

THE PRESIDENT'S INTELLIGENCE CHECKLIST

File

19 JULY 1961 TOP SECRET

<u> </u>	Declassified in Part - Sanitize	d Copy Approved	For Release 2015/05/04 : CIA-RDP79T00936A000100260001-7	<u> </u>
•	Decided in Fart Camaze	a copy Approved	50X1	
1.	Communist China's foreign outlook		502	X1
			a) Bloc unity would be Peiping's basic objective in Sino-Soviet relations during 1961 and Peiping would not take the initiative to reopen the debate 50 even though the Chinese Communists have not changed their basic positions.	X1
2.	Portugal plans to increase military forces in Angola		Revised plans call for reinforcements to up the strength to 40,000double the number Lisbon estimated last May. 17,000 Portuguese troops are already in Angola in addition to about 9,000 native troops. The Portuguese Foreign Minister told the British Ambassador that Lisbon would give "reports, facts and figures" to the UN Subcommittee on Angola but would not at this time	50 X 1

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3.	Ikeda consolidates control over Japanese conservatives	Reorganization of the party and cabinet was completed yesterday, with Ikeda having won considerable cooperation from faction leaders in his own party Ikeda reserved the important post of the party secretary general for a member of his own faction to tighten his grip on the party machinery before			
		his term as party president expires a year hence.			

Council seat being vacated by Ecuador

its candidacy and probably hopes to capitalize on its withdrawal from the race last October in favor of Chile. There also remains some doubt whether Guatemala will be willing to withdraw its candidacy which was announced 22 June primarily as a counter to Cuba. Any failure of a majority of the Latin American caucus to agree on a candidate probably would encourage the Africans and others to seek the seat, one of two now normally assigned to Latin

Cuba continues to maintain 50X1

50X1

America.

5.	Embassy Seoul appraises extent of Communist influence in new regime	Berger concludes: a) the motivations of the revolt are patriotic, nationalistic, and anti-Communist; b) there may be some opportunists and
		Communist "sleepers" among the revolu-50> tionary leaders; c) Pak Chong-hui is not in this category; d) the greatest danger that the
		Communists will benefit lies in failure of the regime to solve its factional differences and meet its economic problems.

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NOTES

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- A. Moderate elements of the middle class in the Dominican Republic are beginning to lose their fear of undertaking political activity and are cautiously organizing to play a role against the Trujillo machine and the recently emerged pro-Castro agitators.
- B. Caracas has turned down a request from the Soviet Ambassador in Mexico that Venezuela be included in the itinerary of the Soviet good-will mission currently touring Latin America.
- C. The British Foreign office, which originally intended to play the visit of Yuri Gagarin in low key, says it was compelled to revise its attitude because of public, press, and parliamentary pressures.
- D. Initial Moscow reaction to the Western notes on Berlin charges routinely that the West, by rejecting a peace treaty, is "aiding and abetting sinister forces which seek to start another war." It is also charged that war hysteria and mobilization planning in the US are giving Adenauer "incentive to adventures." The statement was made over Moscow radio by the regular commentator for German audiences.
- E. The 24-hour general strike in Argentina, termed a "dress rehearsal" by its Peronista leaders, was a complete success which halted activities throughout Argentina. The demonstration of Peronista strength, which was not opposed by the government, could force a showdown between the army and the Frondizi government.

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