and justice (S&J) actors, and build their capacity to deliver services that respond to local community security needs. To date, the project has supported the Free Syrian Police in Aleppo, Idlib and Latakia provinces through training, equipment and organisational development. In tandem, AJACS enables security and justice actors to engage more effectively with their local communities, by developing platforms for dialogue where local stakeholders can engage meaningfully in the planning and delivery of services. Again, Nicholas is responsible for client liaison works, strategy matters, risks and quality of implementation in partnership with AJACS's leadership.

**Somaliland: Somaliland Development Fund, Senior Manager: 2013.** Nicholas worked with two governance, stability and public financial management specialists to design the Somaliland Development Fund (SDF) on behalf of DFID and Danida. The goal of the SDF is to enhance the Somaliland government's ability to deliver and facilitate basic services such as education and health, provide energy and infrastructure, engage effectively with its citizens and manage its budget effectively at a national level to enable the state to perform its functions more effectively. Nicholas was analyst, writer and technical coordinator, and was responsible for co-writing the appraisal and management sections of DFID's business case.

**Somalia: DFID private sector development programme, Analyst and Technical Coordinator: 2011-13.** Nicholas worked as an analyst and technical coordinator on a team designing a DFID private sector development strategy and programme in Somaliland, intended to develop options to accelerate international investment. Through a combination of in-country research and interviews, Nicholas and the team assessed the means by which Somaliland diaspora, foreign investors and firms can be incentivised to invest more. They also looked at existing investments and investment vehicles that could be employed and how to improve the wider investment climate.

**Kenya: Youth Employment and Skills Development in Mombasa, Team Leader: 2013-14.** Nicholas acted as Team Leader in a DFID youth employment project in Mombasa, Kenya with a particular focus on education and skills. The project addresses the causes of unemployment in Mombasa County, and the barriers that prevent young people from finding work, through technical and vocational education systems. It also explores viable sectors and opportunities for employment for young people. It places a particular focus upon the nexus between the private sector, education and young people, and sits firmly alongside the youth and employment strategies and goals of the institutions of the Government of Kenya: the Offices of the President and Deputy President, the Ministries of Industrialization and Enterprise Development, of Devolution and Planning, and of Education, the Vision 2030 Secretariat, and the Mombasa Governor and County Government.

**Kenya: National Climate Change Action Plan, Project Manager, Analyst and Technical Coordinator: 2011-12.** Nicholas was Project Manager, Analyst and Technical Coordinator on ASI's and Vivid Economics' project to design a mechanism to finance mitigation and adaptation actions in the climate change space. The work formed part of Kenya's broader Climate Change Action Plan. The mechanism is intended to harness available sources of climate finance, public or private, multilateral, bilateral or domestic, and channel them into appropriate projects and activities in Kenya. Nicholas's role was to engage stakeholders, review literature, liaise with the Government of Kenya and development partners and contribute to the writing of reports.


**Kenya: Kenya Market Assistance Programme (MAP), Analyst and Researcher: 2011.** Nicholas was Analyst and Researcher on a DFID-funded project which aims to implement tailored market interventions, in the 'making markets work for the poor (M4P)' framework. The project aimed to increase market access and income generation amongst the poor. Nicholas carried out analyses to identify the most suitable sectors in which to intervene, and conducted an environmental appraisal of all MAP's interventions to ensure environmental sustainability.

**Burundi: Support to the Ministry of EAC, Project Manager and Assistant to the Team Leader: 2011.** Nicholas managed a project providing support to the Ministry of EAC in the year of Burundi's chairmanship of the EAC (2011). The project aimed to strengthen institutional capacity and the use of information, and to nurture knowledge and skills in trade, law, policymaking and economics. In addition to his managerial role and ensuring quality control, Nicholas was tasked, along with the Team Leader, with producing Burundi's Regional Integration Strategy Paper and with mentoring Ministry staff in the production of trade and economic policy papers.

**Burundi: Support of Burundi's Office Burundais des Recettes (OBR): 2011-2012.** Nicholas was responsible for working with the OBR, with TradeMark East Africa (the OBR's development partner) and with ASI's consultants to promote the successful and timely of the project's goals. ASI's support to the OBR began in 2009, and has seen the transformation of Burundi's revenue authority into a unified revenue administration, with a new staff, revamped revenue collection, customs, financial management systems and legislation, a tailored organisational structure, IT infrastructure. The data show that reforms have seen revenue rise by 30% between 2010 and 2011, and projections show a similar increase this year. Work is now focused on continuing the organisational reform process and enhancing revenue generation and management systems and laws.

**Ethiopia / Tanzania / Global: Analyst: 2010.** Over the past five years Nicholas has produced and co-produced a number of reports and analyses on international and domestic climate finance and carbon markets. They have covered a range of issues, from climate finance negotiations and realities under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) to the use of climate finance in developing countries to carbon market dynamics in the European Union and Asia. In preparing and writing these reports and pieces of analysis he has worked closely with senior figures in the UNFCCC, World Bank, national governments and academic institutions such as the London School of Economics. Clients included small and large businesses, governments in the developed and developing world and multilateral institutions.

<b>Team Leader:</b> <u>Mark Etherington</u>
<b>Project Manager:</b> <u>Nick Haslam</u>
<b>Project Director:</b> <u>Zane Kanderian</u> – ASI director, Afghanistan and MENA region. Lead strategist of ASI's work in Syria and across the region. Highly relevant experience in stabilisation, S&J and fiduciary risk management, including in Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan › Risk management, strategic guidance, project reporting and client liaison
<b>Research Manager:</b> <u>Schadi Semnani</u> - Fluent Arabic speaking researcher. Currently Research Advisor on ASI's Syria project, AJACS. Experience researching and authoring report on local councils inside Syria. › Lead researcher and manager of research team › Providing up-to-date information on stakeholders, existing and expected stabilisation needs and strategic situation › Producing bespoke research products, including rapid assessments
<b>Field Coordinator:</b> <u>Melhem Mansour</u> - Native Arabic speaker with expertise in project development, capacity building, and training design. Has extensive network within Syria and ability to remotely manage field staff. › Needs analysis with identified stakeholders and partners within Syria › Technical intervention planning, including specification of services and equipment needs and identification of experts, partners and suppliers › Managing implementation of direct and jointly managed interventions
<b>Finance Manager:</b> <u>Boris Bjedov</u> – Certified accountant and auditor with 15 years' experience in PFM, internal controls, strategic planning and training auditors and financial managers. Former senior monitor of the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund and ASI's financial manager on a UK provincial service delivery project in Afghanistan. <u>Fareeha Shareef</u> – Certified chartered accountant, auditor and fraud examiner with 14 years' experience in financial management, audit and internal controls, including in Afghanistan. Strong training skills.* › Reviewing and repurposing financial management procedures for rapid response › Recruitment and training of grants and stipend officers › Oversight and approval authority for technical project expenditure, including day to day management of finance workstream and implementation of procedures
<b>Communications Manager:</b> <u>Hani Dweik</u> - Communication consultant and native Arabic speaker with over 13 years of experience of communications, training delivery and project management. › Drafting project communications plan and guidelines › Training staff, including field officers › Planning and monitoring individual campaigns and problem-solving
<b>M&amp;E Adviser:</b> <u>Janee Crane</u> - M&E consultant with over 18 years' experience. M&E Lead and TL on DFID's project to improve provincial administration and service delivery in Helmand, Bamyán and Uruzgan provinces in Afghanistan. Strong on programme design. › Drafting M&E plan and associated materials, with FCO involvement › Implementing M&E plan, including data management and reporting



\* Alternative candidate

**Deputy Project Manager:** George Hamer – ASI manager formerly head of business development in the Levant. Project and financial management experience in FCAS, including history with ASI's Syria projects. Strong risk management capability.

**Procurement Team:** Chemonics will assign their procurement experts to the project, including a manager and local procurement officers in Jordan and Turkey.  
 › Responding to identified procurement needs outside Syria, including assisting other teams with closer specification of equipment to be procured  
 › Sourcing, procurement, temporary storage and delivery in Syria of specialised equipment which cannot be acquired in-country.

**ST Experts:** We have immediate access to a variety of short-term thematic experts who have developed through our projects a practical understanding of what can be achieved inside Syria remotely, with limited resources. All three consortium partners will contribute.  
 › Provision of expertise on the design of stabilisation interventions in specific technical areas, including health, education and infrastructure.

**Field Officers:** These Syrian field roles will be recruited over the course of the project, using our existing networks of known and qualified individuals developed through our current Syria project portfolio.  
 › Ultimate liaison between beneficiaries and the project  
 › Specialisation in one or more of: research/monitoring; financial management/procurement; planning/needs assessment; communications  
 › Managed by relevant workstream leader according to specialism

**Field Supervisors**  
 › Senior field officers, serving as in-country focal point for FOs and assisting with recruitment, vetting, training and management

**Stipends and Grants Officers:** These roles will be occupied by Syrian staff in Turkey and Jordan, to be recruited prior to the deployment phase in preparation for scale-up.  
 › Financial management of grants and stipends expenditure, including documentation, record keeping and audit, directly liaising with financial field officers and partners in Syria

**Mandatory questions 6 and 7**

*Do you understand the potential risks and have the knowledge and experience to develop an effective risk plan for your staff? Do you have the capability to manage their Duty of Care responsibilities throughout the life of the contract?*

Yes


*Are you prepared to work collaboratively with other HMG implementing partners when required?*

Yes

## 8. Duty of Care Plan

Adam Smith International has been managing projects in hostile environments since 2002 and Syrian specific projects since 2013. Over this period we have developed a robust and responsive approach to risk management that combines corporate policies, set at the central level, with standard operating procedures that are tailored to the requirements of each country. We have dedicated resources to deliver on these policies and procedures, particularly in the Afghanistan, Middle East and North Africa region where we have developed a Regional Operations Management team to handle the constantly changing environment in that region.

The following sets out how this Regional Operations Management team is structured in relation to duty of care of a specific project team working in Syria.



The Chief Operations Officer, Layth Bunni, takes overall responsibility for risk management in relation to the all Adam Smith International staff and contractors. Direct responsibility for programmatic risk lies with the Regional Director and the Project Director. Direct responsibility for operational risks lies with the Regional Operations Manager who delegates day-to-day security management to the Regional Security Manager. The Regional Security Manager works closely with the Project Manager on day to day security and duty of care issues. The Regional Operations Manager and Regional Security Manager conduct a full security review prior to commencing any new projects to take account of the rapid change in security environment. The following sets out our current and planned arrangements for monitoring risks, responding to emergencies and mitigating risks on an ongoing basis.

### Duty of Care for Our Staff in Syria

Adam Smith International's current UK-funded projects rely upon Syrian field staff to liaise directly with the communities that the projects support. Based in Syria, the field staff face a particularly high level of risk, which we monitor in the following ways.

**Personalised security plans and training:** On first joining the project, a Personal Protection Plan (PPP) is drawn up for individual field staff, which is tailored to their individual needs. In this process the risks associated in working in their locations are outlined, and point-by-point plans made for how to mitigate these risks. Field staff are also provided with emergency money, to be used to facilitate the emergency evacuation or movement within the country should the need arise.

The PPP covers risk and mitigation for ground attacks, kidnapping and arrest, artillery attacks and improvised explosive devices (IED). These plans and mitigations were developed in consultation with the Adam Smith International Head of Global Risk & Security.

Field staff receive comprehensive first aid training specifically designed for conflict situations, and the project provides all field staff with a first aid kit.

**Daily check-ins:** On a day-to-day basis, field staff receive a phone call from the Security Officer who is based in Turkey or Jordan. During these calls the Security Officer logs the field staff's locations and notes any security concerns that they may have. Information is gathered on the general security situation in the different locations, which is then fed to the Regional Security Manager for review and action if needed. Working from Gaziantep and Amman, the Regional Security Manager collates information from the field, and combines it with intelligence gathered through his own networks to produce an ongoing analysis of the conflict, and provide an objective evaluation of the threats that each community is facing. In this way, we have developed a system that enables us to maintain an up-to-date understanding of the conflict, and the impact that it may have upon the safety of the field staff on the ground.

**Equipment:** All field staff receive a complete package of equipment, including trauma (first aid) kit, smart phone with internet access, satellite internet equipment/subscription and a portable generator.

### **Responding to an emergency**

**Crisis preparedness:** Emergency response plans are already in place for all field staff, which provide detailed instructions as to how to respond to any emergency situations that may arise. In line with standard ASI procedure, in the event of any emergency situation an Emergency Response Team (ERT) in Gaziantep or Amman is established to manage the situation. The ERT reports to the Adam Smith International Crisis Management Team (CMT) in London. Using the ERPs as a guide, the teams will manage the response to the incident until resolution.

The ERPs include responses for the evacuation/relocation/hibernation, kidnaping or arrest, loss of contact, medical emergencies and death of a Field Officer. These plans are reviewed with individual field staff at the time of employment and during workshops throughout the year.

### **Being prepared for all other risks**

**Medical coverage:** In addition to this, all field staff working in Syria are provided with emergency medical insurance, to assist them in the case of a medical emergency. Although there are no cross-border ambulance services capable of medical evacuation, the PPP encourages all field staff to consider plans for where they could receive emergency medical treatment in the case of an emergency.

**Psychological support:** ASI has retained the services of professional trauma counsellors and has also trained both senior staff members and associates who have daily contact with the field staff in Trauma Risk Management (TRiM). Support sessions are confidential and can be held in person or via telephone or Skype. Counselling is designed to help staff and associates develop self-care strategies, cope with stress and trauma and address circumstances that affect work and relationships with colleagues.

**Supporting and empowering workers in the field:** While our operations and security team provides monitoring and conflict analysis to ensure that we have up to date information, we empower our field staff to make judgements about their own security as they have the best information about the situation in their locations. On no occasion are field staff requested to travel to or stay in a location where they feel unsafe. All travel in and out of Syria is limited to essential movements only.

**Security in Turkey and Jordan:** With regards to the risks facing staff working in Gaziantep and Amman, the respective Country Operations Manager, Regional Operations Manager and Regional Security Manager is on call 24/7 to tackle any issues that may arise. Tracking the local security situation, the team disseminates information about any local disturbances, and advises project staff how to mitigate any associated risks. The team also tracks the comings and goings of all project staff, meaning that we have a constant awareness of our staff's whereabouts.

Emergency Response Plans are already in place in Turkey/Jordan. These plans cover office security, kidnaping and abduction response, missing staff, arrest or detention of staff and serious injury or sickness of staff. Additionally, staff are required to be contactable at all times and this is regularly checked and re-enforced. All staff are provided with a mobile phone, and with adequate phone credit, for the countries in which they are working. As such, the Operations & Security Team can easily contact staff in the case of an emergency. Staff are provided with an "in-case of emergency" (ICE) wallet sized card listing important local phone numbers plus the Adam Smith International 24/7 emergency hotline in London.

ASI is also investing in a "real time/live" security tracking software package for our staff in Jordan and Turkey that will allow real time check-in and tracking of staff. This would allow us to achieve the above more efficiently, making enforcement less time consuming.

**Medical coverage:** All staff working in Turkey/Jordan are provided with emergency medical insurance, to assist them in the case of a medical emergency. Additionally, all staff have access to TriM counsellors.

**Crisis preparedness:** An Emergency Response Plan (ERP) is in place for all staff in Turkey/Jordan as detailed above. All staff also attend Adam Smith International's in-house Hostile Environment Awareness Training (HEAT).



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